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Abstract  
 
 
 
In the long history of Olympic urbanisation, the creation of an “Olympic Park” where 
various Olympic facilities are concentrated has been favoured by both host cities and 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC), due to the regenerative opportunity it 
presents and its management advantages during the Games. Yet the usages and financial 
viability of such an approach after the Games were questioned by past Olympic cities, 
such that turning the post-Olympic Park into a multifunctional “mixed-use” urban 
precinct rather than a mono-functional sporting quarter was the approach taken in 
Sydney and London. This thesis explores the evolution of the mixed-use vision, its 
governance and integration into the wider urban tissues in the pre-bid, post-bid and 
post-Olympic phases, through the cases of the Sydney and London Olympic Parks, and 
highlights the evolution from Sydney to London.  
 
This long-term analysis shows that the vision of the mixed-use Olympic Park originated 
as a mixture of the existing urban socio-economic aspiration and the specific spatial 
demands of the Olympic Games. This evolved in different planning climates, along with 
changes in the governance of the Olympics and legacy planning. I argue that while in 
the case of Sydney the governance of the legacy in each phase was confined within the 
designated planning timeframe and focused on the vision within the Olympic Park, 
London’s approach was more overlapping and extended beyond the boundary of the 
Olympic site, which created a considerable difference in terms of the realisation of the 
initial mixed-use vision and integration with adjacent neighbourhoods. Although the 
thesis traces the evolution from Sydney to London, it also suggests how these cities 
shared the limits of their entrepreneurial urban governance through the application of 
the public–private partnership model to legacy planning and challenges in satisfying 
both local and regional political aspirations for the post-Olympic Park. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Research topic 
 
“…in a world which is arguably becoming culturally homogenised and in 
which places are becoming interchangeable, [mega-events] create transitory 
uniqueness, difference and localisation in space and time” (Roche, 2000, p. 7). 
 
Although they are fundamentally one-off events for the host city, “mega-events”, also 
called “hallmark events” (Hall, 1989b; Ritchie, 1984), have played a significant role in 
modern society. Roche defines the term “mega-events” as “large-scale cultural 
(including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic culture, mass 
popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000, p. 1). Ritchie calls them 
“major one-time or recurring events of limited duration developed primarily to enhance 
the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long 
term” (Ritchie, 1984, p. 2). 
 
The Olympics are the biggest sporting event of this kind (Hill, 1992). In hosting this 
mega-sporting event, the host cities have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity not only to 
display their cities to the world but also to gain a means of developing their existing 
urban structures with large budget infusions. On the one hand, in the age of inter-urban 
competition, the Olympic Games have been employed by host cities as a powerful tool 
for global promotion to attract investment and spur further growth. On the other hand, it 
has been utilised as a strong trigger to accelerate a massive urban regeneration. 
According to Roche, the mega-event could be considered “one of the most visible 
elements of the current local strategies of survival” (Roche, 2000, p. 147), and it is 
evident that many Olympic host cities have achieved rapid urban development 
throughout the history of the Olympic movement.  
 
However, the long-term viability of such Olympic-led urban development has been 
questioned. Roberts and Mcleod suggest that “a common legacy of many past events 
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has been a huge debt and a great deal of under-utilised infrastructure” (Roberts and 
Mcleod, 1989, p. 242). Indeed, many stadia built to Olympic standards in past Olympic 
cities have struggled to find an appropriate use after the Games. Preventing Olympic 
facilities from becoming “white elephants” has been as crucial as building them as 
“icons” for the Games. The concern about post-Olympic utilisation extends further 
when applied to Olympic parks, as these go beyond single buildings and cover entire 
urban precincts. An Olympic Park in which various competition venues are 
concentrated has been created in most Olympic cities as a focal point for the Olympic 
Games, and it has been strategically associated with the urban regenerative aspiration of 
post-industrial cities (Preuss, 2004, p. 82). However, while various academics have 
reported the problem of utilising the post-Olympic stadium (for example, Preuss, 2004; 
Searle, 2002), there is relatively little research on the utilisation of the Olympic Park 
after the Olympic event. Furthermore, as Roche suggests, the concerns of the 
post-Olympic spatial vision begin much earlier when the city decides to host the Games, 
but analysis of how the legacy concerns are embedded in the long-term planning is 
missing from the existing Olympic studies. 
 
Against this backdrop, this research aims to explore the planning process of defining the 
usability of the post-Olympic Park as a critical issue for the Olympic legacy. I will 
examine it through the cases of the Sydney Olympic Park (SOP) built for the 2000 
Olympic Games and the London Olympic Park (LOP) constructed in East London for 
the 2012 Games. In particular, as both cities planned the post-Olympic Park as a 
“mixed-use” urban precinct, in which not only sports but also other urban functions 
such as residential and commercial uses would be included, the land-use planning, by 
which the city defines the functionalities within the site, is the key planning concept. 
While the land-use plan, or the mixed-use plan in my case, is fundamentally a matter of 
the spatial configuration within the designated area, many authors criticise the 
segregation of the specialised urban precinct (for example, Hannigan, 1998; Judd, 1999). 
It is also crucial to consider how it can be related to the urban context. I will therefore 
examine the way in which land-use within the Olympic site has been formulated and its 
relation with the urban context has been (or has not been) considered, from emergence 
of the Olympic vision to the post-Olympic phase. 
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1.2 Research background: the Olympics and the urban legacy 
 
1.2.1 Olympics urbanisation: the dominance of the “Olympic Park” model  
Since the first modern Olympic Games were staged in Athens in 1896, twenty-six 
summer Olympic Games have been held in cities throughout the world. Roche points 
out that the Olympic movement can be observed as “a collection of unique features due 
to the diverse conditions of each host city” (Roche, 2000, p. 135), and from the urban 
point of view, it is understood that throughout the long history of the Olympic 
movement, the ways in which host cities have employed the “Olympic impact” to 
change their urban structures has varied (Fig. 1-1). 
 
With more spatial concerns, Kelly argues that that the role of architecture and planning 
in the staging of a hallmark event can be either “proactive” or “reactive”, which 
suggests the difference between employing the Olympics to conduct urban 
redevelopment and shaping the Games based on the existing urban conditions (Kelly, 
1989, p. 245). These different characters of Olympic urbanisation in past Olympic cities 
has been extensively examined by various authors (for example, Essex and Chalkley, 
1998; Liao and Pitts, 2006; Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b). These authors provide 
historical analysis of Olympic cities in light of different types of urban development, 
and their studies demonstrate that the “proactive” approach has been dominant, 
especially since the 1960s. As a result, most host cities have created some kind of 
“Olympic Park”, by concentrating different sporting competition venues in certain 
places (Fig. 1-2). 
 
There are multiple reasons for the dominance of the “proactive” approach and the 
creation of the Olympic Park associated with urban regeneration. Firstly, from the host 
city’s point of view, it is closely related to urban decline in post-industrial cities. Ward 
suggests that the decline of manufacturing began in the late 1960s, and the 
post-industrial city had to find “new ways of coping with the disappearance of 
manufacturing and the redundant spaces and lives it has left behind” (Ward, 1998, pp. 
187–192). Further, Harvey puts great emphasis on the creation of spectacular urban 
space as a means of attracting capital and people in the age of inter-urban competition 
(Harvey, 1988, p. 92). Given urban decline and necessity of urban imagining associated 
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with urban regeneration in post-industrial cities, the “site of hallmark events is justified 
in the name of urban renewal” (Kelly, 1989, p. 266; Hall, 1989a, p. 28). In particular, 
the creation of Olympic parks, which Sheard suggests require a minimum of one 
kilometre square of land, is justified as a way to regenerate large post-industrial sites 
which may otherwise remain derelict (Sheard, 2001, p. 203). Meanwhile, Liao and Pitts 
note that, throughout the Olympic movement, the venue concentration approach has 
been favoured by the IOC for practical and ideological reasons, and many host cities 
have adopted it in their own urban agenda. With this marriage between the IOC’s 
preference and the host city’s regenerative objective, the Olympic Park has been 
dominant in the history of Olympic urbanisation. 
 
1.2.2 Concerns regarding the Olympic legacy  
While the research on Olympic-led urban development has developed since the late 
1990s, there has also been great concern about the legacy of the Olympic-led 
development. Cashman suggests that “almost every Olympic city since the Games were 
revived in 1896” has some form of legacy (Cashman, 1998, p. 107), but he claims that 
utilising the word “legacy” in scholarly studies is a recent phenomenon that has 
increasingly been used by academics since the 1990s (Cashman, 2003, p. 35).1 In the 
realm of Olympic studies, the focus of the Olympic legacy shifted from the Olympic-led 
urban changes which presumably could not have taken place without the Olympics 
(Essex and Chalkley, 1998), to the long-term urban phenomenon, rather than simple 
physical commodities with the ideology of “urban sustainability” (Liao and Pitts, 2006).  
 
The discourse surrounding the urban Olympic legacy involves various viewpoints, but 
much of the existing research focuses on the problem of post-Olympic usage of 
Olympic facilities, exemplified by Mangan’s claims that many “limping white elephants” 
have shaped the perceptions of “Olympic legacy”(Mangan, 2010). Bridging the 
discrepancy between explicit Olympic usage and undefined post-Olympic usage has 
been the key issue for Olympic host cities, and it has long been discussed.2 This 
                                                  
1 It is worth noting that in the realm of mega-event studies, there was a significant shift from using the word “impact” 
to “legacy” in the late 1990s, which I will argue reflects how academic interest in mega-events began to focus on the 
“post”-event phase, rather than an ambiguous mega-event timeframe. 
2 For example, the International Union of Architects (UIA) and the International Association for Sports and Leisure 
Facilities (IAKS) organised “the programme of the summer Olympic Sports facilities and their Post-Olympic 
Utilisation” on the occasion of the Munich Olympics in 1972, and issued the “UIA manifesto of Munich”. The 
manifesto emphasised that post-Olympic predictions should determine the physical size of the Olympic facilities, 
rather than constructing the venues simply by following the requirements of the international event. Further, the 
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negative legacy is also described as being a consequence of the political intention to 
establish the “iconic” architecture built for the Games as a way to attract global 
audiences (for example, Latouche, 2011; Roult and Lefebvre, 2012 (for the 1976 
Montreal Games), Gold, 2011 [2007] (for the 2004 Athens Games) and Ren, 2008b (for 
the 2008 Beijing Games)).3 
 
Thus, there is various research on the post-Games utilisation of individual Olympic 
stadia (for example, Berg et al., 2002; Searle, 2002), but analysis of the post-Olympic 
Park as an urban precinct with concentrated stadia has been relatively absent. As already 
mentioned, the Olympic Park has been the dominant urban development model in 
Olympic cities, but there is little literature exploring the life of the Olympic Park after 
the Games.4 
 
Along with increasing interest in the Olympic legacy in the academic discourse, the 
IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy has altered significantly. For example, in the 
1970s, an age of massive urban development associated with the Olympic Games, the 
IOC President Lord Killanin commented on the astonishing financial deficit of the 
Montreal Games in 1976. He contended: “sport was not guilty for this”. 5  As 
represented by Killanin’s comment, the IOC’s main concern was “sport”, and it kept a 
certain distance from the host city’s urban transformations and their consequences until 
quite recently (Hiller, 2003, p. 102). Yet the term “legacy” is now clearly part of the 
Olympic Charter, which stipulates that one of the IOC’s roles is “to promote a positive 
legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC, 2003d, p. 
14). From a different viewpoint, Mangan suggests that there are essentially three 
reasons behind the IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy: to provide evidence that 
the event has been good for the host city / nation, to justify the use of scarce public 
resources, and to motivate other cities / nations to bid for future events (Mangan, 2010, 
p. 17). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
conference entitled “Olympic Games and Architecture, The future for Host Cities” was organised by the UIA and the 
IOC in 2001 in Lausanne, Switzerland. The word “sustainability” was frequently used in this conference. 
3 Also see Jencks, C. (2005) Iconic Building, Frances Lincoln Ltd, London. 
4 The problem of the post-Olympic Park has often been reported by the media. For, example, the post-Montreal 
Olympic Park was called a “burden” for the host city by the Canadian media, and the Sydney Olympic Park after the 
event was described as a “ghost town” by CNN in 2001. 
5 Huberty, E. and Wange, W. B. (1976) Die Olympischen Spiele, Montreal, Innsburk, Lingen Verlag, Munich., cited 
in Pitts, A. and Liao, H. (2009) Sustainable Olympic Design and Urban Development, Routledge, Abingdon. p. 19. 
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Against this backdrop, the IOC’s spatial strategy has gradually changed. As indicated 
already, the Olympic Park has been constructed as an urban precinct with various types 
of sports facilities and ancillary urban structures primarily used for the Olympic Games, 
and in most cases, it has remained as a significant regional or national sports complex in 
the host city after the Games. This venue concentration has been preferred by the IOC, 
but its financial viability has been questioned (Preuss, 2004, pp. 84–94). Thus, when I 
talked to a member of the IOC staff, it was suggested that: 
 
“The IOC has always asked a host city to concentrate the Olympic venues as 
much as possible and suggested to create the Olympic Park. But our question 
is whether it is sustainable.”6 
 
1.2.3 Mixed-use as a new alternative? 
Against this backdrop, a new approach for utilising the post-Olympic Park has emerged. 
Although the Athens Olympic Complex, extensively refurbished for the 2004 Olympic 
Games, remained a national sporting complex after the Olympics, Sydney (2000) and 
Beijing (2008) took a different strategy to their predecessors in the twentieth century, 
and London (2012) followed their lead. These cities have constructed Olympic parks 
with the highest degree of sporting venue concentration in the history of Olympic cities. 
Yet, unlike the previous Olympic parks, the legacy of these Olympic parks was not to 
remain as significant sports complexes but to become “mixed-use” urban precincts 
instead, in which not only sports spaces but offices, residences and educational facilities 
would be included. The recent shift to transforming the post-Olympic Park from a sports 
complex to a mixed-use urban precinct can be understood as a means of securing 
economic viability with diverse financial resources for the area, and enhancing the 
park’s liveliness with a variety of activities, as suggested by various authors (for 
example, Coupland, 1997; Grant, 2002). 
 
Sydney left all the competition venues constructed in the Olympic precinct, but its 
post-Olympic utilisation was highly criticised as “a state-of-the art ghost town” in 2001 
and 2002.7 In order to change this, the post-SOP was re-conceptualised as “a dynamic 
and diverse township for living, working and leisure” (SOPA, 2004b, p.1), and Cashman 
                                                  
6 Author’s conversation with Ms. Nuria Puig, IOC staff member, in July 2008 
7 Commentary on CNN on 11 July 2001 
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points out that this unveils the fact that the post-SOP could not survive on sport and 
recreation alone (Cashman, 2005, pp. 161–165). Subsequently, in the case of the 2008 
Olympics, Beijing also planned to transform its iconic Olympic Park, called the Beijing 
Olympic Green, into a mixed-use precinct. According to Ren, the Beijing Olympic Park 
after the Games would be a multi-functional complex with sports, entertainment, 
exhibitions, tourism and business services. Beijing’s long-term strategy was to utilise its 
internationally well-known Olympic venues, such as the National Olympic Stadium (the 
Bird’s Nest) and the Olympic Swimming Pool (the Water Cube), to attract national and 
international investment, rather than retaining them as a sporting precinct in the future, 
thus changing the post-Olympic Park into a crucial economic focal point for the city 
(Ren, 2008a, pp. 50–55). Further, in the case of London, the term “legacy” has been 
utilised extensively by the Olympic authorities since the city’s bidding campaign, and 
even before the Games, the vision of the post-Olympic Park was emphasised as a 
“mixed-use development comprising housing, employment, business, leisure and 
cultural and social facilities” (ODA, 2007d, p. 7).  
 
While mixed-use planning has been widely recognised as a useful spatial strategy for 
realising viable urban precincts, there is uncertainty about whether it is applicable to the 
post-Olympic Park, where various sporting venues would be left as a legacy of the 
Olympic Games. Griffin et al. basically agree that the mixed-use strategy - in this case, 
the idea of bringing shops and office functions to a tourist precinct - will contribute to 
long-term financial viability due to the multiple financial resources. They also state that 
the mixed-use approach will enrich life within the site, by creating “layering 
experiences” by which different people can experience the precinct in different ways 
(Hayllar and Griffin, 2005, p.526). Yet it is crucial here to carefully read the comments 
of Griffin et al., and to notice that they indicate that “a diversity of functions may be 
appropriate” (Griffin et al., 2008, p. 255) (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Cashman 
comments on the post-Olympic SOP: “a new focus on the Park as a multi-purpose 
landscape may sustain the possibility of a useful post-Games life” (Cashman, 2005, pp. 
161–166) (emphasis added). Both authors are tentative in their suggestions, and I will 
suggest that this implies some uncertainties in adopting the mixed-use urban strategy for 
a post-Olympic site. 
 
1.2.4 Timescale and spatial scale of the Olympic legacy 
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While the mixed-use strategy emerged as the “possible” solution for sustaining the 
physical Olympic legacy after the Games, some authors suggest the need for 
considering the Olympic legacy from a longer timescale in the host city, and warn that 
there is very little literature on such an issue. Hiller suggests that “mediating the 
Olympic and existing regional and local urban agenda in the host city” is the 
mechanism for creating the Olympic legacy (Hiller, 2003). In this respect, creation of 
the mixed-use post-Olympic Park can be understood as the long-term process of 
combining the physical inheritance from the Olympic Games and other non-Olympic 
functions, which could be defined in other planning policies, in one urban quarter. The 
lack of contextual views in the mega-event research is also criticised by Roche. Roche 
argues that it is crucial to examine the legacy of the mega-event in the long-term history 
of the planning process, but many existing studies fail to explore it with a longer 
timescale (Roche, 1992). The timescale of the Olympic planning defined by the IOC is 
also relatively short. The IOC has conducted the Olympic Games Global Impact Study 
since 2001 to identify the various Olympic impacts on the host city, but it defines the 
target timeframe as 11 years (2 years in the pre-bid phase, 7 years for preparation and 2 
years for the legacy) (IOC, 2006).8 Indeed, it is long-term examination that the current 
discourse on the Olympic legacy fundamentally lacks, and I will stress that this is one of 
the standpoints which I would like to address in this thesis.  
 
In addition to the absence of the long timescale in the analysis of the “mixed-use” 
Olympic Park, its spatial reach has also been less addressed in the existing Olympic 
discourse. Mono-functional Olympic parks are relevant here. For example, the Munich 
Olympic Park built for the 1972 Olympics has left a significant legacy for the city as a 
sports complex, and Bale (1993) describes it as “a milieu of achievement in sports 
which come close to being a sporting Disneyworld” (Bale, 1993, p. 144). Yet such 
specialised urban precinct has been often criticised in terms of its integration with the 
urban tissue. Judd for example called this urban segregation a “bubble”, in which highly 
prosperous places are greatly segregated from their surroundings (Judd, 1999). It should 
then be asked if a mixed-use Olympic Park has better integration with the urban tissue 
than a mono-functional sporting complex. In this respect, functional connectivity 
between the post-Olympic Park and its neighbours is crucial. Thus, extension of the 
spatial reach of the post-Olympic Park beyond the site boundaries and consideration of 
                                                  
8 Meanwhile Preuss suggests 4 years prior to the bid and 7 years for preparation. 
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the Olympic legacy in wider urban tissues is another crucial point I would like to 
explore in this thesis. 
 
 
1.3 Research cases: the Sydney and London Olympic Parks 
(Figs. 1-3 and 4) 
 
1.3.1 The Sydney Olympic Park (SOP) 
The SOP sits within Homebush Bay located at the demographic centre of the Sydney 
region (the New South Wales (NSW) region), which is located 14km west of the 
Sydney’s Central Business District (CBD), the largest business and commercial centre 
in the Sydney region, and 8km east of Parramatta, the second largest urban centre in the 
region. The SOP occupied 760 hectares of land between the Parramatta River to the 
north and the Parramatta Road to the south, and these two “arteries” are the spine of 
Sydney connecting the east and west sides of the region (Fig. 1-5).  
 
From a regional viewpoint, the Sydney region has had uneven economic development. 
While the east side, in which the CBD is located, has enjoyed economic prosperity, the 
west part of the region has been considered economically low profile. Thus, the “rise of 
western Sydney” in relation to the economically developed east side of the region has 
been an important regional development policy. Geographically, the SOP and 
Homebush Bay are located on the strategic regional western corridor, where economic 
development has been deliberately directed in recent decades (Fig. 1-6).9 
 
The current spatial character of the SOP and Homebush Bay has two folds. On the one 
hand, it is surrounded by a rich natural environment, with the Parramatta River, 
Homebush Bay, and two creeks (Powells Creek to the east and Haslams Creek to the 
west) with rich mangroves, all of which were remediated at the time of Olympic Games. 
On the other hand, it sits within a significant industrial neighbourhood and artificial 
landscape along the Parramatta Road. Indeed, the industrial use has been of significance 
in the local municipality of the SOP; the Auburn Council has been characterised as an 
“industrial commercial and warehousing municipality” (Kennedy and Kennedy, 1982, p. 
                                                  
9 Metropolitan strategies published in 1968, 1988 and 2005 suggested the urban development direction and 
designated the Parramatta Road as one of the important development areas in the Sydney region. 
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12). In particular, the south and west sides of the SOP site have developed as a 
concentrated industrial area, and warehouse-type buildings in a relatively large lot of 
land have dominated the area. While the Auburn municipality has a significant physical 
character represented by industrial and warehousing buildings, socially the area is 
characterised as one of the most multi-cultural places in the whole of Australia, as well 
as one of the most deprived economically (Davidson and McNeill, 2008).  
 
A historical study of the SOP site reveals the industrial development of Homebush Bay. 
The industrial character of this area began with the opening of the State Abattoir and the 
Brickworks in the beginning of the twenty century, and these State-owned industrial 
facilities developed along with the economic growth of the Sydney region. However, 
the subsequent trend of relocating industrial facilities to the outskirts of the region and 
the re-structuring of the manufacturing industry led to the decline of both. Further, along 
with long-term industrial use of the site, various areas in Homebush Bay have been 
utilised as dumping sites, and this has caused the significant contamination of 
Homebush Bay. Given the financial difficulty of operating both facilities in Homebush 
Bay and the significant environmental problems of the site, various visions for 
regenerating the area have been produced since the 1970s. The visions have been 
shaped by Sydney’s Olympic bidding campaigns in region. Although Sydney was 
unsuccessful several times, Homebush Bay was identified, in each bid, as the preferable 
location for a regional sports complex used for the Games, and its spatial importance in 
the region increased over Sydney’s long bidding history. In 1993 Sydney finally won the 
right to stage the Games and this spurred the regeneration of Homebush Bay and “the 
largest land remediation exercise ever undertaken in Australia”.10 
 
1.3.2 The London Olympic Park (LOP) 
The LOP (now renamed the London Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park) was built in the 
Lower Lea Valley (LLV), East London, which is located approximately 5 kilometres 
east of London’s historic financial centre, the City of London. It is also situated close to 
London’s new financial centre in the Canary Wharf area, approximately 4 kilometres 
away.11 Lea Valley is the area along the River Lea, the tributary of the River Thames 
stretching to the north, and the LLV is the southern part of the Lea Valley area (Fig. 
                                                  
10 Sydney Olympic Park Authority, “Restoring urban ecosystems at Sydney Olympic Park”,  
http://www.sydneyolympicpark.com.au/education_and_learning/environment/urban_ecosystems 
11 The indicated distance is measured from Bank station to the main Olympic Stadium site in the LOP. 
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1-7).  
 
Like the Sydney region, prosperity in the greater London area has also developed 
unevenly, but its economic distribution is the opposite of Sydney’s. While the west part 
of the region has enjoyed economic prosperity, East London has suffered multiple 
deprivations. Thus, from the beginning of the formation of the great London authority in 
2000, the “go east strategy”, which aimed to equalise the socio-economic conditions 
between East and West London, has been prioritised by the Mayor of London. This was 
further embraced in the UK Government’s priority urban regeneration strategy, the 
Thames Gateway project, which was commenced before London won the bid for the 
2012 Games. Thus, the LLV has become a strategic location for both regional and 
national development strategy.  
 
On the local scale, the socio-spatial context of the LOP in the LLV also has certain 
similarities with the SOP in Homebush Bay. Various waterways, such as the River Lea, 
the City Mill River and Waterworks River, run through the LOP site, and they are 
designated as the central features to enhance the dramatic topography and powerful 
landscaped structure of the LLV (ODA, 2007g, p. 27). Although these waterways are 
part of the natural setting of the site, they have previously blocked the east-west 
physical connection of the LLV. Furthermore, like the SOP, the site for the LOP is 
physically segregated from other areas by infrastructure, such as the A12 motorway and 
the London under/overground railways (Fig. 1-8).  
 
The Olympic site and the broader LLV area form part of four London boroughs (Tower 
Hamlets, Newham, Hackney and Waltham Forest) which Vigor et al. call the “Olympic 
Boroughs”. These boroughs have relatively young and mixed communities, and are 
described as “some of the most deprived areas in the UK” (Vigor et al., 2004, pp. 
22–25). They have suffered from high unemployment, a low proportion of managerial 
and professional skills among the residents and a high crime rate (ODA, 2007c, p. 27). 
Thus, the SOP and LOP had similar social contexts, and further the LOP has been 
recognised as a derelict industrial area, as Homebush Bay was. Decline of industrial use 
in the LLV was firmly connected with the decline of the London docklands since the 
1970s, and since then various regenerative visions have been created by various 
authorities. Yet none of them comprehensively covered the current LOP area. The 
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boundaries of the Olympic boroughs in particular crossed the middle of the current LOP 
site, and the local Unitary Development Plan of each borough was spatially confined 
within its administrative boundaries. Against this backdrop, the Olympics provided the 
opportunity to create a site-wide masterplan beyond the local boroughs’ administrative 
boundaries, and extend its ambitions to the wider LLV area.  
 
1.3.3 The SOP and LOP in the context of the Olympic movement  
Selection of my cases stemmed from my research interests in examining the evolution 
of the host city’s handling of the Olympic legacy, in particular by creating the 
mixed-use post-Olympic Park. Pitts and Liao recognise that the current concern for the 
“sustainable” Olympic urban form began at the start of the twenty-first century (Pitts 
and Liao, 2009), and in this respect, Sydney is considered the forerunner and London 
the latest example. Furthermore, the SOP and LOP have various similarities in the urban 
setting for the Games and intended legacy transformation. Both Olympic parks were 
constructed as sites of highly concentrated Olympic venues, which in both cases 
included nine competition venues during the Games, and this proposal for a great urban 
setting was appealing to the IOC in the severe bidding campaign for the 2000 and 2012 
Games (five candidate cities for the 2000 and nine applicant cities for the 2012 Games). 
As indicated earlier, after the Games, both cities transferred the Olympic Park to a 
mixed-use urban quarter in which not only sports but also other urban functions such as 
residences, retail spaces and offices are included. We can find a few examples of this in 
the history of Olympic-led urban development. Thus, while my interest in this thesis is 
to explore the mixed-use Olympic Park strategy from the viewpoint of its wider 
temporal and spatial context in the host city, I will extend my examination to the 
broader context of the Olympic movement. 
 
 
1.4 Research questions 
 
The lack of academic research on the usability of post-Olympic precincts rather than 
Olympic buildings, and the emergence of the new practical approach of transferring the 
legacy of the Olympic Park into a mixed-use urban precinct, is my research interest. 
Furthermore, given the lack of a longer timescale for the Olympic legacy in current 
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discourse, my thesis aims to explore the way in which the visions of the post-Olympic 
Park as a mixed-use urban precinct have been shaped in the long-term Olympic 
planning process, and to examine its relation to governance, by using the SOP and the 
LOP as case studies. I will emphasise in my thesis how the planning process defining 
the use of the post-Olympic precinct should be not only a matter of spatial strategy 
within the site but also an inquiry into functional integration in the wider urban planning 
context. Given the recent flourishing discourse on the Olympic legacy, I hypothesise 
that there are certain differences in planning approaches to the Olympic legacy between 
Sydney and London. In other words, beyond the examination of the evolution of the 
planning process within each city, I intend to analyse the evolution of such processes 
from one city to another. Thus, I will endeavour to answer the following three research 
questions in my thesis.  
 
Question 1 
“How has the vision of the Olympic legacy, in particular creating a mixed-use 
Olympic Park, emerged and evolved over time, and how has it been related to the 
governance of Olympic planning?  
 
My primary aim in this thesis is to assess the causes of the origin, evolution and 
implementation of the vision of Olympic legacy, in particular creating a mixed-use 
Olympic Park, in the different phases of the Olympic planning process: pre-bid, post-bid, 
and post-event, as suggested by Roche. I intend to examine the changes and continuities 
in the vision for utilising the post-Olympic Park, and its relation to planning governance 
throughout the different phases. As Hiller claims that dominance of the Olympics 
agenda often conflicts with inherited regional and local urban policies (Hiller, 2003), I 
am interested in how these different visions, especially Olympic and non-Olympic ones, 
can (or cannot) be mediated in defining the vision of a mixed-use Olympic Park. 
 
Question 2 
How has the mixed-use Olympic Park vision been integrated into the local and 
regional spatial strategies in different phases?  
 
While a mixed-used urban development is considered a spatial strategy through which 
to diversify usability within the Olympic site, which potentially contributes to the 
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long-term economic viability of the site, its relation to the local and regional urban 
context needs to be examined, in order to avoid the area being segregated in the city. In 
the regional context, the construction of a specialised urban area such as an Olympic 
Park has been often associated with the socio-economic revitalisation of a derelict area 
in the region (for example, the case of the Munich Olympic Park constructed for the 
1972 Olympics; see Pitts and Liao, 2009). However, it is often isolated from the 
regional spatial strategy and detached from the rest of the city (see the case of the 
Millennium Dome project in London (Thornley, 2000). In the local context, one of the 
negative effects in creating a new urban quarter in the city is to create a social and 
spatial contrast with an adjacent neighbourhood, despite the initial planning objective of 
bringing social benefit to the area. Thus, it is imperative to coordinate the new 
development with a local spatial strategy, but such synchronisation of a new Olympic 
site with a local and regional spatial strategy has been less examined in the existing 
literature. For example, Owen presents the local impact of the venue construction in 
Sydney but the regional dimension is less considered (Owen, 2001). In turn, Searle’s 
exploration focuses on the regional view point and there is little reference to the local 
impact (Searle, 2002; Searle, 2003). Exploration of both local and regional spatial 
strategies will methodologically provide useful resources to examine the functional 
synchronisation between the mixed-use vision in the Olympic Park and the rest of the 
area, as spatial strategies normally designate “land-specification” in the target area with 
certain political intentions (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 278–279). Thus, I will examine if the 
Olympic site has been equally integrated into the local and regional urban contexts in 
the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-Olympic phases. 
 
Question 3 
What was the evolution from Sydney to London, in terms of the approach to the 
Olympic legacy, and what was still lacking in the legacy planning? 
  
Tackling the usability of the post-Olympic Park and its integration into the urban 
context is the common planning agenda of the Olympic cities. Yet, as various authors 
suggest, after the Sydney Games, host cities as well as the IOC became increasingly 
concerned with the integration of the post-Olympic vision into the earlier stages of the 
planning process. Roche argues that the Olympics are evolving because of the transfer 
of knowledge between host cities and changing of from the IOC. Indeed, London 
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clearly suggests that “the London Games of 2012 have the ability to build upon the 
experiences of previous Olympic Games and Paralympic Games in designing and 
planning the facilities and their legacy” (ODA, 2007c, p.46). It is therefore hypothesised 
that there was a great evolution from Sydney to London in the planning approach to the 
post-Olympic Park. Yet I also theorise that there are still some areas that need to be 
re-considered in London’s legacy planning concept. Thus, my third question examines 
the limits of current Olympic legacy planning.  
 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
The aim of this thesis is to reveal the planning process of defining the use of 
post-Olympic parks through the cases of the SOP and LOP. Examination of the 
timeframe suggested by Roche - pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event - and comparison of 
this process between Sydney and London are my methodological frameworks, which I 
will discuss in depth in the subsequent chapter. Based on these frameworks, the main 
body of my thesis will constitute three parts, each of which includes the cases of Sydney 
and London. Then, my first research question, which considers the reasons behind the 
evolution of the vision of mixed-use post-Olympic parks, will be examined throughout 
the different planning phases in Sydney and London, although its origin will be 
discussed only in the pre-bid phase. My intention is to examine the evolution of the 
vision in the different planning climates of the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases. 
My second question, on the integration of the post-Olympic Park into adjacent and 
broader urban contexts, will similarly analyse each phase, in order to identify the 
changes and continuities over time. The third question, which looks at the evolution of 
Sydney and London, will also be addressed by comparing the two cases in each phase. 
Based on this consideration, this thesis will have the structure described in the next 
paragraph.  
 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will set up will set up the analytical and 
methodological framework of this thesis. My first intention is to extract the analytical 
points for the subsequent empirical chapters by reviewing the existing literature. I will 
then demonstrate the methodological concerns for exploring the long-term planning 
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process of defining the spatial vision of the post-Olympic Park in Sydney and London. 
 
Following the discussion of the analytical and methodological framework of this thesis, 
Part I (Chapters 3 and 4) will examine the planning process of the SOP and LOP in the 
pre-bid phase, which Roche identifies as a conceptualisation stage for Olympic-led 
urban development. Chapter 3 will consider the case of the SOP in the period before 
Sydney won the bid in 1993, and Chapter 4 will aim to examine the LOP before 
London’s successful bid in 2005. As both cities engaged in long-term bidding for the 
Games, my intention in both chapters is to demonstrate the way in which the vision of 
the usability of the post-Olympic Park in both cities was shaped over the long history of 
the bidding process, and to examine how it has been related to the non-Olympic vision 
set out in the different planning frameworks. My exploration in this phase will be 
concluded to point out the similarities and differences between Sydney and London in 
terms of embedding the Olympic vision within the city’s own urban development 
strategy.  
 
Part II (Chapters 5 and 6) will comprise an examination of the post-bid phase, which is 
the seven-year period between the host city selection and the Olympic Games. As 
Roche identifies, the planning priority in this phase is to re-evaluate the bid concept and 
implement the construction project, which Hall (1989a) suggests as a “fast-tracking” 
planning process. My focus in this part is to examine the degree to which the vision of 
usability of the post-Olympic Park was integrated into this “fast-track” Olympic 
planning process, and critically examine the stability of the bid concept during the 
post-bid phase along with the evolving governance of the Olympic / legacy planning. 
My interest in this chapter is also the implementation process. In particular I look at the 
involvement of the private sector and its impact on maintaining the initial vision. I will 
also explore the degree to which the vision of the post-Olympic Park was (or was not) 
integrated into the wider planning context in the city. As there were fundamentally 
different climates in legacy planning between Sydney and London, I aim to identify the 
evolution from Sydney to London in conducting the legacy planning during the 
fast-track Olympic preparation.  
 
Following the previous pre- and post-bid exploration, Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) look at 
the post-Olympic phases in Sydney and London. According to Roche, the planning role 
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of the post-event phase is the evaluation and re-conceptualisation of the development. 
Applying these ideas of Roche, my intention in Part III is to consider the experiences of 
the mixed-use post-Olympic Park and to look at the associated planning responses in the 
post-Olympic phase. Yet, while the timeframe to examine Sydney’s post-Olympic phase 
is sufficient, London’s legacy period is limited to just one year at the time of writing. 
Thus, unlike the previous parts, the target timeframe is greatly different between Sydney 
and London. Yet, given the anticipation of London’s more advanced legacy planning 
approach, this still provides various empirical materials to discuss London’s legacy 
strategy, and this will make it possible to observe the similarities and differences 
between the two cities in terms of creating the mixed-use urban precincts in the wider 
urban tissues.   
 
Finally, Chapter 9 will accumulate the findings in the previous three parts and discuss 
the changes over time (pre-bid to post-Olympic phases) and in different places (Sydney 
to London), in relation to the analytical concepts raised in Chapter 2. After 
demonstrating these primary concerns, I will conclude this chapter with propositions to 
the future Olympic cities which were learnt from this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Approach to the Olympic legacy:  
theoretical and methodological frameworks  
 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
The first part of this chapter will develop the theoretical framework through the review 
of relevant existing literature on the Olympics and urban studies. Aspers suggests that 
the researcher uses theories as “schemes of reference”, which give focus to the study 
(Aspers, 2004, p. 7). This not only introduces the existing studies relevant to my thesis 
but also provides the framework under which the obtained data will be interpreted and 
coded (Terraco, 1997). Thus, corresponding to the research questions raised in Chapter 
1, the following points will constitute the theoretical framework to examine them.  
 
2.1.1 The Olympic legacy, its ambiguity and multiple dimensions 
As was briefly suggested in Chapter 1, it is relatively recent phenomenon that the 
Olympic legacy became a crucial agenda in the academic and practical realms 
(Cashman, 2003; Toohey, 2008; Leopkey, 2009). The concept of the Olympic legacy 
emerged in the Olympic circle slightly after the development of the “sustainability” 
agenda in the 1990s, which had a strong relationship with the environmental concerns 
surrounding the area used for the winter Olympic Games. Gold and Gold suggest that, 
in the context of the Olympic Movement, while the term “sustainability” was developed 
along with the increasing notion of “global” environmental concern, the concept of 
“legacy” emerged as “the guiding framework for considering “urban” outcomes”. They 
further stress that the term “legacy” became an all-inclusive framework, as it has been 
loosely defined and therefore provided flexibility (Gold and Gold, 2013, p.3530). While 
Gold and Gold see “flexibility” in the concept of the Olympic legacy, Hiller finds 
“ambiguity” in it. Due to the ambiguous nature of defining the Olympic legacy, Hiller 
states that evaluations of the Olympic legacy greatly vary depending on who is doing 
the evaluating. He particularly underlines the different perceptions between the IOC and 
a host city in regard to the Olympic legacy (Hiller, 2012, p.151). 
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One of the crucial triggers encouraging the study of Olympic legacy was the 
international symposium held by the IOC in 2003, called “the Legacy of the Olympic 
Games, 1984–2000” (IOC, 2003c).12 Similar to Gold and Gold’s suggestion, the 
symposium admitted difficulty in defining the meaning of the Olympic legacy, in 
particular when it was translated in different languages and cultures. The symposium 
recognised that Olympic legacy had multi-disciplines13 and wider spatial reach (i.e. 
local and global). The symposium also predicted that legacy would change over time, 
and this would make it more difficult to identify the characters (IOC, 2003b).  
 
Despite initial difficulty in defining its meanings, numerous studies regarding the 
Olympic legacy have been conducted from diverse points of view, particularly since the 
Olympic legacy conference in 2003(see IOC, 2013a), and there are various ways of 
categorising the different types of Olympic legacy. The IOC identifies five types of 
Olympic legacy in its latest document on the Olympic legacy issued in 2013: 1) 
sporting;2) social;3) environmental;4) urban; and 5) economic (IOC, 2013b). Yet, as 
Leopkey addresses, Olympic legacies have multiple dimensions and there is 
inter-connectivity between different types (Leopkey, 2009, see alsoAgha et al., 2012).  
 
My research interest in this thesis can be categorised as relating to the urban legacy in 
terms of the above IOC categorisation, but it inevitably has multiple dimensions. It not 
only relates to “hard” aspects such as urban beautification and transportation upgrading 
through Games-related urban regeneration (see Kassens-Noor, 2012, for an in-depth 
exploration of the transportation legacy in the host cities) but also includes “soft” 
aspects such as place marketing, which is difficult to evaluate and justify (Hiller, 2012). 
In brief, the urban legacy has both tangible and intangible aspects, which the IOC put 
great emphasis on in dealing with equally (IOC, 2003b, see also Jinxi and Mangan, 
2008; Mangan and Dyreson, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, an urban legacy can be understood as a junction of the social, sporting, 
                                                  
12 It is worth mentioning that there were two symposiums related to the physical aspects of the Olympic legacy:  
IOC (1997b) Olympic Villages: A Hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences, Lausanne. 
IOC (2001) Olympic Games and Architecture –The Future for Host Cities, Lausanne. 
13The Symposium identified six types of Olympic legacies; 1.Urban and environmental; 2.Sporting; 3.Economic and 
Tourism; 4.Political; 5.Cultural, social and communication; 6. Education and documentation (IOC (2003c) The 
Legacy of the Olympic Games, 1984–2000, International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, Switzerland  
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environmental and economic dimensions of Olympic legacies, a view that is 
materialised in Vigor et al.’s book, “After the Gold Rush: A sustainable Olympics for 
London”. The book explores the social, economic and environmental dimension of 
London’s potential legacy by regenerating the vast site in the Lower Lea Valley (see 
social: Raco, 2004, economic: Crookston, 2004, sporting: Coalter, 2004, and 
environmental: Levett, 2004). Yet the book was published before London’s successful 
bid in 2005 and essentially discusses various impacts happening in the Lower Lea 
Valley; spatial aspects, such as land use and physical transformation of the Olympic site, 
are less touched upon. Meanwhile, there are also various records relating to the 
construction of the LOP, which explore the architectural and urban design progress from 
the pre- to post-bid periods (see Hartman, 2012; Hopkins and Neal, 2012; Dyckhoff, 
2012). These books trace the transformation of the design of the Olympic Park and 
venues in the Park, but lack social, economic and political contextual views on the new 
urban quarter in the Lower Lea Valley. Thus, I wish to stress that my research on the 
Olympic Park as urban legacy not only includes spatial but also social, economic and 
political dimensions.  
 
2.1.2 Legacy as a process  
In addition to the multi-dimension of the Olympic legacy, I would like to mention that 
the Olympic legacy is a process rather than a consequence. The term “legacy” is defined 
as “anything handed down by an ancestor or predecessor”.14 Yet, many authors suggest 
that the concern of the legacy should not be a matter of the post-Olympic period, but 
should be extended into the bidding phases in the host city (McIntosh, 2003; Leopkey, 
2009). Indeed, there should be some forms of the legacy even in the unsuccessful bid 
cities (Hiller, 2000; Alberts, 2009; Diaey et al., 2011; Torres, 2012). The IOC also 
recognises the Olympic legacy is a concern throughout different phases of hosting the 
Olympic Games, as its legacy bibliography categorises existing literature on the 
Olympic legacy in three different planning phases (1.candidature, 2.Pre-Games and 
3.post-Games) (IOC, 2013a).15  
 
The most common idea of examining the Olympic legacy in different phases is to 
                                                  
14 Oxford English Dictionary (2007), Oxford University Press, www.oed.com 
15 The 2003 legacy sympisium concluded with some recommendations suggesting the legacy concept from the 
bidding process. 
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identify the gap between the bid promise (candidature phase) and reality (post-Games 
phase) through implementation(pre-Games phase) (see Mean et al., 2004; Kornblatt, 
2006). The need for a long-term view of the Olympic legacy also recalls Hiller’s 
observation that there will be unanticipated and unplanned outcomes in the process. Due 
to the possible unintended outcomes involved in the “Olympic legacy”, Hiller disagrees 
with utilising the word “legacy”. Instead he adopts the term “Olympic outcomes”, 
which he thinks has both intended and unintended meanings (Hiller, 2003). In a similar 
vein, Mangan and Dyreson recognise the Olympic legacies as “intended and unintended” 
outcomes. Their concept of the Olympic legacy as “intended and unintended” outcomes 
includes more than “planned and unplanned” elements, as it incorporates manipulation 
of the initial vision on a longer timescale (Mangan and Dyreson, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, referring to the mega-event driven urban development in the age of urban 
competition, Hall argues that the Olympic legacy should not be treated just as an urban 
phenomenon after the Games, but rather should be considered as part of the long-term 
urban development process. Hall particularly emphasises that the Olympic legacy 
cannot be separated from the host city’s urban redevelopment and place-promotion 
strategy, and suggests that it is formulated through the process of implementing these 
regenerative and imaginative aspirations, in the age of inter-urban competition (Hall, 
1997). In similar vein, Roche criticises a lot of research on the impacts of mega-events 
on host cities which fails to understand the context of the planning process. He argues 
that without understanding the history of urban development, it is impossible to fully 
understand the nature of the legacy (Roche, 1992; Roche, 1994).  
 
Indeed, despite of flourishing number of the literature on the Olympic legacy, it seems 
to me that there is relatively little empirical research connecting different phase of 
Olympic planning, which explore how the vision of the Olympic legacy was created, 
developed and implemented. In particular, there are less qualitative researches of this 
kind, compared to the quantitative researches on investigating the changes between 
different phases (for example in the case of Beijing, United Nations, 2007; United 
Nations, 2009 and in the case of Sydney, Giesecke and Madden, 2007). This is also true 
for the governmental and institutional publication on the 2012 London Games. The 
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Commission for a Sustainable London,16 for example, launched various publications 
during the post-bid and post-event phases.17 Although the Commission published the 
reports throughout time, the analytical points of the Olympic legacy in each document 
varied. There are some documents which explores the evolution from the bid promise to 
the implementation, its consequences in the post-event phase is less touched (for 
example, Commission for a Sustainable London, 2012a; Commission for a Sustainable 
London, 2012c). In similar vein, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport of the 
UK government (DCMS) had published numerous documents on the London’s Olympic 
legacy as quarterly reports,18 and issued planning strategy (DCMS, 2010d) and the 
evaluation documents on the impacts and legacy of the London Games (DCMS, 
2011-13; DCMS, 2012). Yet, the urban legacy, for example, did not appear in every 
book, and evaluation book mainly focuses on post-bid and limited duration of the 
post-bid phase (one year after the Games). Thus, although the case of the 2012 London 
Games certainly contribute to flourishing the literature on the Olympic legacy, there is 
little literature which comprehensively tracks the changes of the legacy vision from the 
pre-bid to the post-Game time.  
 
The timescale of the Olympic legacy, furthermore, can go beyond the planning process 
of an Olympic host city. Given the global reach of the impact of certain Olympic Games, 
the legacy of the Olympics is also inherited by subsequent host cities. Roche suggests 
that the host city has the opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of 
predecessors and this makes each Olympic city both standardised and unique (Roche, 
2000, p. 137). Roche’s argument encourages us to look at the Olympic legacy in the 
context of the Olympic movement beyond a specific Olympic city. There are various 
studies which examine the historical evolution of Olympic-led urban development (for 
example, Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Liao and Pitts, 2006; Baim, 2009) and one with 
more emphasis on the Olympic legacy (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-a). There are also 
studies specifically focusing on evolution of Olympic villages (Spà et al., 1997; Muñoz, 
2006). Yet their studies are narratives of the evolution of the Olympic host cities, and 
the connection between different Olympic cities is rarely touched upon. Thus, in this 
thesis, the concept of “legacy as process” is relevant not only within Sydney or London, 
                                                  
16 The Commission for a Sustainable London is an independent body established in 2007 in order to monitor the 
sustainability aspects of the London 2012 planning and construction which the bid organisation promised.  
17 Regularly publications by the Commission for a Sustainable London can be found in the bibliography.. 
18 Regularly publications by the DCMS can be found in the bibliography..  
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but also to the evolution from Sydney to London in terms of the planning strategy for 
the Olympic legacy.  
 
2.1.3 The Olympics as “external” forces  
While consideration of the Olympic legacy in the long-term process is an underlying 
theme in this thesis, Hiller’s suggestion of the Olympics as an “external” force is 
another crucial concept applied throughout this thesis. Hiller argues that: 
 
“The dilemma for a host city is that the ground rules for the event are 
established by a body external to the city […] Olympic is in many ways an 
intrusion (though often welcome one) in normal urban process and urban 
decision-making” (Hiller, 2003, p. 102) (emphasis added).19 
 
“Externality” has also been acknowledged as an agent of accelerating urban 
regeneration in the city. Robert and Sykes point out that forces of urban regeneration are 
“multi-causal in origin”, and suggests that “they reflect a range of influences which 
emanate from both within and without a city” (Roberts and Sykes, 2000, p. 24). Their 
view is that urban changes are a reaction to the effort of positioning the city within the 
global network, and on the other hand, are greatly influenced by inner city urban politics. 
In a similar vein, Mumford, in his classic book, The Culture of Cities, critically argued 
that “remote forces and influences intermingle with the local and their conflicts are no 
less significant than their harmonies” (Mumford, 1940, p.4). Mumford suggests that 
certain pressures from outside significantly shape cities, and often they are against local 
interests.  
 
While externality has been widely identified as an agent behind urban changes, 
“externality” of mega-events is more explicit and applicable for a limited duration, as 
Kelly claims that mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup have their 
own specific functional, spatial and logistical requirements (Kelly, 1989, p. 265). The 
dilemma for the Olympic host city is to mediate the Olympic spatial requirements 
designated by the “external” bodies with the local and regional demands beyond the 
                                                  
19 Branch et al. similarly point out that “from a local point of view, the mega-event is seen as largely imposed from 
outside, having social consequences, and producing significant social changes”. Branch, K., Hooper, A. D. and 
Creighton, J. (1984) Guide to Social Assessment: A Framework for Assessing Social Change. , Westview Press, 
London., p. 55. 
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event. Hiller points out that the “externality” of the Olympic Games causes exceptional 
circumstances in the realm of mega-event-led urban planning processes, and this 
initiates both intended and unintended consequences in the host city (Hiller, 2003, pp. 
103–104). 
 
The conflict between Olympic demands and host city interests can be identified in the 
initial bid phase. Preuss critically observes that the IOC’s “practical and ideological” 
spatial rules are crucial for bidding cities looking to win the right to stage the Games 
under severe inter-urban competition, and this causes homogenisation of the Olympic 
cities despite their diverse urban characters. Preuss suggests that:  
 
“The high competition of bid cities forces them to follow all requirements the 
IOC sets….it forces the bid cities into the so called ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. That 
means the cities offer ever more to the Olympic Movement and increase their 
costs without gaining an advanced position due to the fact that all bid cities 
offer the same” (Preuss, 2004, p. 290) (emphasis added). 
 
Preuss claims that the severe inter-urban competition has forced the Olympic cities to 
adopt the IOC’s preferred spatial setting, for example the venue concentration approach, 
in their urban concepts, and doubts its suitability for all the host cities. The IOC as the 
powerful “externality” to the city plays a dominant role in re-structuring the urban 
tissues in the host city.  
 
Furthermore, “externality” also creates significant impacts on the planning process in 
the host city. One of the most discussed planning constraints of the mega-event, which 
is set out by “external body” is the unmovable deadline (see also Hall, 1989b; Hall, 
1989a). While this is often employed as the rationale for accelerating urban 
development, which cannot be done without certain deadlines (Preuss, 2004), this time 
pressure also creates a special planning climate for the preparation of the mega-event. 
The “fast-track” planning system is frequently employed to meet the fixed deadline, and 
this often ignores democratic planning processes such as public consultation and 
transparent decision-making (Hall, 1992, pp. 125–127).  
 
Against this backdrop, there have been great concerns about how the Olympic legacy 
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can be integrated into the fast-track planning process. Current discourse on Olympic 
studies particularly puts great emphasis on the importance of an initial commitment to 
the legacy. Although the Olympic legacy is essentially considered to comprise the assets 
or phenomena beyond the Games, various scholars now argue that the Olympic legacy 
is a matter of consideration even before the bidding. Cashman, however, points out that 
such “legacy planning” is hard to integrate into the Olympic planning before the Games, 
due to the time constraints of the mega-event preparation. Cashman observes that all the 
core efforts of the Games’ authorities are directed towards the short-term goal of hosting 
successful Games, and therefore he argues that there is a great danger that key decisions 
on the Olympic legacy will be made “on the run” or “on an ad-hoc basis” (Cashman, 
1998). In addition to the time constraints, Cashman raises organisational discontinuity 
as a potential issue which prevents legacy planning. He points out that the Olympic 
legacy is often looked upon as a secondary vision before the Games, and at the time 
when legacy comes under serious consideration after the Games, many of the important 
local Olympic institutions, including the local organising committee, are winding up. 
Thus, Cashman questions the “consistency of vision” of the fragmented organisational 
structures throughout the planning process (Cashman, 1998; Cashman, 2003). 
 
2.1.4 Entrepreneurial urban governance as a powerful driver 
While “externality” is the key concept for understanding the potential conflict between 
the Olympic host city’s own interests and the special planning climate in the host city, 
entrepreneurial urban governance is a powerful driver to push the urban development 
associated with hosting the mega-event. It deeply involved in the initial aspiration of 
hosting the mega-event, the implementation process after winning the bid and the 
post-Olympic development phases.  
 
Initially, the host city’s aspiration of staging the Olympics is greatly connected with its 
economic growth strategy in the age of inter-urban competition. Harvey observes that 
the transition from industrial to post-industrial society caused ever-increasing 
inter-urban competition seeking the people and money in the global market (Harvey, 
1988, p.92), and “the shift of urban governance from managementalism to 
entrepreneurialism” is firmly connected with survival strategies in inter-urban 
competition. Against this backdrop, he argues that the organisation of urban spectacles 
such as Olympics have become “prominent facets of strategies of urban regeneration” 
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which have become the means of attracting inward investment to the city (Harvey, 1989, 
p. 9). In a similar vein, employing the case of Cape Town’s bid for the 2000 Games, 
Hiller suggests that the city’s great motivation for bidding for the Olympic Games was 
based on “urban boosterism”, in which political and business coalitions were formed to 
advocate a pro-growth strategy. Hiller however argues that such urban growth strategies 
eventually prioritise economic prosperity rather than social benefit (Hiller, 2000). 
 
In the implementation of the mega-event, the entrepreneurial urban governance 
becomes more visible through the formation of a public–private partnership (PPP), 
which Harvey stresses is the crucial mechanism for entrepreneurial governance (Harvey, 
1989). Employing PPPs in urban mega-projects in general has been recognised as a 
useful method, in particular when the public funds are limited (Flyvbjerg, 2003). The 
financial burden of preparing the spatial setting for the Games has been widely 
discussed, and in previous Olympic cities, the severe deficit left after the Games has 
been recognised by various authors (Preuss, 2004; Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b; 
Mangan and Dyreson, 2010). Montreal for example had to shoulder 30 years’ debt for 
the construction of the Olympic facilities for the 1976 Games, and it is widely believed 
that Athens’ significant public expenditure for the 2004 Games became one of the great 
triggers of the subsequent financial crisis in Greece. While the Olympic host cities have 
found difficulty in securing the financial resources with public money, in particular at 
the time of the expansion of the Olympic Games in terms of its size, the recent 
American Olympic cities, Los Angeles (1984) and Atlanta (1996), demonstrated 
different ways of delivering the Olympics and the legacy. Both cities employed PPPs in 
order to reduce public subsidies, and strategically tried to minimise the physical 
Olympic legacy, along with their commercially oriented Olympic planning structures 
and financial strategies (Andranovich et al., 2001; Burbank et al., 2001; Rutheiser, 
1996).  
 
While avoiding the financial burden of staging the Games, Los Angeles and Atlanta’s 
entrepreneurial governance also had certain limits. One of the critiques of the 
entrepreneurial Olympic planning is securing the social value in economically oriented 
strategies. Indeed, most of the critiques of Atlanta’s entrepreneurial approach have been 
on the significant discrepancy between what the local residents needed and what the 
Olympic authorities, which largely reflected the voices of regional business leaders, 
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aimed to achieve for Atlanta’s future economic development (Andranovich et al., 2001; 
Burbank et al., 2001; Rutheiser, 1996). In this respect, the identification of the 
beneficiary is a crucial issue in examining the legacy of the event. Hall suggests that in 
the context in which the organisers often address the benefits of the event for 
“community” in the host city, the question should then be on “which community” 
benefits. Echoing Hiller’s critique of urban boosterism, which fails to maintain the 
social promise, Hall also identifies difficulty in securing the social interests against the 
growth coalitions (Hall, 1997). The question of the social benefit of Olympics-related 
regeneration has also been touched on in the existing literature. Hughes reports on the 
gentrification process in the case of the legacy of creating the Olympic village in 
Barcelona (Hughes, 1999), and Raco also questions if deprived local residents could 
gain any benefits as property developers pursue their economic interests by regenerating 
the Lower Lea Valley (Raco, 2004). These authors thus address the importance of 
securing the social legacy in the economic regeneration associated with Olympics-led 
urban development. 
 
Furthermore, various authors have pointed out uncertainties of entrepreneurial 
governance through PPPs when applied to mega-projects. Flyvbjerg suggests that the 
public and private sectors’ ambiguous responsibility for the project often leads to the 
collapse of the PPP. The ambiguity here does not only mean the role each sector plays in 
the project but also management of the various risks involved in conducting the 
mega-project. Flyvbjerg argues that without clarification of the balance between the 
public and private sectors, highly biased outcomes in which either the public or private 
sector’s interests are prioritised may result (Flyvbjerg, 2003). Furthermore, Flyvbjerg 
indicates that involvement of the private sector is highly dependent on the market 
conditions, and this is one of the great uncertainties in a PPP. From a slightly different 
viewpoint, Harvey argues that entrepreneurial governance is highly fluid as it seeks 
speculative investments in an unstable market economy (Harvey, 1989).  
 
2.1.5 Land-use plans as a representation of a process of mediating different visions  
My primary concern in this thesis is the planning process of defining the use of the 
post-Olympic Park, and this will be spatially represented in the land-use plan as a 
representation of a process mediating different visions. The problem of long-term 
usability of Olympic-led urban development beyond the Games has been long identified. 
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As indicated earlier, Hiller observes that one of the causes of the negative aspects of the 
Olympic legacy is the difficulty in embedding the “external” factor described above into 
the city context, and indicates that “the tension between the Olympic agenda and the 
host city agenda” may lead to a divorce between the Olympic-led urban project and the 
host city’s wider development plan (Hiller, 2003, p. 107). Kelly differently points out 
that the architects and planners involved in the mega-event are faced with a range of 
expectations which may or may not be consistent and coherent (Kelly, 1989, p. 266). 
Thus, the usage of the post-Olympic Park is understood as a matter of political conflict 
between different Olympic and non-Olympic authorities, which I highlight in this thesis.  
 
In the realm of urban planning, this conflict between different authorities will be well 
represented in the land-use plan of the Olympic site. Kaiser et al. argue that “land use 
planning and decision-making resemble a high-stakes competition over an area’s future 
land-use pattern,” and suggest that the conflict is not only over the contents of the 
land-use plan, but also over the procedures of land-use regulations, plans, and 
development decisions (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 6–8). In a similar vein, Pacione suggests 
that “the net effect of socio-spatial process is revealed most clearly in the land-use 
structure of the city”, and claims that the land-use is the element most susceptible to 
changes in urban landscape (Pacione, 2005, p. 139). Thus, I will draw on their concept 
of the land-use plan as a spatial representation of the various political conflicts, and 
utilise it as a means of the examining the process of mediating different political 
aspirations. 
 
Echoing the discussion of the current entrepreneurial governance, Kaiser et al. further 
indicate the socio-economic dimensions of the land-use planning. They argue that 
land-use stakeholders such as market-oriented players, governmental players, interest 
groups, and land planners are continuously in conflict over not only the contents of 
land-use planning, but also the way in which it proceeds. One of the significant areas of 
conflict over the land-use is the fight between the social and market values. Keiser et al. 
define “social land value” as largely represented by the history accumulated in the area 
over time, with certain groups of stakeholders supporting the status quo, and “market 
values” represent the highest and best use of land for the financial return to other groups 
of stakeholders. The authors suggest that the two values become sources of conflict over 
land-use (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 42–51). This further recalls Harvey’s suggestion of the 
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struggle between “use and exchange” values in urban land-use. Harvey criticises these 
biased priorities that depend on stakeholders, and argues that there is a lack of 
comprehensive thinking to satisfy both values in land-use planning (Harvey, 2009, pp. 
153–194).  
 
On an architectural scale, the struggle of balancing social and economic interests has 
also been a crucial issue for the utilisation of the post-Olympic facilities. Preuss points 
out that selection of the type of usage is a socio-economic and indeed political matter, as 
it greatly concerns how the public inherits assets from the Olympic Games (Preuss, 
2004, pp. 87–91). Yet various authors criticise the dialectic between social and 
economic concerns in the post-Olympic facilities. Brown for example observes that the 
post-Olympic Oval built for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics became “consumable 
space”. He explores how everyday practice can be integrated into such economically 
oriented space, and suggest that mediating the social and commercial use of the 
post-Olympic facilities represents the ordering of the society (Brown, 2004). Hall 
further argues that urban space left after the mega-event is “space of conspicuous 
consumption, celebrating commodities rather than civic values” (Hall, 1997). Hall 
criticises the transformation of community-based local space into a visitor attraction, 
which Castells calls the “disconnection of people from spatial forms” (Castells, 1983). 
Thus, utilisation of the Olympic legacy is blurred between the social and economic 
values, and therefore, as Hall argues, the urban legacy causes considerable tension in the 
urban policy-making environment.  
 
2.1.6 Mixed-use strategy, its opportunity and constraint 
Discussion of land-use planning has further elaborated on gaining popularity by 
applying the mixed-use strategy as a means of urban sustainability. As the ideology of 
sustainable urban forms has flourished, with “compact city” (Jenks et al., 1996) or 
“urban village” concepts (Aldous, 1992; Neal, 2003), the mixed-use urban strategy has 
attracted the attention of academics, practitioners, and planning policy makers, as a 
potential agent of urban sustainability (Walker, 1997). Coupland’s book Reclaiming the 
City, Mixed Use Development (1997) provides a useful account of mixed-use 
development in this respect.20 Coupland argues that the most significant advantage of 
                                                  
20 Coupland in the beginning points out the ambiguity of the term “mixed-use development”, which causes confusion 
among relevant parties. The ambiguity of the term lies in the degree to which different functions would be 
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employing a mixed-use strategy is to bring a variety of activities, potentially during the 
day and in the evening, and to enhance the “liveliness” of the place (Coupland, 1997). 
Grant further recognises that this essential argument for the mixed-use strategy is 
inherited from Jacobs’s claim in her influential book, The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities (1961), that “fine grain mixing of diverse uses creates vibrant and 
successful neighbourhoods” (Grant, 2002, p. 72). Jacobs’ argument for replacing 
“zoning for conformity” with “zoning for diversity” has been widely adopted in many 
urban planning policies around the world (Jacobs, 1961, p. 149), and Grant suggests that 
this is evidence of the positive potential of the mixed-use strategy. Jones and Evans 
further point out that, in the UK planning context, the concept of mixed development 
has been heavily promoted by the Urban Task Force Report (Jones and Evans, 2008). 
 
While the mixed-use approach is considered an agent of a self-sufficient “compact city” 
with economic vitality, social equity and environmental quality (Grant, 2002, p. 73), 
various authors also point out its limits. Coupland claims that there are dangers in 
encouraging separation rather than integration within mixed-use urban areas, and 
additionally there may be conflict between activities (Coupland, 1997, pp. 1–25). Frug 
suggests that the fundamental ideology in employing the mixed-use strategy is to 
“encompass a wide variety of difference”, rather than segregating otherness in the 
traditional zoning system (Frug, 1999, pp. 145–149), but as Coupland points out, 
diversification often turns to “contestation” or “congestion” within the place. Such 
conflict between different uses or different spaces is indeed an essential part of the 
land-use planning process. Grant recognised that “compatibility” of different uses is 
critical to the realisation of mixing uses (Grant, 2002). As my selected cases, the Sydney 
and London Olympic Parks, would no longer remain as sports complexes, but as urban 
precincts with various functions, I am interested in the “compatibility in mixed-use 
urban strategy” as a practical inquiry of land-use planning. In particular, I am interested 
in the compatibility between the Olympic-led function (sports) and non-Olympic 
functions (others) within the same urban precincts.  
 
2.1.7 The Olympic “bubble” as a result of enclave development  
Mixed-use development is essentially a planning strategy within the designated district. 
                                                                                                                                                  
incorporated into the designated area, types of use, and the size of the designated area (Coupland, 1997, pp. 5–7). Yet, 
in this discussion, I will take the same definition of “mixed-use development” which Coupland uses in his book: “a 
site with different uses”. 
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Its fundamental objective is to obtain self-sufficiency, which is the crucial idea behind 
the “compact city” model. Consideration of how such an urban quarter could be 
integrated into the urban tissues is another side to be explored, as it is often criticised for 
its isolation from the urban context (for example, Coaffee and Johnson, 2007). 
Interestingly, most empirical studies on the post-Olympic parks in Sydney and Beijing 
focus on the usability within the site, and its relationship with the urban context tends to 
be regional rather than local (for example, Ren, 2008a; Searle, 2008a). Meanwhile, 
various literature on the LOP is keen on its relationship with adjacent neighbourhoods 
(for example, Vigor et al., 2004; Macrury and Poynter, 2010).  
 
Conceptually, Judd’s idea of the “tourist bubble” is useful. Judd indicates that various 
themed and specialised tourist places, such as convention centres, professional sports 
arenas, festival malls and casinos, have emerged as part of a new economic 
development strategy in the context of inter-urban competition in the USA. Yet Judd 
critically observes that such places became a “tourist bubble”, which “create islands of 
affluence that are sharply differentiated and segregated from the surrounding urban 
landscape” (Judd, 1999, p. 53). He argues that a “tourist bubble” is a strictly 
circumscribed world, which is primary utilised for consumption and play; it often 
contrasts with the decay of its immediate area and creates tension between areas inside 
and outside the “bubble”. In a similar vein, Thornley discussed this “bubble” effect from 
the urban planning point of view in the case of sports stadium developments which are 
associated with an urban regeneration scheme. Thornley argues that stadium 
developments are often criticised for being “divorced from their surroundings”, and 
suggests that the catalytic effect of the new development seldom contributes to the 
surroundings, and vice versa, facilities for the local community are rarely integrated into 
the new scheme within the development (Thornley, 2002, p. 816). Under such 
circumstances, Thornley emphasises that it is crucial to synchronise the urban 
development policy within the project area and its wider context, but he demonstrates 
that this does not always happen. In his empirical study of the planning process of the 
legacy of the Millennium Dome project in London, Dome Alone: London’s Millennium 
Project and the Strategic Planning Deficit, Thornley demonstrates that failure to 
determine the Dome’s life after the one-year event occurred because the development 
was “divorced from any strategic planning context before the event” (Thornley, 2000, p. 
689). Thornley particularly criticises the project’s detachment from the local 
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community’s interest and local economy, and puts great emphasis on the need for 
avoiding “enclave development” (Thornley, 2000, p. 697). Given the inevitable complex 
planning structure in conducting the mega-project, Thornley observes that the 
increasing fragmentation of decision-making responsibility and the involvement of the 
private sector prevented the project from being integrated with strategic planning for the 
long-term viability of the Dome.  
 
Thus, it is understood that while self-sufficiency is a crucial agenda in regard to the 
sustainability of an urban precinct, it is also important to consider its integration into the 
local and regional planning context, in order to avoid a “bubble” effect. As my primary 
concern in this thesis is on planning the “use” of the post-Olympic Park, I will argue 
that it is imperative to consider the usability of the post-Olympic Park not only as a 
matter of the land-use plan within the site but also as a matter of how such land use 
within the site can be related to the wider urban planning context, in order to avoid the 
“Olympic bubble”. 
 
Furthermore, integration of the Olympic Park into the surroundings after the Games can 
be questioned from the viewpoint of security. As was suggested in Chapter 1, one of the 
benefits of creating the Olympic Park for the Games is simplified security; a 
venue-concentration model is much easier to control in security terms than a 
venue-dispersed model. Yet, in order to achieve this, the Olympic Park is surrounded by 
tight security with state-of-the-art technology, isolated from the neighbourhood during 
the Olympic Games. Fussey et al. suggest that ever-increasing concern about the 
security of the Olympic site also tends to bequeath physical and conceptual remnants– 
and this become the crucial Olympic legacy (Fussey et al., 2011). In this respect, the 
way of dealing with the site boundary of the Park is important, in particular its 
transformation from the Olympics to legacy mode, in order to evaluate how the 
post-Olympic site is fully integrated with the surrounding neighbourhood.  
 
 
2.2 Methodological framework 
 
2.2.1 Changes over time 
Roche emphasises the importance of analysing the legacy of a mega-event in the 
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context of the long planning process, and criticises the failure of many existing studies 
to do so. Thus, although my primary research interest is the usability of the 
post-Olympic Park and its integration into the urban context, I will not only examine it 
in relation to the post-Olympic phase but also explore the process of shaping its vision 
before the Games are staged. In this respect, as De Vaus suggests, I will employ a 
methodology which enables extracting changes and continuities over the designated 
period. He points out that this research design requires the collection of data from at 
least two points in time, and claims that data collection using multiple points can be 
utilised to: examine long- and short-term effects, track when changes occur, plot the 
shape of any changes, and identify factors that precede any changes (De_Vaus, 2001, pp. 
119–120). As I am particularly interested in analysing how the vision of the Olympic 
legacy has changed over time, and in considering the forces behind the changes, this 
approach is beneficial to explore how the vision was established, developed and 
implemented. Yet, as indicated earlier in this chapter, such a longitudinal approach is 
absent in the existing literature on the Olympic legacy, although various authors put 
great emphasis on the importance of considering the legacy from the early phase of the 
planning process. Existing studies tend to analyse either empirical evidence in the 
post-Olympic phase or the planning process before the Games, but there is little 
research connecting the two. This means that the difference between the vision and 
reality of the Olympic legacy has not been widely researched.  
 
In this time-change analysis, it is crucial to set up the timeframe to examine the changes 
and continuities of the targeted phenomenon, and I will take the timeframe proposed by 
Roche. In his text Mega-Event and Urban Policy (1994) Roche designates pre-bid, 
post-bid, and post-event phases, and identifies the different planning roles in each phase. 
Roche critically suggests that there is a significant discrepancy between what should be 
conducted and what in fact happens in each phase.  
 
Firstly, in the pre-bid phase, Roche identifies that theoretically actions in four areas, (1) 
conceptualisation, (2) pre-bid feasibility, (3) political commitment process, and (4) bid 
group organisation, should be conducted, all of which are crucial in order to bring the 
mega-event to the city. Yet in reality he observes that vague and subjective identification 
is preliminarily provided for a specific project, instead of establishing an explicit and 
objective vision based on feasibility studies.  
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Subsequently, in the post-bid phase, it is suggested that actions for (1) re-evaluation, (2) 
post-bid feasibility study, (3) organisational planning, and (4) implementation are 
necessary to prepare the setting for the mega-event. Roche, however, claims that 
justification of the project becomes the main aim of the post-bid plan, and re-evaluation 
of the bid plan, and the post-bid feasibility studies which are required for a rational 
planning process are not fully conducted in reality.  
 
Finally, in the post-event phase, or legacy phase, Roche claims that (1) monitoring / 
feedback, (2) evaluation, and (3) new concept / new commitment should be developed 
through a rational planning process. Yet, in reality, little attention is given to review of 
planned developments over time. Thus, Roche critically suggests that mega-event 
planning is essentially based on “situational rationality”, which he argues responds to 
urgent problems and without much evaluation of alternatives and cost-benefit 
projections (Roche, 1994, pp. 4–7). With reference to this, I will examine the degree to 
which the planning process for defining the vision of the usability of the post-Olympic 
Park and of its relation to the urban context was synchronised with Roche’s analysis of a 
rational and empirical planning process. 
 
2.2.2 Contrasting the two cases  
Using a time-change analysis to examine the planning process of the Olympic legacy 
throughout the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases, I will consider the Sydney and 
London Olympic Parks and evaluate differences and similarities between them. One of 
the advantages in employing multiple case studies is the ability to identify cross-societal 
similarities and differences and to assess the causes (Ragin, 1987, p. 6). Ragin argues 
that “the identification of patterns of multiple conjunctural causation provides a basis 
for specifying, at a more abstract level, the underlying similarities responsible for 
similar outcomes and the underlying differences responsible for different outcomes” 
(Ragin, 1987, p. 49). Here, I will point out that my research design is not a "comparative 
case" study. This research method requires explicit comparative factors, which can be 
applied to different cities, but this is hard to achieve, even though there are certain 
similarities between the cases in Sydney and London. This approach and argument also 
can be found in Olivia Muñoz-Rojas’s successful PhD thesis submitted to the London 
School of Economics, which was published as Ashes and Granite: Destruction and 
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Reconstruction in the Spanish Civil War and Its Aftermath (2011). Muñoz-Rojas takes 
three cities in Spain, Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao, to examine war destruction and 
reconstruction. Yet she argues that her approach cannot be called a "comparative case 
study" as explicit comparative factors cannot be set up. She rather states that 
"contrasting" similarities and differences is more appropriate. As my case studies have 
similar conditions, I will utilise the "contrasting" research design, rather than a 
"comparative" case study. 
 
Regarding selection of the cases in conducting multiple case studies, Yin argues that it is 
crucial to set up the theoretical framework addressing the conditions under which a 
particular phenomenon is likely to be found or not likely to be found (Yin, 2003, p. 50). 
In this respect, the standardised and differentiated natures of the Olympic movement at 
various times are considered causes of similarities and differences for my contrasting 
inquiry into the Olympic cities. Roche argues that the Olympic cities are utterly 
standardised, as the Olympic Games are run according to the IOC rules and the 
International Sports Federations, and further claims that “each host city’s organising 
committee attends the preceding city’s event and studies it in minute detail to learn 
lessons from its successes and failures. This process in itself is likely to promote a 
certain degree of uniformity of tried, tested and successful organisational features” 
(Roche, 2000, pp. 135–137). Meanwhile, Roche also argues that the Olympic cities are 
utterly unique, because of the location and site, and it is crucial to take into account the 
modification of the IOC rules and nature of the Olympic movement, which has changed 
over time. 
  
Given the essential character of contrasting two cases, it is crucial to carefully select the 
cases to be studied. Yin points out that “every case should serve a specific purpose 
within the overall scope of inquiry,” and suggests that “each case must be carefully 
selected so that it either predicts similar results or produces contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (Yin, 2003, pp. 45–46). Various studies comparing multiple 
Olympic cities have been conducted, but the selection of the cases in previous studies 
does not always address this need for similar or contrasting backdrops, which Yin 
argues is critical. The most frequently utilised multiple case study approach is research 
on the cities which host the Games consecutively. Yet the selection of chronological 
cities is questionable from the methodological point of view. Roche’s book 
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Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture 
(2000), for example, includes case studies on Seoul (1988) and Barcelona (1992), but 
this is by no means the only way of utilising a comparative case study. As the political 
and physical contexts of two cities are highly different, the fundamental aspirations of 
hosting the Olympic Games are greatly different as well. I will argue that Roche simply 
demonstrates the different character of the Olympic cities, rather than looking at 
multiple cases with an appropriate methodological framework. Further, Peter Haxton’s 
successful PhD thesis, Community Participation in the Mega-Event Hosting Process: 
the Case of the Olympic Games, which was awarded by the University of Technology 
Sydney (UTS) in 1999, explored public participation in the Olympic planning process in 
two cities, Atlanta (1996) and Sydney (2000), but the rationale for his case selection 
includes some weaknesses. The most critical point of comparison between the two cities 
lies in their urban planning systems. More explicitly, the leading authorities of the 
Olympic planning process are greatly different between Atlanta and Sydney. While the 
Atlanta Olympics were fundamentally developed by a privately-led PPP with private 
funding, the Sydney Games were very much led by the State Government with huge 
expenditure of public money. Furthermore, while the urban regeneration associated with 
the construction of the sports complex was not conducted in Atlanta, it was an essential 
part of Sydney’s Olympics. Thus, the political and physical contexts of public 
participation in the two cities were greatly different, and without explicitly embedding 
such differences into the research framework it is hard to justify the selection of these 
cities, although they staged the Olympic Games one after the other. In addition to this, 
the “Olympic Legacy: Special Issue” of “Urban Design, Autumn 2010” features 
London and various past Olympic parks, but there is little relevant analytical overlap 
between London and other cities’ Olympic parks (Corteen, 2011).21 
  
In this respect, it is imperative to justify my case selection, and to align it with my 
research concerns. In other words, it is crucial to identify the similarities and differences 
between the cases of Sydney and London, and to address their connections. I will begin 
with addressing similarities between Sydney and London. Similarities in the physical, 
                                                  
21In addition to these examples, there is an attempt to compare the case of London and its predecessor, Beijing. Yet, 
instead of simply comparing the different Olympic impacts in different cities, the author's intention is to find a 
possible analytical framework for examining the social and economic impact by the Olympic Games in different host 
cities (Poynter, G. (2006) From Beijing to Bow Bells: Measuring the Olympic effects, London East Research Institute, 
University of East London.). 
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social and historical conditions of the sites for the Olympic parks in the two cities have 
already been touched upon in the previous chapter. Beyond the similar character of the 
site conditions discussed in Chapter 1, there are significant similarities between the 
cities in terms of the planning contexts and objectives for the creation of the Olympic 
Park, and I will argue that this created predictable similarities in their planning 
approaches to the Olympic legacy.  
 
Firstly, Sydney and London have similar urban planning contexts. The urban planning 
system in both cities is formulated by a national, regional and local planning hierarchy. 
Regional spatial planning policy, such as the “Metropolitan Strategy” in Sydney and the 
“London Plan” in London, has played a significant role in identifying the area’s 
character within the broader region in both cities, while local planning policies have 
further provided detailed spatial frameworks for the area. Under such planning contexts, 
Homebush Bay, the site for the SOP, and the LLV have long been targeted as crucial 
regeneration areas to bring socio-economic changes in socially and economically 
deprived areas. In this respect, Sydney and London took the “proactive” approach in 
staging the Olympics, by which Kelly emphasises that the mega-event is exploited to 
change the urban settings with legacy conditions in mind, rather than the “reactive” 
approach, by which the character of the event is defined by existing physical urban 
settings (Kelly, 1989, p. 265) (Fig.2-1).  
 
Secondly, Sydney and London also had similar Olympic planning structures. The host 
city usually sets up the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games, and this has 
significant planning powers to prepare and run the Olympic Games. The Organising 
Committee fundamentally works as a branch of the IOC for the specific Olympic 
Games, although their staff consists of the host nation or region’s political or economic 
elite. Yet, in the case of Sydney and London, a separate authority for planning and 
construction of the Olympic venues and infrastructures, the Olympic Coordination 
Authority (OCA) in Sydney and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) in London, 
was created. This is one of the unique features in the planning of the Olympic Games in 
Sydney and London, therefore making them different from other host cities, such as 
Athens (2004) and Beijing (2008). 
 
Thirdly, there was a significant transfer of knowledge from Sydney to London. During 
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the course of my fieldwork in Sydney, I met various people who were involved in 
planning the Sydney Games, and subsequently worked for the London Games. For 
example, Jim Sloman, who was the chief operating officer in Sydney and had ultimate 
responsibility for the planning and execution of the Sydney Games, was hired as a 
consultant for London’s Games.22 Furthermore, various personnel in the Olympic 
authorities visited Sydney to learn lessons from its successes and failures. When the 
senior leadership team of the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games 
(LOCOG) visited Sydney in 2006, Paul Deighton, the CEO of the LOCOG, suggested 
that "the Sydney Olympic Park helps to bring many of our plans alive.”23 In addition to 
this, Gary Cox’s exploration of the transferable knowledge of the environmental 
guidelines from Sydney to London suggests that there was a shared planning 
background between both cities (Cox, 2012). It was anticipated that these knowledge 
exchanges from Sydney would provide London with similar planning strategies as well 
as different ones. It is also worth noting that the same architects and urban designers 
were involved in the design process of the two Olympic parks. HOK Sports (now 
named Populous) was the leading firm of architects for the main Olympic stadia in 
Sydney and London Olympic parks, and Hargreaves Associates, who was a leading 
urban designer for the SOP, was subsequently hired as the leading landscape / urban 
designer for the LOP. 
 
Thus, while the various similar planning contexts and the direct transfer of knowledge 
from Sydney to London have the potential to provide similar planning approaches, I 
will emphasise that there were also fundamentally different attitudes in the approach 
towards the Olympic legacy between Sydney and London. As the host city’s attitude to 
the “Olympic legacy” has been drastically altered in recent years, (see, for example 
Cashman, 2003), my great concern is to explore how this condition has affected the 
planning approach. The concept of the “Olympic legacy” in particular has become 
central to the Olympic movement since the Sydney Games, when Jacque Rogge became 
the new president of the IOC in 2001. Since then, the IOC has commenced various 
actions to tackle the previous problem of the Olympic legacy (Table 2-1).  
                                                  
22 CNN, 23 June 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SPORT/06/23/olympics.london/index.html 
Lord Coe, who was the chairman of the London’s bidding team, claimed that “I believe we must improve on our 
proposals and we must aim to produce the best technical bid when we submit our candidate file. […] Jim Sloman and 
his team can help us deliver those goals and I am delighted that they will be working with our excellent in house team 
to search for improvements wherever they can be found.” 
23 http://www.london2012.com/news/media-releases/2006/2006-03 
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Table 2-1: The IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy between 2000 and 2005 
(Source: Author) 
2000 Sydney staged the Games 
2001 -Dr. Jacques Rogge was elected as the president of the IOC on 16 July 2001 -Start of data collection for the Olympic Games Knowledge Management programme 
2002 - Olympic Games Global Impact project, preliminary research start  -Olympic Games Study Commission, Interim Report to the 114th IOC Session 
2003 -Olympic Games Study Commission, Report to the 115
th IOC Session  
-A legacy aspect was added to the Olympic Charter for the first time 
2004 
-Further amendment of the legacy aspect in the Olympic Charter  
-Each bid city for the 2012 Games asked to address “the vision of Legacy” in their bid 
documents for the first time 
2005 London won the bid for the 2012 Games 
 
Furthermore, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter, Liao and Pitts further suggest 
that since the 2000 Sydney Games, the age of urban sustainability has begun (Liao and 
Pitts, 2006). Sydney is considered as the first to adopt this strategy and London is the 
latest example, but there are also Athens and Beijing, which hosted the Games in 2004 
and 2008. However, it is understood that when Athens and Beijing won the bids in 1997 
and 2001, the IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy had not begun or had just 
begun (Fig. 2-2).  
 
Thus, it was in London that the IOC’s actions started to take effect, and the IOC’s 
president Jacque Rogge declared that “London is the first city which adopted the IOC’s 
commitment to the Olympic legacy.”24 Given this historical context, one of my great 
motivations in employing Sydney and London as case studies is to consider the 
significant impact of the IOC’s changing commitment to the Olympic legacy.  
 
2.2.3 Research timeframe and challenges met 
A time-change analysis and contrasting case studies are the two methodological 
backbones of my thesis. I will therefore conduct analysis of the planning process for the 
legacy of the Olympic Park in the pre-bid, the post-bid, and the post-event phases for 
both Sydney and London. It is then critical to define the timeframe for each phase in 
each case, and identify the methodological challenges in my thesis. Table 2-2 indicates 
the periods of each phase in Sydney and London. 
 
 
                                                  
24 Comments by the IOC President, Jacque Rogge, in the Annual de Coubertin lecture in London on 28 November 
2008. 
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Table 2-2: The analytical timeframe of each phase in Sydney and London  
  Sydney  London 
Phases Period Period 
Pre-bid Early 1960-September 1993 Late 1970-July 2005 
Post-bid October 1993-October 2000 August 2005-July 2012 
Post-Olympic November 2000-December 2012 August 2012-July 2013 
 
Firstly, the pre-bid phases were greatly different across cities. Some cities such as 
Barcelona and Sydney experienced several unsuccessful bids; the pre-bid phase for 
these cities can be considered to span more than a few decades. Furthermore, the 
beginning of the pre-bid period needs to be clarified. I will set out, in this thesis, the 
pre-bid phase as the time from the idea of creating the Sydney and London Olympic 
Parks emerged until the winning of the bid, and therefore the length of this period varies 
between Sydney and London. The initial idea of creating the SOP in Homebush Bay 
emerged at the beginning of the 1960s for the 1972 Games, and Sydney eventually won 
the right to stage the 2000 Games in September 1993. I will consider the period between 
the early 1960s and September 1993 as the pre-bid phase for Sydney. Meanwhile, the 
first idea of creating the LOP also emerged in the late 1970s with the feasibility study 
for the 1988 Games. Although this first bid was not put forward, I will take this as the 
beginning of the pre-bid phase for London, and designate July 2005, when London won 
the right to stage the 2012 Games, as its end. Thus, as the pre-bid periods in both cities 
can be considered empirical processes, I will carry out a comprehensive analysis of both 
cases.  
 
Secondly, the post-bid phase is the fixed period between the host city selection and the 
Olympic Games. This period is currently designated as seven years.25 This period 
extended between September 1993 and October 2000 in the case of Sydney, and for 
London period between July 2005 and July 2012. This seven-year period is the time 
when the host city establishes the special authority for the Olympic Games to deliver all 
spatial settings for the Olympic Games, which will define fundamental physical 
character of the post-Olympic Park.  
 
                                                  
25 The period between the host city selection and the Olympic Games has evolved throughout the history of the 
Olympic Games. The current seven-year period was adopted with the Seoul Games in 1988 (awarded in 1981). The 
duration was five years between the 1956 Melbourne and the 1968 Mexico Games, and then it was extended to six 
years between the 1972 Munich and the 1984 Los Angeles Games. 
52 
Finally, while it is possible to define the pre-bid and post-bid phases, the definition of 
the post-event phase is ambiguous, especially when it becomes a matter of empirical 
observation. Its beginning can be explicitly defined as the moment in which the 
Olympic Games are over, but the end of this period cannot be defined. In addition to 
such ambiguity in defining the post-event phase, the post-Olympic phase of the London 
case has certain limits in my thesis. I will designate November 2000 to the end of 2012 
as the post-Olympic phase for Sydney, but I can only observe London’s legacy from 
August 2012 to July 2013 at the time of writing. Thus, while I can observe 12 years for 
Sydney’s Olympic legacy, London’s legacy is limited to one year. Yet, during one year, 
London conducted various planning actions to manage the legacy assets in the 
post-Olympic Park, and this will provide certain empirical data to explore my 
contrasting study with Sydney. Furthermore, the 12 years of Sydney’s post-Olympic 
phase can be considered as a period which provides valuable data to consider London’s 
ongoing post-Olympic planning at the time of writing. I will therefore endeavour to 
carry out a contrasting post-Olympic study between Sydney and London, despite the 
different lengths of the legacy periods in these cities.  
 
2.2.4 Data collection 
Access to data   
One of the significant challenges in employing multiple case studies is that it takes more 
time to collect data than a single case study (Yin, 2003, pp. 44–45). Since my cases 
explored in this thesis are the Olympic parks in Sydney and London, key data has to be 
collected in both cities. In order to collect the relevant data for my thesis, I conducted 
two field visits in Sydney. My first trip to Sydney was in July 2007, and the main 
objective of this was to find out how much data were available on the Sydney Olympics. 
During this trip, I also conducted preliminary official document collection and two 
interviews with regional governmental officials who were involved in planning the SOP. 
Since my first visit had a time limitation, it was not enough for comprehensive data 
collection. Yet, since I was appointed as the visiting research fellow at the Australian 
Centre for Olympic Studies set up in the UTS, this provided me with the opportunity to 
make my second fieldwork period longer.  
 
While a visiting research fellow in Sydney from September 2008 to January 2009, I was 
provided with access to various official documents, secondary literature, and numerous 
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slide films from the Sydney Olympic Games archived at the Australian Centre for 
Olympic Studies archives and the UTS library, and I also had great opportunities to 
interview various kinds of people who were involved in the 2000 Sydney Olympics in 
various phases. Further, I was able to make contact with the SOPA, which is the 
statutory organisation responsible for the management and development of the 
post-Olympic SOP since 2001. The SOPA kindly accepted my application for interviews 
with key personnel within the SOPA, and provided various kinds of published textual 
and visual data for my research. Yet other types of the documents, especially those 
published by the various authorities in the pre-bid phase, were extremely difficult to 
find, as they were archived differently in national, regional and local libraries. Thus, I 
found that collecting data in the pre-bid phases was more difficult than in the post-bid 
and the post-event phases, because not only were they older, but in addition the authors 
of the publication were more diverse than in the other periods.  
 
Meanwhile, since I started my PhD in London in September 2006, I have extensively 
collected data on the legacy vision of the LOP. As the planning and construction of the 
LOP has been underway since London won the bid in July 2005, a massive number of 
planning and process documents have been issued by various organisations. In addition 
to these official documents being available while I have been conducting my PhD 
project, various media, such as newspapers and television programmes, have paid great 
attention to the planning, construction and future of the LOP. Most of these media 
contents are now accessible on the internet, and this made it easier to find the articles 
relevant to my data collection. Thus, it is relatively easy to obtain diverse kinds of 
official or media documents during the preparation phase of the Olympic Games, but 
there are also significant constraints in data collection while the Olympic project is 
underway. The biggest difficulty which I have encountered was access to the people 
who have been involved in the Olympic and the legacy planning process. Yet there were 
some opportunities to hear the opinions of the officials involved in the Olympic 
planning. Some of them, for example Lord Sebastian Coe, the Chairman of the LOCOG, 
or David Higgins, the Chief Executive of the ODA, have made extensive media 
appearances, and commented on their Olympic work. Further, while conducting my 
PhD work, I had the opportunity to be involved in designing the LOP, as an architect of 
the Olympic Park Design Team during October 2007 to June 2008. During my work, I 
was involved in the Olympic, legacy transformation and long-term legacy masterplans 
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for the LOP. These works did not entirely become open to the public, but rather were 
archived as progress documents. Although they are finalised visions, they suggest 
various opportunities and constraints in planning the legacy of the LOP. I was permitted 
to use these documents for my PhD thesis by Bob Allies, partner of Allies and Morrison 
Architects, who had long worked on the Olympic and legacy masterplans, and I 
consider these documents to be critical data which provide a different view from that 
revealed in the final public documents.  
 
Identifying the data  
What kind of data would be required for my research on the Olympic legacy? As my 
intention is to understand the planning process of defining the usability of the 
post-Olympic Park and its relation to the city context, evaluating the masterplan, 
especially land-use plan, published in the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases is 
necessary. Given my objective to understand the usability of the specific urban precinct 
beyond the planning boundaries of the Olympic site, it is imperative to look at different 
scales of land-use plans, both within the Olympic site boundaries and with a wider local 
and regional scale, and examine how the spatial use of the site was represented. This 
representation is normally made textually and visually. Further, as my intention is not 
only to observe the land-use, but also to explore the forces behind it, obtaining multiple 
resources is required.  
 
Methodologically, Yin suggests case studies need not be limited to a single source of 
evidence, but rather he encourages researchers to utilise a wide variety of sources. Yin 
argues that the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of 
evidence is the development of “converging lines of inquiry”. Yin points out that 
different data should be analysed to evaluate one fact from multiple points of view, 
rather than addressing different facts and leading to multiple conclusions (Yin, 2003, pp. 
91–92). As multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the 
same phenomenon, Yin claims that it is crucial to designate the role of each data item in 
the broader research framework. In this respect, it is crucial to identify the types of data 
utilised in my thesis and to consider how each data type will contribute to the 
multi-angle observation of my cases. Although various types of data can be utilised in a 
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case study,26 I essentially consider the following three categories of data as my research 
data, which can reveal different stories on one phenomenon: official documents, media 
articles, and expert interviews. My intention of utilising the above materials as research 
resources is to obtain multiple views of one phenomenon. Also, as Scott argues that 
there are certain different degrees of incompleteness or distortions across documents 
(Scott, 1990), I will argue that analysis of multiple resources would contribute to a 
comprehensive understanding of the research target. 
 
As my thesis analyses two cases, Sydney and London, it is imperative to take account of 
obtaining similar data from both cities. As suggested before, there were certain 
institutional similarities in the Olympic planning between Sydney and London, and this 
provides the background in which similar types of official documents were published. 
Further, similar urban governance systems and Olympic organisations made it possible 
for me to find similar positions of personnel who were involved in Olympic and legacy 
development. During my data collection in Sydney and London, I tried to find similar 
publication materials and similar people and conduct interviews with them, but the 
resources are not always perfectly matched between Sydney and London. As suggested 
before, some personnel in London were not accessible during the post-bid phase, 
because they were too busy or tried to express their opinions as little as possible. 
Although some types of material were only found in one city, they still add value to the 
comparison. The following parts will provide a more concrete view of the different 
types of data which I collected. 
 
Official documents  
Among the different types of research resources mentioned above, the official 
documents are the main data to be collected and analysed in my thesis. Collecting the 
official documents which explain the land-use plan and its urban context textually and 
visually was my primary focus. 
 
Since the vision of hosting the Olympic Games and creating the site for the event 
emerged, enormous numbers of documents have been published in different phases of 
planning by the various public authorities in Sydney and London. The most relevant 
                                                  
26 Yin suggests that evidence for a case study may come from six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003, pp. 79–90). 
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official documents to my thesis are issued by the special Olympic authorities, such as 
the Sydney and London Olympic Bid Committees; the SOCOG and LOCOG, which are 
the institutions responsible for organising the Games; and the OCA in Sydney and the 
ODA in London, which are the statutory bodies responsible for delivering the venues 
and infrastructures for the Games. These documents were published by the one-off 
authorities established for the Olympic Games, and therefore the primary objectives of 
their documents were to address the visions of the Olympic sites, to inform ongoing 
planning and construction processes, and more importantly to justify their activities. 
Thus, analysing the degree to which each Olympic organisation considers the vision of 
utilising the Olympic Park beyond spatial and time boundaries of the Olympics during 
the specialised and fast-track Olympic planning process is a critical part of my analysis. 
 
Further, in the post-Olympic phase, the publications by the SOPA, the statutory body 
responsible for managing the post-Olympic Park, will be investigated in depth. The 
documents not only demonstrate how the Olympic site was utilised after the Games, but 
also set out the problems with the post-Olympic Park and suggest alternative planning 
solutions for the future. Thus, I take these publication materials as documentation of the 
“living legacy”, and evaluate its evolution from the previous pre-bid and post-bid 
phases. Meanwhile, in the case of London, the London Legacy Development 
Corporation (LLDC) took responsibility of the post-Olympic Park. Although the LLDC 
had various messages on the vision of the post-Olympic Park, it had not published the 
post-Olympic masterplan of the post-Olympic LOP at the time of writing this thesis. 
The LLDC follows the concrete spatial vision of the Park issued by its predecessor, the 
Olympic Park Legacy Company, before the Games. In addition to this, the Mayor of 
London published another in-depth spatial vision of the post-Olympic LOP and its 
surrounding area just before the Games, and these two documents are still valid. Thus, 
London offers a more complex planning framework of the post-Olympic site than 
Sydney and I will endeavour to examine how the different documents address the 
visions of the legacy similarly and differently.  
 
While the official documents issued by the Olympic authorities provide an in-depth 
account of the Olympic site with Olympic specific views, the documents published by 
non-Olympic related authorities demonstrate different approaches to the Olympic site. 
The regional government - in my cases, the Department of Planning in the NSW 
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Government for Sydney and the London Development Authority in the Greater London 
Authority for London - have documented the Olympic sites in relation to their broader 
urban context in their regional urban strategies, the “Metropolitan Strategy” in Sydney 
and the “London Plan” in London. These documents designate not only the spatial 
relationship between the site and the broader city, but also the functional role of the site 
within the region. On a smaller scale, the local governments, such as the Auburn 
council in Sydney and the London Borough of Newham, also extensively published 
spatial strategies, and integration or segregation of the Olympic Park located in their 
territories would be another interesting issue to explore. In addition to these regional 
and local planning authorities, site-specific urban regeneration authorities overseeing 
the development of the site were established, most of which were formed as PPPs. The 
publications by these regeneration authorities more explicitly suggest the spatial 
character of the site, including the land-use plan, and the long-term vision beyond the 
Games. Exploration of the cohesion or conflict in the long-term vision of the Olympic 
Park between the Olympic authority, the regional or local government, and the 
site-specific urban regeneration authorities would suggest the divergent nature in 
creating a vision of an urban precinct within the broader urban context.  
 
In addition to the above documents, during the course of my data collection, I had 
opportunities to obtain “semi-official documents” in both Sydney and London. These 
documents were created as progress reports on the Olympic planning, and circulated 
among the specific public bodies involved in the process. They are therefore understood 
as partially official documents. Some of my interviewees in Sydney kindly provided me 
such planning process documents, which were not entirely open to the public when they 
were published before the Sydney Olympics. Although they did not indicate the final 
plan, they suggested key benchmarks in the planning process, and therefore I considered 
them to be valuable document resources. In similar vein, the planning process reports, 
which I obtained while I worked for the LOP Design Team, provide alternative visions 
of the post-Olympic Park in comparison to the ones open to the public. These 
documents were produced by the Design Team and submitted to the related Olympic 
authorities or regional and local governments, and I will argue that it is valuable to 
examine the process of shaping the vision of the Olympic legacy.  
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Interviews with experts  
The official documents issued by various authorities are the core resources in my thesis, 
but I consider that interviews with the people who are involved in producing these 
publications would provide the stories which are not included in the official documents. 
My intention in conducting the expert interviews had two aspects. I intended to obtain 
more detailed information about the facts suggested in the official documents and to 
explore the forces, aspirations, and possible constraints behind the contents in the 
documents. As a methodological technique, I employed “semi-structured” interviews. 
Bryman (2008) argues that the semi-structured interview can be employed with a list of 
questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, but the interviewee has a great deal of 
leeway (Bryman, 2008, p. 438). I will argue that this combination of rigidity and 
flexibility is suitable for my research. As I asked the interviewees about the forces or 
aspirations behind the official documents, the contents of the interviews needed to be 
specific on the one hand. On the other, I expected the interviewees to suggest 
alternative official documents relevant to my thesis. 
 
As indicated earlier, I set out to find people in similar positions who were involved in 
the Olympic planning decisions. My selected interviewees are essentially categorised 
into four groups: officials from the Olympic organisations; the architects or planners 
from the Olympic Park design teams; government advisors on architecture, urban 
design and public space; and local councils. They are considered critical personnel in 
the Olympic and legacy planning, and most of them were also involved in the 
publication of the Olympic and legacy planning documents (Table 2-3). 
 
Yet there were certain challenges in employing expert interviews in my case studies in 
Sydney and London. As previously suggested, accessibility of the intended 
interviewees in Sydney and London was different. In particular, as my time of 
conducting this thesis was synchronised with the preparation for the 2012 London 
Olympics, and my analysis can extend to a year after the event, the number of 
interviewees in London is smaller than in Sydney. Yet, I will again emphasise that I did 
not rely on the expert interviews as my primary research resources; rather my intention 
in conducting the expert interviews was to enrich my understanding of the official 
documents. In this respect, I will argue that despite the different numbers of 
interviewees in Sydney and London, the expert interviews added depth to my research. 
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Table 2-3: Interviewee list in Sydney and London  
(Source: Author (2010)) 
Phase 
Sydney London 
Organisation Name Position Organisation Name Position 
Pre- 
Bid 
 
Sydney 
1996 Bid 
Committee 
David Churches 
(*1) 
Deputy Director 
& Head of 
Planning London 2012 
Bid 
Committee 
Jim Sloman 
(*2) 
Bidding 
Advisor  Sydney 
2000 Bid 
Committee 
David Churches 
(*1) 
Executive 
Manager, 
Planning & 
Design 
Post- 
Bid 
 
 
SOCOG  Michael Knight 
President and 
Olympic 
Minister   
SOCOG Jim Sloman (*2) Chief Operating Officer 
OCA 
David Churches 
(*1) 
Senior Director, 
Games Planning 
ODA / OPLC Rickey Burdett 
Chief 
Advisor on 
Architecture 
and 
Urbanism 
Robert Adbey Director-General 
Dianne Leeson Director of Planning 
SOP Design 
Team  
LOP Design 
Team  
Bob Allies 
Partner, 
Allies and 
Morrison 
Architects 
Kirsty White 
(*3) 
Planner, 
EDAW 
Main 
Stadium 
Design 
Team 
Rod Sheard (*4) Principal, HOK Sport 
Main Stadium 
Design Team 
Rod Sheard 
(*4) 
Principal, 
HOK Sport 
NSW 
Government 
Architect's 
Office 
 
Chris Johnson 
NSW 
Government 
Architect 
(1995–2005) CABE Lucy Carmichael 
Senior 
Design 
Review 
Advisor Peter Mould 
NSW 
Government 
Architect 
(2005-) 
Post- 
Olympics 
SOPA 
 
Darlen Van der 
Bregeen 
Executive 
Manager, 
Design 
N/A 
Brian Bagshaw 
Director, 
Education 
Development 
Kirsty White 
(*3) Planner  
Auburn 
Council Rachel Agyare 
Senior Strategic 
Planner, 
Planning and 
Environment 
 
Media articles  
In addition to official documents and the interviews with experts, media articles are 
one of the research resources to be examined. As Scott (1990) suggests, the 
documentary products of the mass media are major sources of evidence for social 
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research. There are multiple advantages in utilising media articles such as newspaper 
and magazine reports and television programmes, but in particular, the following three 
points are beneficial for my thesis. Firstly, the media articles reflect the progress of 
Olympic planning more frequently than the official documents. While the official 
documents demonstrate the final result, the media articles often explore the background 
of the decision. Secondly, as the official documents tend to deal with the phenomena 
within their territory, facts beyond their boundaries are seldom mentioned. Media 
articles observe the phenomena with a much wider view. Thirdly, the media articles 
often feature interviews with various key personnel, whom I did not have access to. 
Their comments to the media by no means correspond to my research questions, but 
parts of the interviews featured in the media are helpful to understand the ideas behind 
the already publicised facts or visions. Scott however claims that it is imperative to 
assess media articles through the quality control criteria of authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Scott, 1990, p.143). Bryman further suggests that 
authenticity and credibility are problematic in media articles. He argues that media 
articles may contain errors and distortion, and points out that the “contextual factors” 
need to be considered carefully (Bryman, 2008, p. 525).  
 
Having such methodological opportunities and constraints in my mind, I used two 
newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and the London Evening Standard 
(LES), as valuable resources for my thesis.27 Although there are many newspapers in 
both Australia and the UK, I used these regional newspapers as primary media 
resources, rather than national newspapers, because the regional newspapers feature 
Olympic related news more frequently. Further, the articles in the SMH have been 
referred to as a valuable research resource in various academic papers on the Sydney 
Olympics, such as the studies by Cashman (2005, 2011) and Searle (2002). The SMH 
provides a valuable insight into the SOP which researchers struggle to find in the 
official documents. 
 
2.2.5 Visual materials 
Finally, I would like to mention the visual representations in my thesis. Given the 
designated number of words required for the PhD dissertation, it is fundamentally a 
textual work. Yet there is great interest to be had in examining visual materials, such as 
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masterplan drawings, architectural drawings, and urban/architectural images extracted 
from various resources, and also representing them as interpreted diagrams, which are 
frequently used in architectural and urban studies. Exploration of visual materials is 
valuable especially in comparing the different spatial visions of the Olympic Park in 
different phases. Yet, as different masterplans issued in different times applied different 
graphic standards, sometimes it is difficult to simply relate different masterplan 
drawings. I therefore use my own diagrams in this thesis, when necessary. These 
diagrams were interpreted from original masterplan drawings, and were drawn with the 
same graphic rules. This helps us to understand explicitly the differences between the 
different masterplans published in various periods. Thus, I used various original images 
extracted from the sources and my own interpreted spatial diagrams for the 
chronological and multiple case study analysis. These images are collected in the 
second volume of this thesis. 
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Part I: The Pre-Bid Phase 
 
 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 will explore the origin and subsequent development of the visions for 
the Olympic parks in Sydney and London before the two cities won the right to stage 
the Olympic Games. Although the IOC currently recognises the pre-bid phase as the 
two-year period prior to the bid decision, my exploration in this part is much longer 
than this. As I proposed in the previous chapter, I will define Sydney’s pre-bid phase as 
being from the early 1960s to September 1993 and London’s as the period between the 
late 1970s and July 2005, and I will focus on examining the evolving process involved 
in shaping the vision of the Olympics and the various political aspirations behind it. 
Regarding the forces behind the shaping of the spatial vision of the specific urban space, 
I employ Roberts and Sykes’s suggestion that the changes are wrought “from within and 
without” (Roberts and Sykes, 2000, p. 24) and Branch et al’s argument that a 
“mega-event is seen as largely imposed from outside” (Branch et al., 1984, p. 55).  
 
Thus, each of these two chapters will begin with a discussion of the evolution of the 
Olympic vision in the region, as a planning process integrating the Olympic impacts in 
the ongoing regional planning strategy. Subsequently, I will discuss the non-Olympic 
vision, which could emerge from an idea about regenerating the post-industrial site, and 
is developed in the local or regional planning context. Following discussion of various 
visions proposed by different regional authorities, I will explore how they come 
together in the Olympic site in question. As Sydney and London had different histories 
in regard to this planning exercise, the number of spatial plans examined in these parts 
are different, but I will critically examine the compatibility of the different vision as the 
crucial characteristic of the mixed-use urban strategy (Coupland, 1997). Along with the 
examination of the Olympic site, I will also examine how it relates to the broader urban 
context, as a crucial issue which Judd conceptualises as creating the “bubble” in the 
urban tissue (Judd, 1999). 
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Chapter 3: Sydney  
 
 
 
3.1 Olympic vision 
 
3.1.1 Beginning of the Olympic vision: Bidding for the 1972 Games 
Sydney’s first bidding campaign emerged in the 1960s in relation to the 1972 Olympic 
Games, which were eventually awarded to Munich in Germany. Although the 
Homebush Bay area was not considered as a venue in this bid, it included the key 
aspects of Sydney’s subsequent Olympic bid campaigns: the strong connection with the 
regeneration of underutilised industrial sites as main sites for the Games, use of 
public–private partnerships (PPPs), and the financial constraints of the regional 
government. The proposed main venue in the 1972 Games bid was located at St Peters, 
the inner-suburb of Sydney. The initial idea of creating a sports complex was the result 
of one man’s political aspirations. Lord Mayor Henry Jensen put great emphasis on the 
lack of sporting facilities in the Sydney region and the necessity of a regional sports 
complex, which could be used not only by every citizen but could also hold an Olympic 
or an Empire Games (Little, 1997, p. 80).  
 
However, Sydney’s bid for the 1972 Games faced inevitable financial difficulties in 
terms of constructing the sports complex; therefore, a PPP – a model also employed in 
subsequent campaigns – was planned in order to reduce public expenditure. 28 
Nevertheless, the Sydney Olympic proposal suffered because it coincided with the most 
difficult and controversial period in the history of the construction of the Sydney Opera 
House and the Premier of the New South Wales (NSW) region, Robert Askin, was 
understandably reluctant to commit his government to another high-profile project that 
could seriously drain State finances (Jobling, 1994. The financial difficulty of securing 
the construction project was thus a major trigger for Sydney withdrawing its bid for the 
1972 Games.  
 
                                                  
28 The involvement of the NSW Rugby League in the construction of the main stadium and its post-Olympic usages 
was expected to drastically reduce the level of public expenditure. 
64 
3.1.2 Emergence of Homebush Bay as an Olympic site: Bidding for the 1988 
Games 
Following its withdrawal of the 1972 Olympic bid, Sydney’s aspiration to stage the 
Olympic Games in 1988 emerged and was synchronised with its Bicentennial 
celebration of European settlement in 1788. The State Government, led by the Liberal 
National Party, had a great interest in staging the Games, and the Citizen of Sydney 
1988 Olympic Games Committee was appointed in 1970 with Deputy Lord Mayor 
Alderman Nicholas Shehadie as chairman (Jobling, 1994). One of the biggest concerns 
for the Committee was the location of Olympic venues. The Committee initially 
identified Moore Park and the Centennial Park area for the construction of a new 
Olympic stadium. Moore Park was established in 1886, and the proximity to Sydney’s 
Central Business District (CBD) and availability of hotels and temporary 
accommodation (using the University dormitories) was the reason behind the selection 
of Moore Park as a proposed main venue for the 1988 Olympic Games (Development 
Planning & Research Associates, 1971, p. 32). Yet building the new Olympic stadium 
and turning Moore Park into a larger sports complex meant the demolition of a whole 
neighbourhood around the area and therefore the proposal caused a storm of protest in 
1970 and 1971 (Weirick, 1998, pp. 74–75). The architect Walter Bunning was therefore 
commissioned for a special one-off study reviewing the use of Moore Park and 
identifying potential alternative sites for Sydney’s sports complex (Howell, 1995, p. 9). 
The final report (called the Bunning Report) became an important and influential 
document for the subsequent planning decisions around Sydney’s sports complex, and it 
suggested abandoning the use of Moore Park and instead recommended the Homebush 
Bay area 14 km west of the CBD for Sydney’s sports complex site. It was the first 
governmental document suggesting the Homebush Bay area for Sydney’s major sports 
complex, and Bunning began the report by questioning the role of the sports complex: 
 
“[w]hether the priority is for facilities for an Olympic Games or whether the 
continuing recreational needs of Sydney’s present and future population is to be 
the major consideration… [t]he prudent policy would be to select an area 
which would satisfy the requirements for holding the Olympic Games, but to 
ensure the site would fundamentally satisfy the recreational requirements of the 
total metropolitan population present and future, exclusive of the international 
event” (Bunning, 1973, pp. 1-2). 
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It was clear that Bunning envisaged that satisfying both Olympic and post-Olympic uses 
of the sports complex would be critical in deciding the location of the new regional 
sports complex. He pointed out the following five key factors in selecting the site: 
 
1. Proximity to the centre of the present and future population; 
2. Accessibility by private and public transport from residential areas and the 
international airport; 
3. Affordable distance from the hotels and central city areas (20 minutes from 
the CBD by public transport); 
4. Size of the area to be large enough to accommodate the main facilities of an 
Olympic Complex; and 
5. Representation of the image of a young and progressive country.  
 
These are the critical reasons why Bunning argues that the Homebush Bay area was 
more suitable for Sydney’s sports complex than the Moore Park area. The identification 
of “the geographical centre” in the region was the most crucial factor among them and 
Bunning was fully aware of the significant spatial expansion of Sydney’s population 
outwards. This eventually became recognised as the crucial advantage of Homebush 
Bay in the west compared to Moore Park in the east. Bunning addressed that, 
 
“[w]hen the existing facilities were established in the Moore Park area in 1886, 
65% of the population of metropolitan Sydney was living within a 5 mile radius 
of the Sydney Cricket Ground. Since this original establishment the population 
of Sydney has spread outward to the south-west, west and north to the extent 
that the Moore Park areas has inconvenient access for the majority of the 
population” (Bunning, 1973, p. 7). 
 
The Bunning Report’s suggestion of Homebush Bay as “the centre of the geographical 
distribution of Sydney’s present and future population” cohered with government 
concerns about the lack of public facilities in the emerging western suburbs. Spearrirtt 
and De Marco point out that, as most settlement patterns in Sydney’s suburbs showed, 
community facilities were rarely provided in step with residential growth, and the social 
agencies did not have the “political muscle” to secure such facilities (Spearritt and 
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DeMarco, 1988, p. 67). Bunning’s notion of the sports complex was that it was not only 
for mega-events but also for the long-term everyday use of Sydney’s citizens. Although 
the physical character of the sports facilities needed for international events and local 
usages was very different, he nevertheless argued convincingly that the location of the 
sports complex had to be synchronised with the demands on such public facilities (Fig. 
3-1).  
 
3.1.3 Intensification of the sporting character in Homebush Bay: Bidding for the 
1996 Games 
After the last-minute withdrawal of the bid for the 1988 Games in 1979, Sydney did not 
enter the bidding for the 1992 Games. Yet when the Liberal Party won the election in 
March 1988 and Nicholas Frank Greiner became the Premier on 25 March 1988, 
Greiner announced in May 1988 the formation of the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s 
Council, which aimed to submit an application for the 1996 Games (Howell, 1995, p. 
15). Although Sydney eventually lost the national competition for selecting the 
Australian bid city to Melbourne, the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council's 
proposal for the 1996 Games had greatly evolved from the previous 1988 bid.  
 
The Homebush Bay area was again designated as the main venue for the 1988 Games, 
and in order to make the bid proposal stronger, more competition venues were planned 
to be concentrated in the area (Fig. 3-2). Yet the concern with this approach was 
financial feasibility in terms of the regional government’s limited resources and 
long-term viability in sustaining the facilities. Thus, in-depth strategic long-term 
planning was required, and re-organisation of the regional sporting structures became 
the workable solution for this. The Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council pointed 
out that relocating the existing sports facilities to Homebush Bay and selling the 
previous site for new development would be useful means of satisfying both financial 
and post-Olympic functional constraints. Two sporting facilities became the targets for 
this strategy: they were the existing Royal Agriculture Society’s showground at Moore 
Park and the Harness Racing Paceway located at Harold Park close to Sydney’s CBD. 
 
The benefits of these facilities being relocated to Homebush Bay was to attract more 
people with upgraded facilities, although in the case of Harness Racing Paceway, it was 
also very much connected with the severe inter-state competition in Australia to stage 
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limited horse racing events (Cowley, 1988). Furthermore, the sale of the existing lands 
of both facilities would raise enough funds to build new facilities in Homebush Bay, and 
this was also a key benefit for the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council. Thus, the 
Council put great emphasis on constructing the new Royal Agriculture Society's 
showground in Homebush Bay (Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, 1988a, p. 
57) and promoted the relocation of the Harness Racing Paceway by stating that “for the 
first time, all equestrian events will be held at the main Olympic site in the recently 
announced new Sydney Harness Racing Track” (Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's 
Council, 1988b, p. 2).29 
 
Although the relocation of these facilities was considered to be beneficial for the 
Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council, the Royal Agriculture Society and the 
Harness Racing Association, this view was not fully shared in the regional planning 
context. The relocation of the showground in particular became a matter of dispute 
among the different authorities in the State Government, and caused public debate. 
David Churches, the Deputy Director of the Sydney Olympic Games Secretariat for the 
1996 bid, gives some insight into the conflicts with the State Government as follows: 
 
“[t]he democratic centre of the population in Sydney is not here (the Moore 
Park) but here (Homebush Bay). So the feeling (of the Bid Committee) was that 
facilities for the Olympic Games which would also include broad community 
use should more sensibly be in this location (Homebush Bay) rather than in a 
city centre. […] For the legacy it was good for Sydney to develop this new 
concept here (Homebush Bay). So moving the showground became the core 
part of that strategy. But it was difficult because the planning department of the 
State Government always had poor regard for that. They were quite opposed to 
this, because they’d already made up their mind that the showground should be 
in the city centre (the Moore Park), none of which could take the Olympic 
Games. They were very inflexible in their thinking about how we could use this 
opportunity. If I believe there was a failure right back to this stage, it was the 
fact that government authorities didn’t treat this as an opportunity in the right 
                                                  
29 The new Paceway in Homebush was not included in the final bid document, yet the document suggested its 
possibility. 
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way.”30 
 
As the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council was established by the NSW Premier 
as a special authority for delivering the Olympic bid document, and it was independent 
from the NSW Department of Planning, the different views on the relocation of the 
Royal Agriculture Society’s showground entailed a conflict between the special and 
normal planning authorities. As such, it reflected the different approaches to the location 
of public facilities within the NSW planning structure.  
 
In addition to this, the sale of historical public assets and development of the existing 
site also became both political and public concerns. The questions surrounding the 
future of the showground were extensively reported by the regional newspapers such as 
the Sydney Morning Herald, and a new housing development at the existing Harness 
Racing Paceway site in Harold Park created significant tension with the local 
municipality, regarding the legal approval of the plans due to the lack of a consultation 
process.31 Thus, the concentration of the sporting facilities in Homebush Bay was 
envisioned as part of a significant restructuring of Sydney’s sporting landscape, but the 
dispute over these urban changes critically represented the different interests of the 
different authorities involved. 
 
3.1.4 Bidding for the 2000 Games  
Despite a significant campaign backing Homebush Bay as a focal point for the Olympic 
Games, Sydney lost the Australian 1996 Olympic candidature competition to Melbourne 
in November 1988. Yet the scheme to bid for the subsequent 2000 Games was 
formulated just one month later. There were several different points in terms of the 
formulation of the bid proposal. First, the governance of the bid proposal was more 
firmly related to the regional government’s regenerative vision for Homebush Bay 
rather than isolating it, as had been the case in the previous bid. In this vein, the Premier 
Nick Greiner formed the Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee (HBDSC). 
The primary focus of the Committee was not the Olympics but rather a general 
                                                  
30 Interview with David Churches with the author on 26 November 2008. 
31 As the existing land was not designated for residential use, it needed to be re-zoned, but the Mayor of Leichhardt 
(the Local council) claimed that the council rejected the re-zoning proposal. Rawland Smith stated the opinion of the 
NSW Government that all political parties agreed to support the Olympics, and suggested the NSW Government had 
the power to override the decision (Holmes, P. (1988) Paceway: Key to Olympic Bid?, In Sydney Morning Herald on 
20 October 1988. ). 
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development strategy for the Homebush Bay area.32 It fundamentally considered the 
Homebush Bay area to be a highly mixed urban precinct, and sports use was one of the 
dominant uses at the site along with the newly established industrial/technological park, 
the Australian Centre. Echoing the final report to the NSW Government by the HBDSC, 
the Premier formed the Sydney Olympic Games Review Committee on 23 October 
1989 to examine the feasibility of Sydney’s bid for the 2000 Games. The final report of 
the Review Committee, “the Baird Report”, was issued on 11 December 1990, and 
Homebush Bay was again recommended as the most appropriate location for the 
principal Olympic venues.  
 
Secondly, the bid for the 2000 Games required intensifying the sporting character of 
Homebush Bay in a much deeper way than the previous bid had. In addition to the 
relocation of the Royal Agriculture Society’s showground as proposed in the previous 
bid, construction of  new aquatic and athletic centres was recommended, irrespective 
to the result of the bid (Sydney Olympic Games Review Committee, 1990, pp. 5–6). 
This was considered as critical for Sydney to show the IOC that it already had the 
infrastructure ready or at least in development. The President of the Australian Olympic 
Committee (AOC), John Coates, also claimed that: 
 
“[u]nless at least two major Games facilities – the aquatics centre and the 
State athletics centre – were built, the bid would be withdrawn […] financing 
of the bid was solely a matter for Premier Greiner and the Federal 
Government but, without the infrastructure, the Australian committee would 
withdraw Australia's nomination” (cited in Seccombe, 1991). 
 
The NSW Government submitted the Olympic Games plan to the Commonwealth 
Government in January 1991. The Report, titled “Sydney Bid for 2000 Olympic 
Games”, set out how the development of Homebush Bay would be implemented in 
different stages: prior to the 1993 IOC decision, after the 1993 IOC decision and the 
post-Olympic phase. However, it clearly indicated that the construction of the aquatic 
and athletic centres (in the secondary track in the initial phase) and the sports halls, 
which would be part of the Royal Agriculture Society’s showground complex, would 
happen in the first phase, irrespective of the bid result.  
                                                  
32 Interview with David Churches, 26 November 2008.  
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Thirdly, unlike in the previous bid, this phasing strategy was necessary for the State 
Government to clarify both its maximum and minimum expectations in regard to the 
Olympic bid. The State Government also outlined two scenarios for the development of 
Homebush Bay, in the case of a successful and unsuccessful bid. It suggested that if 
Sydney’s bid was successful, various sporting facilities including the main Olympic 
stadium would be built before the 2000 Olympics and anticipated that commercial and 
industrial developments would be implemented after 2000 by selling surplus land, 
which could be created by staging the Games. In the case of an unsuccessful bid, it 
suggested that development of Homebush Bay would be slower, but the relocation of 
the RAS showground and construction of an additional athletic field would still be 
implemented (NSW Government, 1991, pp. 19–28). 
 
Fourthly, the financial arrangements for the bid were more complex than previously. As 
the AOC set the hurdles for the 2000 Olympic bid higher, the construction of the aquatic 
and athletic centres in Homebush Bay became vital for Sydney to proceed with the bid 
campaign. The most critical issue for the NSW Government was to mobilise the 
financial resources to construct these facilities before the bid, and it had to seek the 
financial assistance of the Commonwealth Government. Following the evaluation of the 
above report, the Commonwealth Government agreed to provide an extra AU$ 300 
million to the NSW Government. In addition to this, Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited  
was established as a private–public consortium, whose members included influential 
businessmen, politicians and sportspersons. It aimed at preparing and promoting 
Sydney’s bid and seeking funds from both public and private sources, (SOCOG, 2001, 
vol. 1, pp. 14–15) with a highly ambitious bid plan proposing “the greatest 
concentration of sports at a single site in the modern Olympic history” (Sydney 
Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd, 1993b, p. 6).  
 
Fifthly, the 2000 bid was more thematised than the previous bid. It cohered with the 
IOC’s great championing of the enhancement of the environmental sustainability of 
Olympic Games. Ever-increasing concerns surrounding global warming and severe 
critiques of the destruction of the local eco-system caused by the Olympic Games (in 
particular the Winter Games) had forced the IOC to take the environmental dimension 
of the Olympics seriously in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Cantelon and Letters, 
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2000). The IOC eventually enshrined environmental protection as the third pillar of the 
Olympic Movement along with sport and culture in 1994, and established the IOC 
Sports and Environment Commission in 1995.33 Against this backdrop, the bid for the 
2000 Games was the first bid for the summer Olympic Games in which the IOC asked 
bid cities to set out the environmental dimension of their Olympic-led urban planning 
(IOC, 1992). The Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited took this advantage, and 
connected it to the regional ambition to regenerate the post-industrial site in Homebush 
Bay. Sydney’s bid concept of a “Green Games” in this respect can be seen as the perfect 
response to the IOC’s existing political concerns. Jim Sloman, the chief operating 
officer of the Sydney Games, explicitly pointed out that “pushing the button” the IOC 
wants to see is a key to a bidding campaign.34 In Sloman’s terms, the crucial “button” 
for the IOC in the 2000 Olympics bid was certainly “environmental concern”. Thus, 
Sydney’s concept of a “Green Games” and the masterplan image presented in the bid 
document certainly matched the IOC’s priorities.  
 
The final bid proposal was submitted to the IOC in 1993, and it is worth noting that the 
definition of the “Sydney Olympic Park” was greatly different to previous bids. In the 
previous bids the Olympic Park was the area including the sporting venues, but in the 
2000 bid document the term “Sydney Olympic Park” indicated the wider Homebush 
Bay area, thus including sporting venues, the Main Press Centre (part of the Royal 
Agriculture Society’s showground), and Olympic villages for athletes, media and 
technical staff.35 In other words, the term “Sydney Olympic Park” represented the 
broader Homebush Bay area where most of the 2000 Olympic Games would be 
concentrated (Fig. 3-3).  
 
 
3.2 Industrial vision 
 
3.2.1 The industrial past of Homebush Bay  
While the Olympic vision and its associated “sporting aspiration” in Homebush Bay had 
been shaped along with Sydney’s long history of Olympic bid campaigns, an industrial 
                                                  
33 http://www.olympic.org/sport-environment-commission 
34 Interview with Jim Sloman on 22 December 2008. 
35 Sydney Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd (1993b) Sydney 2000 : Share the Spirit, Vol.2, Sydney. p. 4. 
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vision of the area had also been separately developed. It was in the Newington area, 
west of the Homebush site, where various manufacturers had emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, and major industrial development in Homebush Bay had 
commenced at the beginning of twentieth century, when a major part of the land was 
sold to the State Government in 1907 for the construction of the State Abattoir (Council 
of the Municipality of Auburn, 1982, p. 53). The Abattoir officially opened in 1913, and 
it had been developed with significant meat-production capacity and was described as 
“the largest slaughter complex in the world” by the 1920s.36 The area used for the 
Abattoirs also significantly extended, and west of Haslams Creeks, which was the 
southern part of Newington, was also used for holding stock for many years.37 The 
significance of these industrial developments lies not only in their extensive role in 
supplying products to the Sydney region, but also in their connection to the 
neighbourhood. For example, the Daily Telegraph on 17 January 1908 stated as follows: 
 
“The district is growing in importance as a manufacturing centre, and numbers 
of men are finding employment. The district is greatly favoured by 
manufacturers owing to its proximity to the metropolis. It is authoritatively 
stated that the establishment of the Abattoirs will see the initiation of several 
industries, which give regular employment to hundreds of men.”38 
 
Similar to this, various past newspapers and historical documents suggested that the 
industrial facilities in Homebush certainly had a strong economic connection with 
surrounding neighbourhoods through their provision of employment opportunities.39  
 
However, the economic significance of the Abattoirs declined in the 1960s, as serious 
problem with maintenance of the facilities arose and the State Government pursued a 
policy of encouraging slaughter houses in rural areas. Despite the major modernisation 
process undertaken between 1965 and 1976, the Abattoir struggled to secure its 
                                                  
36 “Industrial History of Sydney Olympic Park”, 
http://www.sydneyolympicpark.com.au/education_and_learning/history/industrial_history 
37 Historical record of Newington and Homebush Bay, archived at the Auburn Municipal Library. The area was used 
as an armament depot during the 1940s. 
38 The Daily Telegraph on 17 January 1908, cited in the “Riverside Heights Estate” promotional booklet published 
by Arthur & Rickard Co. Ltd on 27 February 1909. 
39 It is also worth noting that because of the development of the Abattoirs in Homebush, the Newington area also got 
an opportunity to provide homes for its workers. Although the idea of establishing a residential block in Newington 
for the workers in the Abattoirs did not materialise, a housing development called “River Height Estate” was 
promoted as a convenient location, to which workers came home from the industrial centre by crossing the bridge 
over Haslams Creek. 
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financial viability, and its land was therefore subdivided and sold in various phases until 
its eventual closure in 1988.  
 
In a similar vein, the State Brickworks also experienced a rise and fall in its 
manufacturing significance in Homebush Bay. The State Brickworks was established 
adjacent to the Abattoirs by the State Government in 1911, and enlarged to 23.5 ha by 
1925. Yet the Brickworks showed a declining profit margin, and were sold to the private 
enterprise Brickworks Limited in 1936. However, its profitability did not improve and it 
was eventually closed in 1940.40 Nevertheless, the Brickworks were re-established by 
the State Government after the Second World War, and extensively developed with the 
post-war construction boom.41 Its production peak came in 1969, but it too faced 
operational losses in the 1970s, similar to the case of the Abattoirs. The Brickworks 
ceased trading as a government enterprise in June 1988.42  
 
As both the State Abattoirs and Brickworks had long provided job opportunities to the 
area, the closure of these facilities had a great economic impact on the local Auburn 
Council. It was therefore deemed crucial for the Auburn Council to be able to integrate 
its job demands into the post-Games industrial site. This was also vital so as to keep the 
area’s identity as “Sydney’s industrial hub” (NSW Department of Industrial 
Development and Decentralisation, 1986, p. i) (Fig. 3-4). 
 
Along with the industrial development of Homebush Bay, its role in waste dumping 
should be acknowledged and it is well known that the Homebush Bay landscape was 
shaped by both controlled and uncontrolled dumping. Sydney’s rapid expansion in the 
1950s and 60s and the start of the “throw-away” society meant people and industry 
needed more space for their waste.43 Fig. 3-5 shows the evolution of landfill in 
Homebush Bay, and it clearly illustrates how the shape of land in Homebush Bay was 
manipulated over time (Fig. 3-5). An estimated 9 million cubic metres of waste and 
                                                  
40 “Industrial History of Sydney Olympic Park, 
http://www.sydneyolympicpark.com.au/education_and_learning/history/industrial_history 
41 Historical record of Newington and Homebush Bay, archived at the Auburn Municipal Library. 
42 “Industrial History of Sydney Olympic Park, 
http://www.sydneyolympicpark.com.au/education_and_learning/history/industrial_history 
Excavation of the clay pit was abandoned much earlier and it was utilised as a municipal waste depot from the 1960s. 
43 “Site remediation of Sydney Olympic Park, 
http://www.sydneyolympicpark.com.au/education_and_learning/history/site_remediation 
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contaminated soils was spread over 400 hectares within the 760-hectare site by 1988.44 
Needless to say, this contaminated site became a significant constraint to subsequent 
urban regeneration, and the location and degree of contamination was a critical factor in 
designating the alternative land use in Homebush Bay.  
 
3.2.2 The evolving role of Homebush Bay in the regional planning framework 
The role of the Homebush Bay area in the broader Sydney region has also been 
reflected in wider regional planning policies. Regarding the spatial planning of the 
region, the “Metropolitan Strategy” is considered the critical document in relation to 
Sydney’s development strategies. By the time Sydney won the bid for the 2000 Games 
in 1993, three versions had been issued in 1948, 1968 and 1988.45 As the main focus of 
the plans is addressing regional spatial strategies, the documents do not intend to 
identify in depth the character of specific places, but it is still critical and possible to 
contextualise Homebush Bay within the Sydney region from the metropolitan viewpoint. 
The following chronological view to the regional strategy unveils the changing role of 
Homebush Bay in the regional context.  
 
Sydney’s first regional planning strategy, “the Cumberland Plan”, was issued in 1948 
and enforced in 1951. It was the urban growth strategy for the period between 1951 and 
1975, and promoted a close relationship between living and working within the inner 
Green Belt. Major living and industrial areas were therefore designated in the region in 
a consolidated manner, yet Homebush Bay was designated as neither a living nor an 
industrial area but rather as a special area (Fig. 3-6).  
 
Although the State Abattoirs and Brickworks were in operation at the time of 
publication, and provided significant job opportunities in the area, from the regional 
viewpoint Homebush Bay was recognised as highly isolated from other parts of the 
region and as playing a supportive role in regional economic activities rather than a 
viable urban space in which living and working had a complementary relationship. 
 
Homebush Bay was however identified differently in the subsequent regional spatial 
strategy, the “Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970–2000” published in March 1968. In 
                                                  
44 Ibid.  
45 The “Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970–2000” (1968) was re-examined in 1980, and “Review, Sydney Region 
Outline Plan, 1970–2000” was published. 
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criticising the previous plan as lacking the flexibility to accommodate the scale and rate 
of growth in Sydney, the Outline Plan instead proposed liner-pattern development based 
on existing railway lines as a spatial development strategy for Sydney’s future. The 
Homebush Bay area was located exactly on the western expansion corridor (The State 
Planning Authority of NSW, 1968, p. 15). Special uses were proposed for the rural areas 
in the region, and half of Homebush Bay (Newington side) was designated a 
consolidated industrial area and the other half (Homebush side) was integrated into the 
“existing urban area” (Fig. 3-7). “Urban area” in this Metropolitan Strategy included the 
residential function, but residential use did not exist in Homebush Bay when the 
Metropolitan Strategy was issued in 1968. This means that while Homebush Bay was to 
continue to provide employment opportunities as an industrial site, it was also intended 
to become part of the urban tissues including residential uses.  
 
The NSW Department of Planning later issued the regional planning strategy, “Sydney 
into Its Third Century, Metropolitan Strategy for the Sydney Region”, in 1988. The plan 
advocates the continuation of the principal development strategy of linear urban 
expansion along the transport corridors proposed in the previous Sydney Region Outline 
Plan (NSW Depertment of Planning, 1988, p. 45). Proximity between working and 
living was also again enhanced in the Metropolitan Strategy, and in order to bring more 
jobs closer to the workforce and to create a more convenient and lively environment, it 
designated three regional centres: Sydney CBD, North Sydney and Parramatta, and 16 
sub-regional centres. Homebush Bay was ambiguously located in the vast carpet of 
“existing and committed urban” area, but this stemmed from the fact that, unlike the 
previous Regional Outline Plan, the Metropolitan Strategy did not take responsibility 
for land-use zoning but left it to local councils (Fig. 3-8). 
 
Although the in-depth spatial strategy became the responsibility of the local council, the 
Homebush Bay area was under the control of the regional government, which was 
authorised to issue its own Regional Environment Plan. The Regional Environment Plan 
was a basis for State Government intervention in the planning of the region or part of 
the region (Gurran, 2007, p. 222)46 and the first Regional Environment Plan on 
Homebush Bay was issued in 1986 by the NSW Government. Although the Homebush 
area was part of the existing urban area in the Metropolitan Strategy, the Regional 
                                                  
46 According to Gurran, the definition of ‘region’ in the REP is very broad and can include a defined geographical 
region extending across two or more local governments or a particular place of declared regional significance.  
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Environment Plan extensively addressed the dominance of the industrial use in 
Homebush Bay. This implied that the term “industrial” in the Regional Environment 
Plan did not mean heavy industry as in the previous industrial uses in Homebush Bay 
but rather indicated a lighter and more high-tech industry, which could fit with other 
urban functions. The Metropolitan Strategy identified the significance of the industrial 
use in the region, but it also recognised replacement of some older industries by new 
industries in the inner industrial zones (Spearritt and DeMarco, 1988, p. 33). 
 
3.2.3 New industrial development in Homebush Bay 
Decline of the State-run industrial facilities and recognition of the need for “new” 
industrial uses in Homebush Bay in the 1980s pushed the transformation of the 
industrial area. Yet the opportunity for the new development began much earlier, as 
various pieces of the State’s own land had been released for sale. During the 1960s the 
area between the rail loop in the State Abattoirs site and the Parramatta Road was 
subdivided and sold for industrial development to provide funds for the construction of 
the new sales yard in the Abattoirs. An area west of the rail loop was also released for 
construction of a new waste transformation centre in the early 1980s, and it was also 
decided to conduct further release of surplus land for industrial use in 1982 and 1983 as 
a part of a review of the Abattoir operation.  
 
An arrangement was reached in 1984 with Lend Lease, one of the major development 
companies in Australia, for the progressive release of a 50ha site for development as an 
advanced technology park, named “the Australian Centre”.47 Unlike the previous State 
Government-led industrial developments, these new developments were carried out by 
private enterprises. The consolidated way of transforming old types of manufacturing 
into an advanced technological park via a PPP was understood as the State 
Government’s general strategy for urban transformation in the region, and Homebush 
Bay was, in this respect, considered a model of urban transformation for the Sydney 
region at the time. This was also considered beneficial to the local Auburn Municipality, 
as it would potentially compensate for the loss of jobs in the local area. This was 
particularly true when one considers the limited available land for this purpose in 
Western Sydney. The NSW Governmental document “Development Trends in Western 
Sydney” recognised that the availability of land in the municipality had virtually been 
                                                  
47 Historical record of Newington and Homebush Bay, archived at the Auburn Municipal Library. 
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exhausted, and future development in the area would predominantly need to involve the 
redevelopment of older-style industrial properties (NSW Department of Industrial 
Development and Decentralisation, 1986, p. 4). Yet there were also great concerns about 
whether the private-led development would fit with the existing character of the area 
around Homebush Bay, especially along the Parramatta Road, developed as a major 
warehousing/distribution centre (Kennedy and Kennedy, 1982). Thus, the establishment 
of “the Australian Centre”, which was largely a result of the regional government’s 
urban “entrepreneurialisation” schemes, contained some uncertainties in terms of its 
future integration with the adjacent industrial use. This became a crucial factor in 
defining the future of Homebush Bay.  
 
 
3.3 Evolution of the mixed-use vision in Homebush Bay 
 
As indicated in the previous part, there have been various forces shaping the use of 
Homebush Bay. In particular, industrial use and sporting use were envisioned separately 
at least until 1993 when Sydney finalised its vision for Homebush Bay in the bidding 
for the 2000 Olympic Games. During this period, Sydney undertook three bids, in 1979, 
1988 and 1993, and each bid became a significant benchmark for the subsequent visions 
of land use. Furthermore, between each bid, various masterplans were proposed to 
shape the use of Homebush Bay. Thus, there was great evolution of the mixed-use 
vision in Homebush Bay, as graphically demonstrated in (Fig. 3-9). In the following 
part, instead of describing each masterplan and the chorological evolution of the vision 
for Homebush Bay, I will take a more analytical approach, examining three issues 
during the 30-year journey of Sydney’s bid campaign. Firstly, I will examine the 
significance of the Olympic impacts in shaping the vision of the mixed-use Homebush 
Bay. I will subsequently focus on the periods between the three Olympic bids, which I 
will call interim periods, and investigate the various attempts made in these times. 
Finally, I will explore that final bid proposal which defined the basic spatial strategy for 
the Olympic Park in Homebush Bay in the subsequent phases.  
 
3.3.1 Olympic impacts  
Throughout the long journey of Sydney’s Olympic bid, one of the most significant 
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changes brought about by the bid was the intensification of sporting uses, and the 
degree to which sporting venues were proposed in Homebush Bay increased as the 
years went on. As Fig. 3-10 shows, only three venues were proposed for the Games in 
the 1988 Olympic bid, but the number grew to 13 including two already built venues in 
the 2000 bid (Fig. 3-10). 
 
It is understood that a significant force behind this was the IOC’s influence on the host 
city, as the concentration of sporting venues has been strongly encouraged by the IOC. 
The IOC indicated in its “Manual for Cities Bidding for the Olympic Games” (1992) as 
follows: 
 
“The geographical area occupied by the sports installations required to cater 
for the Olympic programme should be as compact as possible. This can be a 
vital element for the awarding of the Games. In any case, it will facilitate 
organization of the media centres, press access to the different sports, transport, 
accommodation, links with the Olympic village, logistics in general” (emphasis 
added) (IOC, 1992, p. 51).  
 
Venue concentration was thus clearly indicated as an essential factor for winning the bid, 
and thus this can be understood as an example of Preuss’s concept of the “Prisoner’s 
dilemma” in which he argues that bid cities would offer more than the IOC required 
without knowing other bidders’ proposals, in order to win the right to stage the Games 
under severe inter-urban competition (Preuss, 2004, p. 290). Given the marked increase 
in the popularity of hosting the Games since the 1980s (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; 
Shirai, 2008), Sydney had to intensify the sporting vision of Homebush Bay much more, 
and this eventually had crucial impacts in the defining of the spatial character of the 
future Homebush Bay.  
 
In addition to the increase of sporting venues in Homebush along with Sydney’s bids, 
there were also significant changes in the area that sporting uses occupied in Homebush 
Bay. The 1988 proposal (1979), which evolved from the Bunning Report (1973), 
proposed the sporting and residential area be located at the periphery of the Homebush 
Bay area, because it respected the existing State-owned industrial use located in the 
middle of the area. However, sporting uses gradually evolved to be concentrated in the 
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centre of the area. This was partially because of the closure of the State Abattoirs and 
Brickworks, but it also represented the dominance of sporting over industrial use at the 
site. The bid plan for the 1996 Games (1988), in particular, gave crucial momentum to 
the prospect of changing the previously envisioned industrial use at the core of 
Homebush Bay to sports at the heart of the area, constraining industrial use to the 
periphery of the site. However, this caused the spatial isolation of the already 
established high-tech industrial park, the Australian Centre. The bid committee for the 
1996 Games, the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, clearly stated the great 
demand for light industrial uses in Homebush Bay and therefore strategically located 
the Media Centre with the legacy transformation in mind (Sydney Olympic Games 
Citizen's Council, 1988a, p. 124). Yet it failed to integrate the existing industrial use into 
the bid plan, as the Committee considered it as incompatible with ongoing bid 
components.  
 
A further significant impact of the Olympic bid to the spatial vision of Homebush Bay 
was to trigger the residential development in Homebush Bay. All three bids proposed to 
construct the Olympic village in the area and convert it into saleable residential units 
afterwards. This strategy was also synchronised with the NSW Government’s urban 
consolidation policy, as the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council for example 
clearly states:  
 
“[t]he construction of the Olympic villages and their transformation into the 
consolidated residential areas after the Games allow a major demonstration of 
the Government commitment to urban consolidation” (Sydney Olympic 
Games Citizen's Council, 1988a, p. 58) (emphasis added). 
 
This urban consolidation had been promoted by the NSW Government, in particular by 
the Department of Environment and Planning, to satisfy diverse residential needs with 
lower infrastructure and social costs for local and regional government (NSW 
Department of Environment and Planning, 1984, pp. 4–5). The Department of 
Environment and Planning had also greatly enhanced the involvement of the private 
sector in implementing the urban consolidation in terms of the local council’s area target 
of provision of residences (NSW Department of Environment and Planning, 1984, p. 
31). Against this backdrop, each bid committee proposed constructing the Olympic 
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villages as close as possible to the sporting venues, which has been the IOC’s favoured 
approach, and proposed to locate them at the primary location in the area. In the later 
phase of the bid, it was envisaged that the private sector would contribute to the 
implementation of the Village, but questions were raised about whether the Bid 
Committee, which consisted of influential regional business and political leaders, could 
integrate local demand for post-Olympic housing in the Bid proposal.  
 
3.3.2 Interim periods  
Between Sydney’s three Olympic bids were two interim periods, which I will stress as 
crucial phases shaping the mixed-use vision further. Yet there were significant 
differences between the spatial visions and the political interventions in these two 
periods. The first interim period between the bids for the 1988 Games (1979) and 1996 
Games (1989) was dominated by the industrial vision of the new Homebush Bay. As a 
legacy of the bid for the 1988 Games, the State Sports Centre and the Bicentennial Park 
States Sports Centre were constructed at the south-east side of Homebush Bay, and this 
became “the nucleus of a new recreation zone for the Western part of Sydney”, which 
fitted into the Government’s urban strategy of shifting activities away from the CBD 
and established Parramatta as an alternative centre (NSW Department of Environment 
and Planning, 1982, p. 6). However, other than these new sporting recreational uses, the 
focus in this period had been to create the new Homebush Bay as a first-class industrial 
site, in the shadow of ongoing uncertainty regarding the continuation of the existing 
State industrial facilities. There were various masterplans issued by both public and 
private sector actors in this period, but most of them considered the core of Homebush 
Bay as being for industrial use. 
 
The McLachlan Study (1982) conducted at the request of an inter-departmental Steering 
Committee under the auspices of the NSW Department of Environment and Planning, 
the Hub Scheme (1983) proposed by the Impetus Consulting Group, a consortium of 
private professional firms with planning and development expertise, the Lend Lease 
Plan (1985) conducted by the developer which established the Australian Centre at the 
site, and the Regional Environment Plan (1986) undertaken by the NSW Government 
all saw Homebush Bay as “Sydney’s first technology, industry and business park” 
(Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee, 1989, p. 27). However, the problem 
was that there was no single authority which took responsibility for the development of 
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Homebush Bay, and this made each plan different and lacking a cohesive approach. 
Residential use, which synchronised with the regional government’s urban 
consolidation policy, for example, was initially proposed in the McLachlan Study 
(1982), but this was not continuously represented in the subsequent plans. Integration of 
existing uses, such as the already established sports precinct and the adjacent industrial 
neighbourhood, also varied in each plan. Although the Homebush Bay area was 
designated as under the regional government’s planning control in the later phase of the 
first interim period, its planning role was nonetheless limited, and formulating the 
strategic long-term spatial plan was not part of the remit. Thus, the various masterplans 
published in the first interim period greatly represented each author’s aspirations rather 
than integrated various spatial conditions and requirements into one plan.  
 
However, the second interim period, which was between the bids for the 1996 and 2000 
Games (1989–2003 working period) took a more strategic approach. As indicated earlier, 
as soon as Sydney lost the bid for the 1996 Games, the NSW Premier established the 
Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee (HBDSC) to examine an integrated, 
coordinated development strategy for the precinct.48 The primary objectives of the 
HBSC were to advise the Government on all aspects of the development of Homebush 
Bay, to formulate options for development strategies and appropriate means of 
implementation, and to recommend to the Government a programme of future land use, 
staged development and management of assets to secure long-term benefits for 
metropolitan Sydney (,HBDSC, 1989, p. 1). The HBDSC published the final report, 
“Report to Government, 30th June, 1989: Homebush Bay development strategy”, on 30 
June 1989, and as soon as it was accepted by the NSW Premier the Property Service 
Group (PSG) was subsequently established, which was responsible for implementing 
the strategy for developing Homebush Bay. The PSG followed the recommendations of 
the HBDSC and its strategic plan, “Homebush Bay Business Plan”, was published in 
August 1990. The main concern of the HBDSC and the PSG was not sports use in 
Homebush Bay as in the Olympic bid plan, but they rather explored a more 
comprehensive approach, including housing, commercial, industrial, and 
sports/recreational uses. The two planning documents published by the HBDSC and 
PSG in the second interim period demonstrate the State Government’s significant 
                                                  
48 The Committee also considered the future development strategy for the contingent sites, where existing activities 
were proposed to relocate to Homebush Bay, such as the RAS Showground at Paddington, the E.S. Marks Field at 
Kensington, the Harness Racing Club at Harold Park, and the Granville Showground at Clyde. 
82 
intention to regenerate the entire Homebush Bay area.  
 
However, as the HBDSC’s approach was to create a speculative vision of Homebush 
Bay to maximise its land use, and the PSG’s role was to create a feasible strategy to 
implement the development, the masterplans proposed by both bodies were different in 
various aspects. For example, the HBDSC proposed to change many existing areas in 
the west of Homebush Bay to more profitable uses such as residential and commercial, 
but the PSG planned to maintain these areas as much as possible, predominantly for 
industrial uses. 49  Despite the difference between their speculative and practical 
approaches in the two schemes, there were shared strategies in these plans, which I 
argue became critical in the subsequent Olympic Park plan. Firstly, as the 1996 bid plan 
indicated, the HBDSC and PSG recognised that the existing Australian Centre would 
not fit with their future spatial strategy, and left it an unresolved issue in regard to 
subsequent development. “Compatibility” between different uses in the mixed-use 
urban strategy has been considered as one of the crucial concepts (see, for example, 
Grant, 2002), and this had to be recognised in realising the “mixed-use” urban quarter in 
Homebush Bay. Yet the existing Australian Centre was left as an isolated island in the 
new Olympic site. Secondly, the “entrepreneurial” approach was greatly prioritised by 
both authorities. The HBDSC plan clearly stated that development of additional 
commercial uses would be an important means of achieving financial returns along with 
the industrial use of Homebush Bay (HBDSC, 1989, p. 3) and the HBSC masterplan 
demonstrated how such economic priorities would be maximised spatially. In the wake 
of the HBDSC’s proposal, the PSG also adopted a mixed-use approach to maximise the 
financial returns from the regeneration of Homebush Bay. While the HBDSC’s 
approach was to generate them via multiple land uses, such as residential or commercial, 
the PSG fundamentally aimed to do so mainly by making surplus land in Homebush 
Bay available to the private sector. Due to the unknown result in the bidding for the next 
Olympics, the focus on industrial use was strongly connected to the PSG’s objective to 
generate income that would offset the cost of developing Homebush Bay and achieve 
the social benefit of creating the jobs within the area. Both plans sought financial profit 
by different methods, with their planning strategy reflecting the neo-liberal approach of 
regional government, which had been applied to many regeneration projects on 
                                                  
49 The PSG plan suggested that “the major land development use will be industrial which would occupy 107 hectare 
out of around 197 hectare available for developers.” 
PSG (1990) Homebush Bay Business Plan, Sydney , p. 30. 
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State-owned land in the Sydney region. (see, for example, McGuirk and Dowling, 
2009). 
 
3.3.4 Finalisation for the vision of the Olympic site 
 
Sydney finalised the spatial vision of the bid for the 2000 Games in 1993, which had 
been shaped through the various planning exercises that had taken place since the 
previous bid (Figs. 3-11 and 12). As indicated earlier, the 2000 bid proposal was 
managed by the public–private consortium, the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited, 
which examined the spatial layout of the competition venues, Olympic villages and 
supporting facilities in Homebush Bay. However, another authority, the Homebush Bay 
Development Corporation (HBDC) was established in 1992 under the Growth Centres 
Act – which was also under the umbrella of the previously established PSG – to 
implement the masterplan and manage the development of Homebush Bay. The HBDC 
played a key role in overseeing the development of Homebush Bay. Its role was 
connected to the PSG, but it liaised closely with the Bid Limited, so that the Olympic 
planning would be incorporated with the comprehensive masterplan for Homebush Bay 
(HBDC, 1992p. 10). This organisational structure reflects the vision of Homebush Bay 
for the 2000 Olympic bid. The Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited published the final 
bidding document, “Sydney 2000, Share the Spirit”, in 1993. However, similar to the 
previous bid documents, its main focus was to demonstrate how to organise the 
Olympic Games, and did not include an overall land-use plan for Homebush Bay.50 
Thus, as a comprehensive land-use plan, the HBDC issued “Homebush Bay Area Draft 
Structure Plan” in the same year, which stated: “the masterplan concept is for 
Homebush Bay to become a multi-functional centre for the Sydney region at the centre 
of Sydney’s population” (HBDC, 1992, p. 6).  
 
Nevertheless, there were some discrepancies between the visions for Homebush Bay of 
the Bid Limited and HBDC. The 2000 bid proposal was formulated by modifying the 
previous PSG plan with its vision of optimising the value of land, and it is understood 
that the spectacularisation of Homebush Bay for the Olympic Games had a great 
                                                  
50 The bid document followed the structure in which the IOC asked the bid city to answer various questions on 
organising the Olympic Games. Regarding the spatial setting of Homebush Bay for the Olympic Games, it suggested 
that in-depth architectural plans of the Olympic villages and competition venues were indicated separately, and 
therefore it is hard to understand the comprehensive vision of the whole Homebush Bay for the 2000 Olympic Games 
and beyond. 
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influence on these modifications. In this respect, the 2000 bid proposal was understood 
as a mixture of the inherited plan from the HBDC and the new speculative Olympic 
vision led by the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited. However, in the process of 
formulating the masterplan for the Olympic bid, there was a conflict between the Bid 
Limited and the HBDC, as their primary concerns were different. David Churches, the 
former Executive Manager, Planning & Design of the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid 
Limited, suggested that: 
 
“[t]he design of Homebush Bay was done by the NSW Government (the HBDC), 
and the Bid team (the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited) was simply not 
involved in it.[…] I was completely unhappy in the bid period with the design 
work that the Government was doing. I thought that it completely lacked 
imagination. So we formed, in fact I rang a few friends, a committee which 
involved a number of Sydney architects. […] I used it to create a strong case 
with stronger design.”51 
 
As Churches suggests, there were little interaction between the Bid Limited and HBDC 
in shaping the long-term vision of Homebush Bay. This was further highlighted in the 
ways they envisioned utilising the existing Brickpit. As the large hole left by the State 
Brickworks was approached differently by the Bid Limited and the HBDC, tension 
between the organisations emerged. Andre Andersons, an architect who was involved in 
the design of Homebush Bay for the Olympic Bid, emphasised that: 
 
“The Harbour plays a great role in Sydney's self-image, so it seems crazy not 
to avail yourself of the unique opportunity to bring the Harbour into the site. 
[…] The ability for us to access the Olympic site by water would be wonderful 
and the greater the emphasis placed on the Harbour connection with the 
Olympics site, the greater the chance of selling it internationally” (cited in 
Hawley, 1992). 
 
Like Churches, Andersons stressed his dissatisfaction with the HBDC’s approach to the 
Brickpit. He emphasised the need to use it as an opportunity to sell a positive image of 
Sydney in the bid. Utilisation of the Brickpit could certainly demonstrate how Sydney’s 
                                                  
51 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008. 
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“Green Games” would materialise and the SOBL considered this a great strength of the 
bid. But the HBDC had a different view, pointing out that the architects’ proposal would 
not be viable financially and operationally. The HBDC instead proposed to fill the 
Brickpit with rubbish and transform it into a supermarket, offices and car park area 
(Hawley, 1992). Thus, the plan for the 2000 Olympic bid was shaped by both the 
Olympic special private–public body and a non-Olympic urban strategic public 
institution. However, the different priorities of the two organisations also caused certain 
conflicts in envisioning the land use of Homebush Bay (Fig. 3-13). 
 
It is here important to emphasise that, while the final plan for Sydney’s winning bid by 
both the Bid Limited and HBDC was greatly concerned with how the new urban 
precinct would be related to the bay, its relationship with the existing neighbourhood – 
the Silverwater and Parramatta Road industrial area – was not fully considered. This can 
be further identified in the presentation model for the new Sydney Olympic Park which 
was made as part of the Olympic bid, as those neighbourhoods were represented as if 
they were empty green spaces. The responsibility of the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid 
Limited was to assemble the bid components to win the inter-urban competition, and the 
consideration of integrating the Olympic site into the wider urban tissues have been 
considered out of scope, but considerations regarding urban integration should have 
been within the scope of the HBDC, as its planning boundary went beyond the potential 
Olympic site and extended to the adjacent Newington and Rhodes Peninsula area (Fig. 
3-14). Yet the Draft Structure Plan by the HBDC did not mention these areas, and more 
critically little suggestion was made on how the new Olympic site would be positioned 
in the Homebush Bay area. Too much focus on the land-use vision and little 
consideration of the relationship with the surroundings suggests a high potential for the 
new Olympic Park to be isolated from the wider urban tissues, which Judd refers to as a 
“bubble” effect in the creation of a special urban quarter (Judd, 1999).  
 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Olympic impacts on urban regeneration 
This chapter examined the origin and evolution of the Olympic Park in Homebush Bay 
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during Sydney’s 30-year pre-bid phase. The Olympic vision in Sydney had evolved 
greatly with the city’s strong intention to win the bid, and this had shaped the sporting 
vision in Homebush Bay. The decision to create the Olympic Park in Homebush Bay 
rather than upgrade the existing Moore Park was a good fit with Sydney’s regional 
development policy towards the west and, in this respect, the IOC’s preference for 
concentration provided the rationale for the regeneration of Homebush Bay. In addition 
to this, the IOC’s great concern with environmental sustainability at the time of bidding 
for the 2000 Games also encouraged Sydney’s “Green Games” concept and its 
reflection in the spatial character of the Olympic site in Homebush Bay. Thus, I will 
stress that Sydney employed the Olympics as an opportunity to shape the vision of 
Homebush Bay. Yet, at the same time, I will also argue that there were certain 
constraints in this regard. The necessary of increasing the number of sporting venues in 
the Olympic site, which had been favoured by the IOC, forced Sydney to re-consider 
the sporting structure in the region, which caused various political conflicts, and 
intensification of sporting use also entailed a considerable challenge to the mixed-use 
vision in Homebush Bay. Thus, I will suggest that Sydney faced both opportunities and 
constraints in employing the Games as a powerful vehicle to regenerate Homebush Bay.  
 
Governance of the Olympic bid 
Behind the development of the spatial vision of Homebush Bay, there was also a 
significant evolution in the structure of the governance of Sydney’s Olympic bid over 
time. It was different bid committees that pushed Sydney’s different Olympic bids, and 
although they contained powerful political and business leaders in the region their 
planning powers were limited due to their temporary nature. Thus, the great 
involvement of the regional government was imperative in composing the spatial 
concept for the Olympic bid. Along with more recognition of the regenerative potential 
of Homebush Bay, the special authority for development of the area was established, 
and this contributed to more in-depth consideration of Homebush Bay, while the 
Olympic bid committee focused on refining the bid proposal rather than tackling the 
comprehensive masterplan for the Olympic site. In the later phase of Sydney’s bid 
campaign, various statuary development agencies were established to create a detailed 
masterplan for Homebush Bay, but their view was not synchronised with the bid 
committee’s spatial aspirations. As the dispute over the usage of the existing Brickpit 
demonstrated, the discrepancy between the vision for the Olympic Games and the 
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long-term financial viability of the site became apparent. Keiser et al. suggest that 
mediating the different interests is one of the crucial issues of the urban land-use 
planning (Kaiser et al., 1995). It became clear that this mediation was not fully 
conducted in the pre-bid phase, but rather kept as an issue for the subsequent phase. 
 
Mixed-use vision 
Along with intensification of sporting use in Homebush Bay came significant changes 
to the industrial vision for Homebush Bay. I argue that the origin of the mixed-use 
vision of Homebush Bay emerged from the juxtaposition of the new sporting vision 
with the existing industrial areas in the site, rather than envisioning the mixed-use urban 
precinct from scratch. In this respect there was not a “vision” as such at the beginning, 
and the notion of a mixed-use Olympic Park was shaped in line with the NSW 
Government’s commitment to restructuring the industrial use of Homebush Bay and to 
creating a sporting complex there. Much of the literature on post-industrial cities 
suggests significant transformation of industrial sites into spectacular urban spaces, in 
the age of urban competition (see, for example, Ward, 1998). Yet, in the case of 
Homebush Bay, I suggest that it was not a simple transformation from industrial to 
alternative but rather a spontaneous process that involved restructuring the industrial use 
and introducing the spectacular new sporting use. I therefore suggest that the mixed-use 
vision of Homebush Bay should be read as a representation of this spontaneous process. 
 
I will further point out that the degree to which different functions were integrated in the 
land-use plan for Homebush Bay clearly increased as other financially profitable uses, 
such as residential and commercial uses, were introduced, along with the rise of the 
market value of Homebush Bay. However, as each masterplan with its differing 
spatial/functional configurations shows, it was difficult to balance the different 
aspirations for utilising the site. The compatibility of different functions, such as the 
relationship between sports, industrial and residential uses, was relatively poorly 
explored in each masterplan, and sometimes specific functions were planned as an 
isolated area within the site. There was little attempt to identify how such functional 
co-ordination would work in reality at the time of bidding, but in reference to the 
existing literature on “mixed-use” urban strategy (see, for example, Coupland, 1997), 
the compatibility between different uses needs to be more carefully considered.  
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Urban integration  
Looking through the various land-use plans which I examined in this chapter, I suggest 
that, while the functional roles of the new Olympic Park in the Sydney region and the 
land-use plan within the site have been extensively addressed in various planning 
documents (although they were contested ones), its relation to the existing surroundings 
was only ambiguously identified, especially after the complexity in the land-use 
planning increased. This recalls Judd’s critiques on the tourist precinct as “bubble” in 
the city (Judd, 1999), wherein he observes a clear disconnection between the specialised 
urban quarter and its surrounding neighbourhood. The designated spatial boundary of 
the Olympic Park was physically isolated from the wider Auburn Council by the 
Western Motorway, but there were still adjacent urbanised neighbourhoods in 
Homebush Bay. Although the responsibility of the Homebush Bay Corporation went 
beyond the Olympic site to cover the entire Homebush Bay area, the initial vision of the 
Olympic site was significantly isolated in terms of the local urban tissues. This was 
particularly apparent after the industrial vision of the Olympic site decreased and the 
more sporting-led mixed-use vision came to dominate, while other parts of the 
Homebush Bay still remained the same. Thus a sense of synchronisation between the 
Olympic site and adjacent areas was missing from the initial planning process in the 
pre-bid phase; in order to avoid Judd’s bubble effect, this needs to be taken into account 
in the beginning. 
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Chapter 4: London  
 
 
 
4.1. Olympic vision 
 
4.1.1 Proactive versus reactive approach: Bidding for the 1988 Games 
London hosted the Summer Olympics in 1908 and 1948, but these two Games were 
staged in the city without the need for a significant bid campaign. The 1908 Olympics 
was initially awarded to Rome but due to the eruption of Vesuvius in April 1904 the 
IOC decided that the Games would be transferred to London. After 36 years, London 
was initially selected as the host city for the 1944 Games. However, because of World 
War Two, the 1944 Games were cancelled, and the IOC officially awarded the 1948 
Olympics to London by conducting a postal ballot (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-a, pp. 
24–31). The urban impacts of these two Games were relatively limited to the area of the 
Olympic stadium (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Liao and Pitts, 2006), but London’s 
attempts to stage the third Games began in the 1970s and had wider urban regenerative 
aspirations. 
 
The first documents on London’s bid appeared in 1979, when the Greater London 
Council (GLC) conducted a feasibility study for the 1988 Olympics, which were 
eventually awarded to Seoul. The report argued that London already had most of the 
required facilities and accommodation to host this gigantic sporting event, but also 
confessed that “the major current deficiency is the main Olympic stadium” (GLC, 1979, 
pp. 9–12). The report set out two different scenarios for providing the main Olympic 
stadium: (1) The construction of a new stadium as a new National Sports Centre in 
Docklands or (2) the renovation and improvement of the existing Wembley Stadium 
(Figs. 4-1 and 2). This can be considered as a comparison between a proactive approach 
(Docklands plan) and a reactive approach (Wembley plan), and the GLC used the 
following analytical points to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the 
Docklands and Wembley strategies: 
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1. Acceptability of the bid;  
2. The legacy (sports facilities and housing etc.); 
3. Conformity with the local urban plans (regenerative effect); and 
4. Cost and risk. 
 
Although the report suggested that both options could be acceptable to the IOC, the 
GLC was worried that a Wembley-based Games would appear second rate if another 
city offered many brand-new facilities. The GLC suggested that the concentration of the 
stadiums in the Olympic Park and adjacent to the athletes village in the 
Docklands-based Games would prove attractive to the IOC. However, while the 
attractiveness of the proposal was crucial in conceptualising London’s bid, there were 
various concerns about risk. The most critical issue was certainly the cost of staging 
both options. The GLC conducted a preliminary cost analysis for each option, and 
suggested that the Docklands-based Games would cost over GBP 750 million, while the 
Wembley option would cost GBP 436 million. In addition to this, the Docklands-based 
Games were highly reliant on the completion of the Jubilee Line, and the feasibility of 
such work was uncertain. The GLC further envisaged that, before knowing whether or 
not the IOC had accepted the bid, the land for the new Olympic Park had to be available, 
and the relocation of the existing users and preparatory work needed to have started 
(GLC, 1979, pp. 12–13, 130).  
 
The GLC’s comparison between the Docklands and Wembley options went beyond the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the proposals, and the legacy aspect was in 
many respects similarly critical in evaluating the bid strategies. The most crucial issue 
was the post-Olympic usage of the new Olympic stadium in the Docklands. It envisaged 
that construction of a new stadium would lead to demolition of Wembley Stadium (a 
home for national football games) and closure of Twickenham Stadium (a home for 
national rugby games), although there was considerable emotional attachment on the 
part of London citizens to both stadiums (GLC, 1979, p. 14). While the legacy of the 
post-Olympic stadium was an issue of risk management, the legacy of the athlete village 
was a matter of opportunity. The GLC recognised that conversion of the Olympic 
village to diverse sized residential units would be in “sympathy” with Newham 
Borough Council’s Becton District Plan and provision of housing with the creation of a 
new National Sports Centre would act as a “catalyst” for other regeneration projects in 
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the Docklands. Moreover, it would be “in conformity” with the GLC’s policies for the 
Docklands and the “Docklands Strategic Plan” published by the Docklands Joint 
Committee in 1976. Meanwhile, the report suggested the Wembley option, which 
planned to utilise temporary housing, would “not bring any substantial gain” in policy 
terms to the council’s strategic objectives (GLC, 1979, p. 48, pp. 129–130). 
 
Although a great deal was made of the regenerative effect of the Docklands Games in 
the report, the GLC vaguely indicated that:  
  
“The choice of strategy should depend very largely on London’s objectives in 
promoting a bid for staging the Games. If the objective was simply to host the 
Games at minimum cost compatible with a potentially acceptable bid, with 
minimum risks and uncertainties and a very real possibility of breaking even, 
the Wembley option would be chosen. If however the objective was to meet the 
Council’s stated policies for the regeneration of Docklands, then the 
Docklands option could further those policies by acting as a catalyst for a 
range of developments within the sharp discipline of Olympic deadline” (GLC, 
1979, p. 14) (emphasises added). 
 
There were various reasons behind this ambiguous conclusion but, as the report 
repeatedly addressed, the uncertainty of the financial arrangement including the private 
sector’s involvement in the Olympic project and the question about the value for money 
in spending public money were crucial issues. Thus, despite an in-depth analysis of the 
potential for staging the Games in the capital, London did not put forward its Olympic 
vision. Nevertheless, I will argue that the contrast between the Wembley and Docklands 
proposals was inherited by the subsequent bid study.  
 
4.1.2 Fragmented governance: Bidding for the 2000 Games 
Following the withdrawal of the bid for the 1988 Games, London joined the national 
bidding selection process for the 1992 Games. Although some of the British Olympic 
Association (BOA) executives believed that London was the only city capable of 
bringing the Olympics to the UK, London lost against Birmingham in 1985 (Hill, 1992, 
pp. 95–96). London’s appeal to be host city appeared again in regard to the 2000 Games 
in the 1990s. Three different organisations showed an interest in hosting the 2000 
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Olympic Games in London: London Olympic 2000 led by Lord Coe (who eventually 
became the head of the Organising Committee of the London Games), Tarmac, the 
building material company, and the London Council for Sport and Recreation,, a 
mixture of representatives of 33 London councils and various sports. 
 
Regarding the Games site, the initial feasibility study conducted by the London Council 
for Sport and Recreation identified four broad locations – Wembley, the Docklands, 
Paddington and Liverpool Street – all of which were located on the envisaged regional 
development corridor (Fig. 4-3), and the study also recognised the importance of the 
concentration of the main stadium and Olympic village in a single large development 
site close to the city centre. The study therefore proposed to relocate Wembley Stadium 
and the Olympia Exhibition Hall to the Docklands, with better transport links and to 
create a compact Olympic model in the area (Coopers&Lybrand Deloitte, 1990, pp. 
19–21, 34). The proposed Olympic site was scattered along the River Thames, and this 
was also considered as in harmony with future development of the area’s infrastructure 
network (Fig. 4-4).  
 
By the time the final document was submitted to the BOA in 1991, the idea of 
relocating Wembley Stadium and other facilities to the Docklands had been abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the London bid organisers still emphasised how the Docklands-based 
Games in 2000 would provide a “window of opportunity” (London Olympic 2000 
Campaign, 1991, p. 8). The rationality of the proposal was the need for regeneration of 
vast swathes of under-used land in the Docklands that were covered by various national 
and regional policies, such as the importance of balancing development between East 
and West London as suggested by Regional Guidance for the South East (RGP9 by the 
UK Department of Environment) and the UK Government’s “Strategic Planning 
Guidance for London (RGP8)”.52 
 
Despite London’s great emphasis on regeneration of the East Thameside as a vital part 
of the identity of London’s bid for the 2000 Games, London lost the national 
competition to become the candidate city for the 2000 Games. One of the greatest 
reasons behind this was the failure to unify the three different groups involved in the bid. 
                                                  
52 Furthermore, it referred to various official reports suggesting the urgent need for renewed infrastructure in the East 
Thames area, such as the South East Regional Planning Conference (SERPLAN) report and the London Planning 
Advisory Committee (LPAC)’s annual review.  
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Hill points out that each group had its own interests in hosting the Games: Coe’s 
London Olympic 2000 focused on a festival of sports utilising existing sports facilities, 
while the London Council for Sport and Recreation recognised construction of new 
facilities and urban regeneration triggered by the Games as the essence of the Olympics. 
He also puts great emphasis on the absence of a single authority as a disadvantage for 
London’s bidding campaign, and suggests that this led to the loss against Manchester, 
which had solid local support (Hill, 1992, pp. 105–108). Indeed, the governance 
structure of London had greatly changed since 1986, and when the bidding campaign 
for the 2000 Games was developed at the beginning of the 1990s London did not have a 
single governance structure but was rather a collection of local boroughs. Lack of an 
overarching authority made the bid plan uncertain, and the report to the BOA 
Evaluation Committee clearly pointed out the risk of cost over-run and the lower 
probability of London delivering on its promises (Savills, 1991, p. 6). 
 
4.1.3 A different approach: Bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games 
Following the unsuccessful bid for the 2000 Games, there was little impetus for London 
to immediately bid for another Olympic Games. According to the BOA, its people spent 
time with the voting constituency of the IOC and received the very clear message that 
“only when you return to the table with London will we believe that you are serious 
about hosting a future Olympic Games” (BOA, 2007). Thus, the BOA decided to focus 
on the 2012 Games as the target for the next bid (CMSC, 2007, p. 9). While the bid for 
the 2012 Games inherited some of the aspects of the previous bidding campaigns, there 
were also fundamental differences from the previous attempts.  
 
Firstly, while the previous bid for the 2000 Games was conducted during a period when 
there was no single government for greater London, the bid for the 2012 Games 
coincided with the establishment of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the 
election of the Mayor of London. Thus, in contrast to the previous fragmented political 
commitment to the bid conceptualisation, the governance of the bid for the 2012 Games, 
in particular regarding the creation of the spatial strategy, was more concentrated and 
empowered the Mayor of London and his development authorities. As a result, the 
regenerative concept could be more realistic and potentially more integrated with the 
wider urban development strategy. Looking at the mechanism for legislating the GLA 
and the new London Mayor in the late 1990s, Newman and Thornley suggest that one of 
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the reasons why a new metropolitan authority was needed was to make it possible for 
London to bid for the Olympics, as the right to stage the Olympics is awarded to a city, 
and without a legitimate authority a city cannot host the Olympic Games (Newman and 
Thornley, 2004, p. 157). Thus, it was unrealistic for London to bid for the Olympic 
Games after the abolition of the GLC in 1986. Under the process of legislating the GLA 
and Mayor, the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions in the UK 
Government stated that organising actions for the Olympic bid was one of the new 
Mayor’s duties (Department of Environment Transport and Regions, 1998, p. 13), and 
this mayoral role was certainly linked with his responsibility for drawing up a new 
“Spatial Development Strategy” for London. The first Mayor of London, Ken 
Livingstone, had long identified East London as the primary target for such regeneration. 
Thus, the Olympic vision initially proposed by the BOA and the regenerative objective 
in East London set by the regional and national governments for the further economic 
growth of the capital city were firmly connected, through the empowerment of the 
Mayor of London.  
 
Secondly, compared to previous bids, there was a clear process of decision making in 
which the national government and the Mayor of London were involved. As Newman 
also suggests, the initial decisions regarding London’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games 
were taken by the national government and the Mayor of London and his development 
agency subsequently developed the vision. However, I will here point out that there was 
no smooth transition from the national to the regional government, but rather they 
represented slightly different views on the Olympics and associated urban regeneration 
in East London.  
 
Like the previous bids, the bidding process for the 2012 Games began with the question 
of the location, which originated in the previous bid’s two reactive and proactive 
approaches to the Games. The BOA conducted an initial feasibility study in 1997, which 
once again compared Games at East and West locations (Lee, 2006, pp. 5–6).53 
However, the decision on the location for the Olympic site became a matter of dispute 
among the BOA, regional and national government. The BOA’s records indicate the 
following: 
                                                  
53 The feasibility study was commissioned by the double Olympian David Lukes, and the final report concluded in 
2000 as a 395-page document. 
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“At that stage the BOA had used sites in the West and East of London as 
possible options for the Olympic site. But the Mayor insisted that the East 
London option was the most viable because of the regeneration opportunity 
that it created. The Government however were yet to be convinced of the 
merits of the bid and the possibility that it could be successful” (BOA, 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 
This passage clearly reveals that there was a disagreement in regard to the regional and 
national government’s concerns as to the priorities of the bid. While the Mayor of 
London’s view was that the Olympics was a catalyst for accelerating regeneration in the 
Lower Lea Valley (LLV), which was one of the crucial priorities set out in his spatial 
strategy for London, the national government was more concerned with the financial 
risk of putting the Games in East London and thus undertaking the massive regeneration 
project associated with them. In order to explore the costs and benefits of the Games 
being staged in the LLV a consultant company, ARUP, subsequently conducted further 
feasibility studies, and a summary of the report was published in November 2002. 
ARUP concluded that expenditure in staging the Games in the LLV would be GBP 
1.796 billion and income would be GBP 1.302 billion, which meant there would be a 
GBP 494 million loss involved in staging the Olympics in London. Yet the report 
greatly emphasised that this was a “specimen proposal” and the deficit would be 
covered if it considered intangible benefits such as tourism and the economic benefits 
created by physical legacies (ARUP, 2002, p. 11). ARUP further suggested that a 
“mixed-use commercial and residential area” should be centred on the LLV and that 
“Olympic cachet” would act as a magnet to attract long-term investment in this area 
(ARUP, 2002, p. 8).  
 
Thus, the ARUP report did not fully address the financial deficiency of hosting the 
Games in the LLV, but suggested a highly optimistic economic forecast. 54 
Corresponding to the ARUP report, the Culture, Media and Sports Committee (CMSC) 
of the national government published “A London Olympic Bid for 2012” in 2003. The 
report fundamentally supported London’s bid, but suggested that it should not do so at 
                                                  
54 When we think of the eventual budget of the 2012 Games in the LLV (GBP 9.3 billion confirmed by the DCMS in 
2007), the optimistic nature of this view needs to be highlighted. 
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any price. The CMSC recognised that “the heart of a modern Olympic bid appears to be 
the binary development of the main stadium and Olympic village and their 
inter-relationship”, but at the same time it was greatly concerned about the construction 
of a new stadium and Olympic village, regarded as imperatives in ARUP’s report 
(CMSC, 2002, pp. 18–19). The national government’s concerns about the financial 
uncertainty was still apparent, and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) once again addressed the importance of determining the extent to which 
Wembley was to be used for Olympic events, while it also implied the possibility of 
utilising a temporary stadium for the Olympics in order to resolve the difficulty of 
post-Olympic utilisation and to avoid additional further public subsidies (DCMS, 2003, 
pp. 4–5).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the financial uncertainty, the DMCS officially announced the 
Government’s support for the London bid on 15 May 2003, and Poynter suggests that 
there were various factors which pushed the UK Government into serious consideration 
of bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games. These included the success of the Manchester 
Commonwealth Games in 2002, the possibility that the 2012 Games would come back 
to Europe after Beijing won the right to stage the 2008 Games, Sydney’s success in 
selling a positive image to the world during the 2000 Olympics, and the UK 
Government’s desire to redeem itself after the failure of previous mega-projects such as 
the Millennium Dome (Poynter, 2009, p. 184). The Government’s announcement of 
support for London’s bid spurred the Mayor and his development agency’s involvement, 
but it should be emphasised here that the various feasibility studies conducted prior to 
the decision were not objectively observed, and therefore the financial uncertainty 
surrounding a Games in the LLV was handed over to the regional government.  
 
The third identical point in regard to the bid for the 2012 Games was the Mayor’s 
commitment to an in-depth spatial strategy for the Olympic site. As the political 
boundary of the four local boroughs crosses at the middle of the site, commitment on 
the part of the Mayor was imperative, and his economic development agency, the 
London Development Agency (LDA), thus played a leading role in creating the initial 
vision of the Olympic site and in its long-term strategy. One of the key issues for the 
Mayor and the LDA was if the Games could be synchronised with the regeneration of 
the LLV and East London that was now underway. Thus, the LDA commissioned a 
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masterplan consortium headed by EDAW, a planning and landscape design company 
based in London, to prepare two masterplans: one with the Olympic Games and the 
other if the bid is unsuccessful. It also requested the consortium to consider the extent to 
which a successful bid would contribute to their following four key regeneration 
objectives:  
 
1. Land assembly to facilitate comprehensive redevelopment;  
2. The delivery of transport infrastructure improvements;  
3. The achievement of an enhanced scale of environmental and infrastructure 
improvements; and  
4. The furtherance of community development objectives.  
 
Certainly, the Mayor and the LDA expected a catalytic effect to be created by the 
Olympics in relation to their ongoing urban agenda, and tried to achieve more than they 
could do without the Olympics. In addition to this, the LDA prepared the masterplan for 
the Olympic site in the LLV for both the Olympics and legacy modes. The authority 
recognised that the masterplan should be a 20- to 25-year long-term regeneration plan, 
and the Olympics would be only the midpoint of this much larger plan. It further stated 
that: 
 
“The masterplan is the skeleton… the absolutely fundamental components of 
the really big moves in terms of land use and the relationship with those land 
uses has to get right now” (GLA, 2003, p. 3). 
 
This much longer view was certainly required to make the Olympic masterplan a good 
starting point for further development, but the challenge for the masterplan team was to 
finalise the planning application by the time of the IOC’s inspection of the city in 2005. 
It was a political decision that planning permission for the Olympic Park and the legacy 
masterplan should be obtained before the IOC members’ visit and the LDA published its 
statement on the Olympic and legacy masterplan in May 2004. The masterplan was 
finalised in a relatively short period, and therefore did not completely match the final 
bid proposal subsequently issued by the London 2012 bid committee. Thus, the 
masterplan underlined the “physical changeability” necessary to accommodate Olympic 
and post-Olympic demands as a key feature of the spatial strategy, but some crucial 
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aspects such as the massive spatial transformation of the Olympic stadium after the 
Games were not addressed. The idea of the legacy was to be refined along with the 
development of London’s bid conceptualisation. 
 
4.1.4 Conceptualising the "Olympic legacy" in international and regional contexts  
One of the identical parts in London's bidding campaign was massive promotion of the 
Olympic legacy. The term “legacy” was widely used in the various national and regional 
governmental documents, to refer to the benefits of hosting the Olympics for London 
and more widely for UK citizens. The promotion of the Olympic legacy fitted quite well 
within the regional context. As indicated earlier, the dilemma for London in bidding for 
the 2012 Games revolved around the regional and national aspirations for regenerating 
the LLV in East London and the difficulty inherent in in embedding the Olympics’ 
spatial requirements, in particular the need for the new Olympic stadium, became the 
central matter of dispute in both national and regional politics. Against this backdrop, 
the physical changeability of the Olympic facilities became a practical means of 
mediating between the Olympic and post-Olympic spatial demands, as well as an 
symbolic way of representing the London’s tackling the Olympic legacy.  
 
The promotion of London’s “Olympic legacy” cohered with the IOC's great campaign 
to promote the ongoing benefits of an Olympic Games. As was briefly discussed in 
Chapter 2, this tendency began after Jacque Rogge became President of the IOC in 2001, 
and since then the term “legacy” has frequently been emphasised by the IOC. This was 
reflected in a modification of the host city candidature process, and the bidding process 
for the 2012 Games was a kind of milestone for the IOC because the legacy became one 
of the critical aspects for the first time. For example, the bid cities were asked to 
respond to the IOC’s question asking how their vision for the Olympic Games fits into 
the candidate city or region’s long-term planning strategy (IOC, 2003a, p. 70). This 
situation certainly influenced the competition for the right to stage the 2012 Games.55  
 
Mike Lee, the marketing director of London’s bidding campaign, suggests how the 
London team had been conceptualising its bid in such a way as to beat the French 
                                                  
55 Nine cities (Paris, Havana, Leipzig, New York, Madrid, Moscow, Rio de Janeiro, Istanbul and London) submitted 
the document responding to the IOC questionnaire in July 2003. Paris, New York, Madrid, Moscow and London 
successfully went through the second stage, and became candidate cities. These five cities submitted more 
comprehensive candidature files to the IOC in 2004. 
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capital. One of the strong advantages of Paris was its urban setting for the Games; while 
London’s plan was to construct the new Olympic stadium in the new Olympic Park in 
the LLV, the Paris bid proposed an existing stadium as the main venue. Lee recognised 
that having already built a national stadium, the Stade de France, was an advantage for 
Paris, and felt that “London had to offer something more” (Lee, 2006, p. 98). It was 
certain that in terms of the degree of preparedness before the bid, which the IOC often 
sees as an important factor in deciding the host city, Paris had a much stronger position 
than London. London therefore needed to change the focus of the bidding campaign, 
paying attention to after the Games rather than before the Games. The London bidding 
team knew that the IOC had concerns about the problems facing post-Olympics host 
cities and they tried to harness these concerns into a strong sales point for London to 
promote its bid. Lee thus stated that “London 2012 wanted to show it was a “listening 
bid” which cared about sport and the Olympic Movement” (Lee, 2006, p. 105). 
 
Although London's initial idea of promoting the legacy was mainly about the so-called 
“sporting legacy”, which means inspiring young people to take part in sports by hosting 
the Games in London, the concept was further developed in regard to the urban setting. 
The London bid team found out that the urban legacy was a critical concern for the IOC, 
and had been since Jacque Rogge took the presidency and had taken various actions to 
promote it such as the “Olympic Games Study Commission”. However, most of the 
candidate cities for the 2012 Games, in particular the frontrunner Paris, had not actively 
addressed it. It was therefore very strategic for London to take this as its identity. Lee 
suggests as follows:  
 
"The city's legacy argument [i.e. Paris] was nowhere near as strong as that of 
London's – the Games would not change Paris in the same way they could 
transform East London. But the French capital was perceived as a very safe bet. 
After the problematic build-up to the 2004 Athens Games, that was seen as a 
sound reason for the IOC to give the Games to the city" (Lee, 2006, p. 119) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the London bidding team greatly emphasised the urban legacy as their strong 
sales point for the bidding campaign, and this concept was impressively visualised at 
the final presentation for the host city election which took place in Singapore in 2005. 
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London showed what the Olympic Park in the LLV would look like during the Games, 
and more importantly how it was going to be transformed into the biggest urban park in 
Europe after the Games (Fig. 4-5). It was the first time in the history of the host city 
election that a candidate city had set forth its vision of the Olympic site beyond the 
Games. There is no doubt that this visualisation of the Olympic legacy contributed to 
London’s eventual win against Paris. Yet it is also crucial to look at London’s vision of 
urban legacy as it was presented in Singapore. The vision of the post-Olympic site 
which the London bidding team presented is almost an image of parkland covered by 
natural green and rivers, with few buildings being drawn except for some of the sporting 
venues and the Olympic village. Yet, as the LDA’s Olympic and legacy masterplan 
demonstrated, one of the greatest motivations for regenerating the LLV is to bring 
economic prosperity by creating a new mixed-use urban quarter in the LLV – thus, 
London's aspiration was to an extent hidden behind the impressive greenery of the 
post-Olympic Park. 
 
 
4.2 Diverse vision for the LLV 
 
4.2.1 Industrial past  
The Lea Valley is the area that stretches north to south along the River Lea, a tributary 
of the River Thames, and the 2012 Olympic site is located in the lower part of the Lea 
Valley region (i.e. the LLV), which consists of four London boroughs: Hackney, 
Waltham Forest, Newham, and Tower Hamlets. One of the key characteristics of the 
LLV prior to the Olympic development was its tradition of industrial use, and the 
historical development of this greatly depended on two factors. One was the 
development of the London Docklands. As the River Lea connected to the River 
Thames, industrial development along the Thames influenced the formulation of the 
industrial area in the LLV. Pewesy suggests that the industrial development in the LLV 
has a great relationship with the rise and fall of the London Docklands and points out 
that River Lea has long been recognised as an appropriate area for industrial activities, 
in particular the silk-weaving industry that flourished there in the 16th and 17th 
centuries (Pewesy, 2001). As another factor, the LLV’s industrial base has greatly 
depended on the metropolis. Pewsey argues that ever-increasing demand from the 
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metropolis for processed goods of all kinds and people’s unwillingness to have noxious 
industries situated in their own area led to the industrial development in the LLV 
(Pewesy, 1993). This brought continuous business opportunities to the area, but at the 
same time it led to a concentration of dangerous industries. It was during the 1960s that 
trade at the London Docks reached its peak but the evolution of shipping technologies, 
in particular the emergence of containerisation, was about to change the fate of the 
London Port (Naib, 1998). Along with the closure of these Docks, regeneration of the 
London Docklands became the target of national and regional government’s economic 
development strategies, and the London Dockland Development Corporation was 
founded in 1981 to play a crucial role in conducting “market-led” urban regeneration 
projects along the Thames as part of the Thatcherite approach to planning that lasted 
until its winding up in 1998 (Bernstock, 2009).  
 
The Lea Valley region was, however, not included in the London Dockland 
Development Corporation’s planning boundary, and therefore it was left out of the 
boom in urban regeneration led by the Corporation. The broader “Lea Valley region” 
was seen for the first time as a whole region in the Government’s plans for economic 
regeneration of the area in the 1990s. This was triggered by the designation “Lea Valley 
region” as eligible for support under Objective 2 of the Regulations of the European 
Structural Funds in 1994. The strategy, which was indicated in a paper presented to the 
European Commission, aimed to turn the Lea Valley into a more modern competitive, 
diverse and expanding location, with consideration of social and economic integration 
(Cattell, 1997, p. 3). Gradual integration of the LLV into the political regeneration 
agenda cohered with the restructuring of the rail network in the region. Stratford, which 
had acted as “a strategic centre of a rail network” since the opening of Stratford station 
in 1839 by connecting London and other parts of south-eastern England, further 
enhanced its role through the introduction of the Dockland Light Railway, an extension 
of the Jubilee Line, and the forthcoming Cross Rail Project. Beyond this local and 
regional transport development, Stratford is becoming something of an international 
“gateway”. The construction of the Stratford International Station as part of the 
high-speed Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which connects mainland Europe and Central 
London, transformed the LLV from “Gateway to the Metropolis” to the “Gateway to 
Europe” (Pewesy, 2001).  
 
102 
4.2.2 Mixed-use vision: Residential and job opportunities  
The transformation of the industrial vision in the LLV was also recognised in the 
regional spatial planning framework. London’s spatial strategy published before the 
decline of the London Docklands and more recent ones clearly suggest different 
approaches. “The County of London Plan” prepared by Patrick Abercrombie and John 
Henry Forshaw in 1943,56 “the first real move to a planning of London”,57 recognised 
the importance of the industrial base in the LLV for the London region. Abercrombie 
and Forshaw recognised London as a collection of villages (Fig. 4-6), and designated 
the Port and Thames and the Lea side as one of four characteristic areas of London 
(Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, pp. 3-4). The area along the River Lea was located at 
the edge of the London County Council’s area, but they described it as the primary 
source of London’s commercial life Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, p. 25). Although 
he understood the importance of the London Docklnds and the Lea side, however, he 
was not satisfied with the existing conditions in the Lea side, and thought a plan was 
needed to improve them. Abercrombie and Forshaw pointed out that: 
 
“The Lee Valley can be regarded as the right arm of the docks and Thames-side 
industrial areas. As with Thames-side industries, there are several residential 
pockets which require eliminating. […] A clear-cut policy on canal side use, 
either for industry, amenity or residential, but not a mixture of the three, is 
needed”(Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943.p.111). 
 
It was clear that they considered a mixture of industrial and residential use to not be 
ideal, and that a mono-functional approach should be encouraged. Although the 
mixed-use planning was greatly encouraged in the following plans in this area, in 
particular, in the regeneration plans for declined London Docklands which highly 
emphasised revitalisation of industrial use and creation of new residential use, 
Abercrombie and Forshaw thought mixture of different use would be problematic.  
 
However, the London Plan published before London’s bid decision clearly took a very 
different approach. Firstly, it unambiguously addressed the need to reform the uneven 
                                                  
56 As “The County of London Plan” was published after the city had been destroyed by severe air attacks, it 
fundamentally showed the future vision within the boundary of the London County Council (LCC) after the War. 
57 Comment by Lord Reith, the minister of Works and Planning in the 1940s, cited in Hall, P. (1994) Abercrombie's 
Plan for London - 50 Years on -, In Report of the 2nd Annual Vision for London Lecture, Hall, P. (2002 [1975]) Urban 
and Regional Planning (Fourth Edition), Routledge, London, UK. p. III. 
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development in London and underlined the necessity of accommodating inevitable 
population and economic growth. Against this background, the London Plan argued that 
re-centralisation was vital for the city to maintain its status as “a world city” instead of a 
mere dispersion of people and businesses (Newman and Thornley, 2004, p. 153). 
Gordon and Travers further state that a “go east strategy” reversing the established 
westerly bias of growth would be a way of accommodating large-scale population and 
job growth (Gordon and Travers, 2010). In this respect, regenerating under-used land in 
the Docklands to the east was therefore perfectly fitted (at least in rhetorical terms) to 
achieving the above objectives, which could also be a factor in justifying the huge 
investment in new public transport links to the area. The London Plan identifies 28 
opportunity areas in the region and 11 areas located in the East London region (Fig. 4-7). 
The LLV was designated an important opportunity area and Stratford a crucial Major 
Centre in the area, with the London Plan then stating that together with the Isles of Dogs 
it would be a “key beneficiary” of the substantial improvement in transport capacity and 
accessibility (Mayor of London, 2004, pp. 244–245). 
 
Secondly, the London Plan greatly enhanced the high-density mixed-use approach, and 
this planning policy was encouraged to develop the LLV, which was a great contrast 
with Abercrombie’s early suggestion of a single-use vision. The London Plan in 
particular proposed including new job and housing opportunities at the mixed-use 
development in the LLV and Stratford areas, by creating 30,000 new jobs and 4,500 
new homes at Stratford and 8,500 new jobs and 6,000 new homes in the LLV area by 
2016 (Mayor of London, 2004, pp.242–247). The London Plan further proposed to 
intensify the retail character of the area as a part of the mixed-use element and, in 
particular, to designate Stratford a “new mixed use European Business Quarter for 
London” (Mayor of London, 2004, p. 250). In a similar vein, the mixed use, especially 
the provision of housing (including affordable ones) and job opportunities, was 
encouraged by the Thames Gateway, which included the LLV in its planning boundary. 
The London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, which was established in June 
2004 to oversee the regeneration of the London river and the LLV over 20 years, 
considered the opening of the Stratford International Railway Station and hosting the 
2012 Olympic Games in the LLV as “engines for growth” in terms of the development 
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of the wider London Thames Gateway area.58 It aimed to “create a network of compact 
mixed use, mixed tenure neighbourhoods complete with good public transport, shops, 
leisure facilities, schools, healthcare and jobs” (London Thames Gateway Development 
Corporation, 2005, p. 1) (Fig. 4-8).  
 
4.2.3 Cohesion between old and new 
While the new mixed-use vision was greatly enhanced by the London Plan and the 
London Thames Gateway, it was crucial to consider how the new vision would co-relate 
with existing uses in the area. The London Plan fundamentally recognised that “London 
is highly diverse and constantly changing, but developments should show an 
understanding of, and respect for, existing character” (Mayor of London, 2004, p. 175). 
In the case of the LLV, it understands that the area has traditionally been the location of 
low-grade industry and railways and that this has created barriers in the LLV, a situation 
which needs to be improved through the planning framework. However, instead of 
making a new town from scratch by eliminating the existing industrial pockets, it 
proposes to optimise the existing use and integrate new mixed-use developments on 
surplus land in the LLV (Mayor of London, 2004, pp. 248–249).  
 
The cohesion between the existing and new land use was also crucial to the local 
government. As the Olympic boroughs (Newham, Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Waltham 
Forest and Greenwich), which shared a political boundary in the middle of the Olympic 
site, were recognised as one of the most deprived areas in the UK, the provision of new 
housing (in particular affordable social housing) and job opportunities had long been an 
important factor in defining the local planning objectives (Vigor et al., 2004). The 
spatial strategy for the LLV issued by Newham Council, for example, highlighted the 
“mixed-use” strategy in the LLV as a means of satisfying social demands and 
encouraging diverse economic activities in the area. Yet, at the same time, the council 
also underlined the importance of “enhancing the condition, quality and appearance of 
the valley's existing employment and residential areas in order that they can contribute 
to and benefit from this change” (London Borough of Newham, 2000, p. 2). Thus, 
Newham Council’s view on the mixed-use development was not to impose an entirely 
new development on the site but rather to encourage the existing uses through the new 
                                                  
58 The London Thames Gateway Development was part of the central government’s greater urban regeneration plan 
along the River Thames and the Thames Estuary, run from the Department for Communities and Local Government. 
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development. In a similar vein, prior to the recognition of the LLV as the Olympic site 
Hackney Council saw the potential for Hackney Wick, which would become part of the 
future Olympic site, as new development land. The council particularly saw Hackney 
Wick as an area that could create jobs because of the transport improvements in the area 
(London Borough of Hackney, 1995, p. 13). Yet it also underlined the desirability of 
cohesion between the existing and new use in the area, stating that the council would 
seek “the twin objectives of protecting existing community services and 
accommodating newly arising community needs”.  
 
4.2.4 Recreational and sporting vision 
While the transformation of the industrial past to the new mixed use required cohesive 
ways of mixing the existing and new uses in the LLV, a clear recreational and sporting 
vision had also been shaped in the wider Lea Valley region. Along with the industrial 
uses proposed in the Abercrombie Plan in 1943, Abercrombie had also recognised the 
importance of the Lea Valley region as the Metropolitan Parklands. His view of the Lea 
Valley was that it represented an “opportunity for a great piece of constructive, 
preservative and regenerative planning” and he proposed a “giant green wedge along the 
Lea Valley” (Elks, 2008; Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, 2000a). Abercrombie’s 
vision was realised in 1967 by the establishment of the Lea Valley Regional Park, in 
order to meet the recreational, leisure and nature conservation needs of London, 
Herefordshire and Essex. 59  The Lea Valley Regional Park Authority was also 
established to bring the Park into reality either through its own operation or by 
encouraging other agencies. While the first Park Plan by the Park Authority in 1967 
emphasised “informal recreation” in the Lea Valley, the revised 1986 Plan committed to 
the provision of a balanced programme of formal and informal development, taking 
account of the changing nature of leisure trends. Although the Plan proposed to provide 
sporting facilities along with the refinement of the environmental quality of the Park, 
the Park Authority faced severe financial problems in sustaining the leisure facilities 
such as Pickets Lock Sports Centre and the non-revenue generating parklands (Elks, 
2008; Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, 2000a). Thus, the Park Plan was revised to 
keep in mind the environmentally and financially sustainable development of the Lea 
Valley Regional Park.60  
                                                  
59 www.leevalleypark.org.uk 
60 Against this backdrop, the 2000 Park Plan suggested three different types of landscape; landscape conservation, 
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Part of the eventual Olympic site was in the Lea Valley Regional Park and most of the 
area was designated as an “area for leisure, regional sporting excellence and recreation 
with enhanced green links and open space available for outdoor sports, informal 
recreation and nature conservation”. The Plan put great emphasis on redevelopment of 
the existing Lea Valley Sports Centre, Lea Valley Cycle Circuit and the Hackney 
Stadium, and suggested that this would enhance the sporting character of the Lea Valley 
Regional Park and complement the other leisure facilities at Picketts Lock and 
Bronxbourne (Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, 2000b, p. 118). However, in the end 
all these existing sport facilities located in the Olympic site were eventually demolished 
to pave the way for the Olympic development.  
 
In addition to this, it is worth mentioning that there was a proposal to build the national 
athletic stadium on the site of Picketts Lock Sports Centre prior to the Government’s 
decision to bid for the 2012 Olympic Games in 2003. The idea of building a 50,000-seat 
athletic stadium with warm-up track and railway station in Picketts Lock emerged in 
connection to London’s aspiration to host the World Athletics Championships in 2005. 
Picketts Lock was selected though a national competition for the site of the 
Championships,61 but it was eventually abandoned because of its GBP 110 million cost 
and the event was eventually relocated to Helsinki (BBC, 2001b). Although the idea of 
constructing the national athletics stadium disappeared, it nevertheless led to the 
creation of Lea Valley Athletic Centre on the same site at a cost of GBP 16 million, as a 
legacy of the bid for the 2005 World Athletics Championships. The new sporting 
facility certainly enhanced the vision of Lea Valley Regional Park Authority as a place 
for sporting excellence, but it left political uncertainties, as Lord Coe, one of the most 
powerful promoters of London’s bid for the 2012 Games, underlined in 2001:  
 
"We now have a situation where we probably will have no World Athletics 
Championships in 2005, we haven't got a national stadium and we probably 
won't be able to mount a bid for the 2012 Olympic Games” (BBC, 2001a). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
enhancement and investment area.  
61 The Hackney Stadium was a potential venue for the event (see Bond, D. (2000) Hackney is Running for Athletic 
Stadium, In Evening Standard ). 
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4.3 Spatial vision for the LLV 
 
4.3.1 Patchwork of the spatial vision  
As discussed above, various planning authorities had the different vision in utilising the 
LLV, and they separately produced spatial visions within their planning areas. Thus, by 
the time of the spatial strategy for the Olympic site developed by the LDA, various 
spatial strategies for the future Olympic site had already been proposed by different 
planning authorities. Their planning boundaries and the area of the future Olympic site 
were not the same, but each masterplan did cover part of the Olympic site. Thus, I will 
stress that the spatial strategy in the LLV, in particular in the area for the Olympic site, 
was a patchwork of different spatial aspirations, which had never been stitched together. 
The following part will briefly discuss the different spatial strategies for the Olympic 
site area that had been created by the different authorities. 
 
One of the most influential urban developments in terms of the vision for the Olympic 
site in the LLV was the Stratford City masterplan, which had had its planning 
application granted in 2004. The development site covers 73 hectares across rail lands, 
which had become redundant as a result of the decline in industrial use of the railways. 
The masterplan was created as a result of the joint venture between Chelsfield, Stanhope 
and the landowner, London and Continental Railway, and represented the largest urban 
regeneration project within the M25 circular road since 1940.62 This GBP 1.3 billion 
project addressed the synchronisation between the regenerative aspirations for Stratford 
and the LLV set out in the draft London Plan and the Thames Gateway, and suggested 
that it would catalyse further development of the area. Echoing the primary regenerative 
objectives of these regional planning frameworks, i.e. the provision of housing and job 
creation, Stratford City proposed a mixed-use urban quarter in which residential, retail, 
office and social facilities such as schools would be included, in the form of a 
high-density urban block within a clear grid of streets. The concentration of the 
residential blocks proposed to the north of Stratford City later became the site for the 
Olympic village for the 2012 Games (Figs. 4-9 and 10).  
 
Stratford City was conceived as “European” not only because it would have the 
                                                  
62 www.chesfield.com/project/stratford-city 
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Stratford International Rail Station in the middle of the site, which would connect the 
site to the continent, but also in its spatial character, in regard to which one could easily 
find similarities with Barcelona’s urban blocks. Although the developers identified it as 
“European” or a “new piece of city”, they also affirmed that the project would not be 
isolated from the surrounding neighbourhoods. The developers emphasised that the park 
and street proposed in Stratford City, in particular the central spine of the site, would 
connect them seamlessly (Chelsfiled et al., 2003, p. 1). The masterplan further identified 
the fundamental functional character of the adjacent areas, and indicated how Stratford 
City would have different relationships with the neighbourhoods (Fig. 4-11).  
 
Yet there were some doubts about this urban integration strategy. Firstly, looking at the 
future image of Stratford City, a clear contrast with the adjacent existing areas was 
visible. Secondly, planning for Stratford City should have had timely overlaps with the 
Olympic masterplan but it was not integrated into the Olympic proposals, as the 
developers recognised the future Olympic site, where the Aquatic Centre was eventually 
built, as being for industrial use. This suggests that the Stratford City plan composed by 
the private consortium was entirely separate from the Olympic planning process. In 
addition to this, the connection to the Olympic site was also poorly addressed. Finally, 
Stratford City was eventually implemented quite differently from the initial proposal. 
The area adjacent to the Olympic site was filled with a vast shopping mall called the 
Westfield Stratford City Shopping Centre, and the vertically mixed urban form that was 
envisaged was eventually abandoned as the developers sought a more economical urban 
form (Moore, 2011). Thus, while Stratford City did initially aim at synchronisation with 
various urban planning schemes and existing urban tissues, it would eventually become 
a highly specialised area, just which Judd might call a “bubble” in the city.  
 
Prior to the creation of the Stratford City plan by the private consortium, as indicated 
earlier in this chapter, the local boroughs also produced spatial strategies that covered 
the Olympic site area. Indeed, Newham Council’s planning framework for the LLV 
(2000) covered most of the future Olympic site. The masterplan was proposed by the 
Spanish architectural office, MBM Arquitectes, who had made a great contribution to 
the spatial planning for the Barcelona Olympics in 1992. The Barcelona Games were 
widely recognised as a successful Olympics due to their regenerative approach (Gold 
and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b, see also Serra, 1995; Monclús, 2011). Although the impact of 
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the London’s Olympic bid was not touched on in this report, the Council expected a 
regeneration of the post-industrial site into a residential-based mixed-use area (London 
Borough of Newham, 2000, p. 4). Its spatial strategy proposed a linear development 
along the River Lea which would be an extension of the exiting urban area in the 
council boundaries. Thus, the council clearly divided the parts for the high-density 
mixed-use area and others with existing land use (either open space or current urbanised 
use) (Fig. 4-12). In a similar vein, the Unitary Development Plan by Hackney Council 
(1995) also demonstrated how the new development would spatially co-relate with the 
existing urbanised area. The council envisioned a new development area, and retained 
the existing spatial character in the middle. Thus, between Hackney Mash (located in 
southern periphery of the council boundaries) and the northern part of the future 
Olympic site were designated as the job-creation area (London Borough of Hackney, 
1995) (Fig. 4-13). 
 
Thus, what is clear in these council plans published before the designation of the 
boundary of the Olympic site is that the spatial character of the area which would be 
integrated in the future Olympic Park was defined in light of the council’s broader 
urban conditions and its development strategies. It is therefore apparent that when these 
different spatial visions issued before the subsequent Olympic plan by the LDA 
(including that for Stratford City) are stitched together, there was less cohesion and we 
can notice that there were some areas which were hardly touched by any planning 
frameworks. In this respect, the spatial strategies in the LLV at the time of the 
formulation of the vision for the Olympic site and the legacy were highly fragmented, 
and this leads the question of how the new Olympic masterplan would integrate these 
fragmented previous visions in a single spatial development framework. 
 
4.3.2 Olympic and legacy masterplan for the 2012 Games  
The Olympic and legacy masterplan in the LLV was published by the LDA in May 
2004.63 It made London the first Olympic city to possess an in-depth spatial strategy for 
both the Olympic and post-Olympic period (Fig. 4-14). Regarding this spatial strategy, 
the abovementioned diverse visions were to be integrated in the post-Olympic 
masterplan (the so-called the legacy masterplan), and the Olympic masterplan was thus 
                                                  
63 The report was issued under the name of the LDA, but EDAW, HOK Sports, Allies and Morrison, Foreign 
Architects et al were the practical masterplanners behind this report. 
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recognised as a starting point for subsequent developments. Thus, in order to examine 
the relationship with various prior spatial strategies, the legacy masterplan came to be 
the one which would represent the various spatial aspirations.  
 
The legacy masterplan clearly inherited Newham Council’s vision of a linear spatial 
setting in which most of the future development would be located at the periphery of the 
Olympic site, and the vast parklands would be positioned in the middle. Having the 
central spine which would form the Olympic Concourse along the River Lea was 
considered a highly practical and unique spatial setting for the Olympic Games, and it 
was also considered a way of underscoring the strength of the spatial setting for the 
Games to the IOC (LDA, 2004, p. 17) The challenge for the LDA was to find a way of 
leaving vacant land for subsequent development at the periphery after the Games. Given 
the fact that London would not need to retain the all of the Olympic venues after the 
Games, the LDA came up with the idea of constructing them as temporary facilities and 
dismantling the after the Olympics in order to pave the way for subsequent development 
(Fig. 4-15). 
 
With this legacy spatial layout, the LDA conceived of the post-Olympic site as a 
mixed-use urban quarter, which reflected the various planning objectives for the LLV. 
The legacy masterplan identified the core of the post-Olympic site as residential, and the 
legacy masterplan proposed this was built along the waterways. It also recognised the 
need for industrial use which would provide job opportunities for local residents, but the 
industrial use suggested in the masterplan did not mean the existing industrial use but 
rather indicated “technology based intensive industry” (LDA, 2004, p. 44). The 
provision of the residential area and job opportunities were certainly synchronised with 
the regenerative vision for the LLV set down in the London Plan, the Thames Gateway 
and the local plans by the Newham and Hackney councils. Furthermore, having legacy 
sporting facilities with leisure and recreational purposes can be understood as a response 
to the sporting and recreational visions proposed by the Lea Valley Regional Park 
Authority. In this respect then, the 2004 Olympic and legacy masterplan by the LDA 
can be understood as the culmination of the previously fragmented land-use visions set 
out under different political frameworks.  
 
However, the legacy masterplan proposed by the LDA also contrasted with previous 
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spatial strategies in some respects, in particular with the previous plans by the local 
councils. Firstly, the LDA’s proposal aimed at a much higher-density urban 
development compared with the previous plans. The Newham plan, for example, 
concentrated residential development in certain areas along the River Lea, but the 
LDA’s legacy masterplan suggested high-density urban blocks on most of the available 
land in the post-Olympic site. The London Plan issued by the Mayor of London in 2004, 
for example, designated 6,000 new homes would be built in the LLV area, but the 
LDA’s legacy masterplan suggested that 30,000 new homes would emerge in the LLV 
by the end of the 15-year development period (LDA, 2004, p. 44). This significant 
increase in levels of residential development can be understood as a means of 
addressing the massive public investment in the regeneration of the area, but its end 
result is that much of the Olympic site would be occupied by residential blocks which 
would likely be built by private sector organisations and little space would be left for 
public parklands. Furthermore, as the case of the Stratford City would eventually reveal, 
this would cause great gaps with the existing neighbourhood, all of which were built as 
low-rise town houses.  
 
In addition to this, there was also something missing in the LDA’s Olympic and legacy 
masterplan. The London Plan and the Newham Council offering suggested some 
mediation between the existing residential and industrial uses and new development, 
rather than commencing the regeneration from scratch. Furthermore, the Lea Valley 
Regional Park Authority recommended the upgrading of the exiting sporting facilities 
located in the Olympic site. Yet the LDA put great emphasis on the low value of the 
existing site, in particular the industrial use including warehousing and distribution 
centres, and opined that “all existing uses will be cleared” in order to pave the way for a 
“new” Olympic Park (LDA, 2004, p. 44). It was certain that the LDA initially tried to 
make a “tabula-rasa” for the Olympic development by displacing the existing uses.  
 
Finally, while the masterplan by the LDA demonstrated an in-depth vision for 
transforming the Olympic site into the mixed-use urban quarter after the Games, the 
document also included a spatial strategy for the LLV area beyond the boundary of the 
Olympic site (Fig. 4-16). The spatial strategy along the River Lea from the north of the 
Olympic Park to the River Thames was not included in the first London Plan, and the 
Olympic masterplan therefore created the foundation for the subsequent Mayor’s 
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Opportunity Area Planning Framework which would be published after the bid (see 
Chapter 6). Although the legacy masterplan clearly aimed to deliver much 
higher-density urban development in the post-Olympic site, it stated that post-Olympic 
land use would be integrated into the adjacent areas and emphasised the current 
disconnection of both side of the river, suggesting the Olympic site would change from 
a “barrier” to a “bridge”. The 2004 Masterplan in particular recognised the five areas 
with their different spatial characters and proposed that the Olympic Park would be 
merged into these five areas (Fig. 4-17). Yet the LDA envisaged that these existing areas 
would also be redeveloped in the longer term as part of the Olympic legacy. Thus, the 
LDA asserted that the regeneration strategy was “structured around existing and new 
communities” and would “knit together old and new” (LDA, 2004, pp. 13–14), but the 
question this gave rise to was just where this “old” community would be. The document 
also paradoxically suggests that the park edge would be defined and reinforced (LDA, 
2004, p. 34), but this may lead the Olympic site to be somewhat segregated in the wider 
urban tissue. Thus, integration of “old” and “new” was contradictorily addressed in the 
document, and I will argue that this dilemma can be seen to exemplify the difficulty of 
mediating the old and new within a massive urban regeneration project.  
 
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Olympic impacts on urban regeneration 
This chapter has explored the evolution of London’s Olympic bid, in particular 
examining how the vision of the Olympic site was conceptualised well before London 
won the right to stage the 2012 Games in 2005. London’s long journey in terms of its 
Olympic bid had involved a great deal manoeuvring in search for the location of the 
Olympic site. In particular, whether to take a “reactive” or a “proactive” approach had 
been a critical question for London in considering how the city could utilise the 
Olympic effect in its regional development strategy, but the proactive approach had 
always been the preferred option due to the regenerative opportunities which the 
Olympics would trigger in East London. While London had seen the Games as an 
opportunity to catalyse significant urban regeneration, it also had a dilemma in regard to 
integrating more than what the city needed into a “winnable” bid proposal. In the case 
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of London, that was construction of the new Olympic stadium at the Olympic site in 
East London. In this respect, I argue that the Olympic impacts should be considered 
something of a “double-edged sword” for London and its urban development strategy.  
 
Governance of the Olympic bid 
In order to make the proactive bid proposal more realistic than speculative, London’s 
long bidding story underlines the need for strong political leadership and, in this respect, 
the formation of the single London government was a crucial part of the 2012 bid plan. 
Nevertheless, during the process of conceptualising the bid proposal for the 2012 
Games, there were conflicting views on Olympic-led urban regeneration in East London. 
In particular, the central government’s concern about the risk and regional governments’ 
regenerative aspirations were highlighted in this chapter, and various feasibility studies 
were undertaken to flesh out both aspects. Yet the time constraints governing the 
finalising of the bid left the risk of a possible financial deficit as a result of hosting the 
Games in the LLV unresolved, and the regenerative opportunity was more emphasised 
by the Olympic bid organisation. This echoes Roche’s identification of a “subjective” 
feasibility study in the pre-bid phase rather than objective one (Roche, 1994), which can 
leave a potentially negative legacy in subsequent phases.  
 
Furthermore, I wish to point out that it was crucial to conceptualise the “Olympic legacy” 
in a comprehensive way and to consider how different organisations involved in the bid 
could integrate it into their political aspirations. I will stress that there was a 
well-founded background that allowed London to address the Olympic “legacy” both 
regionally and internationally. At the regional level, emphasising the benefit of a 
“legacy” in particular in relation to the new urban quarter in East London was a good fit 
with the Mayor of London’s objective of improving the economic imbalance between 
East and West in the city. Meanwhile, as the bid for the 2012 Games was the first host 
city election wherein the IOC tested their new questions regarding promoting the 
“Olympic legacy”, London also distinguished itself in taking the most advantage from 
this condition. I thus argue that London succeeded in blending its own regional agenda 
of regenerating the LLV with the international gesture of helping the IOC address its 
concerns in relation to the future of the Olympic movement. However, I further point 
out that different representation of the legacy vision at regional and international level 
shows the need for different rhetoric at different stages. What should be addressed and 
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what should not be addressed certainly depends on each political occasion. 
 
Mixed-use vision 
London’s challenge in creating the mixed-use vision of the Olympic site was mediation 
of the Olympic requirements and the various spatial visions for the LLV issued by 
different planning authorities prior to the Olympics and the legacy masterplan by the 
LDA. Recognition of the need for housing and job creation as well as everyday sporting 
facilities rather than just ones for mass events was well articulated in the LDA’s 
masterplan, and its design strategy addressing “physical changeability” was a good 
response to the Olympic and legacy demands. Nevertheless, the LDA’s masterplan did 
not consider integrating exiting uses into the Olympic site, despite suggestions from the 
various planning frameworks such as the London Plan, local plans and the masterplan 
by the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority. One can argue that disconnection with the 
past makes the future planning process easier, but London’s approach of disconnection 
from the past and connection to the future did entail an interruption in the seamless 
urban evolution. Roche argues that planning of a mega-event should be an “organic 
extension of previous developments” (Roche, 1994, p. 45) and in this respect London’s 
vision for the future clearly went against this organic approach, with the pre-bid 
masterplan clearly suggesting that the area would be a completely new urban quarter 
with the traces of the past wiped away. However, I argue that the Olympics should not 
be conceived of as delineating the line between the past and future, but rather be the 
glue connecting them.  
 
Urban integration 
This critique on the disconnection with the past can be applied further to the integration 
of the post-Olympic site and the surroundings. As Judd suggests, there is a “bubble” 
effect often observed in creating new urban quarters in the city. Yet, in the case of the 
Olympic Park in the LLV, concerns about the surroundings were greatly emphasised in 
the LDA’s Olympic and legacy masterplan, and a wider spatial vision was in place in 
the document incorporating the surroundings stretching to the River Thames. 
Furthermore, the LDA proposed to merge the post-Olympic Park into the surrounding 
neighbourhood rather than having it stand out in the area. Nevertheless, regardless of 
these assertions the question may be posed as to whether this Olympic fringe area 
would maintain its exiting spatial character and would be able to co-exist with the new 
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urban quarters. While the LDA masterplan addressed what Hiller calls “urban 
boosterism” in regenerating the wider LLV area (Hiller, 2000), consideration of the 
area’s historical connections was less at the forefront.  
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Part I Conclusion: Similarities and differences in Sydney and London 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the initial planning process in the creation of the Olympic 
site in Sydney and London, and the findings in this part suggested that there were some 
shared experiences, but also significant differences between the two cities. As a 
conclusion to Part I, I will summarise these similarities and differences in the 
emergence and shaping of the vision of the Olympic sites in Sydney and London.  
 
Olympic impacts on urban development strategy 
In the initial phase of bidding, Sydney and London manoeuvred between a reactive and 
a proactive approach in integrating the Olympic impacts on the regional development 
strategy. The significance of the Olympic impacts as what Hiller calls an “intruder in the 
host city” provided Sydney and London with the opportunity to either enhance the 
existing urban structure or conduct a new urban regeneration (Hiller, 2003). The choices 
between Moore Park or Homebush Bay in Sydney and Wembley or East London 
exemplified this. There is no doubt that the regenerative objectives for the declined 
post-industrial sites in Homebush Bay and East London were a great trigger for both 
cities to take a proactive approach, but I will also argue that the Olympic forces and the 
severe inter-urban competition to win the bid they entail greatly affected this crucial 
decision. My in-depth historical exploration of Sydney and London reveals that, behind 
this final decision, both cities had conducted various feasibility studies to identify the 
benefits and risks of both reactive and proactive spatial settings, with both cities coming 
to believe that a proactive approach was imperative in making the proposal attractive to 
the IOC. 
 
While this Olympic vision and the competition provided the rationale for the 
regeneration of the Homebush Bay and LLV areas and the creation of the Olympic parks 
there, it was also greatly influential in defining the spatial character of the Olympic site. 
Both cities recognised that a high concentration of sporting venues would be an 
advantage in the bid, and therefore it was imperative for Sydney and London to 
intensify the sporting vision of the Olympic site, which Preuss terms “the prisoner’s 
dilemma” (Preuss, 2004, p. 290). Thus, the increased number of competition venues 
concentrated in Homebush Bay as well as the need for integration of the main Olympic 
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stadium into the LLV site despite uncertainty regarding long-term use represented the 
powerful Olympic forces shaping the vision of the Olympic site. As a result, how to 
cope with the dominance of the sporting vision became the crucial issue in shaping the 
mixed-use vision of these post-Olympic sites. 
 
Furthermore, I stress that the integration of the IOC’s political concerns at the time of 
bidding into their spatial visions of the Olympic site was crucial in both Sydney and 
London succeeding in their bids. Sydney’s speculative “Green Games” concept and 
London’s promotion of “the Olympic legacy” were both embedded into the spatial 
concept of the Olympic site and, in this respect, the Olympic site can be understood as 
what Lefebvre calls a “representation of space”, where the conceptualisation of space is 
prioritised (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 38).  
 
Governance of the Olympic bid 
Sydney and London experienced almost 30-year bidding processes in their respective 
quests to win the right to stage the Olympic Games, and the governance of the Olympic 
bid evolved significantly during these periods. What we have seen in Sydney and 
London was an evolution from a fragmented governing structure at the beginning to a 
more concentrated Olympic planning structure in the later phase of the bid. The 
concentration of the planning structure here does not mean the provision of planning 
powers to the Olympic bid committee but rather the establishment of a statuary body 
with responsibility to control the spatial strategy of the Olympic site in a close 
relationship with the bid committee. The bid committee in both cities was 
fundamentally an independent organisation consisting of influential political and 
business leaders in the city, but its planning power in the pre-bid phase was limited. It 
was therefore imperative that there was great involvement on the part of the regional 
governments in the spatial planning of the Olympic site. The production of the in-depth 
Olympic and legacy vision for the Sydney bid was made possible through the creation 
of the Homebush Bay Development Corporation (HBDC), the statuary organisation 
which oversaw the regeneration of Homebush Bay at the time of the bid for the 2000 
Games in Sydney, and the great involvement of the Mayor and the LDA for the London 
2012 bid, which was enabled by the establishment of the statuary authority for the 
greater London region. 
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Although the planning structure became more organised in the later phase of the bidding 
process, however, this did not guarantee a cohesive vision shared by the bid committee 
and the regional planning authority. It was not so visible in the case of London, but the 
case of Sydney suggests that the Olympic bid committee and the statuary planning body 
had directly conflicting visions. The fundamental aim of the bid committee was to win 
the bid, and this aim therefore tends to create a distinctive spatial setting intended to 
make the bid proposal attractive. Meanwhile, the regional authority had a more 
managerial and entrepreneurial approach to the site, in which the regional government 
focused on creating a feasible spatial plan and justifying the financial investment in the 
massive urban regeneration scheme of post-Olympic development. Thus, echoing 
Roche’s critique of the feasibility study conducted in the pre-bid phase, I will argue that 
the planning structure was simplified during the bid period but that the gap between the 
spatial strategy of the Olympic organisation and the regional authority nonetheless calls 
into question the inter-relationship between the spatial speculation and the practicalities 
proposed in the pre-bid phase (Roche, 1994). 
 
Mixed-use vision: Accumulation of the various aspirations  
One of the most crucial aims of this part was to explore the origin of the mixed-use 
vision for the Olympic sites in Sydney and London. My view here is that this vision was 
shaped during the long journeys of the bidding campaign in both cities. Homebush Bay 
in Sydney and the LLV in London were subject to spatial visions intended to satisfy the 
regional socio-economic development strategies, such as provision of housing, job 
opportunities and social facilities. The Olympic vision was added to these non-Olympic 
visions, but the way they were mixed in one urban quarter is different between Sydney 
and London. Sydney fundamentally aimed to establish a regional sporting precinct as a 
legacy of hosting the Olympics, and this was considered a means of enhancing regional 
economic prosperity. Meanwhile, London’s primary view of the LLV was to change the 
socio-economic situation in East London for the better, and hosting the Games had been 
considered a trigger to accelerate wider socio-economic regeneration. In this respect, the 
fundamental reasons behind the mixed-use vision for the Olympic site are different. 
This different origin is reflected in the different spatial strategies in Sydney and London. 
Sydney had struggled to combine sporting and industrial use, but London’s challenge 
was to transform the Olympic-sized sporting legacy to a more applicable scale for 
post-Olympic uses and utilise it to enhance the diverse spatial developments in the 
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post-Olympic site. In other words, while Sydney tackled the compatibility of different 
uses in the mixed-use urban precinct, which various authors point out as crucial for 
urban vibrancy (Coupland, 1997), London tried to avoid such a challenge. Furthermore, 
while Sydney’s vision had been shaped historically, London’s legacy vision was planned 
from scratch, being clearly based on the assumption that existing uses would be cleared 
away to pave the way for new development, an approach sharply in contrast to Jacobs’ 
argument of the need for various aged physical artefacts for urban diversity (Jacobs, 
1961, pp. 244–260). Thus, I stress that both cities had different reasons for envisioning a 
mixed-use Olympic Park and these would bring different challenges in the future, as 
these visions would entail some potential problems which the existing literature has 
pointed out in realising the mixed-use urban precinct.  
 
Urban integration  
Finally, while the initial vision of the Olympic Park was founded in the pre-bid phase, 
different approaches to the integration into the wider urban tissue between Sydney and 
London are also visible. One of the potential benefits of having the leading authority 
responsible for the development of the Olympic site was to consider it within the wider 
urban context, to avoid the aforementioned “bubble” effect (Judd, 1999). The planning 
boundaries of the statuary authority which defined the final bid masterplan in both 
Sydney and London went beyond the Olympic site. Yet, while the LDA conducted the 
spatial analysis of wider LLV area, the HBDC’s view was limited to the Olympic site, 
and there were little suggestions on how the Olympic Park and its surroundings would 
be harmonised. In other words, Sydney’s approach was more inward looking, while 
London attempted to mediate between in and outside the Olympic site. Despite seeking 
a more contextual approach in the wider urban area, however, London lacked a 
historical viewpoint which considered the relationship between the old and new urban 
areas in the LLV. Although the regional and local planning policy had pointed this out in 
the pre-bid phase, the LDA failed to address how the creation of the Olympic Park as a 
legacy of hosting the Olympic Games would relate to the existing neighbourhood.  
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Part II: The Post-Bid Phase 
 
 
 
The second part of this thesis (chapters 5 and 6) will explore the post-bid phase, which 
is the seven-year period between the host city's selection and the Olympic Games. There 
are some critical analytical points relating to the planning process of this period, which 
my discussion in this chapter will focus on. Firstly, as Roche has critically suggested, 
the final plan may show significant changes to the vision for the legacy of the Olympic 
site from the one initially proposed in the bid (Roche, 1994). Given my research interest 
in the changes of the spatial vision and the reasons for such changes, I will examine 
how the vision for the Olympic site evolves during the period, along with the changes in 
governance of the Olympic planning. Secondly, along with the development of the 
vision of the Olympic Park, this is the period when some of the facilities are built and 
the spatial framework of the Olympic Park is established, part of which will become a 
significant physical legacy. Thus, I will examine the process of the implementation. In 
particular I will shed light on the involvement of the private sector, through PPPs in the 
implementation process, and explore how this manipulates the initial vision. Thirdly, I 
will look at the Olympic site beyond the site boundaries, and in particular explore how 
each site is contextualised within its wider planning context. Following Part I, Judd’s 
conception of the urban “bubble” (Judd, 1999) will be the underlying analytical 
framework for the relationship between the Olympic site and its urban tissue. My 
exploration here is to examine both local and regional planning contexts, and to identify 
different planning relationships in relation to the emerging Olympic site. As indicated in 
Chapter 2, there has been a fundamental transformation in the IOC regarding its attitude 
to the Olympic legacy between these two periods. Thus, at the end of this part, I will 
explore the differences as well as similarities between Sydney and London.  
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Chapter 5: Sydney 
 
 
 
5.1 Governance of the Olympic legacy and its reflection of the spatial 
vision 
 
5.1.1 Fragmentation: Post-bid Olympic governance (1993–1995) 
Sydney won the right to stage the 2000 Olympic Games at the host city election held in 
Monte Carlo in September 1993, and the Games became a great impetus to facilitate 
further development of Homebush Bay. After winning the bid, the Sydney Olympic 
2000 Bid Limited, led by a powerful consortium organised by most influential public 
and private people in Sydney who tried to promote Sydney’s successful bid, was 
dissolved, and further actions were conducted largely by various public bodies in the 
NSW Government (Fig. 5-1).  
 
In the initial phase of the post-bid period, the different authorities had different roles in 
shaping the vision of the Olympic site in Homebush Bay, and this fragmented planning 
structure certainly reflected the divergent nature of the spatial strategy developed in this 
period. The overall spatial strategy of Homebush Bay, for example, was devised by the 
NSW Department of Planning and the Homebush Bay Development Corporation 
(HBDC). The NSW Department of Planning created the governmental spatial strategy 
for Homebush Bay, “the Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No.24 (SREP. 24)”, as a 
basis for state government intervention in the area (NSW Department of Planning, 
1994; Gurran, 2007, p. 222), and the HBDC prepared the detailed document for land 
use and the transport network, “Structure Plan” (HBDC, 1994) (Fig. 5-2). The draft 
versions of both documents were issued prior to the bid,64 but after re-evaluating the 
feasibility of the previous documents and incorporating the bid decision and public 
consultation, the two documents were revised in different ways.  
                                                  
64 NSW Depertment of Planning (1993a) Draft Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 24 : Homebush Bay 
Development Area Sydney. 
HBDC (1993) Homebush Bay Area Draft Structure Plan, Sydney. 
Draft SREP. 24 was published in June 1993, and the Draft Structure Plan in September 1993. Although it was 
uncertain if Sydney could win the bid at the time of publication, these draft documents were written under the 
assumption of Sydney’s successful bid. 
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Furthermore, different spatial aspirations were developed in the NSW Government. The 
HBDC, for example, took a practical approach, and suggested as the Olympic site a 
more isolated place in the Homebush area. “The Structure Plan” by the HBDC 
addressed “protection” of the Olympic site from the surroundings as an important 
feature of holding major events there (HBDC, 1994, p. 4).65 It was understood that after 
the bid, the management of major events would became a serious issue, and therefore 
the HBDC proposed to isolate the core area of Homebush Bay by a “loop road”, which 
would provide an efficient logistical route for major events by seamlessly connecting 
areas within the site during the event. Isolation of the core area of Homebush Bay from 
the surroundings was further observed in the geographical detachment of the Bay. The 
strong relation between the water and sports was a strong image within Sydney’s bid 
concept, “Green Games.” Sydney's bid proposed to use the existing Brickpit as the 
Olympic Tennis Centre and amphitheatre, which would connect the industrial past and 
the future, but this crucial element was abandoned soon after the bid was concluded. 
Peter Mould, the NSW Government architect during 2005 to 2012, pointed out that 
contamination of the Bay was much worse than expected in the bid, and an in-depth soil 
study of the Brickpit had not been conducted prior to the bid.66 This, the HBDC altered 
the vision of Homebush Bay drastically, based on the more serious feasibility studies, 
and as a result the Olympic site lost its spatial connectivity, instead becoming a 
juxtaposition of different functions enclosed in the loop road.  
 
While the HBDC had sought the practical feasibility of the Olympic site in Homebush 
Bay, the Property Service Group (PSG), the property arm of the NSW Government, had 
looked for a strong identity for Homebush Bay, in order to promote Sydney’s vision 
further. To this end the PSG organised a workshop called “Urban Design Studio” from 
28 November to 5 December 1994, and invited leading domestic and international 
experts in various fields such as urban planning, architectural design, transport and 
ecology (NSW Government, 1994). The PSG believed that the regeneration of 
Homebush Bay would be a great opportunity to promote Australian excellence to the 
world, and good design would add value both economically and socially. One of the 
                                                  
65 This was also indicated in NSW Department of Planning (1994) Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 24 : 
Homebush Bay Development Area Sydney., p. 7. 
66 Interview with Peter Mould on 25 November 2008.  
Peter Mould worked on the Homebush Bay development, and as a government planning officer, and later became the 
NSW Government Architect during 2005 to 2012. 
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most notable participants in the workshop was the French architect Jean Nouvel, who 
has designed various award- winning architectural projects all over the world. Nouvel 
defined his role as finding the architectural/urban design solution to symbolise the 
“Australian identity” and set it as “a model for the rest of world” (Nouvel, 1994). After 
studying various options for the topographic patterning of the site, Nouvel designated 
the Brickpit as the epicentre of Homebush Bay, organising various venues around it, 
even though the new Structure Plan suggested the uncertainty of utilising it (Fig. 5-3).  
 
Although media outlets such as the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) praised Nouvel’s 
approach of finding “specificity” or looking at the “genius” of the existing site,67 his 
scheme was not always welcomed. Although the workshop sought fresh ideas for the 
development of Homebush Bay, it also addressed the need for the new proposals to find 
a balance between the inherited planning agencies’ requirements and the unseen 
potential for the area (NSW Government, 1994, pp. 1–2). In this respect, his scheme 
was considered unique but difficult to integrate historically so as to garner the planning 
consent needed for Homebush Bay. In addition to the difficulty of integrating a one-off 
design workshop into a planning process which already had a long history, it was 
organised at a time when the political regime in NSW was changing, and there was a 
significant risk that the following government would not adopt its predecessor's plans. 
Eventually, despite the great effort and cost invested to seek an identity for Homebush 
Bay which would be directly related to the promotion of the city’s positive image to the 
world, the results of the workshop including Nouvel’s idea were never published. The 
Urban Design Studio workshop was criticised in the statement “the designs have 
disappeared into the recesses of the Government bureaucracy”, although the 
government spent more than AUD 500,000 to obtain various speculative spatial ideas 
for Homebush Bay.68  
 
Thus, the visions of Homebush Bay created in the period of the Liberal Government 
after Sydney won the bid manoeuvred between practicality and speculation, and this 
was certainly reflected in the highly fragmented governance of the Olympic planning. 
The instability of the vision for Homebush Bay caused the serious delay of the 
construction of the Olympic Park, which had led various media critiques on the NSW 
                                                  
67 “Top French architect has designs on Olympic site”, SMH, 5 December 1994. 
   Also “He changed the way we think about Architecture”, SMH, 7 December 1994. 
68 “Hidden in Homebush”, SMH, 15 May 1995. 
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Government. 
 
5.1.2 Concentration: Change of the NSW Government (1995–1996) 
In April 1995, the government of NSW changed from Liberal to the Labour, and Bob 
Carr became the Premier of NSW. As soon as he took the position, Carr started 
reforming various political systems. One of the significant changes was the 
re-organisation of planning powers in the State Government.69  Lack of strategic 
long-term planning of cities' development in Australia had been highlighted by the 
National Prime Minister, and Carr followed suit. He recognised that fragmentation of 
planning power had prevented the strategic planning of the region, and he began the 
reform of the planning structure in NSW. A streamlined planning structure was also 
applied to the ongoing Olympic planning. It is considered that the previous “fragmented” 
planning structures had caused “the lack of the clarity about the direction of the project, 
about issues of scope, size and planning, and the degree of private sector involvement” 
(Cashman, 2011, p. 41), and had also been one of the biggest reasons for the delay of 
some Olympic construction, such as the main Olympic stadium and the athletes' village. 
David Churches, senior director of Games Planning at the Olympic Co-ordination 
Authority, further confirmed that: 
 
“We had change of government in NSW and with the change of government, 
the incoming government had to take much stronger control over the Olympic 
project in particular with construction.”70 
 
In order to centralise planning power and accelerate the process for the Olympic project, 
Carr’s government created the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) under the 
Olympic Co-ordination Authority Act issued on 30 June 1995. The function of the 
authority included planning for and provision of Olympic venues and facilities, 
Olympic Games co-ordination and reporting with/to the NSW Government, 
development of the Sydney Olympic Park development area, and acquisition and 
dedication of land. Under this system, while the Sydney Organising Committee of the 
Olympic Games (SOCOG) had responsibility for the “soft” side of the Olympic 
                                                  
69 Carr, for example, ordered the winding up of some statuary planning authorities, and transferred their planning 
power to the Department of Planning and Urban Affairs. Carr stated that "for the first time, we have a Planning 
Department that can drive the strategic plan for Sydney and other bureaucracies will have to surrender their powers". 
“Carr’s vision splendid over Sydney”, SMH, 6 April 1995. 
70 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008. 
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Games,71 the OCA took great responsibility for preparation of the “hard” side of the 
Games.  
 
In addition to the creation of the OCA, the government also appointed Michael Knight 
as the Minister for the Olympics (Fig. 5-4). Michael Knight was a member of Carr’s 
Labour government, and in the new Olympic governance model, the OCA was directly 
under his control. Knight justified the newly-created streamlined planning structure for 
the Olympic project as follows:  
 
“[t]he two Games venues - the 80,000-seat main stadium and the Olympic 
village - are behind schedule because inter-agency rivalry has caused 
confusion, jealousy and duplication”72 (emphasis added). 
 
The creation of the OCA and concentration of the decision making process was a crucial 
turning point, and the change to the Olympic planning structure was certainly reflected 
in the masterplan for Homebush Bay, as Knight suggested that the finalisation of the 
masterplan had been a priority for the new government.73 In September 1995, only five 
months after the new Labour government was established, the OCA unveiled the 
modified masterplan for Homebush Bay, clarifying various issues such as the relocation 
of the RAS showground and usage of the Brickpit, both of which had been targets of 
public debate in Sydney. The Premier of NSW, Bob Carr, stated that:  
 
“It finally locks into place the sporting and commercial precinct, the rail link, 
bus access and road system as well as creating huge public open space.”74 
 
It is certain that the streamlined planning structure system made it possible for the new 
government to finalise the masterplan in such a short period, and in this respect, one can 
argue that publication of the new masterplan justified reform of the Olympic planning 
structure. Yet the spatial strategy unveiled in the new masterplan showed the limits of 
the fast-track planning. Although the new masterplan document stressed that there was 
continuity with previous planning schemes (OCA, 1995, p. 17), the spatial image shown 
                                                  
71 The Organising Committee is the institution which every host city has to create as the Games’ operating 
organisation under the host city contract with the IOC. 
72 “A Gold Medal Shakedown”, SMH, 11 April 1995. 
73 Ibid. 
74 “Homebush Bay”, News Release, Premier of NSW, 27 September 1995. 
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in the new masterplan in 1995 had drastically changed from the bid proposal.  
 
The masterplan of Homebush Bay at the time of bidding represented an organic mixture 
between built forms and the natural environment, and in particular, the connection 
between the Bay and sports stadia, in order to support Sydney’s “Green Games” concept 
(Figs. 5-5 and 6). The new masterplan in 1995, however, created a division between 
built forms and the natural environment, or to use another word used in the masterplan, 
there was a “juxtaposition” of extensive conservation and open areas with dense urban 
districts (OCA, 1995, p. 28). The inherited identity of the urban design in Homebush 
Bay and the organic configuration of built forms and the natural environment 
disappeared, and instead, a “grid-patterned road system” was introduced, which would 
divide the central area of Homebush Bay into various precincts (Figs. 5-7 and 8). 
Unlike the previous planning documents, the term “urban core” was extensively used in 
the new masterplan, suggesting the area would become a “new city” in the western area 
of Sydney, and grid-patterned roads became the elements to separate various functions 
within this “urban core”.  
 
Given the complexity of the “urban core”, creation of an urban “grid” was a workable 
solution to accommodate the diverse uses, built forms, lease-holders, and histories 
which had to fit in the area. The “urban core” area, in fact, contained an existing light 
industrial area and sporting area operated by the State Government, the new sporting 
area containing the main Olympic stadium which would be operated by the private 
sector, and the new showground area, which would host one of the biggest annual 
events in NSW. The central area of Homebush Bay was thus divided into different 
pieces of land by grid-patterned roads, which would enable different areas to be 
managed by different operators. 
 
Application of a “grid” in urban design can be seen from different perspectives. Sue 
Holly, a former planning officer for the Sydney Games, utilised the term “cohesion” to 
identify the role of the new masterplan in creating a “unified Olympic precinct”, when 
she gave a lecture at the Olympic Conference in Athens in 2006. It is certain that Holly 
justified the application of the “grid” to mediate various differences located in 
Homebush Bay. In a similar vein, Dianne Leeson described the chaotic condition 
created by the involvement of the private sector, as follows: 
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“They (private companies) came along with their own designers and landscape 
designers, and similarly I think half a dozen designers worked for the 
showground. So what we were getting was always competing views. At one 
stage, it will be a terrible mess.”75 
 
Furthermore, a former senior director of the OCA, David Churches, provides a different 
view of the system.76 He points out that the decision to apply the grid system did not 
only come from a feasibility perspective in the fast-tracked Olympic planning context, 
but also from the intention to integrate a long-term post-Olympics vision.77 This also 
recalls Koolhaas’s view of the grid system as a spatial framework for future opportunity, 
which he recognised through his observation of the New York city grid (Koolhaas, 
1995). While Olympic planners indicated the advantage of the grid system, it can be 
critically observed that this was an expression of “control-ness”. “Control-ness” in 
urban space has been widely criticised as a method of erasing urban liveliness. Richard 
Sennett, for example, suggests that “neutrality” is a crucial concept of “grid” systems in 
cities, and it represents “a space of social control”, in his book “The Conscience of the 
Eye: the Design and Social Life in Cities” (Sennett, 1990, pp. 46–62). In his view, a grid 
system homogenises the diversion of the urban space, despite the various social and 
historical backgrounds of the space. His critical view of “control” rather than mediation 
is illustrated in the phrase “organise and juxtapose critical land uses” in the new 
masterplan document (OCA, 1995, p. 18). In fact, David Churches also admitted that 
“[t]he concept of planning in Australia unfortunately is not conceptual, it’s actually 
controlling”78 In this respect, the grid system ironically represented the difficulty of 
mediating different land uses that existed or would exist in the site. 
 
Beyond the practical aspects of the masterplan, the disappearance of the previous 
concept of integration of nature and history and the strong impression of “control-ness” 
were widely criticised. SMH called the new masterplan a “safe option”, reporting that it 
was just a massive grid, and that it was described by architects as “reasonable rather 
                                                  
75 Interview with Dianne Leeson on 7 July 2007. 
76 Churches fundamentally supported the previous organic spatial approach, as he thought the presentation of 
“Sydney-ness” should be livelier and very much integrated with nature. Yet at the same time, as Holly indicated, he 
thought that the grid was going to make the site’s layout easier to understand when it was very busy. 
77 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008. 
78 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009. 
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than splendid”.79 The SMH further criticised the new plan as “staid, boring mediocrity”, 
lacking international significance. 80  These comments were greatly related to the 
question of the centralisation of the planning process, although the new government 
strongly argued for the advantages of the new planning structure for the Olympic 
project.  
 
5.1.2 Impact of the 1996 Atlanta Games 
There is no doubt that the change of the regional government in 1995 was the great 
catalyst for changes in governance of the Olympic planning and spatial vision of 
Homebush Bay. In addition to this, various people involved in the Sydney Olympic 
planning suggested in their interviews that the 1996 Atlanta Olympics had a great 
impact on the ongoing planning of the Homebush Bay Olympic site in Sydney, and also 
triggered further changes of the spatial strategy. What created a great impact on 
Sydney’s Olympic governance and spatial strategy was the risk of the global media 
exposing the planning failure of the Olympic Games and the need for greater 
government involvement in the Olympic planning to avoid this risk.  
 
The Atlanta Games can be characterised by a highly strategic approach largely led by 
business sectors in the city. Instead of creating various new Olympic facilities, it 
strategically forecast the long-term usability of required facilities, and carefully planned 
new developments in light of the solid financial viability of the legacy use. Atlanta’s 
approach to eliminating the long-term burden of the physical Olympic legacy and using 
the Games to push urban regeneration, which business leaders considered necessary for 
their long-term future, can be considered one way of adapting Olympic impacts to a 
city’s development strategy (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b, pp. 42–44). Yet such highly 
privately-led Olympic planning, in which the city government’s involvement was 
minimal, caused various problems during the Olympics. Lack of public funding 
certainly led to little investment in urban infrastructure, and this caused severe traffic 
congestion. Furthermore, administrative problems, security breaches, and 
over-commercialisation were highly criticised as stemming from the “failure of 
American public-private partnership” (Chalkley and Essex, 1999, pp. 387–389). Thus, 
one of the biggest lessons which Sydney learnt from the Atlanta Games was their 
                                                  
79 “Homebush Planners go for safe option”, SMH, 20 November 1995. 
80 “Games vision ’boring mediocrity’”, SMH, 15 March 1996. 
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operational failure caused by a lack of government involvement. As Michael Knight 
suggests: 
 
“Atlanta had a huge impact on increasing the connection with the government. 
What became pretty apparent to me […] is that unless the government was 
more involved, we couldn’t do this. We couldn’t do this without the greater 
government involvement and without the greater integration of the Government, 
Organising Committee (the SOCOG) and OCA.”81 
 
Knight uses the term “pressure” in talking about the impact from the Atlanta Games, as 
Sydney organisers recognised the importance of international exposure of the Olympic 
Games after seeing the problems of the Atlanta Games. As Knight suggests, this led to 
the provision of more planning power to himself as the Minister for the Olympics, and 
the creation of a special governmental agency responsible for all traffic issues related to 
the Olympic Games. Yet, it was not as straightforward as it eventually appeared. 
According to Churches, increasing the government's involvement was difficult, because 
the contract with the IOC was legally made by the Organising Committee, not by the 
city Government. Therefore, it created a complicated relationship between the IOC, the 
Organising Committee and the NSW Government, which the IOC had never 
experienced. Yet the State Government’s strong argument that the government (not the 
Organising Committee) would pay for construction and take financial risks and 
long-term risks made it possible to modify the planning structure of the Sydney 
Games82 (Fig. 5-9).  
 
The change of administrative structure for the Olympic planning had various impacts on 
the ongoing masterplan for the Homebush Bay site, and indeed the long-term vision of 
the Olympic site. Since transportation was not the OCA’s responsibility, it could focus 
more on delivering the venues and public spaces required for the Games. The crucial 
finding from the Atlanta Games for the Sydney planners was the importance of crowd 
control in the Olympic site. Michael Knight pointed out that one of the things that 
people did not appreciate was the size of what Atlanta did.83 Overcrowding in the city 
centre was one of the issues for the Atlanta Olympics, and Sydney planners recognised 
                                                  
81 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008. 
82 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008. 
83 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008. 
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it as a crucial point in staging successful Games. Chris Johnson, the Government 
Architect during the Olympics and a key figure of the Olympic Design Review Panel, 
notes that after seeing the logistics of the Atlanta Games, Sydney planners began to 
recognise that they needed more open spaces in the core of Homebush Bay.84 The 
masterplan, therefore, needed to be modified drastically to create bigger open spaces. 
Yet this had both positive and negative opinions, in particular when considering the use 
after the Olympics. Churches, for example, commented:   
 
“If you’ve see the photographs during the Games, the whole of the boulevard 
was full of the people. People talk about it afterwards and say ‘no, it was a 
waste'. But that wasn’t a waste. That was actually necessary for it to be safe 
and pleasant during the Games.”85 
 
Johnson similarly recognised that they would build on a bigger scale than necessary, but 
he indicated that it would be good to celebrate the “big stimulation” represented by the 
Games and its legacy, because he envisaged that the city would catch up as the region’s 
population continuously grew.86 Although there was uncertainty about its legacy usage, 
the OCA adopted the argument for the expansion of the public spaces. It appointed 
George Hargreaves, an American landscape architect and professor at Harvard 
University, who also contributed to the landscape design of the London Olympic Park 
for the 2012 Games, to design the core of Homebush Bay, especially the public domain 
in the urban core. The OCA unveiled the modified masterplan in 1997. Although the 
new plan was still based on the grid pattern proposed in the previous masterplan, it 
clearly showed bigger urban spaces, by creating a 60m wide Olympic Boulevard as the 
spine of the site, while the area around the main stadium and the indoor arena were kept 
as large open spaces for the event (Fig. 5-10).  
 
When the OCA decided to create the bigger open spaces, this required restructuring the 
spatial layout in the Olympic Park, by relocating some venues out of Homebush Bay. 
The Velodrome, which was located near the Olympic stadium and indoor sports and 
entertainment centre, became the target. Michael Knight indicated that it became 
obvious that the area that the Velodrome occupied could be used for temporary facilities 
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(crowd control and ticketing), both at the time of the Games and beyond, and the 
government decided to relocate the Velodrome.87 Jacques Rogge, the head of the IOC’s 
Co-ordination Commission for the Sydney Games and the president of the IOC from 
2001 to 2013, also stated as follows:  
 
"There are advantages and disadvantages in concentrating big venues in the 
same place. We believe it is a very good idea to move the velodrome out of 
Homebush Bay in terms of landscaping, scenery, crowd control and avoiding 
too much congestion…It will leave a better legacy for Sydney in the future. The 
legacy is very important for the city.”88 
 
Although both Knight and Rogge mentioned that the Velodrome was relocated not only 
for the Games but also in view of its legacy, it is certain that their comments were based 
on the organisational point of view, in particular the event management viewpoint. But 
the cycling federation and users had different views. They were concerned about the 
legacy. The president of the NSW Cycling Federation, Alex Fulcher, argued:  
 
"If they wanted it to be viable after 2000, well they can just forget it in outlying 
areas. This has nothing to do with not supporting the west, it's just not going to 
work if it's not in a central location."89 
 
Johnson said that relocation of the Velodrome would benefit the other area by the 
Olympics, as in Barcelona, which provided multiple Olympic sites for the city’s 
long-term strategic growth.90 Meanwhile, others claimed that securing the Velodrome’s 
viability after the Olympics should be prioritised, and worried that unless an appropriate 
location and transportation were provided, it would not work. Thus, the issue of 
relocating venues exemplified the conflict between operational success during the 
Games and the post-Olympic utilisation. But it seems to me that operational concerns 
were more prioritised in defining the spatial character of Homebush Bay, and 
prioritising the Games’ success in the age of global exposure of the Olympic Games was 
the great impact of the Atlanta Games on Sydney’s spatial strategy.  
                                                  
87 “Cyclists angry as Olympic velodrome is moved west”, SMH, 24 September 1996. 
88 “No more changes to Games site, vows Knight”, SMH, 26 September 1996. 
89 “Cyclists angry as Olympic velodrome is moved west”, SMH, 24 September 1996. 
90 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009. 
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5.1.4 Legacy consideration during the preparation phase 
Many modifications of the masterplan for Homebush Bay and changes in the size and 
settings of sporting venues had set the spatial character of the Olympic site as well as 
the vision of the site beyond the Games. In addition to this, it is imperative to explore 
explicitly the degree to which planners and organisers considered the legacy during the 
preparation phase, in order to directly connect with my research question.  
 
The Olympic Co-ordination Act was issued on 30 June 1995, and indicated that the 
function of the OCA was not only to plan and construct the Olympic venues and 
facilities within the agreed timeframe and budget, but also to ensure they were suitable 
for post-Olympic uses. The Act further defined the role of the OCA to include 
consideration of the long-term requirements of Sydney and the economic development 
of the Homebush Bay area (NSW Government, 1995). By this definition, it is 
understood that tackling the “legacy” was as important for the Olympic planning 
authority as preparing the stage for the Games. Although the term “legacy” is now 
almost central in Olympic planning in both practical and academic spheres, during the 
Sydney preparation phase, “legacy” and similar words were not so visible to the public. 
Michael Knight observed:  
 
“Legacy wasn’t front and centre even at the time that Sydney [was part of] the 
Olympic movement. Now in subsequent years, the IOC thought more about 
legacy. So the IOC requirements for the legacy are much greater than ten years 
ago.”91 
 
David Churches further pointed out: 
 
“I think Sydney has quite advanced the idea of the legacy, but never presented 
them in a consolidated way, because nobody asked.”92 
 
Thus, when searching for the term “Olympic legacy” used in media outlets such as the 
SMH during the post-bid period, we cannot find many articles with the phrase. Richard 
                                                  
91 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008. 
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133 
Cashman, who addressed the importance of the Olympic legacy during the bid, says the 
“Olympic legacy” concept was relatively new in academic circles at the end of the 
1990s (Cashman, 1999; Cashman, 1998). Yet the interviews with the planners and 
organisers of the Sydney Games, and some minutes of meetings of the IOC sessions, 
show that different people had different perceptions of this concept. Jacques Rogge, the 
chair of the IOC’s Co-ordination Committee for the Sydney Games, claimed: 
 
“The Coordination Commission had checked to see if the Host City Contract 
and bid documents had been respected and any changes that were made were 
improvements to the legacy left to the city” (IOC, 1995) (emphasis added). 
 
His view represents the IOC’s view that the various changes made by the host city after 
the bid had to be related to the legacy, and given all of the IOC’s approvals of Sydney’s 
modification of spatial settings, the IOC believed that Sydney had changed the Olympic 
planning due to concerns about the legacy left to the city. Yet this is only one view, and 
the views of planners and organisers in Sydney are more complicated. Many planners 
indicated that the challenge was to find a balance between Olympic planning and legacy 
planning during the post-bid phase, and confessed that little time was spent on the future. 
David Churches suggested as follows:   
 
“The OCA had enormous responsibilities in terms of building the site, studying 
and management of the site, and many other things towards the Games. But we 
really needed an organisation from at least two years before the Games which 
had no other responsibility other than looking to the future. The OCA had that 
responsibility, and David Richmond who was the head of the OCA was quite 
open about the fact that we didn't have much work done on this. It’s because 
everybody was working very heavily on the Olympics and Paralympics. His 
view simply says that there were not enough people in Australia to do the 
future planning and Olympic planning spontaneously”93 (emphasis added).  
 
Chris Johnson similarly recalled that:  
 
“In terms of long-term legacy, we were strongly driven by making the project 
                                                  
93 Interview with David Churches on 29 November 2008. 
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work for the Olympics, not spending too much time worrying about what will 
happen after the Olympics. Maybe that’s right, maybe that’s wrong” 94 
(emphasis added). 
 
These comments suggest that the pressure of delivering the venues on time and 
organising a successful event were prioritised over the post-Olympics period, yet others 
argue that while planners spent much time on the Olympic preparation, certain legacy 
aspects were involved in it. Dianne Leeson pointed out:  
 
“In terms of the Olympic venues, the sporting facilities and village, we did a lot 
of work on what Sydney needed after the Olympic Games. […] So we had a 
question about which venues would be permanent, which ones would be 
temporally. And of the permanent ones, we considered what we really wanted 
after the Games, and what kind of configuration was needed for the Games.”95 
 
Sporting venues were central elements of the Olympic Games, and delivering them was 
a crucial part during the post-bid phase, as suggested by various people. Yet Leeson 
argues that there were careful considerations of how the Olympic and legacy 
requirements could be mediated in each construction project and met within the limited 
timeframe. Thus, the legacy was one of the crucial factors in the sports planning. Then, 
the question emerges as to what was missing in the phase. Michael Knight clearly 
addressed this question. He indicated:   
 
“We thought about legacy when we were bidding. For example, we were not 
building Sydney Olympic park for a 17-day sporting festival. We were building 
Sydney Olympic park for the longer term. We thought about the legacy in that 
sense. We didn’t think a lot about how we’d operate the Sydney Olympic park 
in the future, we didn’t think a lot about what the mix of commercial, 
residential and sporting would be.... We were thinking about creating a 
massive parkland that would be an enormous legacy forever. We never 
necessary thought about where the money would come from in 2015 for the 
operation of the Centennial Park Land, so that wasn’t that level of the detail 
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but we were thinking about the legacy in terms of the things we would be 
building”96 (emphasis added). 
 
Knight clearly confirmed that while the Olympic planners had considered the legacy of 
the sporting aspects, which were directly connected with the Games, and of the parkland 
located at the periphery of the Olympic site, the non-sporting features in the core areas 
had not been addressed. Furthermore, the future management method of the Olympic 
Park was also less developed. As indicated in the beginning of this part, considering the 
long-term economic development of Homebush Bay was a crucial part of the OCA’s 
responsibility, but there was insufficient consideration of the future mixed-use and 
management of the Park, both of which would be highly related to the economic 
sustainability of the site.   
 
During the preparation phase, the OCA issued many planning documents, but most of 
them were on the masterplan for Homebush Bay during the Olympic Games and 
announcements of the construction process in the park. Future spatial plans were rarely 
addressed in a concrete way. The illustrative plan attached to the 1995 masterplan 
document was probably the only legacy plan published during the post-bid phase. 
Creation of a mixed-use urban centre and financial returns were considered crucial to 
the “health of cities” in the masterplan, and as discussed in the previous part, the 
partnerships with the private sector were recommended as an implementation method 
(OCA, 1995, p. 30, 71). Nevertheless, the 1995 masterplan lacked any concrete vision, 
and just showed the broad direction of the site, which reflected the visual plan issued at 
the same time.                                                                    
                                                                   
 
Figs. 5-11 and 12 show the two masterplans, one for the Olympics and another for the 
legacy (Figs. 5-11 and 12). The differences between the two plans are identified in two 
areas: the existing business centre in the urban core and warehouse area located on the 
adjacent western site of the Sydney Olympic Park (SOP). These two pictures suggest 
that in both areas, existing areas would be completely erased and changed to the new 
commercial area defined by grid streets. Highly abstract grid-patterned land forms were 
shown as a post-Olympic commercial development opportunity area, and Peter Mould, 
                                                  
96 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008. 
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who served as the Government Architect between 2005 and 2012 and was also involved 
in the SOP masterplan during the preparation phase, pointed out that grid-pattern streets 
would make the post-Olympics development easier. 97  Mould’s suggestion, which 
reflects Sennett’s conception of “grid as neutrality”, proposed to leave a “blank canvas” 
for further development (Sennett, 1990, pp. 46–62).   
 
It seems that the planning strategy of “leaving it open to the future” instead of defining 
an in-depth future vision was also supported by other planning officers. Chris Johnson, 
the predecessor of Mould, argued:  
 
“We didn’t think of extra building to fill the vacant space, extra layers to be 
added. […] It’s very hard to look at what will happen 20 years ahead. It’s a 
matter of leaving an opportunity for development. Legacy consideration was 
there but not by exactly defining what will happen in the future”98 (emphasis 
added). 
 
It is understood that Johnson’s term “extra layers” meant non-sporting use in the urban 
core, and he fundamentally supported the idea of leaving opportunities for the future, 
rather than detailed legacy planning. Timing of legacy planning was further addressed 
by Knight. Yet his view came from more operational concerns about the Olympic 
Games.   
 
“[a] lot of what you do with the legacy you can’t do before the Games. You 
need bigger open spaces in Sydney Olympic Park to cater for 400,000 people 
on the biggest day in the public domain. You’ll never need that again. So you 
can start arranging buildings in that area, commercial buildings that you could 
never have during the Games. It would have been a nightmare if 6,000 
employees of the commonwealth bank were here during the Games. […] So you 
can’t do a lot of things before the Games, and you shouldn’t do things before 
the Games. […] The growth (of the city) is organic.”99  
 
Knight’s practical viewpoint echoes John Bale’s conceptualisation of the sporting 
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landscape as a “topophobia”, or landscape of fear, which requires separation from “a 
daily life” (Bale, 1994, pp. 145–146). Thus, for various reasons, the planning for 
mixed-use development was rarely conducted before the Games, and this eventually led 
to severe problems and the “post-Olympic hangover”, which I will discuss in depth in a 
later part of this thesis. 
 
Against this backdrop, Churches suggested the need for an organisation which focuses 
on legacy aspects of the Olympic Park before the Olympics. In my interview, when I 
asked what was missing before the Games, Churches replied as follows:  
 
“I think the main thing was management. To achieve legacy you need to create 
some sorts of dedicated structure that makes sure that it happens. And we didn’t 
have that. […] I think, on the legacy, it probably can’t be external to the 
country but I think needs to be external to the Organising Committee.”100  
 
As he recognised the difficulty of mobilising Olympic staff for non-Games related 
activities, Churches argued that an independent body should look at the legacy. Yet he 
admitted the difficulty of having such organisation in reality, due to the limited financial 
resources made available by the State Government during the Olympic preparation 
phase. 
 
 
5.2 Implementation of the vision 
 
5.2.1 Involvement of the private sector 
While the spatial vision of Homebush Bay had been shaped by various masterplans, 
construction of the Olympic venues was conducted simultaneously. In the context of the 
Olympic project, the idea of employing the private sector had been considered for a 
long time. The previous Liberal government, for example, invited private companies to 
design, build, operate and maintain the stadium under a lease-hold from the OCA, in 
order to reduce the cost and risk which the State Government would bear (Searle, 2002). 
In general, due to intense inter-state competition in Australia to attract global investment, 
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upgrading infrastructure and developing the state land has been imperative for each 
State Government in Australia. Against this backdrop, the NSW Government frequently 
employed PPPs for major urban development to reduce the state debt (Searle and 
Bounbds, 1999), and Carr’s government followed in this wake. In the 1995 masterplan, 
it clearly addressed the need to “promote private enterprise opportunities” as one of 
twelve critical points (OCA, 1995, p. 5). This was intended as a means of not only 
reducing capital costs, but also of expanding the economic returns to the government. In 
this respect, the meaning of PPPs in the new government was greatly different from the 
predecessor’s understanding. A comment of David Churches exemplifies this well. He 
suggests that:   
 
“…[i]n fact the Conservative government had a very strong view that the 
Games should not have any cost to the tax payer at all, in the English 
expression ‘small is beautiful’, you should do things as minimal as possible. 
The Liberal government also had a view that it should be very much private 
sector led. When the government changed, their view was that the government 
should have a much stronger role, and there should be a much bigger legacy, 
both a built legacy and a social legacy. They still wanted private sector 
involvement, but this did not mean that private sector involvement would 
reduce the cost, but private sector involvement should allow more things to 
occur”101 (emphasis added). 
 
Such transformation, which can be identified as a change from “managerialism” to 
“entrepreneurism” in urban governance (Harvey, 1989), reflected the change in the scale 
of the sporting venues. The government had been considering which venues should be 
built with the funding from private sectors and which ones from states’ tax. Churches 
further explained:  
 
“During the bid period…[t]he government considered that it would attract 
private sector investment in all small venues, but would have to pay for the 
Olympic stadium and what is now called the Super Dome that was the 
Coliseum during the bid, and the village would have to be have re-subsidised. 
In fact what happened was the complete opposite. We found that it was quite 
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easy to get commercial investment in the really big and expensive venues but 
almost impossible to get private sector investment in the small venues.”102 
 
Thus, two main venues, the Olympic stadium and the indoor sports area, the Super 
Dome, were funded with contributions from the private sector, and their capacity was 
increased from the bidding phase. As the former chief planning officer, Dianne Leeson, 
mentions, there had been a debate about the capacity of the Olympic stadium.103 The 
capacity of the stadium increased from 80,000 (bid) to 110,000 seats (post-bid), and it 
became the biggest stadium in Olympic history. In a similar vein, the capacity of the 
Super Dome increased from 15,000 (bid) to 21,000 (post-bid), and it became the biggest 
indoor arena in Australia.104 
 
Constructing two large event facilities in Homebush Bay represented the State’s 
intention of attracting much bigger events which the existing venues could not hold. The 
existing state facilities, the Sydney Cricket Ground and Sydney Football Stadium at 
Moore Park (42,000 seats) and the Exhibition Centre at Darling Harbour (10,000 seats), 
had been the major event venues for the region, but both of them had a limit in terms of 
capacity. The State Government therefore expected that the bigger event facilities in 
Homebush Bay would create opportunities to host bigger regional and international 
events. While enlarging sporting features in Homebush Bay with the involvement of the 
private sector would bring some opportunities, potential risks were also suggested. One 
of the apparent dangers in increasing the capacity of the sporting venues was the 
post-Games use of these facilities. Churches indicated that:  
 
“There were a lot of arguments that the capacity of the stadium should be 
60,000 or 80,000 in the legacy mode, and the final decision was that while we 
wouldn’t fill to 80,000 regularly, we couldn’t host a major international event 
without it being 80,000. So it didn’t matter if we only used the capacity once or 
twice a year.”  
                                                  
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 The stadium was financed by a special funding method which relied on debt financing, a government capital 
injection and the sale of 30,000 GOLD memberships which would allow each member to buy tickets to the Olympic 
and post-Olympic events held in the stadium up to 2031, and importantly, would provide them an equity share in the 
stadium. The Olympic stadium was to cost A$690 million with a government contribution of approximately A$124 
million (SOCOG (2001) Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad, Sydney, 2000., p. 65). Similarly, for 
the right to operate the venue, the Super Dome was built by the Abigroup development company at a cost of A$197 
million (the State Government contributed A$142). 
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It was certain that there were not enough major sporting and cultural events in Sydney 
to fill the 80,000 seats in the stadium, and the planners in charge of the Olympic site, 
such as Churches, firmly envisaged the infrequent utilisation of the stadium after the 
Games. Yet, as Churches suggests, the opportunities which the stadium would bring 
overwhelmed the risks. Searle further pointed out that there would be an ongoing 
competition between the Olympic stadium and the existing state-run stadia in the region, 
as most regular sporting matches would fit more comfortably in the smaller existing 
venues located closer to the city centre (Searle, 2002, pp. 851–855). Thus, the sporting 
facilities in Homebush Bay were enlarged a great risk of forcing the regional 
government to restructure the existing sporting facilities in the region.  
 
5.2.2 Vision of “Green Games”: the gap between the promise and implementation 
In addition to the construction of the Olympic venues, the construction of the Olympic 
village highlighted the discrepancy between what was promised and what was 
implemented. The Olympic village was also conducted through a PPP, between the 
OCA and one of the largest Australian developers, Lend Lease. The story of the village 
offers another example of the uncertainty of employing PPPs, by highlighting the 
considerable gap between the bid proposal and the implementation plan for the Games. 
 
While the bid file said that sustainable materials such as recycled timber would be used 
for construction of competition venues (Sydney Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd, 1993a), this 
speculative vision was compromised during the preparation phase. The SMH often 
criticised the compromise of the “Green Games” concept of the Sydney Olympics, 
labelling them the “Plastic Games” or “PVC Games”.105 Within the limited period of 
the implementation phase, completion becomes more of a priority than speculation, and 
Sydney’s process exemplified this. Implementation of the “Green Games” vision, which 
was based on the environmental guidelines published in 1992, was widely questioned 
during the Games.  
 
Compromise did not simply come from time pressure, but also sometimes from the 
delivery method for the venues, the PPPs. In the early stage of the preparation phase, 
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the NSW Government feared that the private sector input predicted in the bid would not 
materialise (IOC, 1995, p.31). Yet once private sector organisations came on board, it 
became apparent that their priority was greatly different from the bid promise. The cases 
of the Olympic village and the indoor arena, the Super Dome, are good examples. As 
the private sector did not fully agree to proceed with the idea of an eco-village for the 
Olympic village, the State Government had to subsidise unexpected costs, and this 
eventually led it to give up the bid concept (Weirick, 1998, pp. 78–79). 
 
Furthermore, the bid proposed to encourage spectators’ use of public transport to the 
Homebush Bay site. Yet in the case of the Super Dome, private-sector initiated 
construction and the plans for management beyond the Olympic Games led to the 
construction of a car park to attract visitors from a wider area, and this overwhelmed the 
Olympic organisers’ sustainable approach (Searle, 2002, p. 854). Thus, although the 
concept of “Green Games” had been kept as a critical part of the Olympic planning, 
difficulty in anticipating the delivery method and the issue of post-Olympic utilisation 
led to the abandonment of some bid promises.  
 
Technically, the contents of the bid proposal have a legal validity defined in the host 
city’s contract with the IOC, and therefore, the host city fundamentally has to follow 
what it proposed in the bid document. If it wants to change something indicated in the 
bid file, it needs to negotiate with the IOC and related sports federations (IOC, 1997a, p. 
39). Yet, when looking at the activities of the previous host cities, it can be seen that it 
was rare to implement a bid completely as proposed and in most cases there is a 
discrepancy between what a city proposed and what actually materialised. When 
interviewed about this discrepancy, Michael Knight replied as follows:  
 
“When you bid, you’re bidding along with other bidders, saying please give our 
city the Games, give it to us not to them. So you are in a very weak position 
when you bid. After you become a host city, you’re moving to a different 
arrangement of partnership with the IOC, partnership with a national 
committee, and partnership with sports federations in delivering the Games. 
That’s a very different arrangement”106 (emphasis added). 
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As Knight’s comment suggests, from the bid to post-bid phases, there was a 
fundamental power shift between the IOC/other sports federations and the host city, and 
there was a certain alteration of the bid proposal. In this respect, the bid proposal can be 
understood as the beginning of negotiation or compromise process, rather than a fixed 
vision. Furthermore, “place promotion” has been widely identified as a key feature of 
selling a city in a global context (Ward, 1998; Gold and Gold, 2005). But in the context 
of the Olympic bid, I will stress that the host city needs to conduct more than simple 
place promotion – that is, to a certain degree, to attract the IOC’s interest at the time of 
bidding.  
 
 
5.3 Integration of the Olympic vision 
 
Following the discussions of changes in the planned vision of the SOP and the 
implementation process, I will initiate a further discussion on the area beyond the 
boundary of the SOP, asking how the SOP was positioned within the wider urban 
context, which relates to my other research question in this thesis. My concern here is 
the relationship between the SOP and the Sydney region and Auburn local council, in 
which a major part of the SOP is located.  
 
5.3.1 Process of recognising the SOP in the regional strategy 
During the post-bid phase, recognition of the SOP in Sydney’s regional strategy 
changed over time. After Sydney won the bid in September 1993, several spatial 
strategies for the Sydney region were issued in different political contexts (Meyer, 
2005). The first one was “Sydney’s future” by the Liberal government in October 1993. 
This was the discussion paper for the subsequent metropolitan strategies, setting out 
proposals for planning and managing the Greater Metropolitan Region. The crucial 
point of this document was the recognition of the importance of integrating 
ecologically-sensitive planning approaches and the growth of the regional population 
(NSW Depertment of Planning, 1993b). Yet, as it was published just one month after 
Sydney’s victory in the bid, it is understandable that there was little indication of the 
Olympic project in this strategy.   
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The following regional strategy, “Cities for the 21st Century”, issued by the same 
government in 1995, did indicate that the SOP had an important role within the Sydney 
region. Given the specific nature of the Olympic project, for which many human and 
financial resources were to be concentrated in the region, the aim was for this to become 
a showcase of Sydney’s ability to conduct massive yet sustainable urban regeneration, 
and “Cities for the 21st Century” suggested that the SOP would exemplify the 
Ecologically Sustainable Development guideline. It was proposed in the bid as a natural 
planning method to promote Sydney’s “Green Games”, and later it was integrated into 
the regional planning standard. In addition to the Ecologically Sustainable Development 
guideline, the SOP was identified as one of the key areas for the regional open space 
and housing strategy in which mixed residential and commercial development was 
encouraged. In particular, it is worth noting that the access route between the airport and 
the SOP was targeted as an area in which to improve visual quality in the region (NSW 
Department of Planning, 1995, pp. 71–80).   
 
Nevertheless, Homebush Bay was not recognised as a city centre in the region, and 
instead was identified as an area supporting Parramatta, the existing second-largest city 
centre in the region. “Cities for the 21st Century”, for example, suggests that various 
facilities such as the airport and university in Parramatta would have opportunities to 
encourage economic activity, “taking advantage of proximity to the Olympic site” 
(NSW Department of Planning, 1995, p. 92). Furthermore, the strategy encouraged a 
“compact city model” which needed a strategic land-use and transport combination, but 
the SOP was not developed to reflect this model. 
 
The subsequent regional spatial strategy published by a different government recognised 
the SOP as one of the strategic emphases for the Sydney region for the first time. 
Cashman pointed out that David Richmond, the director general of the OCA, and his 
organisation contributed to a change of attitude towards the SOP in the State 
Government. According to Richmond, the “conventional view” of a centre regards it as 
a “mixed-use” urban area rather than a sports-oriented precinct, and the close proximity 
to the existing centre, Parramatta, had prevented the SOP from becoming another 
strategic centre (Cashman, 2011, p. 69). Richmond's view suggests that while the 
previous regional strategy reflected the understanding that the SOP’s close proximity 
was positive for the existing city centre's development, the Olympic planners, in 
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contrast, considered that this would be negative for the SOP in the regional context. 
 
Given the close relationship between Homebush Bay and Parramatta, designation of the 
SOP as a new strategic centre could also be a potential risk to the latter. Searle argues 
that it could reduce further development opportunities in Parramatta, and indeed its 
growth did not proceed as previously planned (Searle, 2002, p. 857). Searle gave the 
example of the city’s severe internal competition between the new sporting facilities in 
the SOP and the existing state-owned ones. Such internal competition could occur at 
various levels. It is understand that contextualising the new SOP in the Sydney region 
was highly important for its long-term viability; otherwise it would have been isolated 
physically, economically, and socially. Hosting the Olympics and creating the SOP at 
Homebush Bay was initially pitched as one of the methods of balancing the economic 
inequality between east and west in the Sydney region, but in the process of realisation, 
it would paradoxically cause severe competition between old and new urban centres in 
the region.  
 
5.3.2 Divorce from the local council  
While the SOP had gradually come to be recognised as one of the key centres in the 
regional context, there was a considerable gap between the SOP and the adjacent local 
council, Auburn, regarding the vision for the SOP. Owen argues that the Olympic 
development in Sydney was fundamentally planed from a regional and national 
viewpoint, and local government was less involved in the process. There was an 
overwhelming move towards entrepreneurialism in state urban politics, as characterised 
by the centralisation of power, privatisation, and relaxation of the planning process, 
which bypassed the normal planning system (Owen, 2002). These characteristics of the 
Olympic planning certainly caused various problems in sharing the long-term vision for 
the SOP between Auburn Council and the NSW Government and its specific Olympic 
organisation, the OCA.  
 
Auburn Council, located in the western part of the Sydney region, was known for its 
low socio-economic profile, characterised as an industrial council, and called a great 
“Australian back-yard”. There is no doubt that the task of conducting the massive urban 
regeneration of Homebush Bay and creating the SOP was far beyond Auburn’s capacity. 
The Council, in its document on the financial impact on the Games, clearly stated that 
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“development is having and will have impacts on Auburn that are beyond the capacity 
of Council to manage” (Auburn Council, 1998, p. 3). Similarly, from the Olympics’ 
organisational side, David Churches indicated that the Olympics were truly outside the 
capability of Auburn.107 Yet, aside from the question of the local council’s capability, 
there was a lack of relevant communication or information sharing between the local 
and regional governments. The statutory and specific approval system for the Olympic 
project certainly caused a lack of interaction between them. Searle and Bounds pointed 
out that State Environment Planning Policy No. 38, giving the State Government’s 
Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning sole authority to approve Olympic projects, 
became a trigger to reduce the local government’s involvement in the developments for 
the Games (Searle and Bounbds, 1999, p. 171). 
 
Thus, lack of openness and accountability became serious problems in the fast-track 
planning process utilised for the Olympic Games, and Auburn Council complained a 
great deal that little information was provided (Dunn, 1999, pp. 24–27). The Council 
even claimed that “the OCA had rejected Council’s early approaches, despite the 
emergence of the true significance of the issue.” The question of openness to the 
Council can be further demonstrated by the fact that it had been misunderstood that 
Auburn would need to take responsibility for Olympic facilities despite the OCA’s great 
effort in finding private companies which would take care of them (Auburn Council, 
1998). 
 
In contrast with Auburn Council’s critiques, some of the Olympic organisers had a 
different view. David Churches, for example, questioned local councils' attitudes 
towards the Olympic project:  
 
“[w]e had a panel from all of the local government areas that were affected by 
the Olympic Games, but they just treated (the Olympic site) like all the other 
areas. So there was no detailed involvement at all.”108 
 
This comment clearly shows the different attitudes between the Olympic organisation 
whose responsibility was only the Olympic Games and the local councils to which the 
                                                  
107 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009. 
108 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009. 
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Games’ development was one of their many concerns. Nevertheless, lack of 
communication was evident in the Olympic planning during the post-bid period, and the 
political climate caused a discrepancy in the spatial vision for the SOP, in particular the 
long-term usability of venues and the area.  
 
One of the most significant issues was usability of venues in the SOP. The State 
Government and the OCA had envisioned that the sporting opportunities created by the 
state of the art facilities in the SOP would make Homebush Bay a great event precinct 
for the region, attracting national and international visitors. However, Auburn's view 
was that they should be accessible to the local community. Thus, the local and regional 
governments had different intentions for the sporting facilities in the SOP. As previously 
discussed, some of the venues were constructed and operated with commercial priorities 
in mind, and this made the entry fee to the venues relatively high for the local 
community. Lenskyj sharply criticised the fact that the post-Olympic sporting facilities 
would be only for elite sports, and questioned accessibility for local communities with a 
low socio-economic profile (Lenskyj, 2002, p. 129; also (Owen, 2002, p. 31). 
Furthermore, the resulting severe competition between existing sports facilities, such as 
the Auburn/Lidcombe Swimming Centre, and new ones in the SOP was fully recognised 
by the Council (Auburn Council, 1999).  
 
In addition to the post-Olympic usability of the sporting area in the SOP, there were 
various conflicts regarding usability of the adjacent area. The area between the M4 
Western Motorway and the SOP, which was under private ownership, was a focus of 
this clash between local and regional authorities. As it is located next to a motorway 
which is recognised as Sydney’s spine connecting the east and west of the region, it had 
been a convenient location for logistics, and warehouses had occupied this area. The 
land-use map of Auburn Council therefore designated it as a part of a larger industrial 
area in Auburn Council (Fig. 5-13).  
 
Yet, for the Olympic planners, this area was seen differently. It was a crucial area, being 
between the SOP and the motorway. If this area became a part of the SOP, it would 
create a much wider frontage to the main transport corridor in the region. There was 
indeed an effort by the Olympic planners to ask the State Government to purchase this 
land, although it was eventually rejected, as the government believed that the SOP had 
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already acquired a vast and sufficient area for development.109 Nevertheless, the legacy 
masterplan issued in 1995 suggested that this industrial area would become a part of the 
SOP after the Games, and turned it into a large housing area, although the masterplan 
did not show any details of this area. The different view of the long-term land use of this 
area represents the Olympic planners’ intentions for the SOP’s possible application to 
the neighbourhood. Chris Johnson, the NSW Government architect at the time, pointed 
out:  
 
“Put the Olympic site here and that will create a catalytic effect to the 
surrounding area, rather than the reverse happening”110 (emphasis added).  
 
According to Johnson, the changes would happen outside the boundaries of the SOP, 
rather than the SOP integrating the character of the existing surroundings, and the idea 
of turning the existing industrial area into a large housing area was based on this 
catalytic concept.  
 
In a similar vein, the Olympic village site, which was oddly surrounded by an industrial 
area and the regional prison, was also seen differently by Auburn and Olympic 
authorities. The local council saw that the village was heavily based on commercial 
requirements rather than the needs and requirements of the Council (Auburn Council, 
1998, p. 13). Johnson argues that the fact that the village was sold at double the price of 
other areas contributed to the rise of property values in the area.111 Thus, both areas 
discussed above clearly show the conflict between local and regional authorities 
regarding the long-term strategy for the areas in and around the SOP. One can argue that 
this reflects the managerial view of the local government and the entrepreneurial view 
of the regional government. In this respect, when staging the Olympics, local and 
regional governments respond differently, rather than simply seeing all levels of 
governance transfer from a managerial to an entrepreneurial approach.  
 
 
 
                                                  
109 Interview with David Churches on 29 November 2008. 
110 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009. 
111 Ibid. 
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Evolution of governance and spatial strategy  
The first part of this chapter examined the changes in governance of the Olympic 
planning and the associated modification of the spatial vision of the Olympic site 
between 1993 and 2000. Sydney fundamentally had three different planning periods in 
the post-bid phase, according to the different planning approaches, and they were 
divided by two major factors: changes of governance and spatial vision. The first factor 
involved the changes in the regional government in 1995 and the experience of the 
Atlanta Games in 1996. What we have seen in terms of the changes in planning 
structure of the Olympics was the transformation from a fragmented to a more 
concentrated planning system, and the changes of regional government triggered this. In 
addition to this, the failure of the Atlanta Games put more pressure on the Olympic 
organisers in Sydney, and this also led to further amendments. Various authors have also 
pointed out that concentration of planning power for the mega-event was necessary to 
finish all required preparation work within the designated timeframe (for example, Hall, 
1992, pp. 119–135)), but scant literature has touched on its spatial consequences. In the 
case of Sydney, it led to the rationalisation of the spatial vision by abandoning 
speculation in the bid proposal or previous government attempts, and application of the 
grid system also represented the prioritisation of risk control rather than opportunity, 
which may have decreased the future potential for the mixed-use urban precinct. 
Furthermore, as a lesson from Atlanta, the government involvement increased. The 
master planners focused more on the spatial needs for the Games, and the vision of the 
SOP became based more on the Games time than on legacy concerns. I will further 
argue that another force behind this approach was Sydney’s concern about the risk that 
the city might expose the planning failure to the world, and this recalls Roche’s concept 
of the “Olympic media city” (Roche, 2000, pp. 147–150).  
 
Legacy planning 
While Olympic planners had focused on the spatial setting for the Games, many 
academics and media outlets criticised the lack of legacy planning for Homebush Bay. 
Yet my findings in this chapter are that there were different perceptions regarding the 
degree to which Sydney prepared for life beyond the Games. Sydney's planners had 
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many thoughts about the post-Olympic usability of the sports facilities created in 
Homebush Bay, but what Sydney really did not consider beyond the Games were the 
non-sporting elements in Homebush Bay, and indeed the vision of the mixed-use urban 
precinct. Although the State Government and its sub-organisations had created the 
vision of a mixed-use Homebush Bay long before the bid decision in 1993, this was 
totally missing during the preparation phase. It was envisaged that this would create a 
serious gap between the Olympic and post-Olympic development, and leave the 
post-Olympic Park less viable as an urban precinct. Yet it is also important to listen to 
some planners in Sydney suggesting a more open approach in which the planning would 
leave vacant spaces for post-Olympic development. The argument that in-depth legacy 
planning should be done after the Games, due to the unpredicted changes that would 
happen in the Olympic-related area, and the difficulty of predicting the regional 
economic conditions beyond the Games, seems to have a certain persuasiveness. It is 
also certain that mixing Olympic events and other everyday life within the same site 
will cause many problems. I will suggest that the discussion of this should be further 
developed, using the case of London’s legacy planning.  
 
Implementation of the vision 
During the period of preparation for the 2000 Games, Sydney constructed various 
facilities, and as a core strategy of the delivery method, I have discussed the application 
of PPPs to Olympic projects. The benefits of PPP in reducing the public expenditure on 
the mega-project and risk of the private sector’s limited involvement with great concern 
about its own benefit have been well discussed (for example, Flyvbjerg, 2003). Yet, I 
will stress that PPPs applied to the construction for the Olympic stadium and the indoor 
arena represented the regional government’s entrepreneurial approach to urban 
governance, in which the government tried to organise more a commercial event with 
larger expenditure. Yet this inevitably led to significant conflict with existing sporting 
venues in the region, and in this respect, Sydney’s entrepreneurial approach was built on 
the sacrifice of existing sporting structures. In other words, PPPs would accelerate 
restructuring of the existing urban structures for economic prosperity. Meanwhile, PPPs 
employed in the construction of the Olympic village exemplified the limit of the private 
sector’s involvement in public projects. The problem highlighted here is the discrepancy 
between the public and private sectors’ interests in the PPPs. It became apparent that 
while the public sector aimed to achieve the initial bid promise with less public money, 
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the private sector’s interests related more to financial returns with less investment. Thus, 
the involvement of the private sector in the Olympic village had a great impact on the 
realisation of the bid promise, and the uncertainty of the PPPs was further spurred by 
the fast-tracking planning process towards the absolute deadline of the construction.  
 
Urban integration 
Regarding the integration of Homebush Bay with its wider surroundings, there were 
different political intentions on different scales. The consideration of Homebush Bay in 
the regional context was not so active during the preparation phase, although the initial 
idea of putting the major Olympic site of the 2000 Games in Homebush Bay stemmed 
from the State Government’s aspiration of balancing economic inequality between east 
and west in the region. Yet, at the end of the preparation phase, the importance of 
Homebush Bay in the region had gradually become recognised. This, however, led to 
some conflicts with existing regional centres, in particular the adjacent Parramatta. This 
reminds one of how the creation of a new urban centre for further development of the 
city might lead to the decline of other parts of the region; therefore, the region clearly 
needed a more coordinated spatial strategy, but one was not fully developed during the 
preparation phase.  
 
On the neighbourhood scale, there was a fundamental difference between the Olympic 
authority and local government in understanding how the SOP would be related to the 
surroundings. While the OCA took a “proactive” approach by arguing that the creation 
of the SOP would catalyse changes to the neighbourhood, the Auburn Council expected 
a more “reactive” approach to the SOP by suggesting that some essences of the 
neighbourhood should be integrated into the SOP. Despite these different standpoints, 
this chapter unveiled that there was not a solid mechanism of integrating 
communication between the two authorities. The discrepancy between the Olympic and 
local authorities also became apparent in regard to the land use of the site adjacent to the 
SOP, reflecting the different political aspirations for the Olympics. Various authors 
suggest that, in the process of planning the Olympic site, local interests tend to be 
ignored, and the priorities for urban development are set by the Olympic authorities (for 
example, Hiller, 2003). This argument was fully applicable in the case of Sydney, and 
leaves another question regarding whether this tendency has carried on even after the 
Olympic Games.  
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Chapter 6: London  
 
 
 
6.1 Governance of the Olympic legacy and its reflection of the spatial 
vision  
 
6.1.1 Intended transition: ODA (2005–2008)  
As soon as London won the right to stage the 2012 Olympic Games in Singapore in July 
2005, the delivery structure was set up as a partnership of various stakeholders. 
Similarly to Sydney’s Olympic governance after 1995, when the State's Government 
changed, there were fundamentally two bodies involved in the governance of the 
London Games in London’s initial post-bid phase. Yet, unlike the case of Sydney, this 
delivery structure had already been proposed in the bid document, and Alison Nimmo, 
director of design and regeneration at the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), stated 
that “we weren’t starting from scratch, because we had a clear idea of what the overall 
delivery structure would be. We had done a lot of work in the bid phase” (ODA, 2007a, 
p. 15).  
 
While the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) had 
responsibility for promotion and operation of the Olympic Games, the ODA was created 
as a public body delivering (1) permanent venues and other facilities in the London 
Olympic Park (LOP, eventually named the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park); (2) other 
Games facilities outside the LOP; and (3) transport infrastructure and services to 
support the Games. In short, it is understood that the ODA built the set and LOCOG put 
on the show, and the Olympic Board oversaw the entire London Games and took 
responsibility for coordinating the work of LOCOG and the ODA, resolving and 
determining issues raised by members, and, importantly, ensuring a sustainable legacy 
following the Games (ODA, 2007a, pp. 10–14) (Fig. 6-1).112 
 
 
                                                  
112 The Olympic Board comprises the Olympics Minister (the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport) 
representing the government’s interests, the Mayor of London (representing the GLA) and the Chairs of LOCOG and 
the BOA. ODA (2007a) Annual Report and Accounts, 2006–2007., p. 14). 
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Although empowerment of the ODA to deliver the Olympic infrastructure on time was 
addressed in the bid, several issues were altered or clarified further, after various 
debates in parliament. Firstly, the planning area of the ODA became larger than the 
LDA’s area for the 2004 planning application (Figs. 6-2 and 3). One of the most 
significant differences between the two was inclusion of Stratford City. While the earlier 
application did not include this vast area, it was a part of the ODA’s control. Yet, as 
unveiled in a later part of this chapter, it became a matter of conflict between the ODA 
and the private sectors responsible for the development of Stratford City.  
  
Secondly, prior to the bid, a planning application was granted by the local boroughs, but 
the bid document stated that the ODA would have special power to grant in-depth 
planning permission for the LOP. By doing so, the ODA would develop and approve the 
Park, but this dual function of the ODA was criticised as it was thought that it would 
lead to a political conflict between the local boroughs and the ODA and eventually local 
interests would be ignored, to prioritise delivery of the Olympic project (House of 
Commons, 2005, pp. 25–26). Thus, the Planning Decision Team, whose office was 
located in a different place to the rest of the ODA, was formulated within the ODA to 
ensure local boroughs' and others’ interests would be integrated (ODA, 2011, p. 3).  
 
Thirdly, the bid file suggested that the ODA would have a special power to purchase 
land, compulsorily if necessary (London 2012 Bidding Committee, 2004, p. 33), but 
after the bid, the responsibility of securing the land for the LOP went to the LDA. Thus, 
the LDA bought the land, and the ODA simply borrowed it from the LDA for the 
Olympic Games. It is certain that the ODA’s role was decreased after the bid, but this 
land ownership system left the LDA with a huge burden, and had a great impact on the 
legacy planning of the LOP, which I will discuss later in this chapter.  
 
To clarify the above issues, “the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006” 
clearly set out that delivering the best vision possible to meet Games and legacy 
requirements within the budgeted cost and time available was a crucial role of the ODA 
(ODA, 2007f, pp. 1–2). Given this condition, much emphasis had been placed on the 
simultaneous process of Olympic and legacy planning. The ODA, for example, 
suggested that, for the first time ever, Olympic and Paralympic operations and 
post-Games use were fully integrated at the outset of the planning process for the 
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Games (ODA, 2007a, p. 16), and its Chief Executive, David Higgins, also stated that 
“the ODA’s design vision starts from Legacy”.113 Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
spontaneous planning for the Olympics and legacy was already emphasised before the 
bid decision in 2005, and in this respect, the Olympic organisers rephrased the initial 
arguments after the bid. Since there was fundamental continuity between the pre-bid 
and post-bid phases regarding the planning structure and spatial concept, the initial 
masterplan for the LOP could be understood as developing from its predecessor. 
The ODA submitted the initial important planning application for the masterplan of the 
LOP, “Olympic, Paralympic & Legacy Transformation Planning Applications”, in 
February 2007. The 2007 masterplan for the LOP was considered to be the biggest 
planning application in the UK, covering large areas of the Lower Lea Valley, and 
spanning many years of development. Although the planning area of the ODA became 
larger than the area within the spatial boundaries of LDA’s previous planning 
application, the area designated for this planning application became much smaller than 
the ODA’s area of authority. Stratford City was excluded from the planning area, as it 
was independently developed by a private consortium, and critically the Olympic 
village, whose construction and post-Olympic management would be conducted by the 
private sector, was also excluded from this Olympic site-wide planning application.  
 
The new 2007 masterplan provided an in-depth explanation of the spatial settings for 
the period of the Olympic and Paralympic Games and the vision for how they would be 
transformed to create a “platform for legacy communities development” (ODA, 2007c, 
p.7) (Figs. 6-4 and 5). Thus, the concept of physical changeability inherited from the 
LDA’s bid masterplan issued in 2004 was further elaborated by explicitly defining 
permanent or temporary venues and infrastructure, and clarifying between front of 
house (publicly accessible areas) and back of house (logistical areas connected by the 
loop road around the LOP) in each of the competition facilities. This was crucial to 
identify the changeability of the LOP in this masterplan. 
 
The concept of physical changeability was further applied to the design principles for 
the infrastructure and public domains in the Park. An in-depth explanation of the 
changeability of these elements across the LOP was provided in a supplementary 
document for the planning application, “Olympic Park, Urban Design and Landscape 
                                                  
113 Comment on the London Olympics Symposium organised by the Evening Standard in June 2007.  
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Framework” (ODA, 2007g). The emphasis on physical changeability in the Park 
reflected the ODA’s primary objective – provision of “the strategic backbone for future 
development” – and this was further embraced by the concept of a “robust but flexible” 
planning framework encouraged by Commission for Architecture and the Built 
Environment (CABE), which had provided design advice to the ODA and its masterplan 
team regarding the development of the LOP (Fig. 6-6). The idea of the “robust but 
flexible” planning framework was an important spatial concept applied in the initial 
phase of the Olympic and legacy masterplan, as it inevitably involved the uncertain 
future of the Olympic site. It is considered that the initial responsibility of the ODA was 
to provide the “robust” part, which would be left as permanent legacy of the Olympic 
site. But Lucy Carmichael, the planning adviser of CABE, suggested that during the 
course of the Olympic planning, the distinction between the robust and flexible became 
blurred, as what was once considered a permanent structure became a temporary one, 
and vice versa.114 Thus, the initial spatial planning by the ODA was greatly influenced 
by the previous LDA plan, but needed to accommodate various changes happened after 
the bid.   
 
6.1.2 Limits of the ODA  
Although the ODA had been greatly involved in shaping the vision of the Olympic 
legacy, the authority had certain limits. As the land of the LOP would be transferred to 
the LDA, the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority and others after the Games, it was 
imperative to collaborate with these future land owners to integrate the legacy vision 
into the Olympic vision. Yet the ODA’s primary responsibility was the preparation of 
the spatial setting for the Games with the envisaged future demands, not co-ordination 
of the diverse aspirations of different stakeholders. Thus, before the LDA commenced 
its in-depth legacy masterplan in the beginning of 2008, the ODA conducted various 
legacy masterplan studies in order to create the Olympic masterplan. This was called 
“the strategic backbone for future development” (ODA, 2008b, p.12), which was drawn 
based on the vaguely recognised future visions.115 Indeed, the ODA categorised its 
scope into four phases: site preparation, Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, and 
legacy transformation. These phases were separated in order to identify the differences 
                                                  
114 Interview with Lucy Carmichael (CABE) on 7 February 2008. 
115 Although the ODA commissioned the masterplan design team to conduct in-depth studies of various areas in the 
Olympic Park following the Games, they were mainly internal studies within the ODA, and have never been 
published in a consolidated form.  
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between each phase, the 2007 masterplan, and what the ODA had focused on within its 
planning power up to the transformation of the LOP, rather than to provide in-depth 
spatial settings after the Games. 
 
While the 2007 masterplan extensively addressed the spatial changeability to 
accommodate the different Olympic and post-Olympic demands for the Olympic site, as 
suggested earlier in this chapter, the ODA’s planning role is limited by its ambiguous 
definition of the future usability of the site. Along with the official masterplan, the ODA 
conducted various legacy studies, in which it aimed to contextualise the Olympic and 
legacy transformation masterplan. Yet this involved the difficulty in mediating various 
stakeholders’ aspirations, and the development of the Olympic stadium area clearly 
represented the uncertainty of the legacy masterplan under the ODA’s lead.  
 
Although it was never made public, the Olympic legacy masterplan team, led by EDAW 
(now AECOM) and Allies and Morrison Architects, was commissioned by the ODA to 
study the how the post-Olympic stadium would be transformed and new urban tissue 
would be created over the next 30 years. The EDAW consortium took the Olympic 
stadium as a catalyst for further transformation of the surroundings, rather than an icon 
of the London Games’ memory. They looked at some of the historical stadia in Europe 
to analyse the relationships with their surroundings. In addition to this, they referred to 
some enclosed public plazas, such as the one in Lucca in Italy, which had been 
embedded in the urban fabric. An urban plaza merged into the city structure would be 
their final goal, and it seems to me that the masterplan team considered the most crucial 
role of the stadium to be its catalysing effect on the transformation towards an urban 
plaza, without a specific function. This process started with the transformation from an 
80,000 seat stadium used for the Games to a 25,000 seat athletic stadium with a sports 
academy. The team also included some residential blocks in this phase, which would 
become the “DNA” for further residential development around and the stadium. 
According to the consortium’s scenario, the stadium would eventually be altered to form 
an urban plaza, and the sporting elements would disappear (Fig. 6-7).  
 
Not many past Olympic host cities envisioned the long-term future of the Olympic 
stadium in such a way, and in this respect, one can argue that London took a highly 
advanced planning approach. Yet this was not fully welcomed by other stakeholders, in 
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particular by the sporting alliance. Rod Sheard, a principal architect of the London 
Olympic stadium, suggests that there were “different schools of thought on the legacy”. 
When I asked him how he incorporated the legacy development around the stadium into 
the initial design, he replied as follows: 
 
“Well, that is a political question. […] There are two schools of thought about 
legacy, when it comes to the London stadium. One school of thought 
represented by Seb Coe says that we promised the IOC that this is going give 
London a good sporting legacy. And the critical part of that is a 25,000 seats 
athletic stadium. And therefore it’s our opportunity to make that 25,000 seat 
legacy stadium as useful as we can make it for London. And therefore it should 
be a centre of excellence. […] So this side, if you follow the philosophy, a 
legacy of this side is the 25,000 seat bowl surrounded by busy stuff but all 
sports related, using the Park around the stadium for training.”  
 
“Another school of thought says that this is an important part of London, even 
neglected for years. It is a really important urban quarter, and an opportunity 
for London to grow a whole new suburb or whole new environment. So it 
should be a busy urban centre. And the philosophy probably is represented by 
Richard Rodgers, because he is a champion of busy urban quarters. And 
therefore the sports nature of it should be compressed as much as possible. […] 
What we want to do is bring in much residential, commercial retail, and really 
makes this a viable and exciting place. The park is still there up to the river, but 
all around it is great spaces, great living accommodation. Yes, we can have a 
little bit of sports, but it should not dominate.”116 
 
Thus there were two different views, a sporting point of view and an urban point of 
view, represented by different powerful people in Olympic politics, with different ideas 
of how to utilise the area around the legacy stadium. Sheard goes on:  
 
“I suppose that there are two schools of thought. […] We did a little bit of 
legacy work with Allies and Morrison six month ago. They were really 
representing one side, and we represented a sporting side. And the matter was 
                                                  
116 Interview with Rod Sheard on 30 May 2008. 
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trying to bring them together. I think that it is still early days to know […] the 
set up the LDA will take over the legacy work […] where will it go? I really 
don’t know. But in the perfect world, you can mix those two together, and end 
up with a bit of both, but not compromise one.[…] You can achieve both in the 
perfect world.”117 
 
Sheard acknowledged that the views of the master planner, Allies and Morrison, and the 
stadium architect were based on different “schools of thought” at the time of the 
interview, but stated that these different visions could theoretically be merged. This 
clearly shows that different stakeholders expressed different visions, and this was 
difficulty in creating a solid legacy masterplan was a limitation of the ODA’s 
speculative legacy planning. 
 
6.1.3 Unbalanced socio-economic objectives: LDA (2008–2009) 
It the wake of the ODA’s speculative planning for the post-Olympic site, the LDA was 
tasked with preparing the in-depth Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) based on a 
solid feasibility study. The LDA initially created the post-Olympic masterplan before 
the bid, but its further commitment to the Olympic legacy vision began with the 
appointment of the design team in January 2008 to develop the LMF. The LMF team 
was made up of the previous masterplan design team appointed by the ODA and the 
newly appointed Dutch architectural and urban design/planning office, KCAP.118 In this 
respect, the LDA expected certain knowledge transfer from the previous master planners, 
while it expected new ideas from KCAP. The LDA’s approach to the vision had two 
folds.  
 
Firstly, the LDA’s approach became more reactive and policy-based, compared to the 
ODA. While the ODA’s legacy vision was based on speculation, the LDA intended to 
create an in-depth long-term spatial strategy which would address the key physical, 
economic, social and environmental drivers of change of the future LLV (ODA, 2007b), 
and in order to identify the key drivers, the LDA extensively addressed the 
synchronisation with existing planning policy applicable to the regeneration of the LLV. 
The spatial response to the existing wider development policies can be understood as a 
                                                  
117 Ibid. 
118 KCAP Architects & Planners is a Dutch office for architecture, urban design and urban planning, founded by 
Kees Christiaanse in 1989. 
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strong influence of the previous 2004 masterplan issued by the same authority before 
the bid. The strong argument of the LDA for the refinement of the LMF was to achieve 
both social and economic sustainability, which was backed by two national and regional 
planning policies (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). In broader terms, the 
national planning policy, “Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering Sustainable 
Development”, which was fundamentally built on the “three legs” of the sustainability 
concept – social, economic and environmental sustainability – became the crucial 
guiding principles for the LMF (ODA, 2007b, p. 14), and the term “sustainable legacy 
communities” was utilised to underpin the LMF. Although “sustainable legacy 
communities” was vaguely defined, balancing the social and economic development 
through the spatial planning was greatly emphasised in the LMF. In addition to this, as a 
response to the regional socio-economic development policy, the Mayor’s strategic 
planning guidance, “Lower Lea Valley (LLV), Opportunity Area Planning Framework”, 
became the important policy reference (Mayor of London, 2007a). As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the origin of the Olympic bid was greatly connected with the Mayor’s (Ken 
Livingstone’s) socio-economic regenerative aspirations for the LLV, which had sought 
the provision of a variety of housing and job opportunities along with economic 
development to balance uneven economic prosperity between East and West London. 
As the LLV Opportunity Area Planning Framework was set up as a concrete planning 
framework for improving the socio-economic conditions in the wider LLV with the 
qualitative objectives of new homes and jobs and spatial distribution, this became a 
basic reference to conceptualise the Olympic site as a “place where people would live 
and work” (ODA, 2007b, p. 22). The LMF’s approach however was not to enhance this 
mixed-use vision within the site, but rather to embed it within the adjacent urban fabric. 
The LMF therefore designated six areas within the LOP, and proposed that each area 
have different land-use proportions and combinations (LDA, 2009b). This distributive 
approach had also been proposed in the previous bid masterplan by the LDA, and the 
LMF followed a similar path with in-depth analysis of possible land-use mix scenarios 
(Figs. 6-8 and 9). 
 
While the LDA rhetorically addressed the socio-economic sustainability of the 
post-Olympic site, it became apparent that the LDA’s great concern about paying off the 
debt accumulated by buying the land for the LOP was more prioritised. As indicated 
earlier, it was the LDA’s responsibility to assemble the necessary land for creation of the 
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Olympic Park by handling the Compulsory Purchase Order for the designated area, and 
redeeming the initial investment for purchasing the land through the sales and lease of 
the LDA’s land was crucial. However, such deficiency was initially suggested in the bid 
preparation phase, when ARUP conducted a feasibility study of the Olympic-led 
regeneration. ARUP suggested a significant deficit from the construction of the Olympic 
Park in the LLV, but optimistically pointed out that indirect economic benefits 
associated with this would cover the deficit. Yet the LDA sought more direct financial 
returns to compensate for the initial investment, and therefore the scale of the new 
development in the post-Olympic site was crucial for the authority.  
 
Against this backdrop, prior to finalising spatial vision of the post-Olympic Park, the 
LDA and the appointed LMF design team conducted an architectural massing study to 
identify the scale of the new development and its spatial consequences in the area. Its 
initial document, “The Legacy Masterplan Framework, Ambitions and Limitations”, 
preliminarily showed five spatial options of the post-LOP, whose differences can be 
seen in the layout of the building density along with its relation to the open space and 
the legacy facilities within the site (LMF Design Team, 2008) (Fig. 6-10).  
 
The schemes varied from a park surrounded by high-rise buildings to a considerably 
low-rise model, and the provision of development areas and social infrastructure such as 
open spaces and community facilities differed between these options. There was no 
doubt that the selection of a preferred option became a crucial issue not only for the 
LDA but also for wider stakeholders, and it was the Olympic Park Regeneration 
Steering Group whose voice eventually had the greatest influence in designating the 
direction of the LMF scheme. The Steering Group consisted of the Mayor of London, 
the Minister for the Olympics and various leaders from central government and the local 
boroughs who had been affected by the Olympic development. While the Steering 
Group intended to maintain “ambitions” in the LMF, it encouraged more integration 
with local communities and private companies, to secure both the social and economic 
viability of the LOP (Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, 2008).  
 
After authorisation of the preferred option (so-called Output-C) by the Steering Group 
(Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, 2009a), the LDA published the LMF 
document for the purpose of public consultation in February 2009. The published 
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version of the LMF’s vision of the post-Olympic site addressed the Steering Group’s 
concern of balance between the social and economic demands of the post-LOP area, 
which also echoed the national and regional regenerative aspirations.119 Yet it also 
greatly reflected the LDA’s great concern about paying off the debt accumulated by 
intensifying the development within the LOP, in particular the housing development, to 
maximise the revenue from the sales of land (Fig. 6-11).  
 
This high-density model was critiqued by different levels of authority. The boroughs 
expressed some anxiety to the government that this could limit the quality of the space 
and could lead to “unacceptable densities of housing development and inappropriate 
forms of economic activity, undermining the ability to create sustainable communities”, 
although the host boroughs’ leaders agreed to make the post-Olympic vision “ambitious” 
while balancing social and economic sustainability. This high-density urban model 
backed by the LDA’s entrepreneurial approach was further criticised by the central 
government, arguing that the provision of “sustainable communities” should be the top 
priority for the site, and encouraging the LDA to respect this, even though there were 
pressures to extract maximum value from sales of land and a property increase (CMSC, 
2008, p. 42). Thus, the LMF’s primary objective was to create the spatial strategy to 
satisfy the social and economic demands of the LLV, which were defined by other wider 
spatial strategies, but it was necessary to integrate the LDA’s financial obligation to 
compensate for the initial investment of land purchased for the creation of the Olympic 
Park.  
 
6.1.4 Change of the legacy governance: OPLC (2009–2012)  
While there was doubt about the LDA’s high-density model proposed by the LMF, the 
global economic downturn hit London and its property market in late 2008. Along with 
the recession, discovery of the shortfall in the LDA’s Olympic funding strategy, with a 
tremendous gap between the expenses for purchasing the land and possible income 
gained by selling the land in the post-LOP area, became a crucial trigger for further 
modification of the governance of the post-Olympic site in the LLV. Boris Johnson, the 
newly-elected Mayor of London in May 2008, played a crucial role in examining the 
ongoing Olympic legacy planning by the LDA, and addressed the need for a new 
                                                  
119 The LDA published a separate document focused on the socio-economic strategies. LDA (2009a) LMF 
Socio-Economic Strategy, London. 
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governing body responsible for the development of the post-LOP site.120 The Olympic 
Park Legacy Company (OPLC) was established as a joint venture by the Mayor of 
London and the central government in May 2009. The OPLC took over the ownership 
of the LOP and venues inherited by the site, having responsibility for developing the 
Park for the longer term. The majority of OPLC staff were transferred from the LDA, in 
order to avoid the loss of knowledge. In establishing the OPLC, there was a negotiation 
on the land debt between the Mayor of London and the central government which lasted 
for many months, and eventually it was agreed that the OPLC would be free from the 
land debt (GLA, 2010a, p. 20). This was a crucial point for the OPLC in defining the 
development strategy for the post-Olympic site. Ricky Burdett, the Chief Adviser for 
the ODA and the OPLC, further pointed out the differences between the LMF conducted 
by the LDA and the new legacy planning strategy of the OPLC as follows:  
 
“The biggest difference between the LDA and OPLC was [...] in the LDA’s 
scheme which had many options with the KCAP and others, their priority was 
only one[…] to maximise the amount of floor volumes in order to increase land 
value. So they actually acted like hyper capitalists.[…]When the OPLC came 
along, they did not have such a view. The OPLC’s view was how we would 
generate a piece of the city. An important shift happened, because the 
government decided to write off the debt of the land. So the OPLC did not start 
from minus one billion. […]that’s quite important…as achieving a certain 
number of jobs and homes puts a lot of pressure on the site.[…]That’s a big 
difference in the aspirational objectives. […] The OPLC feels that if it breaks 
even, it is a success.”121  
 
The OPLC’s independence from the land debt not only changed its long-term vision for 
the Olympic site, but also brought more business opportunities for the organisation. 
Baroness Ford, the Chair of the OPLC, had a different understanding of the importance 
of not having debt, considering that: 
 
“success would be dependent on the OPLC’s ability to attract investment and 
                                                  
120 After the mayoral election, Johnson appointed David Ross, the Deputy Chairman of Carphone Warehouse, as his 
adviser for the Olympic legacy and finances. Ross urged the mayor to establish a separate organisation responsible 
for the legacy planning. GLA (2010a) The Finances of the Olympic Legacy, Part 1: Olympic Park Transfer and 
Continuing Liabilities., pp. 13–14. 
121 Interview with Ricky Burdett on 21 February 2012. 
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that holding debt would deter potential investors” (GLA, 2010a, p. 20).  
 
Thus, the OPLC had committed to re-evaluate the previous LDA’s legacy vision, and 
re-evaluate the balance between the economic viability and social usability of the 
post-Olympic Park, without the great pressure of maximising the financial return from 
the site. This means that the LMF published by the LDA was no longer valid for the 
new organisation, and the OPLC conducted an intensive design charrette to reflect its 
vision (OPLC, 2011, p. 71). Following various studies, the OPLC submitted the 
planning application for the long-term development of the LOP, “Legacy Communities 
Scheme (LCS)” in September 2011. Although the LCS stated that it was established 
based on the previous studies, in particular the LMF, there were some crucial 
differences from the predecessor. Firstly, the LCS aimed to create a less dense 
development than the one previously proposed in the LMF, which was certainly made 
possible by the removal of the financial burden of paying the LDA’s debt. While the 
LMF designated 10,000 to 12,000 homes to be built within the LMF site (LDA, 2009b, 
p. 101), the LCS proposed that 6,800 new homes would be created in the future 
Olympic Park (OPLC, 2011, p. 79). The vision of creating a less dense urban quarter 
was spatially explained as an adaptation of “London-ness”, which became one of the 
core spatial strategies of the LCS (Figs. 6-12 and 13). The LMF encouraged more 
mid-rise block or high-rise tower housing typologies in the post-Olympic site, but the 
LCS suggested that:  
 
“London’s tradition of building streets lined with terraced houses has created 
some of the city’s most attractive neighbourhoods and provides inspiration for 
much of the new housing proposed in the LCS” (OPLC, 2011, p. 73).  
 
Beyond the reduced spatial density which was certainly made possible by exemption 
from land debt, the strong influence of the Mayor of London could be observed. Since 
the OPLC was established by the central government and the Mayor of London, it is 
highly possible that the Mayor’s preference for traditional buildings rather than the 
high-rise towers encouraged by the previous mayor, Ken Livingstone, was directly 
integrated. Matthew Carmona further points out that the new plan reflected Boris 
Johnson’s clear preference for a traditional London vernacular, while the previous plan 
had lacked “London-ness” (Carmona, 2012, pp. 41–42). 
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In addition to this, the LCS aimed to incorporate wider interests, in particular sporting 
uses, into the future LOP. Although the LMF documents extensively addressed the 
integration of various stakeholders, it was subsequently revealed that a full consultation 
was not fully conducted, when Baroness Ford, the Chair, and Andrew Altman, the chief 
executive of the OPLC, were questioned on the process of the legacy planning by the 
Culture, Media and Sports Committee in April 2010. Altman admitted as follows:  
 
“On the sporting issue, the Chair initiated a process with the main sporting 
bodies around the country to get their specific comments and review of the 
Masterplan. Many felt that they had not been sufficiently engaged, that sport 
was not as prominent in the Masterplan [LMF] as it should be, that it was hard 
to find even the reference to sport in the Masterplan, so we specifically asked 
each of those sporting bodies to give us comments. […] I think it will result in a 
lot of positive changes, not only in the Masterplan but also importantly to the 
ongoing commitment of each of the sporting entities to the Park. I would say 
that the core issue is not so much a design issue per se as getting the ongoing 
commitment to the use of the Park by all the sporting entities so that it 
continues to be a premier centre for sport activity […] We are right now in the 
process of refining the Masterplan. […] You will see the reflection of a lot of 
the comments that were received through that community engagement, as well 
as through the specific engagement with the sports bodies, and that will be 
there” (CMSC, 2010, pp. 17–18).  
 
Creation of a mixed-use urban precinct had been planned since the bid phase, and in 
particular the sporting use had been designated as the core, because various sporting 
venues would be inherited as the Olympic legacy. Yet an in-depth concrete strategy for 
integrating sports into the mixed-use Olympic Park had certainly been missing from the 
previous plan. The LCS masterplan therefore pointed out that “securing the sporting 
legacy” was one of the key issues in conceptualising the long-term vision of the 
Olympic site. This sporting vision aimed not only to provide the sporting venues but 
also to establish the accommodation for athletes coming to the Park. The Chair of the 
OPLC argued that this could be achieved without allocating the money from the OPLC, 
but by attracting the sporting organisations which could contribute the financial support 
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(CMSC, 2010, p. 19). Thus, the reform of the governance of the Olympic legacy and 
subsequent revision of the spatial strategy site not only became a significant turning 
point for future vision of the post-Olympic site, but also provided an opportunity to 
correct previous planning failures and find more opportunities.  
 
Yet, within two years after the establishment of the OPLC, Boris Johnson, the Mayor of 
London, addressed the need for further reform of the governance of the LOP. One of the 
biggest triggers for the Mayor to consider a new organisation was his ambition to 
control the Park more directly, and enable its development to synchronise with the 
surroundings. The Mayor launched a public consultation for transfer of the OPLC to the 
Mayoral Development Corporation in February 2011. The Mayor emphasised the 
integration into the Mayoral draft replacement London Plan published in 2009, which 
identified the Olympic Park and surrounding area as “London’s single most important 
project for the next 25 years”, and indicated his ambition of “convergence” to close the 
deprivation gap between the host boroughs and the rest of London (Mayor of London, 
2011, p. 5). Prior to the consultation, the Mayor had considered the creation of a single 
organisation with the full range of planning power, in order to avoid duplication and 
confusion caused by various planning bodies working on the regeneration of the Lower 
Lea Valley, and aimed to obtain greater political and economic accountability to 
London’s residents (Mackay, 2010).  
 
These ambitions of the Mayor were certainly integrated into his arguments as to why the 
new Mayoral Development Corporation was needed, and after responding to the 
preliminary public consultation, the new LOP governing body, the London Legacy 
Development Corporation (LLDC), was officially established. It took over the 
responsibility for the long-term development of the LOP and its surroundings from the 
OPLC on 2 April 2012. As Johnson had suggested previously, the LLDC became a 
“single point for contract” for regeneration – landowner, developer, planning authority 
and investor. The OPLC’s staff and knowledge were transferred to the new LLDC, and 
the LLDC suggested that planning powers for the LOP and surrounding area would also 
be transferred from the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation and the 
ODA in October 2012, after the Olympic Games (LLDC, 2012a). Thus, the governance 
of the Olympic legacy in London was concentrated, and significant planning power had 
been given to the Mayor.  
165 
6.2 Implementation of the vision 
 
6.2.1 Uncertainty of the public and private partnership: Olympic village 
Due to the high cost involved in regenerating the large post-industrial area in the LLV, it 
was imperative to rely on the private sector’s money to build certain parts of the 
Olympic site. In the case of London, the most visible part of the private sector’s 
involvement was the construction of the Olympic village located in the north-east of the 
Olympic site. The site of the Olympic village had previously been a part of the Stratford 
City development whose planning permission was granted in 2004, and it subsequently 
incorporated the initial Olympic planning permission of the LDA before the bid 
decision in 2005. As discussed in Chapter 4, Stratford City was fundamentally proposed 
by a private consortium, and after gaining the planning permission, the site was divided 
into southern and northern parts by the Stratford International rail line cutting through 
the middle of Stratford City. The southern half was developed as a vast shopping mall 
by an Australian developer, Westfield, and the northern part was developed by Lend 
Lease, which also built up the Olympic village for the 2000 Sydney Games as discussed 
in Chapter 5. The Olympic village was aimed to provide the accommodation for 17,000 
athletes and officials during the Games, and to be turned into privately owned and 
lettable housing after the Games, including 50% affordable units, which corresponded 
to the Mayor’s housing policy in the wider London region (Lend Lease and ODA, 2007). 
The project was carried out as a PPP between the ODA and Lend Lease, and the 
planning permission was submitted in August 2007. Employing the PPP to deliver the 
Olympic village within the seven-year timeframe was considered a way of achieving 
this with less public expenditure, with cohesive development between the adjacent 
Stratford City project and the Olympic site.  
 
Yet, during the course of developing the Village, there were number of difficulties in 
conducting the PPP. The first problem came as a broader issue of the development 
history as a part of Stratford City, just after London won the bid and the LDA issued the 
Compulsory Purchase Order in 2005. As the village was located next to Stratford City, it 
was necessary to secure certain the access to the transportation hub and the Olympic site 
through the privately developed Stratford City. As the Compulsory Purchase Order 
covered the entire ODA planning area including Stratford City, it principally had the 
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planning power to control the site within Stratford City. Yet there were strong voices 
against the Order as a killer of development, which escalated the tension between the 
private developers and the Mayor of London at the time, Ken Livingstone. It was 
eventually resolved by removing the Compulsory Purchase Order from Stratford City 
except for the certain access to the Olympic village (BBC, 2005). Although the 
significant power of the LDA’s Compulsory Purchase Order over the Olympic site was 
widely criticised (for example, Davis and Andy Thornley, 2010), Stratford City was 
treated as an exceptional case. Since the site of the Olympic village was deeply affected 
by the previous Stratford City masterplan, although it was developed with the public 
authority’s involvement, there was difficulty in mediating public and private interests. 
The problem of the inherited attitude from the past development plan can be further 
identified in the spatial strategy of the Olympic village. Fig. 6-14 clearly shows the 
existing urbanised area on the top and the newly developed Olympic village on the 
bottom (Fig. 6-14). The Olympic village was designed according to a high-density 
urban block model, but this was clearly contrasted with the adjacent neighbourhood, 
which Judd might have called a “bubble” in East London (Judd, 1999).  
 
When submitting the planning application, the ODA and Lend Lease explained that “the 
Olympic Village followed the precedent set for previously approved proposal for the 
Olympic Village in 2004”, which allowed “a higher density and height of development 
on the same scale” (Lend Lease and ODA, 2007, p. 53). Looking at the 2004 Olympic 
masterplan, it clearly suggested that the Olympic villages would consolidate the area as 
part of the new residential quarter of Stratford City (LDA, 2004, p. 20). The LDA’s 
focus on the adjacent ongoing Stratford City development rather than existing 
neighbourhoods was further demonstrated by the fact that the 2004 bid masterplan 
graphically emphasised the spatial cohesion with urban blocks of Stratford City. 
Stratford City was initially envisaged to be filled with smaller blocks of buildings and 
create urbanised streets connecting the different parts of adjacent areas, but instead it 
was developed as the vast shopping mall, Westfield Stratford Shopping Centre, 
afterwards. Yet the Olympic village did not correspond to this change, nor did it alter 
the planning direction towards a more integrative approach to the adjacent 
neighbourhoods. Tim Urquhart, the development director of the village at Lend Lease, 
suggested that there was no time to go back to outline planning, and the team had to 
stick to the previous masterplan’s spatial setting. Thus, the village was constructed as 
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what Wainwright severely criticised as “an alien chunk airlifted in from a Spanish 
suburb” (Wainwright, 2012).  
 
Beyond the great influence of the previously private-led development on the 
development of the Olympic village, the uncertainty of the PPP was highlighted when 
the project faced a severe financial downturn at the time of the credit crunch in 2008. It 
was originally planned to raise the funding amount of GBP 550 million from public 
money and the remaining GBP 450 million from the private sector, led by Lend Lease. 
Lend Lease had difficulty in raising the funds for the development in such economic 
climate. It was eventually decided in 2009 that the Olympic village would be 
publicly-owned by raising GBP 324 million from the central government including GBP 
261 million GBP from the Olympic contingency fund (BBC, 2009). It was further 
decided to reduce the current size of the Olympic village by abandoning the site of 
Clays Lane, where the LDA demolished the site of the existing Clays Lane Estate to 
pave the way for the construction of the Olympic village. While the central government 
justified the public ownership of the village as the means of delivering the Olympic 
facilities and securing interests of tax payers, it also pointed out that the Olympic village 
needed to be re-sold as soon as the market would recover, to reduce the financial burden 
of the public sector (BBC, 2009). Thus, in 2011 half of the Olympic village was sold to 
the private consortium of Qatari Diar, the Qatari Royal Family’s company, and British 
developer Delancey for GBP 557 million as private housing, while Triathlon Homes 
was appointed to manage the other half of the village as affordable housing which 
would be available after the Games (BBC, 2011a). Thus, the development story of the 
Olympic village exemplified the risk of a PPP, as the private sector’s involvement was 
highly dependent on the current economic “instability and volatility” (Harvey, 1989, p. 
11). It should also be noted that the public sector’s involvement in the PPP in the case of 
the village represented the government’s entrepreneurial urban governance, which 
prioritised short-term turnover rather than long-term investment in the development.  
 
6.2.2 Blurring of use and exchange value  
While the development of the Olympic village exemplifies the limit of the PPP, the 
story of the Olympic stadium and aquatic centre tells of the difficulty in securing the 
“use value”, while the Olympic authority tried to raise “exchange value” of these 
facilities. The initial bid proposal and the subsequent masterplan put great emphasis on 
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the physical changeability of the Olympic site and venues in order to mediate both 
Olympic and post-Olympic demands. The message of the bid committee and the various 
levels of government regarding the post-Olympic demands was to make the 
post-Olympic venues accessible to local residents. The role and spatial adaptation of the 
Olympic stadium, for example, was clearly identified as follows in the bid proposal: 
 
“Olympic Stadium – conversion [from 80,000] to a 25,000 seat multipurpose 
venue with athletics at its core. It will become a house of sport with training 
facilities, offices and sports science and sports medicine facilities” 
(London 2012 Bidding Committee, 2004, p. 23).  
 
The concept of reducing the size but keeping the primary function of athletics which 
both elite and non-elite players could enjoy was considered one of the biggest promises 
made to both the IOC and London residents, and as suggested in Chapter 4, it conveyed 
the power of London’s bid to the IOC. This concept was further greatly contrasted with 
the “iconic” Olympic stadium in Beijing, for which it had been difficult to find 
post-Olympic usage except for tourism, and London clearly addressed the departure 
from the inherited problem of the past Olympic stadium.122 When the final design of 
the London Olympic stadium was unveiled in November 2007, and ODA promoted it as 
a “living stadium” which included sporting use and community access throughout the 
year (ODA, 2007h) (Fig. 6-15). 
 
Despite the ODA’s great promotion of the “living stadium”, it soon became apparent 
that the potential for athletics to attract spectators and revenue was limited (Dyckhoff, 
2012, p. 250). In a similar vein, Baillieu criticised the stadium design as being based on 
an assumption rather than a confirmation of long-term use (Baillieu, 2007). Many 
critiques also pointed out the need for a football team's involvement in order to 
financially sustain the post-Olympic stadium. Even former IOC president Juan Antonio 
Samaranch indicated that “it is critical the venue be used for football after the Games to 
stop it becoming a white elephant” (Warner, 2007). Since the unveiling of the London 
Olympic stadium in November 2007, the utilisation after the Games had been unclear, 
and the struggle between athletics and football clearly illustrates the difficulty in 
                                                  
122 Tessa Jowell, the Olympic Minister at the time, suggested “This is probably the last Olympic stadium that we are 
going to see on this kind of scale” in an interview with the BBC on 12 November 2007. 
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securing the “use value” which had been promised since the bid, under the pressure of 
raising the “exchange value” to make the legacy stadium financially sustainable. The 
debate on the post-Olympic stadium went on in the central government, as follows:  
 
“…[t]he Candidature File stated clearly that athletics would be at the core of 
its legacy use. The ODA is working to a concept of a “Living Stadium”, with 
permanent seating for 25,000, to form a centrepiece for the local community, 
with a programme of events and a mix of uses that make sure that it is used 
throughout the year. …There is some controversy over the proposed legacy use 
for the stadium. The local authority, the London Borough of Newham, would 
prefer to see a major football club (such as West Ham United) as an anchor 
tenant for the Stadium once the Games have concluded. It implies that the 
“Living Stadium” concept advanced by the ODA might not be realistic or 
sustainable…”(CMSC, 2007, p. 34) (emphasis added).  
 
Uncertainty of the “living stadium” concept materialising spurred the argument for 
demolition of the stadium and creation of a new stadium for football from scratch, 
which would be completely against the initial bid proposal.123 Various media articles 
reported different opinions on the future usability of the post-Olympic site, but a firm 
decision was not made before London hosted the Olympic Games in the summer of 
2012 (Figs. 6-16 and 17).  
 
The problem of undefined usage of the post-Olympic stadium was not only confined to 
the matter of the sustainability of the building, but also impacted on the wider urban 
planning. The LCS, the latest spatial strategy of the post-Olympic Park issued before the 
Olympic Games, presented an in-depth account of the legacy Park, yet given undefined 
post-Olympic usage, the stadium quarter was not included in the LCS document. Due to 
the different use between large football events and community based activities, its 
impacts in the area would be significant, and echoing Harvey’s argument that “exchange 
values can determine use values by creating new conditions” (Harvey, 2009, p. 190), 
exclusion of the area would have been likely unless this problem was resolved. Thus, 
the difficulty in mediating the use and exchange values in the post-Olympic stadium had 
                                                  
123 In a football stadium’s ideal physical setting there is close proximity between the rectangular pitch and the stand 
seating, but the planned Olympic stadium had an athletic track between the fans and the pitch.  
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great impacts on the spatial planning of the post-Olympic Park. 
 
6.2.3 Inclusion of local needs? The case of the aquatic centre 
While the story of the Olympic stadium tells of the conflicts between use and exchange 
values in legacy, the aquatic centre exemplifies the difficulty in including local needs, 
which various authors point out as an issue in the case of mega-event planning 
processes (for example, Hiller, 2003, pp. 103–104). The aquatic centre, designed by 
internationally well-known architect Zaha Hadid, played a critical role in representing 
the architectural achievements in the Olympic Park, but at the same time, its utilisation 
was also crucial to materialise London's legacy concept.124 Coexistence of elite and 
non-elite users and commercial and non-commercial use in the post-Olympic aquatic 
centre was particularly emphasised in the beginning of the bidding phase (London 2012 
Bidding Committee, 2004, p. 95). Thus, similarly to the Olympic stadium, the bid 
committee proposed to reduce the seating capacity to incorporate envisaged 
post-Olympic usability, and after the bid, the ODA confirmed that it should change from 
17,500 during the Games to 2,500 in legacy (Fig. 6-18).  
 
Furthermore, the ODA stipulated that in-depth usability of the post-Olympic pools 
would be determined through the public consultations. As a general approach to conduct 
the legacy planning, the ODA suggested that:  
  
“…[i]f the spaces and buildings it will create are to be successful after the 
Games, local communities and the wider public must be involved in the 
design process. Targeted community involvement can help create a sense of 
‘ownership’ and pride and also help ensure facilities” (ODA, 2007e, p. 12) 
(emphasis added).  
 
The planning documents for the aquatic centre, such as the one prepared for the 
planning application, clearly indicated the process of public participation, and stated 
                                                  
124 The architect, Zaha Hadid, addressed her role in designing the facility, as follows:  
"It has been an exciting challenge for my office to create an innovative design which will provide an outstanding 
building for the Games themselves, as well as a world-class aquatics complex for the community afterwards” 
(emphasis added). 
http://www.the2012londonolympics.com/forum/london-2012-news/6385-revised-aquatics-centre-design-marks-miles
tone-planning-london-2012-games 
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that those voices were integrated into the final design.125 Yet there was an issue 
regarding this community involvement process: the creation of a “leisure water” or 
leisure pool facility. When the final design of the aquatic centre and the planning 
application were submitted in November 2007, the issue of a leisure water facility was 
not presented to the public, although this had been one of the political topics debated by 
various stakeholders. The CMSC suggested in early 2007 that:  
 
“The submission from the London Borough of Newham voiced concern that the 
design being proposed at the time that the submission was being prepared did 
not provide for “leisure water” when in community legacy use. […] there was 
clear evidence of leisure pools being most used by the local community, […] a 
mixed leisure and traditional use was more in line with a Government focus on 
sporting activity rather than “organised” sport. […]We have considerable 
sympathy with the views expressed by Newham Borough Council on legacy use 
of the Aquatics Centre. […] We note that discussions are still under way 
between the Olympic Delivery Authority and the Host Boroughs, and we 
strongly recommend that the design for the Aquatics Centre should provide for 
a mix of leisure use and traditional “lane” swimming” (CMSC, 2007, pp. 
34–35). 
 
As clearly indicated above, the local borough had called for the integration of a leisure 
facility into the new aquatic centre, but even though this can be understood as a matter 
of architectural planning, integration of a leisure water feature was eliminated in the 
process of architectural design because of the cost of the construction. Thus, the task 
came to the Olympic Park masterplan team rather than being in the architect’s scope of 
work. It was October 2007 when the EDAW consortium commenced the study of urban 
development around the aquatic centre, and the integration of a leisure water facility 
was one of the crucial tasks which the team had to consider.126 Since there was no space 
available for the leisure function in the already planned aquatic centre, it was proposed 
in the lower part of the adjacent residential building. With the proposed leisure water 
facility, the masterplan team envisaged that the “use value” of the aquatic centre would 
be drastically increased, as it would attract not only elite athletes but also a wider 
                                                  
125 For example, ODA (2008a) Aquatic Centre Detailed Submission, Technical Report, Statement of Participation. 
126 “Olympic Park & Site Wide Infrastructure Design, Notification of Compensation Event by the Employer”, issued 
on 22 October 2007 by the ODA to the EDAW consortium.  
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audience. The team further suggested that by adding educational and office spaces, it 
would be used by educational bodies such as the University of East London (EDAW 
Consortium, 2008, pp. 28–31). It is certain that provision of a leisure waster facility 
would not only increase the “use value” of the legacy Aquatic Centre, but also raise the 
“exchange value” by securing various sources of income.  
 
Yet the difficulty in implementing the scheme proposed by the EDAW Consortium was 
in the PPP. The leisure water facility was originally to be constructed with contributions 
from the Newham and Tower Hamlets boroughs (GBP 5.5 million from Newham and 
GBP 1.5 million from Tower Hamlets), with the other large part of the cost from the 
private sector. Yet, because of the credit crunch, private developers were no longer able 
to provide enough funding to construct the facility, and it was clear that funding from 
local boroughs alone would not be enough to realise the project. Thus, the idea of 
creating the leisure water facility was cancelled, leaving an uncertain sporting legacy 
(Fig.6-19). When we look at the subsequent masterplans, such as the LMF by the LDA 
and the LCS by the OPLC, there was a clear separation between the aquatic centre and 
the adjacent new buildings, and the integration of the leisure facility was absent. The 
story of the leisure water facility exemplifies the difficulty of keeping “use value” in the 
long-term planning process, while “exchange value” has always been prioritised. This 
seems to be particularly true in the case of PPPs, in which private developers are usually 
interested only in what brings the highest financial return (Flyvbjerg, 2003, pp. 73–106).  
 
 
6.3 Integration of the vision 
 
6.3.1 The LOP in wider regional planning strategies  
The integration of Olympic-led urban development with the wider regional context has 
been questioned by various academics (for example, Cashman, 2003), and this had been 
a crucial issue in the case of post-bid Olympic-led urban planning in Sydney. Yet, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Olympic project was tightly connected with the wider 
London spatial strategy from the beginning of the bid, and the structure for integrating 
the LOP into the regional context greatly evolved after London won the bid. This part 
will unpack the synergy between the vision of the post-Olympic site and London’s 
wider planning context.  
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The first point of departure should be the Mayor of London’s spatial strategy for the 
region, the London Plan. After Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, launched his 
first version of the London Plan in 2004 (before London won the bid), he continued to 
update his regional spatial strategy. During his tenure, the final updated version of the 
London Plan was issued in 2008, and this was greatly different from the 2004 version. 
One of the most substantial changes from the previous plan was the integration of 
maximising the Olympic opportunity along with tackling climate change. The impact of 
the Olympics had already been identified in the previous plan even though London did 
not know the bid result, but the 2008 Plan indicated it more explicitly. The updated 
London Plan, similarly to the predecessor, pointed out that the post-Olympic Park 
needed to synchronise the housing and employment targets set in the Plan through the 
creation of mixed-use urban centres across the LLV, but put greater emphasis on the 
catalytic role of the Olympic development for the wider LLV and the Thames Gateway 
(Mayor of London, 2008, pp. 313–314). Thus, while the previous plan prioritised the 
development of Stratford, and indicated the LLV separately, the 2008 Plan integrated 
Stratford as a part of the LLV, and spatially extended the regenerative focus from 374ha 
(2004 Plan) to 1,446ha (2008 Plan). Along with enlargement of the opportunity area, the 
targets for new jobs and new homes were drastically increased, as indicated in Table 
6-1. 
 
Table 6-1: Target job creation and housing provision indicated in various London Plans 
(Source: Author, 2013, based on Mayor of London, 2004; Mayor of London, 2008)  
Year of 
issue  
Author (Mayor 
of London) 
Opportunity 
area  
Area 
(Ha) 
New jobs  New homes  Target period 
2004 Livingstone  
Stratford  124 30,000 4,500 
by 2016 
LLV 250 8,500 6,000 
2008 Livingstone  
LLV including 
Stratford  
1,446 50,000 32,000 by 2026 
 
In order to correlate the regenerative aspirations and spatial distribution in the LLV, 
Mayor Ken Livingstone issued an in-depth spatial strategy for the area in January 2007, 
called the “Lower Lea Valley Opportunity Area Framework”. The LLV Opportunity 
Area Framework is Mayoral Strategic Planning Guidance, seeking to maximise the use 
of the designated area by transforming the LLV into a “mixed-use city” district, while 
enhancing the area’s rich landscape and waterways (Mayor of London, 2007b, p. 1). 
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Along with the Mayoral housing and job targets, the functional concepts in the LLV 
were termed “water city”, “thriving centres”, “neighbourhood and communities” and 
“working valley”, and the framework demonstrated how they would be scattered in the 
area.  
 
This was not established from scratch. The LLV Opportunity Area Framework clearly 
drew on the 2004 Olympic and Legacy Planning Permission, and it formed the basis of 
the land-use proposals set out in it. The Opportunity Area Framework of course needed 
to integrate the changes of the planning vision for the LOP since the 2004 masterplan; 
the document also encouraged the synergy between ongoing and future transformations 
of the LLV and the LOP (Mayor of London, 2007a). The Opportunity Area Framework, 
in particular, proposed to intensify the employment locations along the west side of the 
River Lea (indicated in purple in figures 6-19 and 20) by transforming the existing 
residential use, and as compensation, it suggested more residential development in the 
Olympic Park (Fig. 6-20). Thus, the LLV Opportunity Area Framework provided a great 
rationale to intensify the development within the LOP, while it envisioned the drastic 
changes of the land-use pattern of the wider regeneration.  
 
After the tenure of Ken Livingstone, Boris Johnson was elected as the new Mayor of 
London in 2008, and re-elected in 2012. As soon as he took the mayoral position, 
Johnson announced the modification of the existing London Plan prepared by his 
predecessor. The draft version of Johnson’s London Plan was issued in 2009, and 
finalised in 2011. Although he reformed the London Plan, he kept the LLV Opportunity 
Area Framework as it was. Johnson addressed the need for maximising the Olympic 
legacy to improve the socio-economic conditions in the LLV more than previous 
London Plan, but the fundamental strategy for the LLV and the LOP, which enhanced 
housing and job opportunities, largely followed the previous London Plan. Yet one of 
the important aspects Johnson added to the spatial concept for the LOP within the wider 
regional context was enhancement of the global vision. In the beginning of his London 
Plan, Johnson addressed his aspirations for London as a global city. Although 
Livingstone also recognised the importance of surviving inter-urban competition across 
the globe, Johnson explicitly addressed this vision by saying that London had two 
objectives: London’s world city status and being one of the best cities in the world to 
live. Johnson then argued that these two aims would not be opposite, but 
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complementary to each other (Mayor of London, 2011, p. 5). His strategy was adapted 
to the vision of the LOP. Along with housing and job opportunities in the Olympic Park, 
the latest London Plan clearly stated:  
 
“The Mayor will, and boroughs should the Olympic Park and venues as 
international visitor destinations for sport, recreation and tourism” (Mayor of 
London, 2011, p. 44) (emphasis added).   
 
Close proximity to the new Stratford International station had been one of the 
advantages of the LOP, but the concept of the post-Olympic Park as a global destination 
had not been addressed in the bid. Most of the planning policies issued after the bid had 
greatly focused on the regenerative benefits which would satisfy the local and regional 
needs. Yet Johnson wanted to add his global aspirations as a new dimension of the LOP, 
and this would need further considerations of how the global, regional and local visions 
would be integrated in the post-Olympic site.  
 
6.3.2 The legacy vision in the local planning context 
While there had been synergy between the LOP and regional planning frameworks, it 
should be questioned whether such interaction had been visible on the local scale. One 
of the well discussed critiques of the planning of the mega-events is of bypassing the 
local planning authorities in the fast-track process (for example, Hall, 1992; Hiller, 
2003). Thus, in the following part, I will discuss how the Olympic planning was 
embedded in the local planning context.  
 
As indicated earlier, there had had various solid systems of integrating local authorities’ 
voices into the Olympic planning process. Firstly, when evaluating the planning 
application related to the Olympic site, members of the local authorities joined the 
Planning Decision Team, to reflect their concerns about the decision making. The 
Planning Decision Team was established by the ODA to gather support for the planning 
decisions on its own project by integrating the local authorities, and in this respect, the 
ODA declared itself the Local Planning Authority for the Olympic Park Area (ODA, 
2006, p. 2). This kind of joint venture for planning decisions between the specialised 
statutory body for the Olympic site and local planning authorities was further employed 
when the LLDC was formulated in 2012. Yet, while this provided opportunities for the 
176 
local authorities to reflect their interests in the development of the post-Olympic Park, 
this was again a system for the LLDC to justify its own planning decisions by 
integrating other voices.  
 
Secondly, the Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group was formulated in 2008, to 
supervise and co-ordinate the range of work and secure a regeneration legacy of the 
Games for east London, focusing both on the Olympic Park itself and on the wider 
benefits for the whole area (GLA, 2010b, p. 4). The Mayor of London chaired the 
Steering Group and leaders of the five Olympic boroughs became the core members. 
The minutes of the Steering Group meetings revealed that the Steering Group had made 
crucial decisions on development strategies for the post-Olympic Park, such as the 
approval of the LMF development option. 127  The Steering Group had provided 
important opportunities to hear about the planning process of the LMF or subsequently 
the OPLC, and to provide comments on it. The meeting minutes of the Steering Group 
also suggests that the debate on creation of the Strategic Regeneration Framework 
began in late 2008, and the first version was approved in October 2009 (Olympic Park 
Regeneration Steering Group, 2009b). This was also the moment that all members of 
the Steering Group agreed on the principle of “convergence” as the unifying theme for 
maximising the regenerative benefits for the five host boroughs. Thus, in my view, the 
local authorities’ voices in the Olympic planning process evolved from situational to 
more strategic, as the local authorities gradually became more co-operative and took 
collective actions rather than evaluating others’ visions.  
 
The first stage of the Strategic Regeneration Framework was issued in October 2009 by 
the five Olympic host boroughs, and the concept of “convergence” was further 
elaborated as follows:  
 
“Within 20 years the communities who host the 2012 Games will have the same 
social and economic chances as their neighbours across London” (Olympic 
Host Boroughs, 2009).  
 
As indicated above, given the social and economic disadvantages of the residents in 
                                                  
127 Although the meeting was conducted “behind the curtain”, the meeting summaries of the Olympic Park 
Regeneration Steering Group posted on the London 2012 website, for example, reveal that the preferred option of the 
LMF was one of the great concerns among the attendees. 
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their councils, the Olympic boroughs designated the Strategic Regeneration Framework 
as a means of equalising these and other areas, in particular the west part of London, 
over next twenty years. As a reflection of this socio-economic ambition of the spatial 
strategy, the Strategic Regeneration Framework identified provision of new homes and 
places for business across the five boroughs as key development principles. These two 
had also been extensively addressed by the Mayor’s LLV Opportunity Area Framework 
or the various post-Olympic masterplans issued by the different Olympic bodies. Yet the 
Strategic Regeneration Framework emphasised that the location, scale and timing of 
development needed to support convergence. The Strategic Regeneration Framework’s 
view of the exiting neighbourhood in the Olympic boroughs was “less coherent and 
more fragmented”, but it also recognised the importance of “tailoring solutions to the 
diverse needs of their local communities”. Thus the Olympic boroughs declared that:  
 
“We believe that the [statutory spatial planning] system is already too complex 
and wish to see simplification rather than the creation of further additional 
separate plans” (Olympic Host Boroughs, 2009, p. 22). 
 
It seems to me that this is quite a strong argument from the local boroughs. While both 
Olympic authorities and the regional development authorities had produced numerous 
spatial planning frameworks to identify the possible vision of the Olympic site and the 
wider area, the local boroughs considered a different approach necessary to 
accommodate the diverse character of the local neighbourhoods. In other words, this can 
be considered a critique of the current complexity of the planning framework. Although 
the Strategic Regeneration Framework did not provide a concrete method for 
incorporating the Olympic opportunities into the diverse local neighbourhoods, this 
clearly represented a need for an alternative planning approach to improving spatial 
quality while maintaining the existing “sense of place”, the term repeatedly used in the 
Strategic Regeneration Framework.   
 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Evolution of governance and vision of the Olympic legacy  
This chapter examined the planning process of defining the vision of the post-Olympic 
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site during the seven years of London’s post-bid phase. We have witnessed the evolving 
vision of the legacy of the LOP during the preparation phase, and I will suggest that this 
was both an expected and unexpected process. I have demonstrated three different 
periods of the Olympic and legacy planning, which corresponded to the change of 
governance and associated modification of the spatial strategy. Throughout each of 
these three phases, there was a leading authority to shape the vision of the Olympic and 
post-Olympic site, and its political aspirations had significant impacts in defining the 
spatial vision of the LOP.  
 
Discussion of the legacy vision of the post-Olympic site after the bid began with the 
physical changeability which would accommodate the Olympic and post-Olympic 
demands in the LOP, and then evolved towards identification of socio-economic 
integration into the legacy development. While the Olympic authorities as well as 
various government addressed the balance between social and economic benefits of the 
creation of the LOP, the conflict between maximising the social value and economic 
return was ironically highlighted when the economic sustainability of the Park was 
placed in danger at the time of the recession. The intervention of the Mayor of London 
and subsequent establishment of the OPLC became the new trigger to change the 
balance between the social and economic values of the post-Olympic site. In this respect, 
I will stress that London’s legacy planning process exemplifies the fragility of long-term 
urban planning, which is based on highly speculative assumptions and is sensitive to the 
political power struggles between various stakeholders involved in the project.  
 
Implementation of the vision  
While the governance and spatial planning of the Olympic legacy had been a crucial 
issue in the post-bid phase, it is certain that the financial arrangements for 
implementation of the vision had also been important. London employed a PPP for 
construction of the Olympic village, but the implementation process of the village 
demonstrated the uncertainty of using PPPs in the Olympic project. It is widely believed 
that the private sector’s involvement in a public project is limited to certain occasions 
where they can see the financial surplus (Flyvbjerg, 2003). The collapse of the PPP for 
the village project at the time of the credit crunch exemplified this fundamental problem 
of the PPP, and suggested the danger of relying on the private sector for much of the 
delivery process. Furthermore, the decline of integrating the leisure waster facility into 
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the privately developed building next to the aquatic centre due to the recession also 
suggests the limited difficulty in collaborating with the private sector in a time of 
economic uncertainty.  
 
In addition to this, I will further point out that concern about the economic viability of 
the future Olympic facilities became a great threat to the promised “use value” of the 
legacy venue, and the story of the Olympic stadium exemplified that fragile balance 
between “use and exchange value” of the legacy development. What became apparent 
to me was that the initial proposition of enhancing “use value” lacked a solid feasibility 
study of financial viability, which Roche identified as a typical problem of the bid 
component (Roche, 1994). This raises the question of whether the London’s bid 
proposal of “physical change ability” was overwhelmed by the rhetoric to respond to 
what the IOC wanted to hear and the justification of Olympic-led urban regeneration in 
the LLV.   
 
Urban integration  
While the vision inside the LOP was developed in seven years of the post-bid phase, in 
various ways it was also connected with the broader urban planning context to identify 
its socio-economic role in the wider urban tissue. The divorce from the wider planning 
context was one of the great dangers in conducting the urban regeneration project 
associated with mega-events, and Judd’s concept of the urban “bubble” suggests the 
spatial consequence of an isolated planning process. Yet, in the case of London, the 
vision of the legacy for the Olympic Park was well articulated within various regional 
planning frameworks. As an inheritance from the bid phase, the role of the LOP, in 
particular its post-Olympic role, had been well integrated into the Mayor’s development 
strategy to address the uneven development between west and east in London. Thus, 
there were various planning frameworks and authorities to consider the way in which 
the LOP would be integrated into the wider urban tissue. After securing the Olympics in 
2005, the expectations for creating the LOP and its catalytic effect in wider LLV area 
became high, and housing and job opportunity targets became higher than in the bid. 
Boris Johnson’s further request that the LOP be a global destination added further 
ambitions to the role of the site in the wider London region, but this conflicted with 
local aspirations to focus on the mediation between existing and new development in 
local areas. The local boroughs’ “convergence”, a crucial concept of maximising the 
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Olympic legacy for equalising the socio-economic unbalance in London, certainly did 
not involve renewing the whole area of the LLV, but rather sought cohesion between 
existing and new development in the area. Although the London Plan initially addressed 
this before the bid, after the bid, such conception seemed to erode. In this respect, I will 
stress that the biggest issue for London to overcome may not be avoiding the urban 
bubble, but rather mediating the divergent nature of the spatial aspirations attached to 
the post-Olympic Park.  
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Part II Conclusion: Evolution from Sydney to London  
 
Evolution of Olympic governance and the spatial vision  
One of the aims in this part is to identify the significant changes of governance of 
Olympic and legacy planning and its reflection of the spatial vision of the Olympic site 
in the seven years of the post-bid phase. Sydney and London experienced considerable 
changes of planning structure, and they had a great impact on the vision of the Olympic 
site. Sydney and London each had three different phases in terms of governance of the 
Olympic and legacy planning, and I will point out that the reasons for these changes 
were “intended” and “unintended”. The concept of “intended” and “unintended” is 
pointed out by Mangan and Dyreson as a key factor for understanding the Olympic 
legacy (Mangan and Dyreson, 2010), and I have seen both factors in the evolution of the 
planning structure and spatial vision in both cities. Changes of the regional government 
and impact of the Atlanta Games in Sydney, or creation of the OPLC caused by 
discovery of the financial shortfall of the LDA in London, was not envisaged when the 
city won the bid, while the transition of the leading legacy body from the ODA to the 
LDA in London was expected at the beginning of the post-bid phase.  
 
Among these changes in Sydney and London, I will in particular stress that change of 
the regional government had a significant impact on both the planning structure and 
spatial vision of the Olympic site in the post-bid phase. Concentration of the planning 
power in the OCA in Sydney and establishment of the OPLC with different financial 
arrangements in London were certainly made possible by the strong intervention of the 
new political power, which was the change of regional government in Sydney and 
election of the new Mayor in London. The change of planning structure, importantly, 
created the momentum for altering the spatial strategy developed in the previous 
political regime. While the OCA utilised the vision of Homebush Bay rather than the 
speculative proposal of the previous political government, the OPLC drastically 
changed the density of the post-Olympic development in the LLV compared to the 
previous high-density urban model proposed in the LMF. However, the question should 
be asked as to whether the revised spatial vision fit the initial objectives of creating a 
mixed-use vision of the post-Olympic site. Application of the grid system by the OCA 
turned Homebush Bay into a more controlled rather than interactive space, which is 
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fundamentally against the maximising the benefit of a mixed-use urban strategy 
suggested by various authors (for example, Coupland, 1997). Meanwhile, the OPLC’s 
strategy of lower density (fewer houses) than in the previous LMF also led to the 
question of whether it would contribute to the realisation of the initially envisioned 
mixed-use concept, which included provision of affordable houses. Thus, while the new 
spatial strategy created by the new political regime provided an alternative view to solve 
ongoing problems in the post-bid phase, it also left some questions in the subsequent 
phase.  
 
Legacy planning  
It should be noted that there were fundamentally different legacy planning climates 
between Sydney and London. When Sydney conducted the planning for the 2000 
Games, the term “legacy” was not commonly utilised in the sphere of Olympic studies 
and practices. Yet, when London commenced its planning for the 2012 Olympics, the 
word “legacy” became central in Olympic discourses. Against this backdrop, one of the 
most contrasting planning issues between Sydney and London was the degree to which 
each city tackled the spatial vision of the post-Olympic Park. Sydney and London 
initially set the future vision of the Olympic Park as a mixed-use urban quarter, and this 
was clearly addressed in the bid phase. Yet Sydney primarily focused on the spatial 
setting for the Games, and paid little attention to the post-Olympic mixed-use vision 
during the post-bid phase. Meanwhile, London undertook a considerable amount of 
work for the entire mixed-use vision of the post-LOP area. It seems that London took a 
more advanced approach to the legacy planning vision, but in London’s case it also 
demonstrated the difficulty in fixing the spatial vision in seven years. As the ODA 
initially addressed, advance planning effort for the legacy was able to contribute to the 
smooth transition to the subsequent post-Olympic phase without creating a considerable 
gap between the two phases. Beyond this, I will suggest that having a more 
comprehensive vision was the way of enhancing the communication between different 
stakeholders, which made it possible to provide great opportunities for various 
stakeholders to address their aspirations. The proposed vision of the LMF, for example, 
triggered the discussion in the Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, and 
although the LMF’s proposal was eventually abandoned, this led to the creation of the 
Strategic Regeneration Framework. I will argue that even though the vision of the 
legacy was a “placeholder”, it certainly contributed to the subsequent discussion of the 
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post-Olympic development.  
 
Implementation of the vision using PPPs 
As part of the Olympic facilities constructed during the post-bid phase would become a 
considerable legacy after the Games, Part II has examined the implementation process 
of some Olympic facilities in the Park. I have in particular looked at the involvement of 
the private sector in realisation of Olympic facilities and its opportunity and risk. Both 
Sydney and London employed PPPs to implement certain parts of the Olympic 
construction in the post-bid phase, and reduction of the financial burden of the public 
sector was one of the main drivers of collaboration with the private sector. Yet, during 
the course of the construction process, it became clear that there were various risks in 
employing PPPs. Firstly, echoing Flybjerg’s point on the strong presence of the private 
sector’s financial benefits in PPPs (Flyvbjerg, 2003), I will argue that there was a 
danger that the initial vision of the Olympic site/building would materialise only when 
the public authority’s political intentions were synchronised with the private sector’s 
interests. Indeed, Sydney and London employed PPPs for the construction of the 
Olympic villages, and neither village was constructed in the way the Olympic authority 
envisaged in the beginning of the post-bid phase. The construction process in Sydney, 
which was supposed to follow the environmental standard set in the bid, and the 
collapse of the PPP in the Olympic village construction in London exemplify the private 
sector’s fragile involvement in the public project. This was in particular highlighted in 
the situation of what Harvey calls “considerable economic instability and volatility” in 
the current world (Harvey, 1989, p. 11), as the delivery method of the village project in 
London was greatly altered when the city hit a severe recession.  
 
Secondly, what became apparent to me is that employing PPPs for the implementation 
of the Olympic project showed an imbalance between “use and exchange value”. 
Enlargement of the Olympic stadium and indoor arena in Sydney, whose “exchange” 
value the private sector aimed to increase without a solid forecast of the usability, and 
the dispute over the post-Olympic stadium in London suggest the struggle to maintain 
the “use value” of the Olympic venue initially proposed in the bid phase under the 
tremendous pressure of financial viability, which would require the increase of 
“exchange value”. Although it was not so visible in Sydney, the struggle between “use 
and exchange value” was the core point of discussion in defining the mixed-use vision 
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of the post-Olympic Park in London. Enhancing the “use value” in the LOP was 
emphasised to justify the benefit of hosting the Games, but it seems to me that 
“exchange value” eventually became more of a priority in order to avoid further public 
expenditure on the Olympic Park and venues in London. As Harvey suggests, the 
exchange value can determine the use value by creating new conditions (Harvey, 2009, 
p.190); this tendency put initial promise danger. In this respect, the OPLC’s approach to 
the lower-density model faced a great challenge in mediating use and exchange value.  
 
Urban integration  
Divorce of the specialised urban quarter from its surroundings has been a crucial issue 
in the realm of mega-events and urban studies, and I will suggest that Sydney and 
London provide a stark contrast in this respect. Although the creation of the SOP was 
initially expected to create a major centre and shift economic prosperity to the west in 
the region, it had been difficult to embed the SOP as a part of the regional development 
strategy. The problem of creation of a new urban centre lay in the potential conflict with 
existing urban centres in the Sydney region. While the critical issue for Sydney in the 
post-bid phase had been the isolation of the SOP from the wider planning context, 
London had a different story. The Mayor’s London Plan and its in-depth area framework, 
LLV Opportunity Area Framework, raised the ambitions for the Olympic Park much 
higher than what had been envisaged in the bid, and the LOP was expected to carry out 
various roles in the region. Meanwhile, on the local scale, there was a significant 
discrepancy between the local Auburn Council and the Olympic authority in Sydney, 
regarding how the SOP would be related to the local neighbourhoods, and critically a 
solid mechanism of integrating the local’s interests was absent in developing the SOP. 
London in turn had established various formal opportunities to integrate (or at least 
hear) local authorities’ voices. 
 
While London took a more connected planning approach to the regional and local 
planning framework, Sydney’s process was understood as what Thornley might call 
“enclave development” (Thornley, 2000), and this led to the great danger that the SOP 
would be an urban “bubble” (Judd, 1999) in the local and regional urban tissue. 
Although there were various planning frameworks identify the role of the Olympic Park 
to satisfy each planning objectives in London, the challenge was to mediate local and 
regional aspirations for the LOP given the complexity of the planning context. In 
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particular, as the regional aspirations became much higher in the process of constructing 
the LOP, there may have been a great danger in ignoring coherence between the new 
and old development in the area, which both local and regional authorities had 
addressed before the bid. This remained a crucial point for the local authorities, but it 
seems that regional aspirations came to focus on more catalytic urban renewal of the 
LLV. Thus, I will stress here that London’s planning context certainly originated from a 
desire to avoid the “Olympic bubble”, but mediating regional and local development 
interests through relevant planning policy was still the challenge for London.  
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Part III: Post-Olympic Phase 
 
 
The third part of this thesis (chapters 7 and 8) will explore the post-Olympic phase. The 
duration of the post-Olympic phase needs to be clarified here, as it could have an 
unlimited timeframe. As suggested in Chapter 2, my target timeframe for the 
post-Olympic phase in Sydney extends from after Sydney’s hosting of the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games in September and October 2000 to the end of 2012, and London’s 
post-Olympic phase is defined as starting with the conclusion of London’s Paralympic 
Games in September 2012 and lasting to the end of June. While the twelve-year period 
of Sydney’s post-Olympic phase provides a lot of empirical data, London’s legacy phase 
which I can explore is relatively short. Yet London’s legacy planning was conducted 
before the Games, and after the Games, it has been further elaborated, with some crucial 
planning actions undertaken in this short period. In addition to this, the findings about 
Sydney’s post-Olympic phase will provide useful accounts to consider against the 
various actions happening in London’s post-Olympic development. Thus, although the 
chapter on London’s case is shorter than the chapter on Sydney, I consider that Chapter 
8, in particular the evolution from Sydney to London in the legacy planning, will play a 
crucial role in considering my research question. My focus in examining the 
post-Olympic phase is two-fold. Firstly, I will explore the interaction between the 
implementation and the planning of the post-Olympic site. Hall suggests that the 
continuous action of review and design is a fundamental characteristic of the recent 
planning processes (Hall, 2002 [1975]), but Roche points out that such processes are 
rarely implanted in the post-event phase (Roche, 1994). In the case of Sydney’s legacy 
phase, I will examine how the post-Olympic authority redefined the vision of the 
post-Olympic site. In particular, the vision and realisation of a mixed-use development 
in the site will be analysed in depth. Meanwhile, in the case of London, it is too early to 
see such interaction between implementation and planning, and I will focus on the 
legacy planning framework and the risks which might emerge in the ongoing legacy 
development process. Secondly, as in Part II, which looked at the post-bid phase, Judd’s 
conception of the “tourist bubble” (Judd, 1999) will be examined in the context of the 
relationship between the post-Olympic site and the surroundings, as a crucial analytical 
point of the legacy planning. While Sydney and London showed a great contrast 
regarding their vision for integrating the Olympic Park into the wider urban tissue in the 
post-bid phase, this part will further examine how the conditions did or did not change 
in the post-Olympic phase.  
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Chapter 7: Sydney  
 
 
 
7.1 The governance and spatial planning of the post-Olympic Park 
 
7.1.1 Uncertainty after the 2000 Games 
Sydney staged the Olympic and Paralympic Games from 15 September to 29 October in 
2000.128 It is considered that the Sydney Games were particularly successful, as the 
president of the IOC at the time, Juan Samaranch, declared them “the best Olympics 
ever”. Sydney’s great promotion of the “Green Games” concept, and the globally 
well-received hospitality of the Sydney people and volunteers contributed to the “best 
Olympics ever”. During the Olympic Games, 200,000 to 400,000 people came to the 
SOP each day (SOCOG, 2001, p. 187) and watched the competition.  
 
After the events, the OCA, which took responsibility for constructing the venues and 
infrastructure for the Games, conducted physical transformation work within the SOP. 
This included downsizing the competition venues, such as the Olympic stadium and the 
aquatic centre, both of which utilised temporary seating systems in steel structures to 
accommodate the Olympic capacity, and dismantling temporary structures in the 
Olympic site. Decreasing the size of the competition venues based on predicted legacy 
demands and employing the various temporary structures removed after the events were 
well planned by the Olympic organisers before the Games, in order to mediate the 
Olympic and legacy demands in Sydney.  
 
Yet, within six months of the Sydney Games, the Olympic precincts became the target 
of criticism by various parts of the media, and the terms “ghost town” and “white 
elephant” were frequently used to describe the condition of the post-Olympic site. As 
some transformation works were underway and the SOP was not ready for legacy uses, 
it might not have been appropriate to criticise the Olympic site as a “white elephant” 
just a few months after the Olympics, but that did not stop the regional newspaper, the 
SMH (for example, “Empty Olympic stadium” (Moore and Verrender, 2001)). The 
                                                  
128 Olympic Games from 15 September to 1 October and Paralympic Games from 18 to 29 October in 2000. 
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contrast between the 400,000 crowds during the Olympic Games and the empty space 
after the Games was further highlighted by the international media. CNN, for example, 
reported on the SOP in July, 2001 as follows: 
 
“… Despite the stunning sell-out success of the 2000 Games, Sydney's $200 
million Olympic Stadium is shaping up as a white elephant of mammoth 
proportions…While the massive Stadium Australia has managed to secure 
some major events like international rugby games and football (soccer) 
matches, what it lacks is an anchor sporting team that can keep the crowds 
coming back…The problems are not confined to the main stadium. Most days, 
this sprawling complex resembles little more than a state-of the art ghost 
town.”129 
 
Considering the legacy of the SOP was one of the OCA’s responsibilities during the 
preparation phase, but as indicated in Chapter 5, little had been done except for the 
plans to downsize the Olympic venues. Facing this situation, the OCA created various 
cultural events at the SOP in the beginning of 2001 in order to attract people, but this 
failed to attract citizens’ attention, and visits to the Olympic site were far below the 
20,000 to 30,000 a day which were considered necessary to make the SOP viable 
(Peatling and Jacobsen, 2001). The problem of the post-Olympic site was also well 
recognised in the regional parliament. The Premier of NSW, Bob Carr, defended the 
post-SOP by using the example of the Darling Harbour, the redevelopment project 
located in the centre of the city of Sydney, which as Carr noted took some years to 
revitalise the regenerated area. Carr, however, was concerned about the location of the 
SOP, which is away from the CBD, and addressed the urgent need for a development 
plan for the post-Olympic site (Ryle and Kerr, 2001). In addition to the emptiness of the 
SOP, the public subsidies to sustain the Olympic site for the longer term were of great 
concern to the NSW citizens as well as politicians. The OCA envisaged that it would 
take at least ten years for the SOP to become a self-sufficient site (Peatling and Jacobsen, 
2001), and this triggered discussions in the NSW Cabinet to consider the various 
options for the utilisation of the post-Olympic site (Peatling, 2001). 
 
 
                                                  
129 CNN, 11 July 2001. 
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7.1.2 Initial post-Olympic visions of the OCA 
While some problems were identified in the post-Olympic site, the OCA issued the first 
post-Olympic masterplan, the “Vision for beyond 2000”, in December 2000, which 
became the starting point for further elaboration of the spatial planning of the SOP in 
the coming decade. The document indicated a broad vision for the future development 
of the SOP, without providing concrete plans for the Olympic site. It certainly echoed 
various concerns of the media and the NSW Parliament at the time, and Michael Knight, 
the Olympic Minister of the Sydney Games, stated: 
 
“…the sports facilities alone are not enough to guarantee the viability of 
Sydney Olympic Park in the future. Many other developments, working in 
harmony with the existing facilities at Sydney Olympic Park, will be required if 
the taxpayers of NSW are to realise the full value of their investment in the site” 
(OCA, 2000, p. 2).  
 
The uncertainty of sustaining the SOP with only the sporting venues and the need for 
solutions to avoid public subsidies were central in the public criticism. The first 
post-Olympic document clearly attempted to tackle these issues, and three key concepts, 
which can be understood as vital elements of a “mixed-use” urban strategy, were 
pointed out. Firstly, the “Vision for beyond 2000” stressed that a “diverse range of 
activities” were needed for the post-Olympic site to become a daily attraction. These 
included various kinds of urban activities ranging from special events to daily office 
work, in order to bring life and vibrancy in to the post-Olympic Park. Secondly, related 
to the above vision, “cohesive development” between different uses, in particular 
coexistence of sports and commercial facilities, was recognised as a crucial factor for 
the SOP to maximise the significant Olympic legacy and future potential. Thirdly, 
financial “self-sufficiency” was raised as a crucial issue, and justified the need for 
commercial development. The document once more suggested that the commercial 
development should cohere with other uses within the site. The “mixed-use” urban 
precincts had been considered even before Sydney won the bid for the 2000 Games in 
1993 (see Chapter 3), but this idea was invisible throughout the post-bid phase (see 
Chapter 4). The “Vision for beyond 2000” suggested a re-consideration of the 
mixed-use urban strategy for the SOP. 
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Although the first post-Olympic masterplan was only thirteen pages long, as Michael 
Knight suggested during my interview, these concepts were carried through to the 
following masterplans,130 and cohesion between sports and commercial uses in the 
mixed-use development at the post-Olympic site was repeatedly emphasised in the next 
several years.  
    
“…over the next 20 years, 25 years, you will see a lot more commercial 
development, you will see a lot more residential development. Key for us is to 
get the balance right between those two things, commercial / residential and 
great sports events that happen here, and also great parklands.”131 
 
While the key concepts for post-Olympic development were clearly suggested, their 
application in the spatial strategy was only vaguely demonstrated in the “Vision for 
beyond 2000”. The OCA drastically limited its focus to the central part of the SOP 
including the adjacent industrial site, and proposed to subdivide five precincts within 
the SOP: Brickpit, East, Town Centre, Core and South West (Fig. 7-1). The OCA 
identified the fundamental character of each area, but it was clear that this was only 
indicative rather than practical, and more in-depth spatial planning of the post-SOP was 
yet to come.  
 
In the wake of the “Vision for beyond 2000”, which set out the key planning concept for 
the post- SOP, the OCA asked four architects how the idea of “mixed-use”, “everyday 
life” and “self-sufficiency” could be spatially implemented. The four architects were 
also requested to consider the design solutions for integrating the post-Olympic SOP 
into the urban tissues and transportation strategy. Although various studies were 
conducted before the bid, regarding the mixed-use development, the invited architects 
were asked to refer to the 1995 masterplan issued by the OCA as a point of reference 
and other past studies were largely ignored.  
 
The invited architects proposed various fascinating spatial concepts which they 
considered necessary to sustain the SOP as a vibrant area for the longer term. Tony Caro 
Architects, for example, was of the view that the new Homebush Bay should become “a 
                                                  
130 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008. 
131 Comment in the video “Sydney Olympic Park, from the Beginning…” by the SOPA 
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piece of the city” and achieve a human scale by inserting new gentle buildings between 
the large scale Olympic physical forms. They represented their idea as the classic 
juxtaposition of public and private architectural language (OCA, 2001b, pp. 51–61) (Fig. 
7-2). Meanwhile, Lacoste + Stevenson shed light on the urban “rhythm” of a day, and 
demonstrated how new additional urban programmes such as work and retail would fit 
with the uneven rhythm of sporting events (Fig. 7-3).132 Although they did not provide 
an idea of how these rhythms would be created spatially across the site, their proposal 
was a direct response to the OCA’s concern about “urban vibrancy” in the post-SOP 
(OCA, 2001b, pp. 39–48). 
 
Each architect proposed various ideas to revitalise the SOP, and they once more stressed 
the “mixed-use” strategy. As a crucial implementing strategy for achieving a mixed-use 
post-Olympic site, they proposed to focus on new high-density development around the 
rail station in the Town Centre and to enhance the residential development in the 
post-Olympic SOP. These two ideas became influential factors in the subsequent 
masterplanning, although they were not developed as imaginatively as the architects 
originally envisioned (Searle, 2008b, p. 96).   
 
7.1.3 Establishment of the Sydney Olympic Park Authority 
The OCA was eventually dissolved at the end of June 2002, and the new statuary body, 
the SOPA, was established on 1 July 2001. The responsibility of the SOPA was defined 
in the Sydney Olympic Park Authority Act 2001 as follows: 
 
“(a) to promote, co-ordinate and manage the orderly and economic 
development and use of Sydney Olympic Park, including the provision and 
management of infrastructure, 
(b) to promote, co-ordinate, organise, manage, undertake, secure, provide and 
conduct cultural, sporting, educational, commercial, tourist, recreational, 
entertainment and transport activities and facilities, 
(c) to protect and enhance the natural and cultural heritage of Sydney Olympic 
Park, particularly the Millennium Parklands, 
                                                  
132 It is certain that their conception of designing in relation to time in the urban area was influenced by the Dutch 
architect Rem Koolhaas’s early work on the Yokohama Project, in which Koolhaas proposed to bring various new 
activities to vitalise the fish market area where the peak activities are limited in a specific duration of a day (see 
Koolhaas, R. (1995) S,M.L,XL, Monacelli.). 
192 
(d) to provide, operate and maintain public transport facilities within Sydney 
Olympic Park, 
(e) to liaise with and maintain arrangements with Olympic organisations, such 
as the International Olympic Committee and the Australian Olympic 
Committee Incorporated” 
(NSW Government, 2001). 
 
As the Act clearly stated, enhancing the mixed-use strategy with economic development 
in mind was fundamental to the role of the SOPA. In order to transfer the valuable 
knowledge of the SOP, most of the staff in the previous OCA were transferred to the 
new authority, and the director-general of the OCA, David Richmond, became the first 
chairman of the SOPA. Richmond had been keen on the need for a legacy organisation 
even before the Games, and he was also a great promoter of integrating the SOPA into 
the wider regional context (see Chapter 5). In this respect, the appointment of Richmond 
as chair of the post-Olympic organisation was considered a rational choice for the SOPA. 
Furthermore, the creation of the SOPA was imperative to empower a single organisation 
to take care of the Olympic site in the post-Olympic political climate in the region. 
Michael Knight suggested that the financial resources given to the OCA greatly 
decreased compared to the preparation phase. He stated that:  
 
“In a preparation for the Olympic Games, the Olympic coordination authority 
became very powerful within government. It had formal power to direct other 
government departments. It pretty much got any resources it wanted. But when 
the Games were over, the power was gone. It had an impact on post Olympic 
planning, because the body that was trying to do the planning for the Sydney 
Olympic Park, the remains of the OCA, was no longer a powerful body within 
government. If you’re going to have something done, it’s much rather done 
when the body is powerful rather than when the body is essentially powerless. 
And so that impacted the resources that were available, and impacted on a lot 
of things.”133 
 
Knight argued that the OCA had difficulty in implementing the post-Olympic 
masterplan due to the limited financial resources, and it was imperative to renew the 
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organisation and establish a certain political power in the regional government.  
 
7.1.4 Post-Olympic Masterplan 2002 
Following the two initial post-Olympic documents issued by the OCA, the SOPA 
published the first in-depth masterplan, “Sydney Olympic Park, Masterplan 2002”, in 
May 2002 to provide a framework for further development of the post-Olympic site.134 
It proposed a spatial development strategy over 10 to 15 years (up to 2012–2017), based 
on identification of the post-Olympic problems as well as the potential for the site. The 
2002 masterplan intended to establish the SOP as “a special event precinct and 
mixed-use centre” in Western Sydney by suggesting that it should become Sydney’s 
premier destination for various events, as well as having employment-generating uses 
(SOPA, 2002, pp. 15–16, p. 53). Although the 2002 masterplan tried to combine two 
different concepts, it had certain constraints.  
 
Firstly, as the fundamental spatial layout was established by the 1995 masterplan for the 
Olympic Games, the way of distributing different functions and areas available for new 
developments were spatially limited. The grid patterned road system installed in the 
SOP also strictly defined the boundaries of different parcels of land. Thus, as inherited 
from the 1995 Olympic masterplan and the initial post-Olympic document, “Vision 
beyond 2000”, the 2002 masterplan subdivided the Olympic site into the eight precincts, 
and provided a distinct land-use in each precinct (SOPA, 2002, p. 79) (Figs. 7-4 and 5). 
The two distinctive uses, sports and employment-generating uses, were also clearly 
confined in different precincts in the post-Olympic SOP. The Authority proposed to 
concentrate new development around the railway station (Town Centre precinct 
indicated as “A” in Fig. 7-4), while it aimed to enhance the sporting and entertainment 
activities in a separate area of the SOP where the legacy sporting facilities were located 
(Northern Events (C), Sydney Showground (D), and Southern Events (F) in Fig. 7-4). 
 
Secondly, the 2002 masterplan was constrained regarding the employment and 
commercial development targets, due to potential conflicts with the surrounding urban 
centres. The masterplan targeted a daily workforce population of 10,000 people, with 
110,000m2 floor space for commercial development concentrated in the Town Centre 
                                                  
134 Prior to this, the OCA had issued the draft version in June 2001, and the final masterplan was adapted by the 
minister of planning of the NSW. Refer to OCA (2001a) Sydney Olympic Park : Draft Post Olympic Masterplan, 
Homebush Bay, NSW. 
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precinct. Yet the OCA initially recognised that 20,000 to 30,000 people daily were 
needed to sustain the SOP for the longer term, and the target number proposed in the 
masterplan is much smaller than this. While the SOPA identified that business and 
commercial uses were complementary to the functions of the region, it also stressed that 
they should not significantly impact on the future commercial development in the 
Parramatta CBD. In a similar vein, retail uses also had development constraints as they 
might have obstructed the viability of other retail centres such as Burwood (SOPA, 2002, 
p. 17). Thus, although the 2002 post-Olympic Park masterplan envisioned a “mixed-use” 
town centre as the means of creating a “diverse range of activities” and 
“self-sufficiency”, the ambition had certain constraints due to the need for cohesive 
development in the region.  
 
 
7.2 The development of the SOP since 2001 
 
7.2.1 New construction 
The SOPA adapted the final version of the post-Olympic masterplan in July 2002, and 
this became the initial planning framework for new construction projects within the 
SOP boundary. The process of implementing the vision proposed in the 2002 
post-Olympic masterplan took time, and by the end of 2012, the initial vision of the 
post-Olympic site developed in 2002 had not fully materialised (Fig. 7-6). 
 
The commercial development was commenced by selling the surplus land of the SOP to 
private developers, and this provided the crucial financial resources for the SOPA to run 
the post-Olympic site. Yet the story of the development of the commercial projects in 
the SOP reveals the difficulty of creating them from scratch. The first commercial 
development in the post-Olympic site was an extension of the existing low-rise office 
block in the eastern side of the Australian Centre. As the images of the SOP before the 
2000 Olympics showed, this high-tech industrial park was developed a long time ago. 
After the Olympics, the GPT Group, a private real estate company, acquired the first 
building in July 2001, and subsequently developed three low-rise office buildings. The 
Group finally developed them as the QUAD Business Park with 23,400 square metres 
of lettable space in a 31,900 square metre site (Fig. 7-7). The GPT Group considered 
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that “the Quad Business Park is located in the Sydney Olympic Park precinct which 
provides tenants with a unique amenity in an iconic location” and suggested that “the 
location is particularly attractive to tenants wishing to offer their staff the opportunity 
for work/life balance”.135 In a similar vein, the existing hotel business established 
before the 2000 Games was also expanded. Novotel and Ibis have remained opposite 
the site of the ANZ Stadium and the aquatic centre, and another hotel, the Pullman 
Hotel, was built at an adjacent site in 2005. The 18-storey hotel was the first five-star 
hotel opened in Western Sydney since the 2000 Olympics (Fig. 7-8). Thus, the first 
major commercial development was begun by extending the existing buildings, rather 
than creating anything from scratch.  
 
The slow pace of development in the post-Olympic Park in Sydney was widely 
recognised in the realms of both Olympic research and practice,136 but according to 
Richard Cashman, it was only after 2005 that new construction in the post-Olympic site 
was accelerated and changed the skyline of the SOP (Cashman, 2011, pp. 89–90). The 
opening of the first Commonwealth Bank office in 2007, and subsequent expansion in 
2008, marked the first commercial development from scratch, and it became a 
significant moment in the development of the post-Olympic site for the SOPA. The 
seven storeys and total 280 metre length (including the public space between the two 
buildings) of the three office blocks not only changed the physical setting of the Town 
Centre, but also brought in 3,500 daily staff. The Commonwealth Bank opened the new 
workplace in the SOP in order to be located in its strategic growth area, Western Sydney, 
and to create a campus style office, which could not be realised in the existing CBD 
area. The Bank further mentioned that building a state-of-the-art office complex would 
create a synergy between the Bank and the SOP’s “green” concept.137 Along with the 
creation of the new workplace, various restaurants and shops were opened on the 
ground floor, in order to support daily activities. The opening of the Commonwealth 
Bank office triggered further urban development of the Town Centre. The small pocket 
park in front of the office, called Jacaranda Square, was opened in 2009, and another 
office block on the opposite side of the Bank office was completed in 2010.  
 
                                                  
135 http://www.quadbusinesspark.com.au/Core/Content/AboutQuadBusinessPark/Content4431.aspx?menuUT=1. 
136 London’s Olympic authority, for example, considered the Sydney’s post-Olympic development to be slow 
delivery. Olympic Delivery Authority (2007), Design and Access Statement, Olympic, Paralympic & Legacy 
Transformation Planning Applications, p. 47). 
137 http://www.commbank.com.au/about-us/news/media-releases/2006/120706-news-workplace.html. 
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In addition to these commercial developments in the Town Centre precinct, a new 
residential development was planned and commenced at the adjacent site, the eastern 
side of the Australian Centre precinct. The residential development had been planned 
since the first post-Olympic masterplan issued in 2002, but its realisation took some 
time. The developer that initially planned to develop the residential project eventually 
withdrew from it, as it decided to focus on the city rather than the suburbs (Cashman, 
2011, p.103). Another developer, Billbergia, took over the luxury residential tower 
development. The developer planned a three-stage development, and the first tower was 
completed in 2012. The second tower, named the One Australia Tower, will be the 
highest residential tower in Western Sydney and is due in 2014. As its advertisements 
suggest, one of the target groups of customers for this residential development was 
people employed in the SOP, and the lifestyle of close proximity between home and 
work has been promoted as follows: 
 
“In most parts of the world you have to travel far to enjoy such recreational, 
entertainment and sporting facilities, but at One Australia Avenue they are on 
your doorstep. […] It is a great place to work and live, so demand for 
accommodation continues to be strong as Sydney Olympic Park evolves into a 
major suburb.”138   
 
It is certain that new residential development was planned as “exclusive” 
accommodation, and it seems that there will not be any space for the affordable housing 
which the 2002 masterplan intended to include in the post-Olympic SOP. While the 
developer has fully utilised the advantage of the close relationship with sports to add 
value, a mixed-use strategy, in particular the combination of sports events and 
commercial development, has been emphasised by the SOPA in order to meet its 
management cost expectations of the post-Olympic site. Some sports representatives in 
the SOP also welcomed these new developments, considering that they also helped to 
raise funds for them (Cashman, 2011, p. 112). In this respect, the juxtaposition of these 
two land-uses created a “give-and-take” relationship, although some of the SOPA 
planners noticed that the proximity between sports stadia and residential buildings 
needed special care, in order to avoid disruption of daily life caused by traffic and noise.  
 
                                                  
138 http://1australiaavenue.com.au/sydney-olympic-park-hits-new-heights#more-126. 
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7.2.2 Maximising the usability of inherited facilities   
While the post-Olympic masterplan put great emphasis on the post-Olympic SOP 
becoming a mixed-use urban centre, the SOPA recognised that new developments in the 
post-Olympic site would take some time to materialise, and the SOP initially needed to 
survive with only the existing physical elements in the Park. The post-Olympic 
masterplan also clearly suggested that it was imperative for the SOPA to maximise the 
usability of these venues to maintain the SOP as a major event area. Thus, the SOPA and 
venue operators in each sporting venue needed great efforts to maximise the existing 
facilities in the post-Olympic site (Shirai, 2009) (Fig. 7-9). For example, the SOPA 
encouraged the SOP to become a major site for business events. Yet before major 
commercial development happened in the post-Olympic site, there were only one hotel 
and a number of sports facilities left in the SOP. It is obvious that there was a limit on 
the capacity to host major business events. Nevertheless, the sporting facilities left in 
the post-Olympic site were utilised as a venue for business meetings and conferences 
(Fig. 7-10). In this respect, the legacy facility in the SOP was no longer 
mono-functional architecture, but included multiple, sometimes unexpected, uses; the 
architect Bernard Tschumi calls such multiple uses “cross programming” or “hyper 
programming”. According to Tschumi, utilising architecture for an initially unplanned 
purpose or juxtaposing different uses in a single architecture would be necessary in the 
age of uncertainty (Tschumi, 1999). In the case of the SOP, in particular, right after the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games, before the post-Olympic development materialised, it 
was imperative to look for “cross programming” or “hyper programming” to maximise 
the venues and generate various activities in the vast space.  
  
Thus, maximisation of the inherited buildings in the post-Olympic site was crucial for 
the SOPA from the beginning of the management of the post-Olympic site, and the 
authority desperately sought various types of events, including sporting, entertainment 
and business events as well as community events. As a result of extensive effort to 
utilise the sporting facilities, the number of visitors who came to the SOP increased 
(Figs. 7-11 and 12).  
 
The SOPA in particular managed to secure various international and national premier 
sporting and entertainment events after the Olympic Games. For example, it secured the 
hosting of the Rugby World Cup in 2003 in the post-Olympic stadium (Stadium 
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Australia, later changed to the ANZ Stadium) and the Swimming World Cup in 2005 at 
the Aquatic Centre. The Medi Bank International Tennis Tournament also moved its 
venue to the Tennis Centre in the SOP from 2000. Furthermore, the controversial V8 
Car racing has been staged annually since 2009, despite great opposition by the 
residents and even the officers from the SOPA, due to the great risk of damaging the 
natural resources of the parklands, which has been considered one of the great legacies 
of the Olympic Games. Yet it should be noted that the increase in events was 
accomplished through the intense competition over the limited event programme within 
the Sydney region. Regarding the sports and entertainment events, the SOP was in 
competition with the existing sporting events precinct located in the CBD area, the 
Sydney Cricket Ground. As the popularity of the SOP as a major event precinct 
increased, it decreased the profitability of the Sydney Cricket Ground (Searle, 2002, pp. 
851–854). In a similar vein, the SOP has competed with the existing business centre 
close to the CBD, the Darling Harbour redevelopment site, for business events. Darling 
Harbour was redeveloped in the late 1980s to contain a number of convention exhibition 
halls, and was used as one of the venues for the 2000 Olympic Games. While Darling 
Harbour promoted its close proximity to the Sydney CBD, the SOP pointed out its 
uniqueness as a healthier work environment away from the CBD (Cashman, 2011, p. 
110). Both developments were initiated by the State Government, but it seems to be 
clear that events in the SOP could lead to the competition with already established 
events precincts.  
 
7.2.3 Further challenges  
Although it took some time, the mixed-use vision for the post-Olympic site proposed in 
the beginning of the 2000s was gradually realised, and the construction of new 
buildings and the hosting of various events have been celebrated in the SOPA’s annual 
reports as evidence of the transformation. Yet there are still various challenges for the 
SOPA to overcome, in particular on “cohesive development” and being “self-sufficient”, 
both of which were key concepts for post-Olympic development.  
 
Cohesive development 
Firstly, despite the authority’s great emphasis on the materialisation of the “mixed-use” 
urban core, how it has been embedded into the post-Olympic site has been questioned. 
As the post-Olympic masterplan shows, the post-Olympic site was divided into different 
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“precincts”, and different land-use strategies were given for each area. Post-Olympic 
development has been conducted based on this precinct strategy, and this led to uneven 
developments throughout the SOP. While development in the Town Centre and adjacent 
site intensified, to bring the daily workers and residents into the SOP, the spatial 
character of events precincts, where various legacy stadia are located, stayed the same, 
although some post-Olympic developments were expected in these areas. Importantly, 
there is little interaction between these two contrasting areas. Thus, there is a question 
as to whether the post-Olympic development created a truly mixed-use urban area, or 
just a juxtaposition of different land-uses.  
 
“Cohesive development” in the post-Olympic site is also questionable when we look at 
“time” and daily life in the SOP. The interview with the SOPA planning officers pointed 
out that managing “everyday life”, in particular coordinating the peak time of different 
uses in the SOP, has been a great concern in the post-Olympic site139 (also suggested in 
(Breggen, 2008, pp. 122–124). Each precinct is operated with a different rhythm 
throughout a day / month / year, and this also accelerated the uneven vibrancy of the 
post-Olympic site. The Events precincts, for example, have been utilised differently 
throughout the year. Fig. 7-13 clearly indicates the uneven distribution of the events in 
the ANZ Stadium and Acer Arena. In a peak month, July or August, there were events in 
both stadia on most weekends, but in the summertime (December-February), few events 
were organised. In fact, in December 2007, no events were organised in the stadia. 
Furthermore, the events in the Events precincts mostly happen on Friday or on the 
weekends and it remains quiet on other days of the week (Fig. 7-14). Such events also 
occupy only a couple of hours. Thus, it is hard to create continuous liveliness in the 
precinct throughout a day, week and year, in contrast to the SOPA’s promise to create a 
24-hour, 365-day vibrant urban area.  
 
Meanwhile, new commercial developments have created daily work in the 
post-Olympic site; in particular, the opening of the Commonwealth Bank office was 
seen as a significant change. Yet these activities also have certain rhythms throughout a 
day and month, with the vast majority of activity taking place during office hours on 
weekdays. Outside of working time, the commercial precincts seemed to be empty. 
Even during working hours, most people stayed in their offices, and the precincts 
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remained quiet outside of commuting and lunch times (Fig. 7-15). In contrast with the 
Town Centre, the parklands attracted most visitors during the weekends, and various 
events have also been organised at weekends. In addition to these different rhythms in 
the SOP, when major events were staged in the Events precincts, there has been crucial 
disruption of activities in other precincts, because of the noise and traffic control. Thus, 
designing time in the post-Olympic site has been a crucial issue along with the 
implementation of a mixed-use urban core, but it seems to me that the SOP still lacks a 
strategy for how to coordinate these different rhythms; Lefebvre’s term “eurhythmia”, 
or association of different rhythms (Lefebvre, 2004, pp. 67–69) applies here. There is 
also no strategy to create a sense of “everyday life” in the post-Olympic site. I will 
therefore argue that the mixed-use approach should be not only a matter of how the 
different functions are distributed spatially but also of how they are experienced across 
time.  
 
Self-sufficiency 
In addition to the “cohesive development” concept in the post-Olympic site, another 
initial idea of the post-SOP, “self-sufficiency”, needs to be questioned. The aspiration of 
creating a mixed-use urban core was to make the post-Olympic site financially 
“self-sufficient”. The SOPA has therefore extensively released State-owned land to the 
private sector either as long-term leases or free-hold sales. Fig. 7-16 shows the changes 
in land sales and lease activities of the SOP from 2001 to 2010. It is clear that the 
income from land sales and leases increased from 2001, although there was not a 
continuous increase throughout the period. 140  When comparing 2001–2002 with 
2009–2010 it can be seen that the revenue from land sales and leases almost doubled 
(Fig. 7-16).  
 
The involvement of the private sector in large scale projects has been widely recognised, 
and one of the arguments for seeking public-private partnerships is to reduce public 
expenditure (for example, Flyvbjerg, 2003). In the case of the SOP, there were some 
variables regarding the public subsidies from the NSW Government, yet when 
comparing 2001–2002 with 2009–2010, it is clear that the amount of the public 
contribution was nearly same (AUD 36.3 million in 2001–2002 and AUD 33.6 million 
in 2009–2010), while the revenue from the land sales and lease in the same period 
                                                  
140 The income during the 2005 to 2008 financial years includes the land sales of the Lidcombe Hospital site.  
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increased from AUD 9.4 to 17.5 million (Fig. 7-17). 
 
What happened in the SOP can be considered to contradict the typical public-private 
partnership in which the financial burden on the government should gradually decrease. 
Yet this may not be surprising when the strategy before the Games is considered. When 
the State Government used a public-private partnership in constructing some of the 
competition venues in the SOP during the preparation phase, it intended to achieve more 
with the private money rather than reduce its own financial contribution. I will argue 
that this funding strategy towards the mega-project by the State Government was 
inherited after the Games. Harvey suggests that recent urban governance in developed 
countries in particular has changed from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 
1989). But in the case of the governance of the SOP, as the State Government has been 
greatly involved regarding the finance, its strategy can be understood as a mixture of 
entrepreneurialism and managerialism, or in Glen Searle’s terms, a mixture of 
neo-corporatisation and neo-statism (Searle, 2008b). Thus, the application of the 
mixed-use strategy was not directly related to the “self-sufficiency” in the post-SOP, 
and realisation of independence from the public subsides still remained as a challenge 
for the SOPA.  
 
 
7.3 Revision of the post-Olympic masterplan 
 
7.3.1 Vision 2025  
The post-Olympic development in the SOP was conducted based on the masterplan 
issued in 2002, but while implementing the strategy the SOPA updated the future vision 
for the Olympic site. New challenges, including the need to synchronise with the 
regional development strategy, were major forces to push further modification of the 
masterplan. The first revision was commenced just one year after the publication of the 
2002 masterplan. The new masterplan was based on the previous 2002 masterplan 
(SOPA, 2003, p. 19), but there were various reasons for the update. Firstly, as the 
director of planning of the SOPA, Craig Bargley, clearly suggested, the greatest trigger 
for preparation of the Vision 2025 was the need for synchronisation with the ongoing 
preparation of the new Metropolitan Strategy, which was eventually published in 
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2005.141 The new Metropolitan Strategy, called “City of Cities, A Plan for Sydney’s 
Future”, would aim to provide the regional spatial development strategy for the coming 
25 years, while the previous SOP masterplan had targeted only a 7–10-year timeframe 
(up to 2012). The SOPA therefore needed to demonstrate the equivalent timeframe 
vision for the SOP. The Vision 2025 extended its timeframe to 2025, and also 
accommodated the State’s target of employment and housing provision, which expected 
12,000 new jobs and 17,000 dwellings in the Auburn Council area by 2031 (NSW 
Government, 2007). Secondly, the new vision stemmed from the problems in the field. 
As discussed in the previous part of this chapter, the SOPA recognised the uneven use of 
space and time in the SOP, and considered the need for a “critical mass of people that 
can generate a viable and vibrant town 24 hours a day, 7 days a week” (SOPA, 2004a, p. 
19).  
 
Against this backdrop, “Vision 2025” was published in 2004 to seek planning consent 
from the NSW Government for its proposal to intensify the mixed-use urban strategy 
(SOPA, 2004c, p. 10), Following the ambitious employment and residential targets set 
in the regional strategy, the SOPA’s targets were also set drastically higher. While the 
2002 masterplan designated 10,000 daily workers and 3,000 residents in the 
post-Olympic site, the Vision 2025 intended to increase this to 24,500 daily workers and 
25,000 residents by 2025 (SOPA, 2004c, p. 14). The strategy also mentioned the 
inclusion of affordable housing, which was suggested in the 2002 masterplan but not 
fully implemented as suggested earlier. The changes to the targets for employment and 
housing also led to modification of the spatial strategy. While the 2002 masterplan 
focused on commercial developments in the Town Centre, the Vision 2025 proposed to 
extend this development focus beyond the Town Centre (Fig. 7-18).  
 
When we compare the land-use plans proposed in the Masterplan 2002 and the Vision 
2025, they show a clear transformation from a low density to a high-density model, in 
particular with regard to the number of residential blocks / towers. While there were still 
open spaces scattered across the previous plan, these areas were filled with buildings in 
the new plan. In addition to the greater density of the site, there were other crucial 
differences between the two plans. The 2002 plan fundamentally did not touch the 
Events precincts, but the new plan proposed to insert additional functions, in order to 
                                                  
141 Interview with Craig Bargley on 24 November 2008. 
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reduce the empty spaces between the venues and use these areas more frequently. This 
strategy stemmed from the fundamental problems which the post-Olympic site had 
suffered, and responded to many comments obtained through customer surveys which 
the SOPA had undertaken. Craig Bargley, a director of planning, and Darlene van der 
Breggen, an executive manager of design at the SOPA, stated:  
 
“By our customers’ survey, we know that one of the issues that visitors to the 
Sydney Olympic park do not feel comfortable with is the grand space around 
the stadium. […] We have looked at some stadium developments in the USA, 
where the stadium is built in the city centre and offers an active façade to the 
city.”142 
 
The Events precincts have been considered the great legacy to be inherited, but in the 
Vision 2025, the SOPA changed that view, and began to see it as a part of the city. The 
new masterplan therefore emphasised the post-Olympic site as a new “town” rather than 
a major event destination for the region (Fig. 7-19).  
 
Furthermore, the long-term spatial strategy of the Vision 2025 proposed to replace the 
existing industrial site, the Australian Centre, with a new residential area in the future 
(Fig. 7-20). The Australian Centre existed even before the SOP was created, and 
although it hardly cohered with other parts of development in the SOP, it played a 
significant role in providing employment opportunities in Western Sydney. Yet, due to 
the ambitious target of creating new residential blocks, the Centre will disappear in the 
near future. In a similar vein, while the previous plan kept all sporting facilities in the 
SOP, the new plan proposed to change some minor facilities so that they would have 
other functions. All of these replacements, or in other words the disappearance of the 
past, stemmed from the SOPA’s great intention to be part of the Metropolitan Strategy 
by making a major contribution to the ambitious target for housing provision in Western 
Sydney. Another motivation was the authority’s objective to maximise the financial 
returns by selling the surplus land to developers, and decreasing the degree to which the 
SOP would be dependent on the State Government.  
 
7.3.2 Masterplan 2030 
                                                  
142 Interview with the author on 27 November 2008. 
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Ten years after the Sydney Games were concluded, the SOPA officially launched the 
new “Masterplan 2030” in 2010, following the public display of the draft version in 
2008 .143 The previous masterplans had covered the entire SOP area, but the new plan 
focused only on Urban Core area. Nevertheless, the new documents suggest that the 
new masterplan was built on the previous masterplans (SOPA, 2010, pp. 20–24). All the 
post-Olympic masterplans addressed the “mixed-use” strategy and this was continued in 
the Masterplan 2030, but the concept of “self-sufficiency” was not emphasised in the 
new document. This reflected the spatial strategy of the Masterplan 2030, and creates a 
great contrast with the previous Vision 2025. The Vision 2025 intensified new 
development, residential development in particular, across the site, but the Masterplan 
2030 took a more compact approach by concentrating on different uses in different sites 
(Figs 7-21 and 22). There were various reasons for this fundamental shift of spatial 
strategy. 
 
Firstly, the influence of the Metropolitan Strategy lessened in designating the land-use 
strategy, compared to the previous Vision 2025. One of the great intentions of the 
previous plan had been to integrate the SOP into the Metropolitan Strategy. The SOPA 
therefore needed to demonstrate its capacity to meet the employment and residential 
targets set by the strategy. Yet, at the time of issuing the new plan, the Metropolitan 
Strategy had already been published and recognised the SOP as one of the specialised 
centres in the Sydney region. Thus, the pressure on the SOPA was reduced, and this was 
reflected in the planning target of the Masterplan 2030. The 2030 plan drastically 
decreased the residential target from the 25,000 residents in the Vision 2025 to just 
14,000. Michael Knight, the former Olympic Minister before the Games and a 
Chairman of the SOP since 2008, also addressed the need for appropriate development 
patterns for the post-SOP rather than blindly applying a high-density urban model to the 
site (Figs 7-23).  
 
Secondly, the SOPA also found physical constraints which would prevent the future 
development. The site currently used for the golf practice field but proposed for a new 
residential area, for example, was found to be unsuitable for residential use due to heavy 
site contamination. Craig Bargley, the director of planning in the SOPA, suggested that 
                                                  
143 Refer to SOPA (2008), Sydney Olympic Park, Draft Masterplan 2030, Homebush Bay, NSW. 
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some of the site remediation works had not been fully conducted for the Games.144 The 
fast-track planning before the Games created some physical constraints for the 
post-Olympic development, and the lack of an in-depth legacy vision was another factor 
contributing to the problematic conditions in the area. For example, as the former 
planning director of the OCA, David Churches, suggests, the OCA established the 
pipeline in the most convenient location for the construction because there was no 
in-depth post-Olympic masterplan.145  
 
Thirdly, the SOPA also faced difficulties in replacing the existing uses with others. The 
Vision 2025 proposed to replace the existing Australian Centre with new mixed-use 
residential blocks in the longer term, but the SOPA found that the existing leaseholders 
had a different vision for utilising the site. They wanted to maximise the opportunity of 
the business park, which was one of the biggest in Western Sydney, and preferred to 
maintain the site as a mono-functional area rather than a mixed-use residential area. 
Thus, the SOPA recognised that mixed-use would theoretically work in the 
post-Olympic Park but it was difficult to realise in practice.146 Yet the Masterplan 2030 
still proposed to convert the southern part of the Australian Centre, which was 
developed as a centre for the sports institutions in the NSW region, to residential use in 
the future. Bargley and Breggen pointed out the powerful voice of this concentrated 
sports community and the difficulty in replacing the established land-use.  
 
This more mature relationship with the regional strategy and recognition of various 
constraints within the site led to a drastic change to the land-use plan, although the 
concept of “mixed-use” was kept as a key planning concept. Thus, instead of the 
speculative approach in the previous Vision 2025, the new Masterplan 2030 took a more 
practical approach, in which different land-uses were spatially organised with certain 
rationality, mediating different uses in the post-Olympic site, rather than just 
juxtaposing them. For example, the SOPA recognised the commercial area located 
between the Stadia precincts (previously called the Events precincts) and the future 
residential areas as a buffer zone mediating the major events and everyday life. The 
Masterplan 2030 also recognised the importance of educational functions in the 
post-Olympic site, which had been organised next to the commercial centre, and it 
                                                  
144 Interview with Craig Bargley on 27 November 2008. 
145 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009. 
146 Interview with Craig Bargley on 27 November 2008. 
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proposed to concentrate them in the areas where the legacy aquatic and athletic centres 
were located. In other words, the new masterplan proposed to extend the role of 
sporting venues by combining them with various educational uses. While the initial 
2002 post-Olympic masterplan vaguely identified the spatial strategy of a mixed-use 
urban core which Glen Searle called “tabula rasa for developers” (Searle, 2002), the 
latest Masterplan 2030 seeks a more determined approach based on the practical 
opportunities and constraints in the existing site. The 2030 document indeed contains 
many pages for planning “control and guidelines”, which strictly define various aspects 
of future development in the SOP. 
 
However, while the Masterplan 2030 provides in-depth spatial guidelines within the 
SOP, there is less focus on the relationship with the surroundings. Terms such as 
“neighbourhood” or “community” are used in the document, but they are mostly 
referring to areas within the SOP, and do not extend beyond the boundary (SOPA, 2010, 
p. 62). Thus, the question of integrating with the neighbourhood needs to be further 
investigated.  
 
 
7.4 The post-Olympic site within the regional and local context 
 
7.4.1 The SOP in the regional context 
 
2025 Metropolitan Strategy, “City of Cities, A Plan for Sydney’s Future”  
Before the Games, despite the intention to integrate the SOP into the wider regional 
context as stated by the OCA, and in particular by the director-general, David 
Richmond, the SOP did not become the part of the regional strategy (see Chapter 5). It 
was only after the Olympics that the SOP was formally integrated into Sydney’s 
regional strategy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the SOPA’s publication of the 
alternative post-Olympic masterplan, “Vision 2025”, was synchronised with the 
preparation of the new regional strategy, Metropolitan Strategy, “City of Cities, A Plan 
for Sydney’s Future”, published in 2005. It targeted the regional development up to 
2031, anticipated that 1.1 million more people would be added to Sydney’s population 
between 2004 and 2031 and emphasised the great demands on housing and employment 
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in the Sydney region. It also envisaged that inter-city competition among the global 
cities and the pressure of urban sustainability prevailing in the world would have a great 
impact on Sydney’s spatial development strategy. (NSW Government, 2005). The 
strategy identified Sydney as a city with various consolidated cities, by designating 29 
strategic centres which could be categorised into four different types, “global Sydney”, 
“regional city”, “specialised centre” and “major centre”. The strategy also identified 
three “global economic corridors” – North Sydney to Macquarie Park, city to airport 
and Parramatta to city – in order to connect the spatially isolated centres and create a 
strong network between them. “City of Cities” designated Parramatta as the second 
CBD in the Sydney Region, and the area connecting the existing Sydney CBD and 
Parramatta was emphasised as a crucial economic corridor for the region to develop 
further in the age of inter-city competition (Fig 7-24). 
 
Within the Metropolitan Strategy, the SOP was combined with the adjacent Rhodes area 
and recognised as a “specialised centre”.147 The Olympic Park / Rhodes specialised 
centre is also integrated into the Parramatta to city global economic corridor, which is 
defined as the “strong economic corridor from Macquarie Park through Olympic 
Park-Rhodes towards Parramatta to bring the higher skilled jobs to Western Sydney and 
complement the existing the Global Economic Corridor to the east” (NSW Government, 
2005, p. 66). The sub-regional strategy of “City of Cities” further identified that:  
 
“Olympic-Rhodes will develop as a major economic driver for the metropolitan 
area and will provide substantive new employment and dwelling opportunities, 
as well as retail and recreational facilities, for the Sydney Region” (NSW 
Government, 2007, p. 66). 
 
The SOP was now officially embedded into the future growth strategy of the Sydney 
region with ambitious employment and housing targets, but one of the problems 
recognised in implementing the concept of the SOP in the Parramatta–city global 
economic corridor was transport links. The Parramatta–city corridor has been set up on 
the Western Motorway, which was located next to the SOP, connecting the city and 
Parramatta. The railway connecting the existing and new CBDs runs slightly off the 
                                                  
147 A specialised centre is defined in the Strategy as a “place where such as hospitals, universities and major research 
and business centres perform the vital economic and employment roles across Sydney”. 
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Parramatta–city corridor, and there was no direct train connecting the Sydney CBD and 
the SOP. The shuttle rail system connecting the SOP and Lidcombe, the closest railway 
station on the Western Line of the City Rail network, was constructed for the Games, 
and this was the only rail connection to reach the SOP from other parts of the region. 
Yet, as the Metropolitan Strategy encouraged public transport as a means of sustainable 
development in the region, lack of direct public transportation has become critical to 
realising the idea of the Parramatta–city global economic corridor via the SOP.  
 
The Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036  
Renewal of the Metropolitan strategy was planned to take place every five years, and 
the updated version of the strategy, the “Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036”, was 
accordingly published in December 2010. The 2036 strategy fundamentally continued 
the previous strategy, but encouraged further growth or renewal of the city centres. It 
also promoted more a compact development model for city centres, and this triggered 
some changes in the status of the SOP as the specialised centre in the region. The 2036 
strategy specified that:  
 
“The 2005 Metropolitan Strategy identified Sydney Olympic Park–Rhodes as a 
single Specialised Centre due to their geographical proximity and potentially 
complementary role. However, each has developed as a distinct centre with an 
employment base of more than 8,000 jobs and they are now identified as two 
Specialised Centres. Over time, both Sydney Olympic Park and Rhodes have 
the potential to take on the role of more traditional Major Centres with a 
mixture of housing, retail, office–based employment and services 
complemented by good public transport and access to open space and 
recreational facilities” (NSW Government, 2010a, p. 67). 
 
This policy encouraged the SOP to be a more compact and self-contained specialised 
centre. Furthermore, the 2036 strategy once again put great emphasis on the further 
employment growth in Western Sydney, in which half of the new jobs would be created 
(NSW Government, 2010b, p. 5). This emphasis was certainly reflected in the increase 
of the employment target for the SOP from the current 4,000 (2006 base) to 23,000 by 
2036 (NSW Government, 2010a, p. 134). While other major centres also raised their 
employment targets (by an average of 49%), the SOP growth rate was one of the highest 
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in all the strategic centres in the region (475%). Thus, the regional strategy now 
recognised the SOP as a crucial strategic centre, not only as an event destination but 
also as an employment and residential centre. It therefore became highly important to 
integrate the SOP into the wider regional transport network, which the previous 
Metropolitan Strategy could not achieve.  
 
While the 2036 strategy aimed to strengthen the strategic centres in the region, it also 
emphasised further enhancement of the connections between city centres. Thus, the new 
Metropolitan Strategy proposed alteration of the major regional transport network, and 
this became a great opportunity to address the lack of direct public transport connecting 
the Sydney CBD and Parramatta via the SOP. Although they were not confirmed plans 
but rather speculation to optimise the potential of strategic centres, the 2036 Strategy 
suggested two major public transportation lines in the future, and the SOP was 
identified as a junction of two lines (Fig. 7-25). 
 
Some of these ideas have been studied in further detail. For example, the NSW and 
Commonwealth Government have been conducting a feasibility study for a new 
Western Metro Link since 2008. The new rail network would be independent of the 
existing City Rail network, with transfer opportunities at key points, and the 
construction project would be jointly funded by both governments (the Commonwealth 
(AUD 20 million) and NSW (AUD 10 million) Governments)148. The feasibility study 
identified that a quarter of a million commuters utilised the existing City Rail between 
Parramatta and Sydney CBD on a typical weekday, and another half million people 
would be added to this over the next 25 years. Thus, upgrading the existing rail system 
is imperative, and both governments considered that a new independent route through 
more potential areas including the SOP would match the regional development strategy  
(Fig. 7-26).  
 
Construction of the Western Metro Link would be beneficial to emerging centres such 
as the SOP, but at the same time would have negative impacts on some of the existing 
centres. The existing City Rail, which runs through the Strathfield, Lidcombe and 
Auburn stations, has a long history. These existing stations are located to the south of 
Parramatta Road, and the western suburbs have been developed around these stations. 
                                                  
148 http://www.minister.infrastructure.gov.au/aa/releases/2008/August/AA100_2008.aspx.  
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Yet a new rail link might leave these existing centres out of the growth corridor in the 
region. The Western Metro Link concept to construct an independent line was 
withdrawn in 2010, but the idea of upgrading the exiting City Rail Western Line with a 
direct connection to the SOP emerged. Better transportation links for the SOP would 
bring more development opportunities to the post-Olympic site, but inevitably mean a 
sacrifice of development opportunities for other (mostly less developed) existing areas.  
 
7.4.2 The SOP and the neighbourhoods  
As discussed above, the SOP has gradually embedded into the regional planning 
framework, establishing its role in the region. This leads to another question: how can 
such a politically focused place have a relationship with the local neighbourhoods? 
During my fieldwork in Sydney, one of my friends, who was born and grew up in 
Sydney, said to me that “the Olympic Park is like a spaceship!”149 Her view of the SOP 
as a “spaceship” suggests that the SOP is in danger of being independent from the 
neighbourhoods, or in Judd’s term, becoming a “bubble” in the urban tissue (Judd, 
1999). Integration of the SOP into the neighbourhoods is crucial, and this has been 
identified and discussed since the construction of the SOP. The previous OCA view of 
the integration of the SOP into the surrounding community was based on the catalytic 
effect of the SOP on the neighbours, rather than the SOP integrating the local 
characteristics into its site (see Chapter 5) (Fig. 7-27). How has this idea been inherited 
(or not) in the post-Olympic period? There are three adjacent neighbourhoods which 
were within the OCA’s planning control but excluded from the SOPA’s control. These 
three areas are now parts of Auburn Council’s planning boundary, and they have 
different social and spatial relationships with the post-Olympic site.  
 
Newington was the site of the Olympic village during the Games, and it became part of 
Auburn Council after the Games. Residences in Newington were developed with the 
post-Olympic physical transformation in mind, and converted into family homes after 
the Games in accordance with the concept of a self-contained community suburb with 
residential, retail and community facilities. As it was developed as a part of the SOP for 
the Games, the physical relationship between the two was well considered. Newington 
faces a rich landscape with the river in the SOP, and this has added a luxury resort 
atmosphere to it (Mivac Lend Lease Village Consortium, 2001, p. 31, p. 46). With these 
                                                  
149 Conversation with the author on 23 December 2008. 
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attractions, it has continuously attracted many upper–middle class buyers after the 
Games, and the number of residents in Newington increased 73%, while the population 
increase in the Auburn area was 16%.150 Yet it also became clear that, in terms of 
housing price, the expensive Newington area was greatly different from other areas in 
Auburn, which has been considered a place of socio-economic disadvantage. 151 
Furthermore, Newington and the adjacent industrial area also created a great contrast, 
and some of the residents in Newington have complained about this uncomfortable 
spatial relationship to Auburn Council. The Council however did not have any plans to 
mediate the two different uses, and the significant contrast between Newington and its 
adjacent industrial area remains.  
 
In a similar vein, Homebush West has developed a part of the land as luxury residences. 
Although Homebush West still contains various industrial uses and small shops, the new 
area’s spatial strategy published in 2004 designated it primarily as a waterfront 
residential area with provision of public space and community facilities for residents 
(NSW Department of Infrastructure Planning and Natural Resources, 2004). The 
land-use strategy for Homebush West was synchronised with the adjacent SOP, in 
particular the public space in the parklands, and in this respect, a positive interaction 
between the SOP and Homebush West was planned. Although Homebush West does not 
have any adjacent areas except for the SOP and Homebush Bay, it became apparent that 
the socio-spatial character of this geographically isolated area is greatly different from 
that of the other parts of Auburn.   
 
While these two newly developed areas have certain planning synchronicity with the 
SOP, but less socio-spatial connection with other parts of Auburn Council, the Carter 
Street Precinct, the area between the SOP and Western Motorway, has a different story. 
This area was within the planning boundary of the OCA before the Games, and the 
OCA tried to change the existing industrial use to another which would fit more with the 
SOP, while the Auburn authority wanted to maintain it. After the Olympics, planning 
power for the Carter Street Precinct was returned to the Auburn local government area, 
and a new masterplan for the area was prepared as a part of the Auburn development 
                                                  
150 Residents in the Newington increased from 2,794 in 2001 to 4,858 in 2006 (data obtained from Cashman, R. 
(2011), Sydney Olympic Park 2000 to 2010, History and Legacy, Walla Walla Press, Sydney, p. 176). Residents in the 
Auburn Area increased from 55,851 in 2001 to 64,959 in 2006 (Australian Bureau of Statistics (9 March 2006)).  
151 Interview with Rachel Agyare, the senior strategic planner of the Auburn Council, on 10 December 2008. 
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control plan. The latest plan suggests the need to “ensure that new development is of the 
highest quality and complements the high public profile and special character of the 
precinct given the local, national and international significance of Sydney Olympic Park” 
(Auburn Council, 2010, p. 3). In contrast to the pre-Games period, the Local Plan 
suggests transformation of the existing industrial use to something that would fit with 
the post-Olympic site. Yet the planners for the SOPA and Auburn Council noted 
difficulty in the transformation. Craig Bargley, a planning director of the SOPA, pointed 
out that the clash between different visions by different authorities on this land-use is 
still the issue. Even though different authorities agreed that the area was designated for 
industrial use, its target users were different. While the SOP intends to bring in 
white-collar work, Auburn Council’s target would be blue-collar work. The regional 
government’s view is close to Auburn’s.152 Meanwhile, Rachel Agyare, the senior 
strategic planner at Auburn Council, stressed the importance of securing the local 
employment opportunities which the area has been generating. Thus, despite the 
objective of developing this industrial area to co-exist with the SOP, the physical and 
functional character of the area has been kept the same as before the Games at the time 
of writing this thesis, and this has been a great physical barrier between the SOP and 
other areas of Auburn Council (Fig. 7-28).  
 
Generally, there is a fundamental spatial and social barrier between the SOP and other 
parts of the Auburn Council area. Spatially, the urban core of the SOP is surrounded by 
the parklands, and this offers great open spaces for local residents without any charges, 
but at the same time, this also becomes a significant barrier between the local people 
and the urban core of the SOP. Furthermore, the M4 Western Motorway runs between 
the SOP in the north and other residential areas in the south, and there is little physical 
connection between them. Bargley suggested that the river running from north to south 
could be utilised to connect the SOP and the southern residential area, but 
implementation of the plan needs to overcome various spatial, financial and political 
constraints. In addition to the physical barrier separating the SOP and the Auburn 
Council area, there are certain social barriers. While the parklands have attracted local 
residents with a multi-cultural background (Cashman, 2011, pp. 179–180), the social 
accessibility of various facilities in the SOP has been questioned. For example, the entry 
fee to the local swimming pools in Auburn Council, such as the Ruth Everuss Aquatic 
                                                  
152 Interview with Craig Bargley on 27 November 2008. 
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Centre, is AUD 3, but the entry fee to the aquatic centre in the SOP is AUD 7.153 While 
the SOPA has promoted the post-Olympic SOP as the primary location for various 
events, as Lenskyj identified, the social accessibility of the legacy facilities has been 
less addressed by the authority (Lenskyj, 2002), and this has been one of the crucial 
points contributing to the SOP’s current situation of the Olympic “bubble.” 
 
Thus, the question is whether this situation will be improved politically. The political 
relationship between the SOPA and Auburn Council is not straightforward. As Rachel 
Agyare, the senior strategic planner at Auburn Council, suggests, there have been 
certain contributions from the SOP to the Council. For example, the SOP undertook a 
major part of the new housing provision set out in the Metropolitan Strategy; otherwise 
the Council would have had to find an alternative location to fulfil the regional 
requirement.154 Yet there is no solid system to integrate the Council’s demands with the 
ongoing development of the post-Olympic SOP. While Auburn Council requested that 
the SOPA integrate the provision of affordable housing for local people into the new 
masterplan, that request has hardly been integrated into the SOP’s future vision.  
 
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
 
7.5.1 Governance and planning 
One of the typical observations by academics and the media on the Sydney’s Olympic 
site after the Games has been on the low usability of the legacy stadia and subsequent 
slow development, but little attention has been paid to what happened in the post-SOP 
in the decade after the events, and what kinds of planning efforts have been made. This 
chapter examines these two questions in Sydney’s experience of dealing with the 
Olympic legacy. Sydney’s legacy planning began with recognition of the problems 
which occurred just after the Games, rather than creating an ambitious socio-economic 
target for the future. The OCA pointed out three concepts which stemmed from the 
mixed-use strategy, “diverse range of activities”, “cohesive development” and 
“self-sufficiency” of the post-Olympic site, to activate the SOP for the longer term. It 
                                                  
153http://www.auburn.nsw.gov.au/Explore/SwimmingPool/Pages/SwimmingPool.aspx?ControlMode=Edit&DisplayM
ode=Design#admission. 
http://www.aquaticcentre.com.au/opening_hours_and_costs. 
154 Interview with Rachel Agyare on 10 December 2008. 
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seems to me that these three concepts have been kept at the core in a series of 
post-Olympic masterplans published by the OCA and SOPA, but the intentions behind 
each plan and intensification of development at the post-Olympic site have been 
different. These factors were based on the problems (critique of the “white elephant” 
facilities) or intentions (integrating the SOP into the metropolitan strategy) which the 
SOPA identified at the time of planning, and became uncertainties in the post-Olympic 
planning rather than being strategically identified. In this respect, I will argue that 
Sydney’s post-Olympic masterplan was reactive rather than proactive. Thus, the 
post-Olympic masterplan represents what Glen Searle describes as a “keno-like 
post-Modern city” (Searle, 2008b), rather than being an example of strategic urban 
planning.  
 
7.5.2 Implementation of the legacy vision  
In order to make the post-Olympic Park socially and economically sustainable, the 
SOPA employed a mixed-use strategy by which the post-Olympic authority has tried to 
achieve an unprecedented combination of a special place for major events and an urban 
quarter filled with everyday activities. It is generally believed that a mixed-use urban 
strategy is the best way of achieving a sustainable urban precinct (Coupland, 1997), but 
in the case of the post-SOP, there were various challenges. Firstly, what became 
apparent from the daily experience of the post-Olympic site in Sydney was the difficulty 
of combining the event-led land-use and other everyday life, such as home and work. As 
John Bale points out, sporting events often turn into a “topophobia” where the massive 
crowds’ movement and noises are in conflict with local residents (Bale, 1994), and the 
SOPA has struggled to mediate these two different urban functions. Furthermore, the 
SOPA has focused on the spatial relationship between different uses in the SOP, but the 
authority has lacked a concept of how to mediate the different rhythms of activity in 
different areas in the post-Olympic site. This led to uneven uses of the SOP, which was 
full of spectators for event days, then became a less-active urban area on days without 
events.  
 
In addition to the failure to create a sense of “everyday life” in the post-Olympic site, 
another objective, achievement of “self-sufficiency”, is not certain, as the SOPA still 
needs a certain amount of subsidies from the State Government. Due to the great efforts 
to attract private sector involvement in developing the post-Olympic site, the authority’s 
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income increased since 2002, but the amount of the public subsidies did not show a 
drastic decrease. This can be understood as showing that the PPP in the governance of 
the post-SOP did not represent a typical PPP relationship in which private money 
replaces public expenses for the implementation of a mega-project. In the case of the 
post-Olympic SOP, as seen in the preparation phase for the Games (see Chapter 5), the 
private money encouraged the SOPA to achieve more rather than to reduce the 
dependency on taxpayers’ money.  
 
7.5.3 Urban integration 
Integration of the post-SOP into the wider urban tissue was a complex issue, as the 
political context on the regional and local scale was different after the Games. While the 
SOP had never been recognised as an integral part of Metropolitan Sydney before the 
Olympics, the 2005 Metropolitan Strategy identified the SOP for the first time as a 
specialised centre in the region, carrying certain responsibility in provision of jobs and 
housing. This changing relationship with the Metropolitan Strategy had a significant 
impact on the spatial strategy for the post-Olympic site, in particular in defining the 
density of the urban core in the SOP. More importantly, as the importance of the SOP 
became greater, it led to changes in the direction of the regional development corridor 
together with the regional public transportation network. This means that some existing 
centres located along the existing economic corridor would be greatly affected. In this 
respect, the success of the post-Olympic Park in the regional context would be built on 
the sacrifice of politically weaker centres.  
 
Meanwhile, the SOP’s relationship with the adjacent neighbourhoods has been more 
complex. Some adjacent sites have developed as affluent residential areas in one of the 
most economically deprived regions in Australia. These areas have had a close 
relationship with the post-Olympic site physically but showed a clear contrast in terms 
of their socio-spatial profile. It also became apparent that both Auburn Council and the 
SOPA identified the need for mediation between the SOP and other parts of the Council, 
but they have different political agendas and this prevented further actions. Furthermore, 
the post-Olympic site has spatial and social barriers which make it harder for local 
residents to access the heart of the SOP. Thus, although there is still a “bubble” in the 
local context, its shape is no longer as simple as being just the SOP. 
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Chapter 8: London  
 
 
 
8.1 Governance of the post-Olympic site and surroundings 
 
8.1.1 Concentration of the planning power 
London staged the Olympics Games from 27 July to 12 August, and the Paralympic 
Games from 29 August to 9 September in 2012. The LOP (officially re-named the 
Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park after the Games) was the focal point during that time. 
Since the Games, the LOP has been closed to remove temporary venues and seating, 
and is now undergoing a transformation to the post-Olympic spatial setting. Although 
some permanent sporting venues and some parts of the parklands will need more time 
before they are opened to public, it was planned for the LOP to be fully accessible again 
in April 2014. 
 
The fundamental character of the governance of the post-Olympic site was set before 
the Games. As indicated in Chapter 6 (London in the post-bid phase), in April 2012, 
following the dissolution of the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) established in 
2009, the Mayor of London established the mayoral urban development company, the 
London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), whose responsibility is not 
confined to development and management of the post-LOP, but also includes the 
surrounding areas, as follows: 
 
“The purpose of the Mayoral Development Corporation is to promote and 
deliver physical, social, economic and environmental regeneration of the 
Olympic Park and its surrounding area, in particular by maximising the legacy 
of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, by securing high-quality 
sustainable development and investment, ensuring the long-term success of the 
facilities and assets within its direct control and supporting and promoting the 
aim of convergence.”155 
                                                  
155 http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/about-us/what-we-aim-to-achieve/. 
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After the Games, the LLDC’s Planning Functions Order came into force on 1 October 
2012, and it obtained the full range of planning functions within both the LOP and the 
surrounding areas, which belong to the London boroughs of Hackney, Newham, Tower 
Hamlets and Waltham Forest (Fig. 8-1). The LLDC’s planning power includes not only 
evaluation of the planning applications in the planning boundary, but also Local Plans in 
the LLDC’s boundary area, which used to be the responsibility of the planning 
authorities in the local boroughs.156  The LLDC also has the power of charging a 
Community Infrastructure Levy, which the Corporation may use when it considers it 
necessary for new developments designated in the Local Plan. Thus, the LLDC obtained 
strong planning powers including the Community Infrastructure Levy,, and the two-year 
project, called the Local Development Scheme to produce Local Plans in its planning 
boundary, is now underway (LLDC, 2012b, pp. 3–13).  
 
In addition to the transfer of local boroughs’ planning powers to the LLDC, the 
empowerment of the LLDC coincided with the dissolution of the London Thames 
Gateway Development Corporation, which was established in June 2004 to oversee the 
regeneration of the London River and the Lower Lea Valley over the next twenty years, 
aiming to “create a network of compact mixed use, mixed tenure neighbourhoods 
complete with good public transport, shops, leisure facilities, schools, healthcare and 
jobs” (London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, 2006, p.1). Before reaching 
its twenty- year timeframe, the National Government’s promotion of the “Localism Bill,” 
which stated that local authorities should have more responsibility for the development 
of their area, along with the severe economic recession triggered by the collapse of 
Lehmann Brothers in 2008, created the conditions for the reform of the public sector 
across London. It was decided that the London Thames Gateway Development 
Corporation would be formally dissolved in January 2013, and prior to the end of the 
Corporation, its planning powers were handed to the local boroughs and the LLDC in 
October 2012. The staff of the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation 
were also transferred to the LLDC and the GLA (London Thames Gateway 
Development Corporation, 2012). The dissolution of the London Thames Gateway 
Development Corporation meant that more concentrated power was given to the LLDC 
regarding further development of the LOP and Olympic Fringe areas.  
                                                  
156 http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/planning-policy-and-decisions/. 
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8.1.2 Preparation of the area spatial strategy 
While the LLDC became the planning authority responsible for overseeing the 
post-Olympic site and the surroundings, Boris Johnson published further spatial 
planning guidance for the LOP and surroundings, “Olympic Legacy Supplementary 
Planning Guidance”, in July 2012. The intention of the Supplementary Planning 
Guidance was “to supplement and apply London Plan policy to the area by setting out 
the Mayor of London’s strategic priorities and long term vision for the Queen Elizabeth 
Olympic Park and its surrounding areas in a single spatial planning document” (GLA, 
2012, p.7).157 The Supplementary Planning Guidance was also designated to have same 
planning power as the Mayor’s spatial strategy for the wider Lower Lea Valley, “Lower 
Lea Valley (LLV) Opportunity Area Planning Framework”, issued by the former 
London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, in 2007. 
 
As Fig. 8-2 indicates, both the Supplementary Planning Guidance and the Opportunity 
Area Planning Framework were positioned under the London Plan regarding planning 
hierarchy, but the relationship between these strategies was clearly defined (Fig. 8-2). In 
fact, the two strategies have geographically different aspirations. While the Opportunity 
Area Planning Framework stretches the development area along the River Lea, 
connecting with the River Thames, the Supplementary Planning Guidance detaches the 
project area from the Thames, stretching it further north around the LOP (Figs. 8-3 and 
4). Since the areas designated for the Supplementary Planning Guidance and the 
Opportunity Area Planning Framework are different, the OLSPG simply replaces the 
Opportunity Area Planning Framework where the two areas overlap (GLA, 2012, p. 
127). Thus, in the current planning framework, the northern part of the LLV will be 
developed with the new Supplementary Planning Guidance while the southern part still 
follows the existing Opportunity Area Planning Framework. Although the 
Supplementary Planning Guidance and the Opportunity Area Planning Framework are 
located in the same place in London’s spatial planning hierarchy, the degree to which 
each planning document indicates land-use strategy in the area is different. While the 
Opportunity Area Planning Framework aims to identify the overall strategy throughout 
the LLV with a more carpet-like land-use strategy in the area, the Supplementary 
                                                  
157 The OLSPG is also utilised as a framework for the decisions and planning priorities of the LLDC under the 
umbrella of the Mayoral London Plan. 
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Planning Guidance intends to provide a more concrete spatial vision in the designated 
area. Unlike the Opportunity Area Planning Framework, the Supplementary Planning 
Guidance further subdivides the area into five different “Olympic Fringes”, and intends 
to characterise each area differently.  
 
In addition to the LLV Opportunity Area Planning Framework, there is another planning 
framework which defines the future of the Olympic Park. The LLDC inherited the 
previous “Legacy Communities Scheme” (LCS) issued in 2011 by the predecessor, the 
Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), as a long-term spatial strategy for the LOP. 
The LCS boundary was inherited from the Planning Delivery Zones used for the 2007 
Olympic Masterplan issued by the ODA in 2007, and the area covered by the Planning 
Delivery Zones is much smaller than the Supplementary Planning Guidance boundary. 
Furthermore, importantly the area defined as the Olympic Park is different between the 
LCS and the Supplementary Planning Guidance. The LCS’s recognition of the LOP is 
fundamentally the same as that defined in the 2007 masterplan. As the LOP included 
various elements which would integrate with the urban surroundings in the 
post-Olympic landscape, such as the converted Media Press Centre and the International 
Broadcasting Centre in Hackney Marsh and the legacy aquatic centre and adjacent new 
residential block along Carpenter Road, the post-Olympic LOP had been considered the 
collection of these different urban functions in the LCS, where different Olympic 
boroughs would have different visions for their utilisation. Yet the Olympic Park 
designated in the Supplementary Planning Guidance mainly included the sports 
facilities and public park along with various canals, and most of the urbanised areas to 
be created after the Olympic Games were excluded. They became the part of other 
Olympic Fringe areas to reflect their functional character.158 Although there might be 
uncertainty regarding the integration of the newly transferred parts from the LOP into 
the existing urban tissue, this can be considered a way to ease management of the 
post-Olympic Park, because the urban functions left in the Supplementary Planning 
Guidance’s Olympic Park will be more simplified than those in the LCS.  
 
Furthermore, the planning boundary of the LLDC is different from that of the LCS and 
Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance (Figs. 8-5, 6 and 7). These 
                                                  
158 The legacy aquatic centre and adjacent new residential block along Carpenter Road are planned to remain with 
the LOP in the OLSPG. 
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different planning boundaries in different planning frameworks make understanding the 
socio-economic strategies difficult. While the Supplementary Planning Guidance 
provided for 2,154 dwellings to be created within the Olympic Park, the LLDC calls for 
8,000 homes to be built in the Park by 2030, and the LCS’s vision is far beyond the 
Supplementary Planning Guidance’s target. The numbers indicated in the plans are 
different, and the designated area sizes also vary. Although it is suggested that the 
Supplementary Planning Guidance area carries similar socio-political aspirations in 
terms of the land-use as the previous LLV Opportunity Area Planning Framework, 
“Homes and Communities, Business and Employment, Open Space and Sustainable 
Development” (GLA, 2012, pp. 18–54), the cohesion between the different strategies is 
hard to recognise. Thus, now there are different planning frameworks which provide a 
future vision for the post-Olympic Park, and they have different spatial and 
socio-economic strategies. These multiple strategies would cause confusion in defining 
the future of the Olympic site. In addition to this current planning complexity, as 
suggested earlier in this chapter, the LLDC will create the new Local Plans within the 
planning boundary, and this will add further complexity. The Mayor of London once 
pointed out the conflict between organisations responsible for the long-term 
development of the Olympic site, and this was a strong motivation for him to reform the 
legacy governance before the Games. Yet this problem still exists after the creation of 
the LLDC, and I will argue that this remains a crucial problem for London’s legacy 
development in the future.  
 
 
8.2 Transformation of the post-Olympic site 
 
8.2.1 Chobham Manor: uncertainty of private-led development  
The LLDC characterises the post-LOP in two halves: the South Park as “a buzzing hive 
of cultural activities, commerce, social interaction and entertainment” and the North 
Park as “a tranquil area with wetlands and landscaped parklands” (LLDC, 2012e). Both 
parks include the Olympic facilities to be transformed for the legacy uses and new 
developments which would be built in the vacant areas created after the legacy 
transformation (Fig. 8-8). At the time of writing, one year after the Games and just 
before the LOP re-opens in the summer of 2013, there was little construction underway 
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for the new developments in the post-Olympic site. The planning process for new 
developments however has been pushed forward during the transformation period, in 
order to commence the construction as soon as the site is ready.  
 
Various planning activities are simultaneously underway, but the LLDC determined that 
the first development plan in the post-Olympic LOP would be the development of 
Chobham Manor, located in the north of the Olympic village site. The LLDC designated 
that Chobham Manor would be built in line with London’s DNA, which Boris Johnson 
put great emphasis on before the Games, aiming to construct mews houses and terraced 
houses with private gardens and open squares, along with tree-lined avenues and 
intimate streets (LLDC, 2012d, p. 4). The LLDC has called on private developers to 
complete this work and Taylor Wimpey, one of the UK’s largest house-builders, and 
London and Quadrant, a social housing landlord, were selected to develop the 9.3 
hectare site with 870 new homes, a new health centre and nurseries, which will become 
a compact self-contained urban quarter. The consortium is expected to develop the 
project over the next two decades (Kollewe, 2012). The new houses will be built on the 
infrastructure legacy of the Games such as the heating, telecommunication network and 
fibre optic broadband, which were created with public money for the Games. The 
LLDC tried to create some public benefits out of this private-led development, and one 
third of the houses will therefore be affordable housing.  
 
Yet the crucial question is whether the consortium can maintain and realise the vision of 
a mixed community within a mixed-use urban quarter over the next two decades. Some 
debates on the athletes villages come to mind. The athletes village, which was built with 
government funds, and later half of the units (1,400 homes) were sold to the private 
developers, Qatari Diar and Delancey, as profitable housing. Triathlon Homes, the 
consortium of East Thames Group, Southern Housing Group and First Base, took 
another half to develop as affordable housing. This arrangement seems to be a way of 
achieving the social and economic objectives which have been promised since the bid, 
but some authors pointed out uncertainty in guaranteeing the provision of housing. One 
of the warnings was that there is a difficulty in defining “affordable” housing in the 
local context, which traditionally meant homes for working-class and low-income 
people, but now implies homes for graduates and young professionals (Cooper, 2012). 
Furthermore, Rowan Moore, the architectural critic, points out the difficulty in 
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maintaining a unified vision in a long-term plan, with regard to the case of the Olympic 
village. Referring to the history of the Olympic village since the first vision of creating 
a “new metropolitan centre” in the beginning of the twenty-first century, Moore 
suggests that the current urban condition of the Olympic village represents a mixed 
history of sold and re-sold sites by different owners and developers, and lacks a unified 
vision. He implies the need for the involvement of the public sector to realise a cohesive 
spatial vision throughout the development site (Moore, 2012).  
 
8.2.2 Media Centre: integration of the post-Olympic facilities into the local 
neighbourhood 
The post-Olympic transformation of Hackney Wick in the LOP, including the Media 
Press Centre and International Broadcasting Centre, has been planned by the LLDC and 
the London borough of Hackney. Hackney Wick within the LOP has long been 
anticipated as an employment hub for the local area, in particular in business related to 
digital media. Ken Livingstone, the former Mayor of London, once suggested in 2007 
that the Bollywood film industry would become the primary tenant of the legacy Media 
Centre,159 but it was eventually decided that it would become a hub for the media 
industry. This would include a data centre which would fit with the preference of the 
British Prime Minister, David Cameron, to turn London’s East End into a technology 
centre to rival California’s Silicon Valley.160 Although there was some criticism of the 
transparency of the tender process in defining the lease-holder of the post-Olympic 
Media Centre, a consortium called iCity and consisting of Infinity, a data centre 
provider, and Delancey, the developer that owns the Olympic village, was chosen in 
July 2012. The Mayor of London and the UK Prime Minister initially intended to create 
a media business hub as the legacy of the Media Centre, but in a slight modification of 
the initial plan, the iCity became a centre for media enterprise and academic education, 
in which BT Sports, Hackney Community College, Hackney Technical College, 
Loughborough University, and Infinity SDC would all occupy space (iCity, 2012) (Fig. 
8-9). 
 
While who was going to use the post-Media Centre was the crucial legacy issue, how it 
would affect the local neighbourhood was another concern, which Hackney Council has 
                                                  
159 http://www.standard.co.uk/news/bollywood-must-move-to-olympic-site-says-mayor-6648016.html. 
160 http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1668772/London-Olympic-media-centre-set-for-Silicon-Valley-revamp. 
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long identified as crucial triggers for the area’s economic development. The Local 
Development Framework of Hackney identified Hackney Wick as follows:  
 
“[t]he Legacy Media Centre is an opportunity for an innovative employment 
led mixed development attracting economic growth to the area, to increase 
physical and functional connectivity to neighbouring areas and improved 
natural and built environment. This will also support its development as a new 
and cohesive neighbourhood as part of an integrated urban place and 
destination” (London Borough of Hackney, 2010, p. 40) (emphasis added).  
 
The question for Hackney Council has been how the post-Olympic Media Centre will 
become part of Hackney Wick, and this was included in the Council’s in-depth spatial 
strategy for Hackney Wick, “Hackney Wick Area Action Plan” issued in September 
2012, just after the Olympic and Paralympic Games. This means that the borough of 
Hackney was working on the area’s spatial strategy long before the owner and tenants of 
the post-Media Centre were determined. The Hackney Wick Area Action Plan planning 
boundary includes the post-Olympic Media Centre, the post-Olympic Multi-use Area 
used as the Handball Arena during the Games, the adjacent new development area and 
part of the Olympic parklands (Fig. 8-10). 
 
The Action Plan recognises three equally important characteristics; (1) Hackney Wick 
Hub as the new heart of Hackney, where heritage buildings and new architecture would 
create a mixed-use environment, (2) Hackney North as an existing residential 
neighbourhood, and (3) the “Creative Media Centre” including various facilities and 
open spaces located in the post-Olympic site (Fig. 8-11). The fundamental character of 
the area is designated in terms of how the employment, residential and community uses 
would be distributed and connected (London Borough of Hackney, 2012, pp. 17–36).  
 
As Hackney’s economic condition has drastically changed with the decline of the 
traditional inner-city industries and the relocation of existing businesses by the 
Olympics, along with the emerging new cultural business in Hackney Wick (London 
Borough of Hackney, 2012, p. 7), it is certain that securing employment was identified 
as one of the most crucial issues for the Council to sustain the local economy. The 
London Plan 2011 therefore identifies some parts of Hackney Wick as the Mayor’s 
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Strategic Industrial Land and, in particular, the eastern part of the Lee Navigation was 
identified as an Industrial Business Park (London Borough of Hackney, 2012, p. 34). 
The designation of the “Creative Media City” in the area including the post-Media 
Centre certainly follows in this wake. Yet in addition to being a business hub, significant 
parts of the post-Olympic Media Centre will be used for educational purposes, as the 
future tenants of the iCity clearly suggest. Having educational opportunities is 
beneficial to the other Action Plan areas. Yet, in order to maximise this additional value, 
the Area Action Plan needs to integrate it, which currently it does not. When the 
Hackney Wick Action Plan was published, inclusion of education was not considered, 
but rather came as a result of the iCity consortium’s great efforts to fill the post-Media 
Centre as much as it could. If this will be a combination of media related business and 
academic / community education, the term “Creative Media City” may also not be 
appropriate any more. Thus, I will argue that the post-Olympic Media Centre was 
integrated into the local planning context to a great degree, but determination of the 
post-Olympic uses of the Media Centre and issues of the Local Plan were not 
synchronised in a timely manner. It is therefore crucial to mediate these different 
matters in the post-Olympic planning. 
 
8.2.3 Olympic stadium: accessibility to the post-Olympic facilities 
As discussed in Chapter 5, usability of the post-Olympic stadium has been debated 
throughout the preparation phase of the London Games, but there was no solid 
confirmation about the future of the stadium before the Olympics. It was after the 
Games that some of the uncertainties about the post-Olympic stadium became clear. 
Firstly, West Ham United, a football club in the Premier League, was confirmed as the 
anchor tenant of the post-Olympic stadium after severe turmoil between two Premier 
League football clubs, West Ham United and Tottenham Hotspurs (see BBC, 2011b). 
The decision to appoint West Ham as a future tenant was made by the LLDC, and 
London Mayor Boris Johnson, the chair of the LLDC, suggested that “we can secure a 
terrific future for this much loved and iconic venue” (BBC, 2012a). 
 
Secondly, the financial arrangement for operating the post-Olympic stadium was 
established. The appointment of West Ham as an anchor tenant means that the football 
club will contribute GBP 15 million for the post-Olympic adaptation, and pay an annual 
lease for the long-term operational cost of the stadium. In addition to this, the London 
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borough of Newham will contribute to the long-term operation of the stadium. Newham 
Council decided to invest GBP 40 million in the post-Olympic transformation work. 
More importantly it set up a joint venture managing the post-Olympic stadium with the 
LLDC, called Newham Legacy Investment Limited (the E20 Stadium Limited Liability 
Partnership), in order to secure benefits from the post-Olympic stadium for the longer 
term, including:  
 
-A minimum 35% equity share in the Olympic stadium and island site; 
-Year round access to the 400m community track; 
-Ten exclusive mass participation events in the stadium per year for Newham 
residents; 
-Millions of tickets to West Ham United matches held in the stadium from 
2016; 
-Additional tickets to sports and other entertainment events held in the stadium; 
-A training and education centre in the stadium; 
-A majority of new jobs created on the site to be filled by Newham residents.161 
 
Thirdly, the post-Olympic stadium secured the hosting of various international sporting 
events in the near future. It obtained the right to stage the World Athletics 
Championships in 2017, and the post-Olympic stadium would be the main venue for the 
event. This became a strong factor in keeping the athletics track as the London Bid 
Committee had promised to the IOC, even though the anchor tenant of the 
post-Olympic stadium would be a football team which would prefer not to keep the 
athletics track. There is no doubt that Lord Coe, who made the bid promise of leaving 
an athletics stadium as a legacy of hosting the 2012 Games, played a critical role in 
bringing the event to London, and this decision was detached from a series of 
discussions on securing the financial viability of the post-Olympic stadium before the 
Games. Furthermore, it was decided that the UK would host the Rugby World Cup in 
2015, and the post-Olympic stadium would be used as one of the competition venues 
together with Twickenham Stadium and Wembley Stadium in London. It should be 
noted that although the event will be a national event utilising various stadia across the 
country, using the Olympic stadium as the third venue in London meant that another 
city lost the opportunity to be a host. 
                                                  
161 Ibid. 
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Against this backdrop, the transformation of the post-Olympic stadium was finalised 
and planning permission for the Olympic Stadium transformation was granted to the 
LLDC in May 2013. The 80,000 seating stadium used during the Games will be 
converted into a 60,000 seat multi-purpose stadium, instead of the 25,000 seats initially 
planned at the time of bidding. It will keep the athletics track but the post-Olympic 
stadium will have retractable seats so that football matches and the 2017 World 
Athletics Championships can be staged in the same stadium (Peach, 2013). The 
documents prepared for the planning application state that “the LLDC is seeking to 
deliver a commercially viable combination of uses that achieves both year round 
community access and wider public benefits” (LLDC, 2012c). 
 
Yet the accessibility for locals is somewhat uncertain despite Newham Council’s great 
investment in the future of the stadium, and despite the continuous emphasis on the 
benefits to Newham residents of the Mayor of Newham, Sir Robin Wales. The planning 
application document includes an estimated plan for the events that will be staged in the 
post-Olympic stadium. It suggests that more than half of all weekends will be occupied 
by large scale events and annually there will be a minimum of 99 spectator events. Thus, 
there might be very few days in which the local residents can access the stadium 
throughout a year. Furthermore, the LLDC suggests that there will be another 400-metre 
athletic track adjacent to the post-Olympic stadium, termed a “Community Track,” 
which will accommodate community events and be a warm-up track for the athletics 
events (LLDC, 2012c). Given the high utilisation of the post-Olympic stadium for more 
commercially beneficial events, and the preparation of a new “Community Track”, it 
may be possible that local residents will mainly use this secondary athletic field. In 
addition to this, the LLDC’s future plan suggested that the area to the south of the 
post-Olympic stadium, the Marshgate Wharf area, will be converted into a new 
neighbourhood (Fig. 8-12). (The LCS does not show any development plan of this 
area.) Thus, there is a danger that this “Community Track” will disappear and pave the 
way for new housing developments in the future. Thus, despite Newham Council’s great 
involvement in the future of the post-Olympic Park financially and politically, Newham 
residents’ access to the iconic stadium may not be fully granted. Similarly, access to the 
aquatic centre after the Games may not be fully secured, despite the Olympic authority 
extensively claiming that the entrance fee to the Centre would not be different from that 
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of other local leisure centres in the Council (BBC, 2012b). 
 
 
8.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Governance 
London had set up the fundamental planning structure of the post-Olympic site before 
the Games, and the LLDC has taken a crucial role in the management and development 
of the LOP for the longer term. None of the past Olympic host cities prepared the 
governance of the legacy before the Games to the degree that London did. The 
concentration of planning power in the host cities before the Games is well discussed in 
the realm of Olympic studies (for example, Hiller, 2003) but little has been said about 
empowerment of the special authority taking care of the legacy after the Games. In the 
case of London, great planning power has been concentrated in the LLDC, and its 
planning boundary was extended beyond the Olympic site. Transfer of planning powers 
from the local authorities to the LLDC stemmed from the Mayor of London’s intention 
of maximising the investment not only for the LOP but also for a much wider area, and 
of cohesive development in the designated area.  
 
Various research papers published for the London Olympics put great emphasis on the 
need for authorities to  coordinate legacy development both within and outside the 
LOP (for example, MacRury and Poynter, 2009; Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors, 2010). In this respect, creation of the LLDC and the provision of the great 
planning power beyond the Olympic site to the Corporation can be seen as a way of 
avoiding Judd’s conception of the “bubble” effect (Judd, 1999). Yet the planning context 
of the LOP and its surrounding areas is much more complex, and various planning 
frameworks have identified the vision of the area. In particular, the London Mayor’s 
planning framework for the LOP area, “Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning 
Guidance,” and the LLDC’s “Legacy Community Scheme” were crucial, but they have 
discrepancies regarding their spatial and economic visions. Thus, it is imperative to 
coordinate between them, and more importantly to establish a clearer planning structure 
to mediate these difference.  
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Development of the post-Olympic site  
The LLDC has determined that the post-Olympic site will be a place of rich parklands, 
legacy stadia and five newly-built neighbourhoods along the waterways. At the time of 
writing this thesis, we cannot see much implementation of new neighbourhoods, rather 
than transformation works of the infrastructure, public realms and legacy stadia in the 
Park. Yet planning of these new developments has been undertaken, and there might be 
some uncertainties in these developments. Firstly, as we have seen in this chapter, most 
of the new developments employed private investment, and there is a great concern as 
to whether the privately-led developments will maintain the initial public interests such 
as provision of affordable housing or local residents’ access to the legacy stadium. 
MacRury and Poynter suggest that the “leverage” model of private and public 
partnership tends to prioritise commercial rather than social interests, which became 
highly problematic in the case of the Atlanta Olympics (MacRury and Poynter, 2009). 
 
Secondly, post-Olympic developments are inevitably defined by different timescales in 
planning. Definition of primary uses, designations of the private sector’s involvement, 
and integration into the local action plan are conducted using different timelines, and 
therefore there are some discrepancies in the vision of development. The post-Olympic 
development of the Media Centre exemplifies the gap of vision caused by different 
planning timescales. In the case of London, it seems to me that there are many planning 
frameworks defining the spatial vision of each post-Olympic development, in particular 
the usability of the post-Olympic site and venues within it. I will argue that it is quite 
crucial to coordinate the different timescales in different planning frameworks, and to 
accommodate various changes that may happen in the longer term. In a similar vein, the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development pointed out that preparation 
of both the long-term and short-term strategies would be crucial to maximise the social 
and economic legacy of the Olympic development (Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2010). London has addressed the long-term vision of 
the post-Olympic Park, but little has been discussed about strategy for the shorter term. 
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Part III Conclusion: Reflection from Sydney to London 
 
Governance and planning  
Chapters 7 and 8 highlighted the different approaches to planning of the post-Olympic 
site between Sydney and London. Sydney fundamentally undertook the legacy planning 
after the Games, but London commenced it far before the Games were concluded. It is 
therefore considered that while the Olympic Games were a significant transition point 
between the pre and post-Olympic periods for Sydney, London tried to connect these 
two phases as seamlessly as possible. Peter Hall suggests that urban planning is the 
continuous process of reviewing and designing (Hall, 2002 [1975]), and planning for an 
Olympic site is no exception, as both cities have demonstrated through their production 
of numerous legacy masterplan documents even before the Games. Yet there was a great 
contrast in the fundamental mechanisms for generating new plans in Sydney and 
London, and I will argue that Sydney's approach was reactive and London’s was 
proactive. Sydney’s approach can be understood as a more conditional approach, as the 
SOPA renewed the post-Olympic masterplan when the authority identified problems or 
opportunities. Meanwhile, London issued an in-depth post-Olympic masterplan before 
the Games, and kept it as the backbone for further development of the post-Olympic 
site.  
 
Sydney’s reactive legacy planning caused slow implementation of the post-Olympic 
development, and this generated a negative image of the Olympic legacy. In addition to 
this, the relationships between plans were not based on a review and re-design process, 
but a more scattered relationship, although there are common key concepts in the 
different post-Olympic masterplans. Meanwhile, London’s proactive approach enabled 
immediate transformation from the Olympic to the post-Olympic development, but I 
will suggest that there may have been some limitations in London’s proactive approach. 
As it was issued in advance based on some assumptions, it may have encountered some 
unexpected outcomes. Within a year of the Games, some unexpected post-Olympic uses 
for legacy facilities were identified such as the need for a secondary athletics field for 
local communities and the educational use of the post-Media Centre. Furthermore, the 
Olympic project is framed by different spatial strategies issued with different timescales. 
Thus, unless there is a flexible mechanism to synchronise different plans, each vision 
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will become an isolated strategy. Meanwhile, Sydney’s reactive approach may be 
flexible enough to accommodate the ongoing changes, if it is promptly renewed. In my 
interview with Kirsty White, who worked on post-Olympic planning in both Sydney 
and London, she suggested that “London's planning approach to the legacy may not be 
so different from Sydney's ad-hoc post-Olympic planning, it may eventually require 
many revisions to adapt to what really happen in the Olympic Park.”162 Thus, I will 
argue that London’s legacy approach has some advantages over Sydney’s reactive 
post-Olympic planning, yet it still requires flexibility to integrate the various changes 
that will happen in the future.  
 
The limits of mixed use 
It has been recognised that the application of a mixed-use urban strategy is necessary for 
an urban quarter to be sustainable, and both Sydney and London envisioned the 
post-Olympic site as a “mixed-use” urban quarter. In the legacy phase, we can explore 
whether this idea applies in the case of post-Olympic sites in which various legacy 
sports stadia and other urban functions such as residences and offices are mixed in one 
place. One of the rationales for employing a mixed-use urban strategy is to make a 
vibrant urban quarter by collecting diverse functions, but Coupland points out that the 
way in which the different land-uses are mixed is highly crucial, as it may lead to 
conflict between different uses (Coupland, 1997). Sydney has struggled to create a 
vibrant post-Olympic site by implementing a mixed-use strategy, and the difficulty lies 
in the management of the conflict between special events and everyday life. I will here 
stress that one of the great lessons learnt from Sydney is the importance of considering 
different rhythms in different urban activities in the post-Olympic site, and Sydney still 
lacks this in the current post-Olympic spatial vision. Lynch, the author of “The Image of 
the City”, has also emphasised the importance of designing for time in urban planning. 
Lynch suggests that designing the short-term aspects such as the rhythm of daily 
activities is crucial, as well as envisioning a long-term future for a city (Lynch, 1972, p. 
71). 
 
The uneven distribution of rhythms in the post-Olympic site in Sydney was further 
highlighted when it was combined with the mixed-use spatial strategy. The SOP was 
subdivided into different pieces of lands, and a specific character was set for each 
                                                  
162 Interview with Kirsty White on 3 June 2008. 
231 
precinct. This approach confined different urban activities to different precincts, and 
there was little interaction between them. In the case of London, the latest spatial 
strategy for the post-Olympic Park suggests that unlike Sydney, the entire site was 
subdivided into smaller neighbourhoods, and each will have a variety of uses. Thus, 
different characters of uses in the post-LOP are proposed in much closer proximity than 
in Sydney, but different temporal uses of different buildings, in particular legacy 
facilities and newly developed residential buildings, get less attention than the spatial 
vision in various post-Olympic planning documents. Yet the experiences in Sydney 
suggest that allocation of time is equally important as spatial arrangement.  
 
Another aspect of employing a mixed-use urban strategy is financial viability, and the 
term “self-sufficiency” has been emphasised as an important concept in the 
post-Olympic site in Sydney. Both Sydney and London largely relied on the private 
sector to implement the mixed-use post-Olympic Park, but this has a certain limit, 
which is the discrepancy between the public authority’s and private sector’s interests. As 
one of the public benefits for investing in the Olympic-led urban redevelopment, both 
cities, in particular London, promised to provide affordable housing in the post-Olympic 
area. Yet, in the case of Sydney, developers have promoted post-Olympic residential 
developments as exclusive residential towers, and it has been hard to integrate the 
affordable housing which the regional and local governments wished for. Similarly, in 
the case of London, there has been doubt as to whether the developers appointed to 
construct the post-Olympic housing could keep the initial promise of providing a 
designated number of affordable homes. Furthermore, the gap between public and 
private interests can be seen in the development of sporting facilities in the 
post-Olympic site. Both Sydney and London needed the private sector’s involvement in 
sustaining a legacy stadium, but enhancement of commercial value prevents public 
access, in particular for local residents from a relatively low socio-economic group. This 
happened in Sydney, and London should avoid similarly limited accessibility, which 
would cause the social isolation of the post-Olympic site.  
 
Urban integration 
Integrating the post-Olympic site into the wider urban tissue and avoiding the creation 
of an Olympic “bubble” was identified as a crucial issue in both cities even before the 
Olympics. Yet Sydney and London have experienced quite different stories. In the 
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regional context, Sydney made significant efforts to integrate the post-Olympic SOP 
into the regional spatial development strategy after the Olympic Games, which it was 
not able to achieve before the Games. Yet, as a negative effect, recognition of the SOP 
as an important centre in the region eventually led to the alteration of the regional 
development corridor, and left existing local centres dangerously absent from the 
development framework. This suggests the difficulty of putting a new regional centre in 
the existing development strategy. London, in turn, embedded the Olympic Park into the 
Mayor’s spatial development strategy from the time of the bid, because the Olympic site 
was recognised as an important epicentre to push the Mayor’s development strategy 
further. Yet Sydney’s lesson tells us that too much political attention to the Olympic site 
will weaken development opportunities for other areas, unless a cohesive development 
strategy is implemented.  
 
On a local scale, it seems to me that the name of the legacy authority clearly represents 
each city's intention for the post-Olympic site in the local urban tissue. As the name of 
the Sydney “Olympic” Park Authority suggests, Sydney intended to maintain the 
significance of the Olympic Games after the Games were over. London however 
changed the name of the post-Olympic authority from the initial “Olympic” Park 
Legacy Company set up before the Games to the subsequent London Legacy 
Development Corporation, without mention of the “Olympic” aspect. This implies that, 
in London, the significance of the Olympics would fade into the urban tissue.  
 
The SOPA shrunk its planning boundary by releasing the former Olympic village site 
and some adjacent areas, and has focused development within the SOP after the 
Olympics. Meanwhile, the LLDC’s planning responsibility was expanded to the 
surrounding areas. It is certain that this causes significant differences between the two 
cities regarding the relationships between the Olympic site and the neighbourhoods. In 
the case of Sydney, the post-Olympic SOP still has significant contrasts with the 
adjacent neighbourhoods, except for the former Olympic village site and the newly 
developed high-end residential areas. It became apparent that the political intention for 
the borders of the SOP is also different between the SOPA and the local council. In this 
respect, the post-Olympic site can be recognised as spatially and socially isolated from 
the local context, creating the Olympic “bubble”. In contrast to this, the expansion of 
the LLDC’s planning responsibility to include the adjacent areas around the LOP and 
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the Mayor’s OLSPG reflect the emphasis on the integration of the post-Olympic site 
into the local urban tissue. Yet there are various planning frameworks in the area, which 
overlap with each other. Thus, London needs to coordinate them; otherwise this could 
cause some confusion in planning priority, and the significant concentration of planning 
power in the LLDC may lead to potential conflict between the LLDC and local 
authorities.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
 
 
 
The final part of this thesis assembles findings in my research on the Sydney and 
London cases and conclusions demonstrated in the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic 
phases (Parts I, II and III). This chapter further discusses my research concerns and 
evolving legacy vision through time (from the pre-bid phase to the post-Olympic phase) 
and place (from Sydney to London), along with relevant theoretical accounts. In 
Chapter 1, I raised questions about the evolution of the legacy vision of its relation with 
governance, in particular the origin and changes of the mixed-use strategy, and its urban 
integration in Sydney and London. I then asked about the evolution from Sydney and 
London and remaining challenges which Sydney and London shared. Based on this, I 
will discuss the following first three enquires separately in this chapter, by contrasting 
the two cases and highlighting remaining challenges for both cities.  
 
Firstly, in relation to my first research question, which asked about the evolution of the 
vision of the Olympic legacy and its governance, I will discuss the following three 
aspects. Firstly, I will discuss the different objectives of legacy planning in the pre-bid, 
post-bid and post-Olympic phases, in which different planning climates were created by 
the Olympics an “intruder” into the urban planning process of the host city (Hiller, 
2003). Secondly, I will highlight the governance of legacy, in particular the significant 
differences between Sydney and London, by suggesting its timescale and spatial reach. 
Thirdly, following the evolution from Sydney to London, I will discuss entrepreneurial 
governance as a remaining challenge in current legacy planning. 
 
Secondly, I will discuss evolution of the “mixed-use” Olympic Park from the viewpoint 
of urban compatibility, which various authors consider crucial to create a “sustainable” 
urban quarter (for example, (Coupland, 1997; Grant, 2002). My focus here is on 
observing the initial envisioning of the mixed-use Olympic Park, and on revisiting the 
planning process to explore how the potentially divergent natures of the political and 
economic aspirations were mediated in the post-Olympic site.  
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The third part of this chapter considers the urban integration of the post-Olympic site in 
the wider local and regional context thorough the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic 
phases in both Sydney and London. Judd’s concept of the “tourist bubble” (Judd, 1999) 
has been the core theoretical backbone throughout the previous chapters in examining 
the urban integration of the post-Olympic site in both cities. Failure to integrate urban 
development triggered by the mega-events into the urban tissues has been addressed by 
various authors, but little research has explored it in different spatial and time scales. 
Thus, my observation spanned both the smaller local scale and the wider regional scale 
in different phases.  
 
Finally, following the above three discussions, I will connect my findings in this thesis 
to wider research on Olympic legacy. As my research aimed to extend the time and 
spatial scales of the existing research on the Olympic legacy, I will discuss how the 
lessons from Sydney and London demonstrated in this thesis could contribute to 
long-term planning of the Olympic legacy. This chapter concludes by bridging the 
findings in this thesis and the IOC’s ongoing planning policy on the Olympic legacy. I 
hope that I will provide a useful account for further practical as well as academic 
exploration of the long-term planning for the legacy.  
 
 
9.1 Long-term planning: vision of legacy and governance 
 
The first aim of this thesis was to explore the evolving vision of the Olympic legacy in 
the longer-term timeframe, along with its relationship with planning governance. My 
underlying analytical focus throughout this thesis was on the Olympics as “external 
forces” to the host city as suggested by Hiller. He points out that the “externality” would 
become both opportunities and constraints for the host city, and my exploration 
therefore added the timescale to Hiller’s conception (Hiller, 2003).  
 
9.1.1 Planning the Olympic legacy in different phases  
Throughout my long-term exploration in Sydney and London, it became apparent that 
the fundamental objectives of planning the Olympic legacy in pre-bid, post-bid and 
post-Olympic phases evolved under the different planning climate in which the Olympic 
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formulated both opportunity and constraints as external forces to the host city (Hiller, 
2003), and Sydney and London correspond to this differently.  
 
In the pre-bid phase, Sydney and London had the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to 
regenerate Homebush Bay and LLV, respectively, but at the same time both cities had to 
accommodate planning constraints which were more rigorous than IOC’s spatial 
requirements, which Preuss calls the “prisoner’s dilemma” (Preuss, 2004). 
Intensification of venue concentration in Homebush Bay and the final decision of 
integrating the new Olympic stadium into the LLV rather than utilising the existing 
Wembley Stadium represent integration of significant pressure to win the bid. Thus, 
planning the legacy in this period was intended to mediate different spatial aspirations 
of different political powers, and demonstrated the spatial vision beyond the Olympic 
Games.  
 
Subsequently, in the post-bid phase, while there was opportunity to demonstrate its 
planning achievement to the global media (for example, Sydney’s effort to present the 
Green Games planning as discussed in Chapter 5 or London’s demonstration of physical 
changeability of the Olympic venues indicated in Chapter 6), delivering the spatial 
setting for the Games within the fixed seven-year timeframe, which the IOC requires of 
the host city, became a great planning constraint for Sydney and London. Yet 
developing the legacy vision of the Olympic site was also clearly identified as a role of 
the Olympic authority in Sydney and London. The challenge for both cities was to 
achieve these objectives within the fixed timeframe, but the two cities treated the legacy 
planning differently. The legacy planning for Sydney in this phase was mainly meant to 
prepare the Olympic spatial setting with envisaged post-Olympic usability, but it was 
only part of the initial legacy vision set up in the bid. Meanwhile, legacy planning for 
London was more extensive than in Sydney’s approach and London’s officials 
conducted various planning exercises to define the whole vision of the post-Olympic 
site.  
 
Finally, in the post-Olympic phase, the direct relationship between the Olympics and the 
city disappeared, and some of the venues and infrastructure remained as physical 
inheritances from the Games, which became both opportunities and constraints for 
further development of the post-Olympic Park. The legacy planning in this period was 
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intended to maximise these physical inheritances from the Games on the one hand. On 
the other hand, it aimed to enhance the new developments where the land was available 
in the post-Olympic site, as both cities indicated that the post-Olympic Park would 
become a new piece of the city. Sydney and London took different approaches in 
utilising Olympic impacts after the Games. Sydney’s approach was “infusive”, while 
London took a more “diffusive” strategy. While Sydney aimed to identify the 
post-Olympic SOP as a specialised urban precinct with the identity of a global 
destination for major events in the region by maintaining the significance of the 
Olympic brand, London has emphasised that the post-Olympic site would be integrated 
into the adjacent neighbourhoods, and the significance of the Olympics would 
disappear. 
 
9.1.2 Governance of the Olympic legacy, its timeframe and its spatial reach 
The above different recognition of the Olympic legacy in different phases between 
Sydney and London was firmly related to the governance of the legacy. I have examined 
the evolving governance of legacy planning and demonstrated different ways of 
arranging the planning structure for the Olympic legacy. In the case of Sydney, there 
was a clear distinction between the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases, in which 
the most powerful organisation primarily focused on the planning required for each 
phase, but this created considerable discrepancy between the planning and 
implementation. In London, in contrast, there was planning overlap between different 
phases, and this enabled the smooth transition between different phases and prevented a 
planning gap, which had caused the regional government to lose a significant amount of 
public money in the case of Sydney. In this respect, the governance of the Olympic / 
legacy planning should go beyond Roche’s clear distinction between the pre-bid, 
post-bid and post-event phases and planning objectives in each phase (Roche, 1994), 
and a more overlapping planning approach is needed to bridge different phases.  
 
In addition to the timeframe of the governing structure of legacy planning, there is a 
fundamental difference between Sydney and London regarding the spatial reach of the 
Olympic organisation’s planning power in the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic 
phases. I have argued that this led to significant contrast in the relationship between the 
post-Olympic site and its adjacent neighbourhoods. In the case of Sydney, there was a 
narrowing process. Sydney’s bid committee and the statutory development authority for 
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Homebush Bay covered the wider area of Homebush Bay including the SOP, but in the 
subsequent post-bid phase, the OCA’s planning boundary only included the SOP and a 
few adjacent sites. The SOPA subsequently further reduced its planning boundary to 
inside the SOP, and furthermore the latest post-Olympic masterplan only covers the 
central part of the SOP. Meanwhile London made more organic changes, in the context 
of which I observed the process of repeating expansion and reduction. The LDA’s 
planning concern before the bid was far beyond the LOP, and included the long-term 
vision for the LLV. Yet the ODA’s planning power was further reduced, and this body 
developed the spatial plan only within the LOP. The LMF led by the LDA extended the 
vision beyond the Olympic site, but its spatial strategy fundamentally focused on the 
LOP in the pre-bid phase. Yet the latest LLDC planning boundary was once again 
expanded beyond the Olympic site.  
 
While Sydney’s inward planning approach led to the creation of the “post-Olympic 
bubble”, London’s approach can be understood as more spatially overlapping 
governance to avoid the post-Olympic site becoming a bubble in the urban tissue. It is 
widely recognised that establishment of special authorities and concentration of 
planning power in them are necessary in planning and delivering the Olympic facilities 
and infrastructure within the time limit (for example, Hall, 1989a; Hiller, 2003). 
However, there is little research on the spatial reach, and the cases of Sydney and 
London suggest the importance of evolution of the spatial boundary of Olympic 
authorities.  
 
9.1.3 Uncertainty of the entrepreneurial urban governance 
Although London had more timely and spatially overlapping governance for planning 
its legacy, my findings in this thesis also suggest that there were still some uncertainties, 
as London as well as Sydney had experienced various unintended outcomes in the 
long-term planning process. Throughout my examination, I have in particular 
emphasised the uncertainty in “entrepreneurial” urban governance (Harvey, 1989). It 
was employed differently in different phases in Sydney and London. In the initial phase, 
it sought to redeem the initial investment in regeneration of the post-industrial site and 
construction of various stadia in the park. After the Games were over, it was employed 
to reduce the management cost of the post-Olympic Park and achieve a “self-sufficient” 
urban quarter. Sydney clearly identified that sports themselves could not maintain the 
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vast site of the Olympic Park, and London similarly addressed the need for the housing 
and commercial development in the vacant area left on the site after the Games. The 
degree to which new housing and commercial developments were planned in the 
post-Olympic site varied, depending on the financial objectives of the leading authority 
at the time responsible for selling and leasing the surplus land. The scale of the housing 
and commercial developments proposed in the various masterplan documents issued in 
the post-Olympic phase in Sydney significantly varied (Chapter 7), and in a similar vein, 
the building density proposed for the post-Olympic site in London was greatly different 
between the LMF of the LDA and the LSC of the OPLC (Chapter 6). There was a 
significant political intervention behind these fundamental changes, and in this respect, 
the mixed-use strategy for the post-Olympic site triggered by urban entrepreneurialism 
represents Harvey’s argument about the political economy of place rather than territory 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 7).  
 
Yet the legacy planning has been sensitive to the economic conditions, and I have 
demonstrated that unintended outcomes in various phases has been firmly associated 
with what Harvey calls “entrepreneurial” urban governance (Harvey, 1989), which is 
realised through the application of a PPP. The private sector has been involved in the 
planning process differently in different phases in Sydney and London, but its 
fundamental dependence on the market economy spurred uncertainty in legacy planning. 
Harvey suggests that “the speculative qualities of urban investments simply derive from 
the inability to predict exactly which package will succeed and which will not, in a 
world of considerable economic instability and volatility” (Harvey, 1989, p. 11). Indeed, 
proposed development density of in the post-Olympic site in both Sydney and London 
Parks oscillated between extremely high and relatively low over time, and this 
represented the economic aspiration of entrepreneurial urban governance and the 
instability of the market economy. Furthermore, Harvey’s suggestion of uncertainty of 
planning due to economic instability and volatility was highlighted by the great impact 
of the credit crunch in 2008, which Sydney experienced in the post-Olympic phase and 
London in the post-bid phase. As demonstrated in Chapter 7 for Sydney and Chapter 8 
for London, this economic uncertainty became a significant trigger of change of 
ongoing development in the Olympic site, which was exemplified by the change of the 
financial arrangements of constructing the Olympic village in London and cancellation 
of ongoing post-Olympic development projects in Sydney. 
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In addition to the unpredictable nature of the entrepreneurial governance, the divergent 
nature of the public and private sector’s interests in PPP has been identified, and in 
particular, it became more evident in the post-Olympic phase than in previous phases. 
Different views of the future vision of the SOP between the SOPA and the private lease 
holders in the post-Olympic phase represented their different prioritisation of increasing 
“use” or “exchange” value through long-term development, and eventual application of 
the private sector’s preferred approach to the post-Olympic spatial strategy suggested 
dominance of “exchange” value in the post-Olympic landscape. Difficulty in satisfying 
both use and exchange values was also highlighted in the post-Olympic utilisation of the 
Olympic stadium and aquatic centre in London, whose use value has been greatly 
addressed as a community benefit of staging the Olympic Games. Yet it is apparent that 
it has been difficult to secure use value of the post-Olympic facilities while maintaining 
financial viability by increasing exchange value of the venue. 
 
 
9.2 Mixed-use vision: evolution of urban compatibility 
 
As a more concrete exploration of the spatial vision of the Olympic site, this thesis 
examines the origin and evolution of the mixed-use vision for the post-Olympic Park in 
the long-term planning process, with the compatibility of different uses in the 
post-Olympic site being considered a crucial matter in spatially accommodating 
different planning aspirations. This reflects a much discussed issue in mixed-use urban 
development in general. A land-use pattern represents a high-stakes competition over an 
area’s future (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 6-8), and “compatibility” between different uses is 
the key for long-term mixed-use urban strategy (Coupland, 1997; Grant, 2002). In my 
thesis, it was necessary to look back on the evolution of “compatibility of different uses” 
throughout time. My observation of the long history of Olympic legacy planning in 
Sydney and London shed light on different planning roles in different phases for the 
long-term vision of the Olympic site. 
 
9.2.1 Origin and evolution of the mixed-use vision 
In the pre-bid phase, I have demonstrated that there were different political intentions 
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for the Olympic site in Sydney and London, and this created different spatial strategies 
for the post-Olympic site. Creating a regional sporting centre and restructuring 
post-industrial urban space to provide new job opportunities, in particular for West 
Sydney, was the initial motivation for regenerating Homebush Bay, but these two aims 
have been promoted by different political powers in the NSW region. Land-use plans of 
Homebush Bay before the bid clearly revealed the ever-changing political power 
conflict between the Olympic and non-Olympic authorities, but critically, “compatibility” 
between the sporting and other uses in the post-Olympic site was not fully resolved in 
the masterplans issued before the Games. While tackling “compatibility” between 
Olympic and non-Olympic uses was a crucial issue for Sydney, London tried to avoid 
such challenges. Meanwhile, unlike Sydney, London’s initial intention was to transform 
the sporting venues used for the special events into facilities for everyday uses which 
would be part of the urban neighbourhood legacy. London did not have a political 
intention of establishing a new event based sporting precinct in the capital, but had a 
strong national and regional objective of regenerating the LLV, which would provide 
residential and job opportunities in East London. This created the basic spatial strategy 
of avoiding the potential conflict between sports and other residential and commercial 
development in the Olympic site.  
 
Subsequently, the post-bid phase was conceived as the phase in which the initial spatial 
strategy for mixed use would be further elaborated along with the preparation for the 
Olympic Games, but what became apparent in the post-bid phase was the difficulty in 
maintaining the initial mixed-use vision in the post-bid phase, in which various 
economic and political uncertainties were involved. Sydney inherited an unresolved 
relationship between various uses proposed in the bid, but the fast-track planning 
process and lack of a legacy authority in this phase led the OCA to focus on the Games 
related sporting vision, and little has been considered about the non-Olympic vision of 
the post-Olympic site. Against this backdrop, “controlling” possible incompatible uses 
by application of the grid system in the urban core of the SOP became the crucial spatial 
strategy in Sydney, rather than seeking the solution for “mediating” them. Meanwhile, 
London had a different path in the post-bid phase. As it set the spatial strategy of 
avoiding potential conflicts between the Olympic and non-Olympic visions, the 
fundamental aim for London in this phase was to develop each vision within the 
anticipated framework set in the previous phase. The ODA developed the Olympic 
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related venues and infrastructure with speculation on possible future scenarios, and the 
LDA conducted in-depth post-Olympic development scenario development. Yet as 
Chapter 6 established, there was a certain discrepancy between the ODA’s envisaged 
future and the LDA’s legacy vision, and this became more crucial when London faced 
political and economic uncertainties in maintaining the initial post-Olympic spatial 
strategy. This also revealed that London’s initial vision of avoiding “compatibility” 
between the sporting and other uses in the post-Olympic site was built on the highly 
sensitive political and economic climate before the bid.  
 
9.2.2 Experience: limits of the mixed-use vision 
In the post-Olympic phase, the compatibility of the different uses in the Olympic Park 
became real. The SOPA simultaneously conducted the evaluation of the planning 
outcomes for the site and updated the existing masterplan in the post-Olympic phase. 
What the SOPA identified as a problem was the limit of the current idea of the 
mixed-use Olympic Park, which clashed with the authority’s primary idea of balancing 
special events and everyday life in the post-Olympic Park. Their findings were also 
recognised as contrasting with Jacob’s suggestion of “conditions for city diversity” 
(Jacobs, 1961). Firstly, different uses were spatially confined in different precincts set 
up in the previous phase, and there was little interaction between them; rather they were 
just juxtaposed in one large urban area. Secondly, different uses have different activity 
rhythms throughout a day and year, and the SOPA has struggled to manage different 
rhythms, although it put great emphasis on a vibrant urban quarter activated 24 hours 
and 365 days. Jacobs argues that there is a need for small blocks which create an 
intricate pool of urban fluidity and a need to spread people over periods of the day 
(Jacobs, 1961, p. 204, 241), but the SOPA found that these ideas were not fully realised. 
The crucial issue found here was that the different uses occupied different land held by 
different land lease holders / venue operators who had different aspirations for their own 
sites, and this prevented the creation of a cohesive long-term vision. This reflects 
Searle’s suggestion of the spatial outcomes of development as the product of 
stakeholder interaction in which different stakeholders have varying abilities to exercise 
power (Searle, 2008a, p. 219). 
 
 
 
243 
9.3 Urban integration 
 
The third aim of this thesis was to understand the process of integrating the Olympic 
site into the wider regional and local spatial development strategy, and Judd’s concept of 
the “bubble” was the reference to examine urban integration of the Olympic site. While 
hosting the mega-event is widely recognised as the part of the regional economic 
development strategy for the host city, there is little research examining its mechanism 
in the longer term, and also few studies highlight the different integration processes into 
the regional and local urban context.  
 
9.3.1 Regional context: conflict within the region 
Prior to the bid, Sydney and London aimed for the Olympic site to be a strategic 
location to equalise the uneven socio-economic development in the region, but Sydney 
and London had different paths in embedding the Olympic site in the regional spatial 
development strategy. In this thesis, I highlighted the differences from the viewpoint of 
conformity and conflict with existing urban development centres in two cities. While 
Sydney showed difficulty inserting the Olympic Park as a new urban centre into the 
existing regional spatial strategy, such problem was less identified in London, as 
development of the Olympic Park has led to upgrading of the already designated 
regional development centre. 
 
In the case of Sydney, the integration of the SOP into the wider regional development 
strategy was not fully conducted before the Games, and it was five years after the 
Olympics when the SOP was first integrated into a part of the regional development 
strategy as a specialised centre. I argued that one of the great difficulties in embedding 
the SOP into the wider regional spatial strategy was the conflict with the existing 
centres in the region. This sensitive relationship with the existing regional centres 
recalls Searle’s suggestion of potential “inner-urban” competition caused by the urban 
restructuring due to “inter-urban” competition. In this context he observes difficulty in 
sustaining the new Olympic stadium as limited events are available after the Olympic 
Games (Searle, 2002). Meanwhile, London’s bid proposal was formulated in line with 
the regional development strategy proposed in the Mayor’s London Plan issued before 
the Games, which already recognised LLV as one of the major centres in the greater 
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London region. After winning the bid, the regional strategy was further updated to 
maximise the regenerative benefit of the Olympic site, and the socio-economic target of 
the post-Olympic LOP, such as provision of residences and job opportunities, has been 
expanded. Furthermore, the post-Olympic LOP was designated as a global tourist 
destination, and thus the Olympic site currently carries various regional aspirations.  
 
While Sydney and London contrast in the process of recognising the Olympic Park 
within the regional development strategy, in Parts II and III of this thesis, I stressed that 
the two cities have challenges in reconciling the Olympic Park as a new regional centre 
and existing urban areas. What the case of Sydney demonstrated after recognising it as a 
new development centre in the region was that the rise of the Olympic Park as the new 
regional development focus caused the decline of the existing adjacent centres. The 
initial justification for regenerating Homebush Bay and creating a mixed-use Olympic 
Park was synchronised with the socio-economic improvement of the western part of the 
Sydney region, but ironically it has changed the regional development growth corridor, 
and left some adjacent existing centres out of the regional strategy. Meanwhile, in the 
case of London, as suggested in Chapters 4 and 6 (London’s pre and post-bid phases), 
cohesive development with other existing areas in the wider Lea Valley has been 
questioned since the bid. While significant planning resources would be poured into the 
Olympic site, how the surrounding area would balance existing and renewed urban 
quality has been the local authority’s concern. Thus, as I argued, a more cohesive 
development strategy was needed to integrate the Olympic Park into wider and narrower 
urban tissues.  
 
9.3.2 Local context: bordering the Olympic Park  
While my examination of the urban integration of the Olympic Park on the regional 
scale focused on the relationship with existing urban centres, I have looked at the 
Olympic Park on the smaller local scale, from the political, spatial and social viewpoints. 
Politically, it has been widely pointed out that one of the negative impacts of the 
mega-event for the host city is failure in integrating the local interests (Hall, 1989a; 
Kelly, 1989; Thornley, 2000). In the case of Sydney, the SOP has been isolated from the 
local planning context throughout the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phase. In 
other words, the local Auburn Council was detached from the development of the SOP. 
Political power of the Olympic authority before and after the Games has been greater 
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than that of the local Auburn Council, and this created a mechanism in which little input 
from the local council has been integrated into the planning process in the post-bid and 
post-Olympic phases. Meanwhile, London has extensively addressed the cohesive 
development between the Olympic Park and the surroundings since the bid. London has 
created various mechanisms to integrate the local council’s view into the 
decision-making.  
 
Judd’s conception of the urban “bubble” spatially implies a precinct with a 
“well-defined perimeter” and a socially “segregated island of affluence” from the 
surroundings (Judd, 1999). Thus, my exploration was to observe how these spatial and 
social barriers would be weakened in the long term in order to avoid the “bubble” effect. 
In the case of Sydney, the spatial challenge was to improve the isolated physical setting 
of the Olympic site inherited before the bid, and to erase the traces of secured Olympic 
precincts for the Games after the event. Yet it became apparent that Sydney has not paid 
enough attention to the “boundary” of the Olympic site throughout time, except for the 
newly developed neighbourhood triggered by the Games. Thus, spatial isolation of the 
post-Olympic site is still apparent in Sydney. On the contrary, London has put great 
emphasis on how to weaken the boundary of the Olympic site, and how to merge the 
Olympic site and the adjacent site after the Games. It seems to me that London’s 
planning approach has been creating what Sennet terms “borders”, where different 
groups interact, rather than “boundaries”, where things end (Sennett, 2004). It is certain 
that realisation of spatial “borders” requires the interaction between the Olympic and 
local authorities, but that was hardly visible in the case of Sydney.  
 
Meanwhile, weakening social barriers, in other words, gaining “accessibility” to the 
post-Olympic site (Lenskyj, 2002), has been the key to examine the social connection 
between the Olympic Park and the surroundings. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the 
post-Olympic site in Sydney became a relatively expensive area to access, compared to 
the other public leisure facilities in the local council, because the generation of profit 
became crucial for the sporting facilities in the SOP. Furthermore, the various facilities 
in the SOP have been promoted by developers as the doorstep for luxury housing 
emerging in the Olympic Park. As indicated earlier, the weaker position of the local 
council in the decision-making of the post-Olympic planning has made it difficult to 
improve this. Similarly, there might be signs of difficulty in securing local access to 
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London’s post-Olympic Park when we look at the post-Olympic planning process for 
the Olympic stadium; the LLDC, the Premier League and the local council would be 
involved in management of the stadium, as discussed in Chapter 8. Although the LLDC 
and the local council have pointed to the physical legacy as the local benefit, this may 
be uncertain given the dominance of the private sector in management of the facilities. 
Thus, “social accessibility” has been deeply related to the power relations in the PPP set 
up for construction and management of the Olympic venues and public space in the 
Olympic sites, which was in tandem with Thorley’s suggestion of “conflicts between 
economic priorities and community needs” (Thornley, 2000, p. 698). This leads to the 
need to establish the mechanism to integrate the local voices into the PPP in the 
post-Olympic site planning, in order to avoid creating a social “bubble” in the 
post-Olympic site.  
 
 
9.4 Wider implications of this thesis on the research on Olympic legacy 
 
9.4.1 Towards long-term planning: need for long and short-term views  
One of my strong intentions in conducting this research was to examine the Olympic 
legacy over a long timescale, which most of the existing literature does not touch upon, 
despite the current growing interest in research on the Olympic legacy. As the term 
“legacy” implies, the Olympic legacy is fundamentally the phenomenon after the event, 
but this thesis demonstrated that planning of the legacy is a quite long journey, which 
spans long before the bid to far beyond the Games. In the long term, the city 
experiences political and economic uncertainties, and this could cause significant 
impacts on the change of governance and spatial vision of the legacy, as in Sydney and 
London. Searle points put that current planning theory increasingly recognises the 
difficulty in making a long-term plan by forecasting fluidity of the spatial relationship 
Searle, 2008b, p. 105). In order to accommodate these changes, establishing a “robust 
and flexible” planning framework has been addressed by the Olympic authorities in 
Sydney and London. Yet the robustness and flexibility in the spatial development 
strategy were not clearly defined, and there is a great danger that robustness in the 
legacy planning has been blurred by the political climate, and flexibility has become the 
justification of the unintended changes and inability to pursue the initial concept.  
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While a “robust and flexible” planning vision was necessary to conduct long-term 
planning, my empirical findings in this thesis indicated that legacy planning also 
involves short-term planning of the post-Olympic site. One of the crucial findings in 
this thesis is the importance of evaluating the everyday life in the post-Olympic site in 
Sydney, and incorporating it into the legacy planning. In a general sense, little attention 
has been paid to designing time in urban planning, compared to spatial planning. Lynch, 
a great cultivator of spatial planning in modern cities, put great emphasis on 
establishing a temporal and spatial model of the city to include short-term fluctuations 
as well as long-term changes (Lynch, 1972, p. 71). Jacobs, a great provocateur of 
liveliness in the contemporary city, also stresses “significance of time spread” in 
activating a city district (Jacobs, 1961, p. 200). What became apparent in Sydney’s 
post-Olympic Park was the uneven distribution of the various activities in terms of time, 
and failure to activate the post-Olympic site throughout a day and year. This recalls 
Lynch’s argument that allocating time, in particular choosing and distributing time, is as 
important as defining spatial quality. Moreover, Lynch suggests that temporal 
modifications will often have spatial consequences (Lynch, 1972, pp. 73-74), and this 
was exactly what happened in the post-Olympic Park when the spatial layout of 
different uses in the urban core was considered, which had a great impact on the 
long-term spatial strategy of the SOP.  
 
The short-term planning is usually conducted well during the Olympic Games, to 
prevent the potential conflict of overlapping events in the Olympic site, but the sense of 
the short term is gone after the event. Due to the unprecedented nature of the land-use 
mix in the post-Olympic site and potential conflict between them, it is crucial to 
integrate short-term planning of the city, as well as to carry on the long-term 
development strategy of the site.  
 
9.4.2 Spatial scale of the urban legacy  
While incorporating analysis of the timescale was one of my great motivations for 
conducting this research, considering it on various spatial scales was another crucial 
point in this thesis. Essex and Chalkley suggest that Olympic urbanisation has 
historically extended from the construction of the mono-stadium to the Olympic quarter, 
such as the Olympic Park, and further point out that it became a matter of the host city’s 
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strategic urban development vision, in which the connection between the Olympic 
quarter(s) and other parts of the city was crucial (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). Yet, as 
suggested in the introductory chapter, current studies of the Olympic legacy 
fundamentally focus on either the architectural scale examining the usability of the 
post-Olympic facilities, or the wider regional and local urban scale looking at 
post-Olympic impacts of various aspects on the host city. There is relatively little 
research focused on the Olympic quarter, and more critically, work connecting different 
scales of the urban legacy is largely missing.  
 
My research connected these different scales, and demonstrated the inseparable nature 
of these different scales. My empirical study in Sydney and London suggested that 
usability of the post-Olympic Park played the crucial role in defining the spatial 
character of the post-Olympic Park, and the spatial character of the post-Olympic Park 
was highly related to the regional development strategy. Vice versa, the regional 
development strategy is certainly connected with the way of using the legacy stadium. 
This thesis also explored the governance of the different scales of the urban legacy, and 
identified the leading organisations / authorities managing and developing venues, the 
Olympic Park and the regional spatial strategy in the post-Olympic climate. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis also suggested the importance of the small scale in large-scale 
urban regeneration. The importance of considering the smaller scale in the urban quarter 
is addressed by Lynch and Jacobs. Jacobs’ argument about the need for small elements 
in the urban precinct, as well as smaller urban blocks, is highly connected with urban 
diversity, which she put great emphasis on as a crucial factor in a contemporary urban 
quarter (Jacobs, 1961, p. 193, 241). Jacobs’ argument about the need for smallness in 
the urban precinct has been influential in the current “compact city” or “urban village” 
idea which has greatly enhanced mixed-use urban strategies. Meanwhile, Lynch 
recognises small-scale artefacts as being more identifiable for recognising the image of 
the city district (Lynch, 1960, p. 67).  
 
Yet, as Hiller suggests that the governance of the Olympics was determined by “external 
forces” (Hiller, 2003), the demands made by the Olympic Games on venues and public 
space is normally larger than what the city needs afterwards, and therefore tackling the 
scale is a crucial issue for the mediating the Olympic and post-Olympic usability of the 
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Olympics site. Sydney celebrated its large-scale stadia and public space in the global 
celebration during the Olympics, but they became the fundamental problem for the 
legacy use. London however has kept a sense of small-ness, and physical changeability 
for mediating the Olympic and post-Olympic demands has been extensively addressed 
since before the bid. Critically, however, Lynch argues that scale is not a matter of the 
urban precinct, but rather an issue of physical cohesion with wider surroundings. 
 
9.4.3 Implications for the IOC’s policy: temporal and spatial dimensions  
This thesis can also be referenced in relation to the current IOC policy on the legacy. 
The IOC has extensively noted that one of its roles is “to promote a positive legacy 
from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC, 2011) since Jacque 
Rogge took the presidency of the organisation in 2001, and various actions in this 
regard have been undertaken by the IOC. For example, methodology of the legacy 
planning has been proposed in the Technical Manual for the host city, and the Olympic 
Games Global Impact Study and the Olympic Games Knowledge Management 
Programme were introduced as means of collecting empirical data on planning and 
impact of the Games from the bid to the post-Olympic phase to transfer the experiences 
of a host city to the successors. The IOC’s effort to create shareable knowledge of 
legacy planning has contributed to the foundation of the legacy planning in the new host 
city, and the findings on temporal and spatial aspects of the Olympic legacy explored in 
this thesis could contribute by connecting with the IOC’s current planning policy.  
 
Firstly, the IOC’s current system of evaluating the legacy in the host city targets up to 
three years after the Games, because the host city’s organising committee is wound up 
after the Games and the IOC’s supervision of the research has certain time limits. Yet 
my empirical exploration in Sydney showed significant differences in the post-Olympic 
site three and ten years after the Games. Thus, the three-year evaluation of the Olympic 
legacy may not be relevant as a reference point for subsequent host cities, as drastic 
changes happened six years after the Games in the case of Sydney.  
 
Secondly, the IOC has encouraged identification of the legacy use of the Olympic 
facilities as early as possible, and confirmation of early post-Olympic use has been 
recognised as positive in the bid phase. Current discourse on the legacy planning also 
emphasises the advantage of early commitment to the legacy, and the IOC has greatly 
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enhanced such proactive legacy planning of the host city. For example, the IOC’s 
“Technical Manual on Venues” stipulates that “As part of the candidature phase the 
intended Post-Games of all competition and training venues must be identified” (IOC, 
2007, p. 106). Yet, as this thesis has demonstrated, the vision of the legacy tends to 
evolve throughout the long-term journey of the Olympic and legacy planning. The 
planning structure needs, in addition to the spatial vision, flexibility to accommodate 
future changes.  
 
Finally, the IOC’s bid document has long asked the host city about different aspects of 
the bid components, and integration of the Olympics into the long-term regional 
planning strategy has been one of the crucial points of the evaluation. In addition to this 
the post-Olympic usability of each competition venue was examined as a crucial issue 
of the Olympic legacy. Yet the IOC pays little attention to other scales of the urban 
legacy at the time of bidding. In particular, the local level of the urban legacy is little 
touched upon. This thesis argues that the urban legacy should be expand from the 
architectural scale to the urban scale, as they are highly connected. In this respect, the 
IOC’s current concern with the Olympic legacy needs to bridge different scales of the 
urban legacy in the host city.  
 
9.4.4 The final note: Lessons learnt from Sydney and London  
As the final note of this thesis, I would like to summarise the key findings in my 
exploration in Sydney and London, which could be valuable lessons for future host 
cities. 
 
Firstly, many authors and the IOC address the need for legacy planning from the bid 
phase onwards, but this thesis has demonstrated that the vision of the Olympic legacy 
changes intentionally and unintentionally throughout the pre-bid, post-bid and 
post-Olympic phases. Thus, I argued for the need for flexible governance of the legacy, 
in order to correspond to the changing visions throughout time. In other words, political 
connections between different planning phases are crucial. In particular, I emphasised 
that London had more advanced thinking than Sydney on the overlapping legacy 
governance bridging different phases of Olympic planning to ensure that the vision of 
the Olympic legacy could be carried out, and in this respect there was a certain 
evolution from the 2000 to 2012 Olympic Games. 
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Secondly, this thesis explored a mixed-use strategy as a practical method for sustaining 
the Olympic Park beyond the Olympic Games. The mixed-use urban strategy has been 
widely considered a useful approach in this respect, but my empirical study on Sydney 
and London suggested that urban planners had to consider the approach to mixing 
different uses in an Olympic site, otherwise the mixed-use approach would not fully 
work. One of the crucial elements was the need for a balance between the social and 
economic dimensions, as economic concerns have often overwhelmed social ones. In 
particular, this is crucial in the case of entrepreneurial governance, which both Sydney 
and London applied, and it was apparent certain public initiatives were necessary to 
make PPPs workable in the mixed-use Olympic site. In addition to this, this thesis 
suggested the need to integrate time factors in mixed-use urban development, as it 
affects the compatibility of different uses. Much of the current discourse of mixed-use 
urban planning focuses on the spatial relationship of the different land use, but I put 
great emphasis on the fact that the temporal relationship is equally crucial.  
 
Thirdly, the investigation of the degree to which the post-Olympic Park is integrated in 
the local and regional spatial strategy beyond the boundary of the Olympic site was one 
of the important parts of this thesis. As the Olympic Park attracts more political and 
economic attention than any other area in the city even in the post-Olympic phase, the 
post-Olympic site drastically changes the socio-economic landscape in the region. Thus, 
I stressed that constructing a cohesive development strategy in the region is imperative 
so as to avoid triggering uneven urban development in the city. In terms of local scale, 
this thesis suggested bordering the Olympic site instead of creating a clear boundary is 
crucial in mediating the post-Olympic site and surrounding areas. In this respect, 
compared to Sydney's approach of maintaining the "Olympic" identity of the Park, 
London's approach of eroding the "Olympic" significance of the post-Olympic Park is 
highly suggestive, as an attempt to embed it in local and regional urban tissues.  
 
The essence of the above findings in this thesis is the creation of appropriate 
connections between different political, spatial and functional elements in sustaining the 
legacy beyond the Olympic Games. I would like to underline that this could certainly be 
applied to future host cities. As was suggested in the introductory chapter, Sydney and 
London both used a highly concentrated venue location model, which led the 
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construction of the Olympic Park, and the above findings are certainly useful for this 
model. Yet the next Summer Olympics host cities – Rio de Janeiro in 2016 and Tokyo in 
2020 – have taken different approaches to the mono-clustering Olympic Park model 
seen in Sydney and London. Tokyo in particular has applied a dispersed model in which 
individual venues are placed in a certain area in the city centre. Yet the need for flexible 
legacy governance and a strategic view in regard to integrating the post-Olympic site 
into the local and regional context are equally important to Tokyo. Although Tokyo will 
not have any Olympic Park as an urban legacy, my suggestions for a mixed-use strategy 
could also be applied to the 2020 host city, as the 2020 Tokyo Olympics organiser is 
now seeking a mixed-use approach in regard to sustaining the legacy venues. Thus, I 
hope that key findings obtained from my research on the Sydney and London Olympic 
parks will become lessons for subsequent host cities, regardless of whether or not they 
employ a similar Olympic Park model to that used by Sydney and London. 
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Appendix: Chronology of Olympic-related planning 
documents and regional strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following tables show the major publications for Olympic-related planning 
documents and regional strategies discussed in this thesis, along with crucial Olympic 
and political incidents.  
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Sydney
ohtuAeltiT r ohtuAeltiT r
1968 Sydney Region, Outline Plan 1970-2000 State Planning
Authority of NSW
1960s
1973 Bunning Report Walter Bunning
Olympic Games, Sydney 1988,
Submission to the Australian Olympic
NSW Government
1980 Review, Sydney Region Outline Plan DEP
Proposed State Sports Centre,
Environmental Impact Statement
DEP + Cox and
Corkill, Pty. Ltd.
Mclachian Scheme DEP
1983 The Hub Scheme Impetus Consulting
Group
1985 Land Lease Masterplan Land Lease
1986 REP Department of
Sydney into Its Third Century,
Metropolitan Strategy for Sydney
DEP
Olympic Games, Sydney 1996,
Submission to the Australian Olympic
Federation
Sydney Olympic
Games Citizen's
Council
1989 Homebush Bay Strategy Committee,
Report to Government
Homebush Bay
Strategy Committee
Draft REP DEP
1990 REP No.24 DEP
Homebush Bay Business Plan DEP
1991 Sydney Bid for 2000 Olympic Games NSW Government
Sydney 2000, Share the Spirit Sydney Olympic
2000 Bid Limited
Homebush Bay draft REP No.24 DEP
Homebush Bay Area Draft Structure HBC
Sydney's future DEP
Homebush Bay REP No.24 DEP
Homebush Bay Area  Structure Plan HBC
Homebush Bay masterplan in HBC
Urban Design Studio Brief: The Future
Redevelopment of Homebush Bay and
the XXVII Olympiad 2000 AD, Sydney,
PSG
Cities for the 21st Century DEP
SEPP No.38 NSW Government
Homebush Bay development guidelines OCA
Homebush Bay masterplan OCA
Sydney as a Global City Department of
Urban Affairs and
1998 Homebush Bay site guide OCA
Sydney Olympic Park : vision for
beyond 2000
OCA
Sydney Olympic Park : Draft Post
Olympic Masterplan
OCA
Sydney Olympic Park : Draft Post
Olympic Masterplan : Summary Design
OCA
2002
Sydney Olympic Park : Master Plan
adopted by the Minister for Planning on
31 May 2002
SOPA
2004 Sydney Olympic Park, Vision 2025 - A
Town of the Future
SOPA
2005 Metropolitan Strategy - City of Cities, A
plan for Sydney's Future
NSW Government
2008 Sydney Olympic Park, Draft Masterplan
2030
SOPA
Sydney Olympic Park, Masterplan 2030 SOPA
Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036 NSW Government2010
2000
Olympics / Homebush Bay planning documentyear Regional development strategy
Sydney Olympic Park Authority Act 2001
Bidding for the 1972 Games
Bidding for the 1996 Games
Bidding for the 1988 Games
1993
1994
Sydney won the bid in Monte Carlo
1988
1979
1982
1995
1996
2001
Atlanta Olympics
OCA created
New Labour Government established
Sydney Olympics
268
London
rohtuAeltiTrohtuAeltiT
1988 Olympic Games Feasibility Study GLC
1986
1990
London’s Olympic Challenge
(Feasibility study of London’s hosting
 Coopers &
Lybrand Deloitte
London Olympic 2000  (Bid Document
for the 2000 Games)
London Olympic
2000 Campaign
1997
The final report by David Lukes David Lukes
London Olympics 2012 Costs and
Benefits – Summary ARUP
Draft London Plan Mayor of London
A London Olympic Bid for 2012 CMSC
Government Response to 'A London
Olympic Bid for 2012 DCMS
London Plan Mayor of London
Olympic Precinct & Legacy , Design LDA
2005
2006 London Plan, Sub-RegionalDevelopment Framework, East London Mayor of London
Lower Lea Valley, Opportunity Area
Planning Framework Mayor of London
Olympic, Paralympic & Legacy
Transformation Planning Applications,
Design and Access Statement
ODA
Olympic Park Urban Design and
Landscape Framework ODA
LMF (Ambitions and Limitations) LMF Design Team
LMF (Ambitions and Limitations) LMF Design Team
LMF (Posibility and Flexibility: A LMF Design Team
Draft LMF LDA
Draft London Plan Mayor of London
Strategic Regeneration Framework
An Olympic legacy for the host
5 Olympic
Boroughs
London Plan Mayor of London
Legacy Communities Scheme, Design OPLC
Olympic Legacy Supplementary
Planning Guidance Mayor of London
Local Development Scheme LLDC
Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group established
LMF Team appointed
Boris Johnson becomes the Mayor of London 
OPLC established
year
ygetarts tnempoleved lanoigeRtnemucod gninnalp detaler-cipmylO
The UK Government announced its support for London's bid (15 May 2003)
The BOA asked David Luckes to undertake a feasibility study into a possible London bid
GLA  established, Ken Livingstone becomes the  Mayor of London
GLC abolished
Bidding for the 2000 Games
Bidding for the 1988 Games
1979
1991
2000
2002
2003
LLDC established
London  Olympics
ODA PDT functions passed to the LLDC
2012
2007
2008
2004
2009
2011
London won the bid in Singapore
